JUDGMENT : M.L. Bhat, J. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this writ petition it is necessary to summarise the facts briefly The Respondent No 3 is said to have been the Headmaster of the institution in question till the year 1973 When the institution was raised to the status of Intermediate College, he preferred his claim for the post of Principal of the College and is said to have obtained a resolution from the erstwhile committee of management in his favour appointing him as Principal of the College. This order was said to have been set aside by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 16E(10) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, hereinafter called as 'the Act.' This order seems to have been challenged by the Respondent No. 3 in writ petition No. 13515 of 1981. The said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 21-2-1986. The Respondent No. 3 seems to have lost in the Supreme Court also as his SLP against the said judgment was dismissed on 31-7-1986. The institution is said to be headed by the Principal selected by the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 3 does not seem to have reconciled to his defeat in the writ petition, therefore, he is said to have neither taken the classes assigned to him nor did obey the orders of the Principal or the Manager of the institution. The Respondent No. 3 was thereafter placed under suspension by the Manager of the committee of management on 2-3-1988. The committee of management by a resolution authorised the Principal to serve the charge sheet and obtain approval of suspension order from the District Inspector of Schools. Copy of the order of suspension is placed on the record. 2 The District Inspector of Schools, Nainital has raided some objection to the order of suspension of the Respondent No 3 under the impression that the said order was not supported by a resolution of the committee of management. After removal of his doubts the District Inspector of Schools approved the suspension of the Respondent No. 3 on 18-3-1988. Copy of this order is placed on record. After removal of his doubts the District Inspector of Schools approved the suspension of the Respondent No. 3 on 18-3-1988. Copy of this order is placed on record. The Respondent No. 3 was served with a charge sheet on 14-3-1988 by the Principal of the College in exercise of the authority vested in him by the resolution of the managing committee dated 29-2-1988. The Respondent No. 3 is said to have challenged the authority of the Principal to issue the charge sheet. However, he did not submit any reply to the substance of the articles of the charge sheet; He asked to participate in the enquiry and appear before the committee of management and place his view point before it. The Respondent No. 3 refused to submit his reply. The, enquiry was thereafter completed exparte by the enquiry officer, who submitted his report to the President of the committee of management. Copy of the report dated 29-5-1988 is placed on the record of this writ petition. The report is said to have been placed before the committee of management on 30-5-1988. The committee of management thereupon passed a resolution for removal of the Respondent No. 3 from service which needed obtaining of approval from the authority concerned. Copy of the resolution was sent to the District Inspector of School on 4-6-1988 for being forwarded to the Respondent No. 2 as required under law. The Respondent No. 1, District Inspector of Schools, does not seem to have forwarded the proposal for removal of the Respondent No. 3 from service to the Respondent No. 2, though he was required to forward the same within thirty days from the date of its receipt. The Respondent No. 1 is said to have directed the committee of management to reinstate the Respondent No. 3 in service by his letter dated 22-12-1988, a copy of which is placed on the record. The Respondent No. 1 is said to have been requested that he was bound to send the papers for removal of the Respondent No. 3 to the Respondent No. 2. There is a communication dated 4-1-1989 addressed by the committee of management to the District Inspector of Schools in this regard. The Respondent No. 1 thereafter is said to have passed an order for reinstatement of the Petitioner which is impugned in this writ petition. There is a communication dated 4-1-1989 addressed by the committee of management to the District Inspector of Schools in this regard. The Respondent No. 1 thereafter is said to have passed an order for reinstatement of the Petitioner which is impugned in this writ petition. The Respondent No 1 thereafter passed another order for single operation of the payment of the salary on 17-5-1989, which is also impugned in this writ petition. The impugned orders are contained in Annexure 11 and 14 respectively to the writ petition. 3. It is contended by the Petitioner that* before passing the order of single operation no opportunity was given to the Petitioner and the bills prepared for the salary of the teachers were returned by the Respondent No 1 on the ground that full salary bills ought to have been prepared. The order of single operation is said to be bad because the Respondent No. 1 has failed to forward the papers for the removal of the Respondent No. 3 within thirty days to the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 1 is said to have failed to perform his statutory duties. The impugned order dated 17-5-1989 is said to have been passed because the Respondent No. 3 had threatened 'to observe a fast until death which would amount to pressurisation and undue influence upon the Respondent No. 1. The Petitioner submits that this order was illegal and for its non compliance single operation was passed for payment of salary etc. The impugned orders are said to be without jurisdiction and are challenged on a number of grounds. 4. It is stated that the order of the Respondent No. 1 for reinstatement of the Respondent No. 3 and payment of salary is a nullity in the eyes of law and without jurisdiction. The Respondent No. 1 is said to have failed in performing his statutory duties inasmuch as he did not forward the papers for removal of the Respondent No. 3 from service to the Respondent No. 2 within thirty days. The order of single operation is also bad as it is without notice to the Petitioner and based on grounds which are violative of the provisions of law. 5. The Respondent No. 3 has filed counter affidavit. The order of single operation is also bad as it is without notice to the Petitioner and based on grounds which are violative of the provisions of law. 5. The Respondent No. 3 has filed counter affidavit. He has contended that the High Court and Supreme Court have dismissed the writ petition with regard to the post of Principal of the institution but the Respondent No. 3 is said to be the Headmaster and even today he is getting salary of the same grade. It is contended that there was no basis for the suspension of the Respondent No. 3. It is stated that the Principal of the college has passed the suspension order. No resolution was passed by the committee of management or the authorised manager. The Principal is only a lecturer. He has no authority to issue orders on behalf of the Manager of the committee of management. The order dated 29-2-1988 is, therefore, without jurisdiction. It is stated that the District Inspector of Schools by his letter dated 11-3-1988 has disapproved the proposal of suspension of the Principal as it was illegal and without jurisdiction. The charge sheet issued by the Principal is also without jurisdiction. The Respondent No. 3 submits that he was not informed that the committee of management has delegated its power to suspend the Respondent No. 3 to the Principal. The Respondent No. 3 submits that his status a Headmaster of the institution is recognised by the High Court, therefore, the Principal has no authority to issue the charge-sheet to him. The enquiry report is said to have been prepared at the back of the Respondent No. 3. The Respondent No. 3 was not supplied with a copy of the report. He was not given any opportunity before the resolution dated 30- 5-1988 was passed. The action of the District Inspector of Schools is justified and the services of the Respondent No. 3 are not terminated. It is stated that the District Inspector of Schools has the authority to revoke the suspension order The suspension was revoked after giving opportunity to both the parties u/s 16-G of the Act. The District Inspector of Schools is said to have issued show cause notice to the committee of management in this regard but the committee of management did not present itself before the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools is said to have issued show cause notice to the committee of management in this regard but the committee of management did not present itself before the District Inspector of Schools. The District Inspector of Schools again sent a letter dated 19-12-1988 to the Manager for his presence in his office. The Respondent No. 3 was present but the Petitioner failed to appear before the District Inspector of Schools on 21-12-1988, the date fixed for his appearance, The services of the Respondent No. 3 cannot be terminated because the termination order is based on exparte enquiry which was conducted against the provisions of law. The proceedings of enquiry are vitiated as these are illegal. The Respondent No. 3 submits that he is not being paid salary though he was reinstated by the District Inspector of Schools. Therefore, the order of single operation is also said to be bad. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at some length. 7. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondent. No. 3 cannot be said to be the Headmaster after the institution was upgraded. The institution is now an Intermediate College headed by the Principal. There is no provision that in a college there can be two posts of Principal and Headmaster. The reliance placed by Respondent No. 3 on the judgment of the High Court in this regard is said to be misplaced because he was contesting for the post of Principal when he was a Headmaster. With the up-gradation of the institution the Respondent No. 3 has ceased to be the Headmaster because now the institution is headed by the Principal. He may be getting higher salary of the grade of Headmaster but that would not make him the Headmaster in the institution when such a post does not exist in the institution. As such the contention of the Respondent No. 3 that he continues to be the Headmaster is not correct in fact or in law. It was further contended that the charge-sheet was framed against the Respondent No. 3 by the Principal under the authority of the committee of management, which had passed a resolution in this behalf. 8. As such the contention of the Respondent No. 3 that he continues to be the Headmaster is not correct in fact or in law. It was further contended that the charge-sheet was framed against the Respondent No. 3 by the Principal under the authority of the committee of management, which had passed a resolution in this behalf. 8. It was next urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that u/s 16-G (8) of the Act suspension order can be revoked only on a very limited ground. The ground for revocation of suspension is that if at any time the District Inspector of Schools is satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings against the head of the institution or teacher are being delayed for no fault of such head of the institution or teacher, the District Inspector of Schools after affording opportunity to the management can revoke an order of suspension passed u/s 16-G of the Act. Once the order of suspension was approved by the District Inspector of Schools he could not thereafter revoke it unless the conditions laid down in Section 16-G (8) were satisfied. It is stated that there is no authority vested in the District Inspector of Schools to revoke the order of suspension once the same was approved by him The only authority given to the District Inspector of Schools in this regard is laid down in Section 16-G (8) of the Act. If the order of suspension is not approved by the District Inspector of Schools it cannot remain in force for more than sixty days and would come to an end automatically after the expiry of sixty days but where the order of suspension has been approved, its revocation has to conform to the requirements of Section 16-G (8) of the Act. 9. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 submitted that the suspension of the Respondent No. 3 was without jurisdiction as it was ordered in violation of the statutory provisions of the Act and rules framed there under. He argued this point under the impression that the Respondent No. 3 was Headmaster and not a teacher. He relies on Regulations No. 35, 36 and 37 framed under the Act. He argued this point under the impression that the Respondent No. 3 was Headmaster and not a teacher. He relies on Regulations No. 35, 36 and 37 framed under the Act. Under Regulation No. 35 it is provided that if a complaint or adverse report of fact of a serious nature is received, the committee in the case of teachers appoint the Headmaster or Principal or Manager as the enquiry officer and in the case of Headmaster or Principal a small sub-committee is to hold the enquiry. 10. Under Regulation 36 it is provided that the grounds on which it is proposed to take action are to be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which are to be communicated to the employees charged which shall be clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged employee of the facts and circumstances against him Such employee is to be given three weeks' time to put in written statement of his defence and state whether he wishes to be heard in person The enquiry is to be held in respect of such charges which are not admitted. If the enquiry officer or the person charged with the allegations so desires, then the detailed procedure for holding the enquiry is also given. 11. Under Regulation 37 it is provided that after the report of the proceedings and recommendation from the enquiring authority are received, the committee of management shall after notice to employee meet to consider the report of the proceedings and take decision. The employee, if he desires, is to be permitted to appear before the committee in person to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member of the committee. The committee shall thereupon send a complete report together will all connected papers to the District Inspector of Schools for approval of action proposed by it. 12. Mr. Singh's contention is that this procedure was not followed, therefore, the suspension order was void ab-initio. It could be revoked by the District Inspector of Schools as apart from invoking his powers u/s 16-G (8) of the Act, the void order was to be treated as non-est which could be done away with by the District Inspector of Schools. 13. Another point urged by Mr. It could be revoked by the District Inspector of Schools as apart from invoking his powers u/s 16-G (8) of the Act, the void order was to be treated as non-est which could be done away with by the District Inspector of Schools. 13. Another point urged by Mr. Singh was that the charge-sheet was given after the Respondent No, 3 was suspended which was against the provisions of law. It was necessary for the Petitioner to frame the charge first and thereafter, if suspension was required, the Respondent No. 3 could be placed under suspension. He relies on Section 16-G (5) of the Act. For the sake of necessity Section 16-G (5) of the Act is reproduced below: 16-G (5)--No Head of Institution or teacher shall be suspended by the management, unless in the opinion of the management- (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 14. From a careful analysis of the aforesaid provision of law it emerges that suspension by the management is to be ordered after the management forms an opinion that the charges are of serious nature and if proved they may entail in dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or continuance of the person charged in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him or a criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, enquiry or trial. If either of the three contingencies given in sub section are present in a particular case in the opinion of the management, the management has the power to order suspension of head of the institution or a teacher. As to whether framing of articles of charge is to precede the order of suspension would also fall for consideration in this case. 15. Admittedly in this case the Petitioner was suspended and thereafter the charge sheet was framed. The suspension had preceded framing of charge. Some authorities have been cited at the Bar which need to be discussed. 16. As to whether framing of articles of charge is to precede the order of suspension would also fall for consideration in this case. 15. Admittedly in this case the Petitioner was suspended and thereafter the charge sheet was framed. The suspension had preceded framing of charge. Some authorities have been cited at the Bar which need to be discussed. 16. In Mangla Prasad Upadhya v. State Government of U.P. 1988 UP LB EC 552, it was held that the order of suspension without serving charge-sheet was not sustainable. 17. In Rajendra Prasad Srivastava v. State of U.P. 1989 (1) UP LB EC 143 it was held that the conditions presents for passing order of suspension are to be complied with If these conditions are not present, the order of suspension would be void. It was further held: A bare reading of the aforesaid Sub-section (5) of Section 16 (G) would Indicate that the order of suspension has to be preceded by three conditions. The first is that the charges must have already been framed against the teacher and those charges must not be simple or ordinary charges. They must be serious enough so as to lead to his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. The next condition is that his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him, and the third condition is that any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial against him. In the present case no charges were framed before the Petitioner was suspended, nor there was any evidence. Hence, there was no question of charges being serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and there was no evidence at all, nor it was averred in the counter affidavit that continuance of Petitioner in office was likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him. Further, there was no criminal case against him under investigation, inquiry or trial involving moral turpitude. The Petitioner could not accordingly have been suspended. 18. Further, there was no criminal case against him under investigation, inquiry or trial involving moral turpitude. The Petitioner could not accordingly have been suspended. 18. In Rajendra Prasad Gond v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur 1990 (1) UP LB EC 279, it was held that where a peon in the college remained absent for about four months, refused to accept notice sent by the authorities concerned asking him to join duty, it was not a case of absconding so as to attract the provisions of Regulation 36 (2). To such case Regulations 36 (1) and 37 were applicable. The Petitioner's services in that case were terminated without complying with the provisions of Regulations 36 (1) and 37. The order of termination was held invalid. 19. In Ramesh Chandra Mishra v. U.P Secondary Education Services Commission, Allahabad, 1990 (1) UPLBEC 488, it was hell that in respect of Headmaster, Principal and teachers Regulations 35, 36 and 37 provide a procedure to be followed where a complaint is received against any of the above persons Regulation 35 provides for appointment of the enquiry committee. Regulation 36 lays down the manner in which opportunity of hearing is to be given to any person who is to face any enquiry. Regulation 37 lays down a procedure after the enquiry report of the inquiring authority is received and placed before the committee of management. It also lays down that sub committee under Regulation 35 should consist of members of management committee and not the members who are outsiders. In Mehar Singh v. District Inspector of Schools. Saharanpur 1985 UP LB EC 629, it was he'd that if approval of the District Inspector of Schools u/s 16-G (3) (a) was obtained by fraud or mistake or misrepresentation, the same can be revoked Under the said provision of law it is laid down that removal, dismissal or discharge from service cannot be ordered except with the prior approval in writing from the District Inspector of Schools. In the present case this sub section has no application. Mr. Singh relies on the case of Hindu National School Management Trust Society, Dehra Dun v. Deputy Director of Education, Pauri Garhwal Region Pauri 1980 UP LB EC 175, which lays down that Regulations 35, 36 and 37 have been framed to safeguard the interest of the employees against unjust and arbitrary actions. Mr. Singh relies on the case of Hindu National School Management Trust Society, Dehra Dun v. Deputy Director of Education, Pauri Garhwal Region Pauri 1980 UP LB EC 175, which lays down that Regulations 35, 36 and 37 have been framed to safeguard the interest of the employees against unjust and arbitrary actions. Regulation 35 is directory and not mandatory in nature. The earlier authorities to the contrary reported in 1971 ALJ 896 and 1977 ALR 114 were overruled. 20 The Respondent No. 3 has not challenged the order of suspension before this Court by filing a separate writ petition. He has only in defence stated that the order of suspension was bad and he remained under suspension under the bad orders. If the bad orders of suspension are revoked the orders of the District Inspector of Schools cannot be said to be bad Under an interim order the Respondent No. 1 was directed to pay suspension allowance to the Respondent No 3 as he was still on service and his termination of services was not approved. The Petitioner has sought only two reliefs namely (1) regarding revocation of the suspension order of the Respondent No. 3 and his reinstatement and (2) the papers relating to the removal of the Respondent No. 3 from service should be sent to the Respondent No. 2. 21. The suspension of the Respondent No. 3 was ordered before the framing of the charge. The suspension order had preceded the framing of charge. Therefore, the suspension order of the Respondent No. 3 does not seem to have been passed in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 16-G (5) of the Act. From the examination of the aforesaid authorities it appears that the framing of charge must precede the older of suspension. u/s 16-G (5) of the Act it is provided that suspension of head of the institution or teacher is to be made after forming an opinion by the management with regard to certain conditions which are given in the said sub-section. It is not expressly stated that the articles of charge are to be reduced to writing first and thereafter they are to be served on the person charged. It is not expressly stated that the articles of charge are to be reduced to writing first and thereafter they are to be served on the person charged. If the committee of management desires to suspend the Head of the Institution or a teacher the committee of management has to expressly state that continuance of such person in office will hamper the conduct of enquiry or it is to be mentioned that criminal charge involving moral turpitude is under investigation, enquiry or trial The sub section mentions that if the charges are serious and continuance of a person in office would hamper the enquiry proceedings the managing committee may suspend such person. This Sub-section (5) of section 16-G has been interpreted by this Court to mean that the articles of charge are to be served first and thereafter suspension order is to be passed. The Division Bench authority in this regard is binding on this Court. Therefore, the view of this Court in respect of Section 16-G (5) not requiring the articles of charge to be reduced into writing, before suspension can be ordered, is not of any significance because this Court is bound by the decision of the Division Bench. So long as the Division Bench authority on the point is operative is to be held that framing of articles of charge must precede the order of suspension and without that suspension is bad. That being so, the suspension of the Respondent No. 3 was not therefore in accordance with law as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court. 22. The next question that will arise for consideration in the petition would be whether the District Inspector of Schools could revoke the order of suspension on any ground other than the grounds mentioned in Section 16-G (8) of the Act. 23. It is true that the District Inspector of Schools is authorised to revoke the suspension order if disciplinary proceedings are being delayed for no fault of the Head of the Institution or teacher. This sub-clause supposes that the suspension order mentioned in the said sub-clause must be valid and must have been passed in accordance with the provisions of law. It is true that the District Inspector of Schools is authorised to revoke the suspension order if disciplinary proceedings are being delayed for no fault of the Head of the Institution or teacher. This sub-clause supposes that the suspension order mentioned in the said sub-clause must be valid and must have been passed in accordance with the provisions of law. A valid order can be revoked on any ground mentioned in Sub-section (8) of Section 16-G of the Act, If the order of suspension has inherent; invalidity, the District Inspector of Schools must be deemed to possess the power to set it aside because any order which is without jurisdiction and manifestly against the provisions of law can be set right by the authority, who has issued such order. This power is implicit and inherent in the District Inspector of Schools by virtue of the power vested in him under Sub-section (7) of Section 16-G. If he has approved the order of suspension which was void ab-initio or without jurisdiction, he will be deemed to have the power to recall such an order at anytime and this will not be a case which would fall u/s 16-G(8) of the Act. u/s 16-G (8) of the Act valid orders issued can be revoked for the reasons given in the said sub section. But an order which is basically invalid or void or without jurisdiction can be recalled by the person who approved the said order. The District Inspector of Schools only recalled such order, which would mean that the order of suspension was not enforced from the date of recalling the approval on the said order. The exercise of power of the District Inspector of Schools would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The District Inspector of Schools only recalled such order, which would mean that the order of suspension was not enforced from the date of recalling the approval on the said order. The exercise of power of the District Inspector of Schools would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In respect of a valid order which is passed under the Act if he wants to recall the same he has to recall it only u/s 16-G (8) but in respect of an invalid order, which is void or without jurisdiction, his jurisdiction to recall the order would stem from his authority to grant approval to such order and not from the provisions of Section 16-G (8) The revocation of an order of suspension which is void or without jurisdiction would not detract from the authority of the District Inspector of Schools to set the record correct and he must be deemed to have inherent power to set the record correct. The revocation of suspension order therefore can not be said to be bad in any manner and is to be maintained. 24. The recommendation of the Petitioner for the removal of the Respondent No, 3 from service cannot be enforced. The recommendation is based on an enquiry which is exparte and has been conducted not in accordance with the provisions of law. It seems that Regulations 35, 36 and 37 have not been taken note of by the Petitioner. Without following the procedure established by law the recommendations for the removal of the Respondent No. 3 from service have been made. 25. If so advised, the Petitioners are free to initiate from disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent No. 3. Should they desire to do so, they are bound to follow the provisions of Section 16-G (5) as interpreted by this Court in the authorities referred to above. There is no estoppel to the Petitioner to initiate fresh enquiry against the Respondent No. 3 if the same is required to be initiated. 26. The Petitioners have also challenged the order of single operation dated 17-5-1989, a copy whereof is contained in Annexure 14 to the writ petition. The Respondent No. 1 seems to have been under impression that his earlier order of reinstatement of the Respondent No 3 was not deliberately followed by the Petitioners and he was not paid the salary intentionally by the Petitioners. The Respondent No. 1 seems to have been under impression that his earlier order of reinstatement of the Respondent No 3 was not deliberately followed by the Petitioners and he was not paid the salary intentionally by the Petitioners. The Petitioners in fact seem to have been labouring under a bonafide belief that the Respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to pass an order of revocation of suspension order unless the case was covered by Section 16-G (8) of the Act They also were waiting to see that the recommendation for removal of the Respondent No. 3 would be forwarded by the Respondent No. 1 to concerned quarters. Their belief in this regard cannot be said to be absolutely misplaced. The order of single operation does not seem to be justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore the said order cannot be sustained. The Petitioners have challenged this order on a number of grounds. But after having held the order of revocation of suspension of the Respondent No. 3 as valid there is no jurisdiction for the order dated 17-5-1989 to remain in force. The said order is accordingly quashed and the Petitioner's committee is directed to be permitted to discharge their functions and manage the institution in question as before. 27. Accordingly for the reasons given above the writ petition fails partly and is dismissed so far as the challenge to the letter dated 20-12-1988 in respect of revocation of suspension of the Respondent No. 3, con-tuned in Annexure 11 to the writ petition is concerned, that letter is said to be valid and the reinstatement of the Respondent No. 3 to the post held by him is perfectly legal. The writ petition is partly allowed. The order dated 17-5-1989, contained in Annexure 14 to the writ petition, by which the order of single operation of payment of salary is made by the Respondent No. 1 is hereby quashed. The said order is arbitrary and unjustified. 28. There is no order as to costs.