ALOK KUMAR BASU, J. ( 1 ) THE short question involved in this writ petition is whether the petition under S. 125, Cr. P. C. filed by the contesting opposite party Smt. Triveni can be entertained at Bareilly and also whether the child Km. Saraswati said to have born out of a wed-lock of Moti Ram, Petitioner and Smt. Triveni, Opposite Party can claim maintenance without herself being impleaded as an applicant in the said application. ( 2 ) THE short facts are that applicant Moti Ram was married to Smt. Triveni and out of the siad wed-lock two daughters were born. This marriage, according to the allegations in the writ petition under S. 125, Cr. P. C. , was performed in Bareilly. Thereafter husband and wife were living in Pilibhit. After a long passage of time Smt. Triveni was allegedly turned out along with the children from the house of Moti Ram in Pilibhit with the result she was forced to come at Bareilly with the children. In the meantime no efforts were made by Moti Ram to sendfor Smt. Triveni and the daughter nor did he take any step to maintain them. Consequently, the opposite party filed a petition under S. 125, CR. P. C before the Magistrate concerned in Bareilly with the prayer that a composite maintenance allowance of Rs. 125. 00 be paid for her and her child Km. Saraswati. ( 3 ) AN objection appears to have been taken by the petitioner Moti Ram relating to the proceedings. It is argued that the courts at Bareilly will have no jurisdiction and that without impleading the child as an applicant herself, Smt. Triveni could not claim maintenance allowance on her behalf. Further argument is that a composite prayer for the two persons, mother and the child was illegal. ( 4 ) ALL the three arguments raised by Sri K. G. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner fallacious. Section 126, Cr. P. C. itself says that the place where either of the parties is residing could be a place where proceedings under S. 125, Cr. P. C. may be initiated. ( 4 ) ALL the three arguments raised by Sri K. G. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner fallacious. Section 126, Cr. P. C. itself says that the place where either of the parties is residing could be a place where proceedings under S. 125, Cr. P. C. may be initiated. The averments in the application are clear enough to indicate that the marriage had taken place in Bareilly and though the petitioner had taken Smt. Triveni to his house in Pillibhit but after desertion by him she came along with the child to live with her father in Bareilly and, therefore, it is quite obvious that Bareilly courts will have jurisdiction to go into merits of the case. ( 5 ) AS regards the second argument that mother could not claim maintenance allowance on behalf of the child some more facts may be examined here. It has been found by the courts below on the objection of the petitioner that in earlier civil litigation between Smt. Triveni and Moti Ram, it has been held by the civil courts that the marriage between them was void because of an earlier marriage of the petitioner Moti Ram with another lady. The result, therefore, is that though the child Km. Saraswati has seen the world as a result of marital unity between the two that is the petitioner Moti Ram and the opposite party Smt. Triveni, yet this marital unity cannot stand the scrutiny of law and has to be declared as void. This places the child in the category of a legitimate child and legitimately living with the mother. Therefore, it will be doing violence to the language used under S. 125, Cr. P. C. if it is held that the mother could not maintain the application for maintenance on behalf of her minor child living with her. The language used in S. 125, Cr. P. C. does not admit of such distinction as is being argued by Sri Srivastava, learned, counsel for the petitioner. It is true that in such cases when the time for passing the final order comes and if the Magistrate makes up his mind to award maintenance to the child and mother both he may make a distinction for awarding specific amount to each of them. It is true that in such cases when the time for passing the final order comes and if the Magistrate makes up his mind to award maintenance to the child and mother both he may make a distinction for awarding specific amount to each of them. But since in the instant case the question of paying any amount to Smt. Triveni does not arise because of the civil Courts fiding existing between the parties, the amount, if any to be paid by the Magistrate could relate only to Km. Saraswati and not Smt. Triveni. For this reason the third argument need not to be decided. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussions this writ petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed. Interim order dt. 27-2-1990 is vacated. Costs of this petition shall be borne by the parties. Petition dismissed. .