JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Plaintiff has approached this Court by filing this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed on October 7, 1982 by District Judge, Solan and Sirmaur Districts at Nahan, allowing the appeal of Budh Ram, defendant-respondent and dismissing the suit of plaintiff and thereby reversing the judgment and decree passed on December 27, 1977 by Sub-Judge First Class, Nalagarh. 2. Assa Ram, plaintiff-appellant, filed a suit against Budh Ram defendant-respondent impleading Sukh Ram, his own father as defendant No. 2 A decree for possession was claimed on the ground that the property in the hands of his father Sukh Ram was a coparcenary Joint Hindu Family property, which had been sold to Budh Ram without any legal necessity, which was not legal. Defendant Budh Ram contested the suit and denied that the property was coparcenary or that it was an ancestral property in the hands of Sukh Ram. It was specifically pleaded that the sale by Sukh Ram was for legal necessity and the consideration had been applied to meet the legal necessity which had arisen. Sukh Ram filed a written statement admitting the claim of the plaintiff The trial Court held the suit land to be coparcenary Joint Hindu Family property. It was also found that the property had been sold without any legal necessity Alienation was found as not binding upon the interest of the plaintiff. Since Sukh Ram had died during the pendency of the suit, therefore, the Court granted decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant took the matter in appeal. On behalf of the defendant, during the course of arguments challenge was confined only to the first two issues, which were as follows to— 1. Whether the land in suit was a part of the coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, as alleged ? OPP. 2. Whether the land in suit was alienated for legal necessity, as alleged ? OPD. 3. Whether the land in suit was a part of the coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendant No. 2, as alleged ? OPP. 2. Whether the land in suit was alienated for legal necessity, as alleged ? OPD. 3. Considering arguments on first issue, the lower appellate Court found that Jwala father of Sukh Ram as well as Sukh Ram himself were not the full owners of the property but held the same as Adna Malik till the promulgation of the PEPSU Abolition of Ala Malkiyat Rights Act, 1954 (briefly the Act) and by virtue of this legislation, the rights of Adna Malik were enlarged, whereafter Sukh Ram held the property as full owner. Abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights, according to the findings of the lower appellate Court had created a new kind of estate in the Adna Malik and thereby had altered the nature and character of the property in his hands. Though the Adna Malkiyat rights held by Sukh Ram were found to be ancestral but since after the coming into force of the Act, on an enlargement of the rights, it was held that the land in dispute cannot be considered ancestral qua the plaintiffs. In view of this finding, the lower appellate Court did not thought it fit to return any finding on the second issue as to whether the sale was for legal necessity. Appeal of the defendant was allowed by reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The suit of the plain tiff for possession was dismissed. Plaintiff now, feeling aggrieved, has filed this appeal before this Court. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the abolition of Ala Malkiat Rights in any manner would not: alter the nature and character of the property in the hands of Adna Malik. The Adna Malik rights, which admittedly were found to be ancestral, never ceased to be ancestral by the abolition of Ala Malkiat rights, The abolition of such rights did not make any difference in the nature or character of the land held by Adna Malik since those rights were merely a burden on the land So far as Adna Malik rights were concerned, the burden stood removed on coming into force of the Act. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court by urging that the two types of proprietary rights, namely, Ala Malkiat and Adna Malik rights earlier vested in two different persons. Adna Malik lacked something which was possessed by Ala Malkiat. Adna Malik was not a full owner and by abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights a new estate comes into being into the hands of Adna Malik which by no stretch of imagination could be considered as held by him earlier. Further it was urged that since it was a case of smaller estate merging in the larger estate, therefore, this new estate in the hands of the father of plaintiff was not ancestral one but has to be considered as his self-acquired property. In support of his argument, learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nachhattar Singh and others v. Budh Singh and others, 1971 PLR 536. 5. Considering the question as to whether the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights in any manner would alter the nature of the property in the hands of Adna Malik or, in other words, where Adna Malkiyat rights, which are ancestral in nature would cease to be so by the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Nachhattar Singhs case (supra) held that after the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights, which vested free from all encumbrances in Adna Malik, there was an enlargement of the estate as held by Adna Malik, since he did not have full rights of ownership prior to vesting of Ala Malkiyat rights in him, therefore, it was a new kind of estate created in favour of Adna Malik which changed the nature and character of the land in his hands and the same did not remain ancestral. The Bench reversed the decision of the learned single Judge in Budh Singh alias Nachhatar Singh v. Gurdev Kaur and others, 1968 Cur LJ 27 The learned single Judge was of the view that vesting of Ala Malkiyat rights in Adna Malik did not in any manner enlarged the estate or the rights of Adna Malik and the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights merely removed the burden, therefore, the property which was ancestral in the hands of Adna Malik would not cease to be ancestral. The Division Bench in Nachhattar Singh9s case proceeded on certain admitted facts, which were to the effect that it was the Raja, who was Ala Malik and had a right only to receive 5% of the land revenue from Adna Malik. Inheritance to the estate of Adna Malik in that case was not governed in accordance with the rules of inheritance known to customary law whore the parties were governed by custom or where the parties were governed by personal law, by the rules of personal law, but the same was governed by the rules laid down in Dastur-ul-Amal of 1893 under which though there was power of alienation with Adna Malik of sale and mortgage but he had no right to make a gift or Will which right was further subject to certain conditions. In view of the peculiar circumstances of that case, it was held that there was, in fact enlargement of the estate since Adna Malik did not possess full proprietary rights prior to the vestment of Ala Malkiyat rights in him, therefore, it was held that the ancestral property in the hands of Adna Malik on vestment of Ala Malkiyat rights had ceased to be ancestral. The learned single Judge in Budh Singhs case (supra) after having traced the history of Ala and Adna Maliks, as it existed in Punjab, and after considering various judicial pronouncements, disposed of the question which arose before him in the following words :— ".... .The question that really arises is whether the abolition of the Ala Malkiyat rights, in any manner, would alter the nature of the property in the hand of the Adna Malik. .The question that really arises is whether the abolition of the Ala Malkiyat rights, in any manner, would alter the nature of the property in the hand of the Adna Malik. In other words, whether the Adna Malkiat rights, which are ancestral, would cease to be ancestral by the abolition of the Ala Malkiat rights In my view, the abolition does not make any difference in the nature or the character of the land held by the Adna Malik. Ala Maliks rights are merely a burden on the land so far as the Adna Malik is concerned, The abolition of Ala Malik’s right merely dears off that burden In no manner, the rights of the Adna Malik are enlarged Any analogy from the case of an occupancy tenant becoming proprietor of land under the Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1954 (Pepsu Act No. 18 of 1954) would be wholly misleading. In the case of vesting of proprietary rights in the occupancy tenant, what happens is that the lesser rights, i e., tenancy rights, merge with the larger rights i. e. proprietary rights. After the merger, the lesser rights disappear. Therefore, if the occupancy tenancy was ancestral by its merger with the larger right, the occupancy tenancy has ceased to exist as such and what the occupancy tenant has come to possess is the proprietary right or the ownership right, or in other words, a totally new right. The acquisition of the new rights in his band can, under no circumstances, be held to be ancestral merely because the basis, on which he acquired those rights, was ancestral the rights being altogether new. Therefore, the larger right in his hand was rightly held by a consistent trend of judicial opinion not to be ancestral in spite of the fact that the occupancy rights were ancestral. This analogy has nothing to do with the present case. It also docs not, in any manner, matter whether the Ala Malkiat rights are of one category or the other. The right of escheat is well known. If a proprietor dies without leaving any heir, the ultimate heir is the State. In the case of Ala Malik, if Adna Malik has the right of reversion he intervenes and takes in preference to the State. The right of escheat is well known. If a proprietor dies without leaving any heir, the ultimate heir is the State. In the case of Ala Malik, if Adna Malik has the right of reversion he intervenes and takes in preference to the State. But all the same, the right of the Ala Malik in this respect is nothing short of than the right of escheat the Ala Malik taking precedence over the State The right of escheat does not, in any manner, affect the nature of the rights in land held by the proprietors Moreover, the ancestral character of the property has meaning only so long as there are heirs of the male holder, in the case of escheat, or reversion this concept has no meaning whatever. Therefore, whether the ancestral land escheats to the State or it reverts to the Ala Malik, it has nothing to do with the character of the property.............. ...The vesting in my opinion, does not, in any manner, enlarge the rights. The abolition merely removes a burden and the automatic result of the removal of the burden is that what has to be paid by the Adna Malik to the Ala Malik is no longer to be paid Nothing more than this happens. The rights in the hands of the Adna Malik remain almost the same as they were before the abolition,........” (Emphasis supplied) 6. It will be seen from the decision in Nachhttar Singhs case that what really held was that the estate held by Adna Malik was a lesser estate than the estate held by Ala Malik and on abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights, the estate held by Adna Malik stood enlarged. An answer to this question under consideration in the instant appeal largely depends upon the fact whether there is any enlargement of rights or estate in the hands of an Adna Malik on the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights by coming into force of the PEPSU Abolition of Ala Malkiyat Rights Act If so, then what is the nature of this enlarged estate. For this, it would be necessary to consider the respective rights of Ala and Adna Maliks. 7. For this, it would be necessary to consider the respective rights of Ala and Adna Maliks. 7. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Luddar Mani v. Raja Baldev Singh Sahib, AIR 1935 Lab 459, held that Adna Maliks tenure in the State of Punjab varied greatly in different parts and the question about their rights was to be decided on the facts of each case. It was observed that there were two ways in which the classes of Ala and Adna Maliks were created Firstly, where the Ala Maliks so called are merely talukdars, whose ancestors have been farmers of revenue or conquerors who have been content to leave all management, etc., to the conquered peasantry and take quit rents, and. secondly, when the Ala Maliks were originality the sole proprietors of the soil of the village and have called outsiders and settled them on some or all of the lands. !t is usually in the case of the latter class that the Ala Malik is entitled to the right of reversion on the death of an Adna Malik without natural heirs. 8. In the case of Ludar Mani (supra), Raja of Guler in Dehra Tehsil of District Kangra was held to be a real proprietor and not a mere talukdar entitled to succeed a son-less Adna Malik dying without heirs near or remote, but it was held that he had no right to challenge or control an alienation made by a male Adna Malik who had no sons, heirs or collaterals The Adaa Malik in that case was held having right of sale and mortgage and Ala Malik being entitled only to recover certain percentage of revenue with right of reversioner in the event of Adna Malik dying leaving behind no heirs or near one to succeed. On the Ala Malik getting the property on reversion, Full Bench in Ludar Manis case (supra) held that he took it subject to encumbrance created by Adna Malik. 9. On the Ala Malik getting the property on reversion, Full Bench in Ludar Manis case (supra) held that he took it subject to encumbrance created by Adna Malik. 9. From the ratio of Full Bench judgment in Ludar Mani’s case and that of learned single Judge in 8udh Singhs case, it would be seen that Ala Maliks rights were considered merely a burden on the land so far as Adna Malik was concerned and in the latter case the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights merely removed the burden and it in no manner enlarged the rights of Adna Malik. 10. Ex. PX is the copy of Wazib-ul-Urz relied upon in the instant case for showing the respective rights of Ala and Adna Maliks. It is obviously on the basis of this Wazib-ul-Urz, which is binding on the parties, that the question arising for determination has to be decided. Reading of this document would make it clear that the Ala Malik, namely, the Rajo, who was the sole proprietor initially had called in outsiders and settled them on different parcels of lands Such persons, who had been brought were the Adna Maliks whereas Raja was the Ala Malik, who had only a right of reversion in the event of Adna Maliks line becoming extinct and had also a right to receive certain percentage of revenue and nothing more. There was no restriction on the rights of an Adna Malik to encumber or alienate the estate. He could alienate the property or create encumbrance without restriction, whereas the rights of Ala Malik were of reversion and to receive percentage of land revenue only. Inheritance in the case of Adna Malik was governed by customary law or by personal law, as the case may be but it was not as per the special rules, which were noticed by the Division Bench in the case of Nachhattar Singh’s case. In the said case, it was also noticed that an Adna Malik had no absolute right of alienation Therefore, the ratio of the said case cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case, which proceeded on altogether different assumptions and peculiar circumstances where the Ala Malik, namely, Raja of Faridkot in whose case a separate notification had been issued on September 7, 1949 resulting in abolition of his Ala Malkiat rights. When Adna Malik in the instant case had full rights to alienate and create an encumbrance, it cannot be said that there was any enlargement of the estate on the vesting of Ala Malkiyat rights in him on abolition of such rights 11. The question can be viewed from a different angle also There were restrictions on the rights of a widow to hold the property which came in her hands on the death of her husband, prior to coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Whether the kind of estate held by her can be said to have been enlarged on the commencement of the Act or not or whether it can be said that it was a new estate which came in her hands after the coming into force of the Act. This aspect of the matter was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Mast Ram v. Makhnu, 1LR I982 HP 211 Interpreting section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the Bench held that: "It is obvious that the main provision is only declaratory in nature. It declares that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner thereof. The only effect of this provision is to remove the traditional limitations and restrictions on the powers of disposition of a female Hindu which hitherto were considered as inherent in her estate, Otherwise it does not operate to vest any new estate in the widow. She continues to possess and own the same estate, namely, the estate which once belonged to her husband and to. which once belonged to her husband and to which she had succeeded as heir of her husband, The estate of the husband never lost its entity on his death. It continued to exist What happened on the death of the husband was that it only changed hands and came to be vested in the widow. The widow was never divested of this estate. How could the widow be then said to have acquired a new estate under section 14 (1) of the Succession Act which could be called her self-acquired property ? The widow was never divested of this estate. How could the widow be then said to have acquired a new estate under section 14 (1) of the Succession Act which could be called her self-acquired property ? For the same reasons I am unable to appreciate as to how the life estate of the widow to which she had succeeded through her husband under the old Hindu Law was annihilated or cashed away on the coming into force of the Succession Act. What was annihilated and mashed away with the enforcement of the Succession Act was the restriction or the limitation placed on the powers of disposition of the female owner and not the estate which very much continued to exist in its original form, It, therefore, cannot be said that any new estate came to be vested in the widow with the enactment of the Succession Act." (Emphasis supplied) 12. On the same analogy, the only effect of the abolition of Ala Malkiyat rights and vesting of the same in Adna Malik was the removal of certain restrictions and nothing more. Adna Malik continued to possess and own the same estate, namely, the estate which was ancestral in his hands No new estate could be said to have come into being It was only removal of some burden on an Adna Malik but not a creation of a new estate in him on the abolition of the rights of an Ala Malik and vesting of the same in an Adna Malik. The arguments advanced on behalf of the learned Counsel for the respondents proceeds on the analogy of rights of an occupancy tenants, which stood enlarged to full ownership on coming into force of the Punjab Occupancy of Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952 This aspect was also considered by the Full Bench in Mast Rams case (supra). The estate held by an occupancy tenant is definitely a different estate with various restrictions. Main proprietary rights vested in the landowner and an occupancy tenant had also restricted rights of alienation which was not in the case of an Adna Malik, who had full right of alienation. 13. The estate held by an occupancy tenant is definitely a different estate with various restrictions. Main proprietary rights vested in the landowner and an occupancy tenant had also restricted rights of alienation which was not in the case of an Adna Malik, who had full right of alienation. 13. In view of the above, I am of the view that abolition of the Ala Malkiyat rights in the instant case had not in any manner altered the nature of the property in the hands of Adna Malik and the property would be continued to be ancestral in the hands of Adna Malik in whom Ala Malkiyat rights vested on coming into force of the PEPSU Abolition of Ala Malkiyat Rights Act The findings of the lower appellate Court, as such, to the contrary are not sustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. It has to be held that the property held by Sukh Ram was ancestral and continued to be so even after the enforcement of the PEPSU Act. 14. The lower appellate Court, in view of its findings on issue No. 1, did not considered it proper to record any finding on the second issue. In the absence of any findings on the said issue, the matter ordinarily would have resulted in an order of remand to the lower appellate Court for recording its findings on the said issue, but since on record there exists evidence on the issue and findings thereupon of the trial Court, therefore, instead of remanding the case, the parties were heard on the second issue also. 15. The trial Court recorded a finding that the sale was without legal necessity. It is this finding, which is under challenge at the behest of the respondents The plea, which was raised by the defendant-respondents was that the property had been sold for legal necessity, which necessity was the personal requirement of the vendor and it was also averred that the amount had been spent for legal necessity. It is a settled proposition of law that where the manager of a Joint Hindu Family alienates the joint family property, the alienee is bound to enquire into the necessity for the sale. It is a settled proposition of law that where the manager of a Joint Hindu Family alienates the joint family property, the alienee is bound to enquire into the necessity for the sale. The burden lies upon him to prove either that there was a legal necessity in fact or that he made proper and bonafide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity and did all that was reasonably required to satisfy himself as to the existence of such necessity. The trial Court found that there was no plea raised by defendants that he made proper and bonafide enquiry as to the existence of legal necessity therefore, be failed to discharge the burden and accordingly found that the sale was without a legal necessity. In the written statement the only plea is that in fact there was a legal necessity. What that legal necessity was has been elaborated in the evidence Sukh Ram was about 80/90 years of age and had some eye trouble for which he was operated upon. This fact was admitted by the plaintiff when he appeared as PW 3. The defendant has led sufficient evidence on record to the effect that Sukh Ram was in need of money so as to enable him to get his eyes operated and the plaintiff Assa Ram, the alienors son was also getting education at Ropar for which purpose also some amount was required by Sukh Ram This fact has also not been disputed by the plaintiff that he was getting education at Ropar and his father used to send him money. The land was not cultivable but was lying barren at the time of sale In case, Sukh Ram was having 72 to 80 bighas of other land and this land was not yielding any income to him, it cannot be said that by sale of this land, some loss was caused by him to the estate. The land was not cultivable but was lying barren at the time of sale In case, Sukh Ram was having 72 to 80 bighas of other land and this land was not yielding any income to him, it cannot be said that by sale of this land, some loss was caused by him to the estate. In case he was in need of certain funds for his Urgent requirement, namely, for an eye operation and for the education of his son, it cannot be said that it was not a legal necessity Raising money for the treatment of eye and for the education of his son will not amount to mismanagement Otherwise, also, defendant Budh Ram while appearing as DW 4 has clearly stated that at the time when bargain was struck, he made due enquiry about the legal necessity. In view of this, the findings, of the trial Court to the contrary are liable to be set aside. 16. In the result, while reversing the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and the findings of the trial Court on issue No. 2, the appeal of the plaintiff is dismissed, which ultimately results in the dismissal of his suit, Costs on parties. Suit dismissed.