JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. In this application under section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the main question for consideration is whether, in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, a fresh attornment by the tenant to the land-lord's transferee is necessary. 2. The plaintiff opposite party filed Eviction suit No. 23 of 1986 with respect to the premises, situate in Darbhanga town, as described in schedule A of the plaint, stating that he is the exclusive owner of the suit premises by virtue of purchase under registered sale issued dated 16.1.1986 executed by Kamalendu Biswas. He belongs to a trading family and the purchase was made for the purpose of doing business in crockery. Notice was sent to the defendant-petitioner on 25.5.1986, who was in occupation of the suit premises from before, asking him to vacate the same on the ground of personal necessity. The defendant, however, did not vacate and hence the suit. 3. The defendant's case, in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of appreciating the point urged and arising for decision, is that he was a monthly tenant of one Kalyan Kumar Biswas, who had already filed Eviction Suit No. 10 of 1985 for his eviction, which was still pending. No notice of the transfer of the premises said to have been made on 16.1.1986 was given to him and in the absence of any attornment, no fresh tenancy was created vis-a-vis the plaintiff and he was not the landlord and entitled to evict the defendant. According to the defendant further, the plaintiff bad no personal necessity for the suit premises since the family of the plaintiff had big residential house in the main marketing centre of Darbhanga town, which was most suitable for the proposed business. 4. The trial court took evidence of both sides and came to the conclusion that the landlord and tenant relationship exists between the parties and that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own occupation reasonably and in good faith. 4. The trial court took evidence of both sides and came to the conclusion that the landlord and tenant relationship exists between the parties and that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own occupation reasonably and in good faith. Since no finding regarding partial eviction in terms of the proviso to clause (c) of section 11(1) of the Act, had been recorded, while admitting this application on 3.8.1990, this Court directed the trial court to frame a specific issue in that regard and to transmit its finding after taking necessary evidence and hearing the parties. The trial court, after necessary enquiry and on the basis of evidence including report of the Commissioner, has held in its finding dated 21.12.1990 that the necessity of the plaintiff cannot be satisfied except by eviction of the defendant from the entire suit premises. The petitioner, accordingly, has challenged the aforesaid finding by way of a supplementary affidavit, which aspect I will deal with after examining the main question arising for decision, as noticed above. 5. Mr. Raghib Ahsan, appearing for the petitioner, although initially attempted to raise a number of contentions challenging the correctness and legality of the order of eviction but he laid emphasis on only one of them, namely, that the finding of the trial court in regard to the existence of land lord tenant relationship between the parties is not in accordance with law. According to him, in the absence of notice of transfer of the ownership of the premises in favour of the plaintiff and attorement by the defendant in his (plaintiff's) favour, no landlord tenant relationship between the parties could be created. Learned counsel in support of his contention has relied on a decision in the case of John Nadjarian v. E.F. Trist (AIR 1945 Bombay, 399). 6. Mr. Chunni Lal, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, has drawn my attention to the notice (Exhibit 1) sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's reply thereto (Exhibit 1/A), in order to show that the plea of absence of attornment was false. According to learned counsel, the defendant had admitted payment of rent in favour of the plaintiff in the very first paragraph of the said reply and, above all, had expressed his willingness to abide by all the terms and conditions in the last paragraph thereof. According to learned counsel, the defendant had admitted payment of rent in favour of the plaintiff in the very first paragraph of the said reply and, above all, had expressed his willingness to abide by all the terms and conditions in the last paragraph thereof. According to him, the plea of the defendant in regard to the payment of the rent by mistake was not a plea tenable in law. He has also referred to the oral evidence of the defendant as D.W. 10 in this connection. Reliance has been placed on decisions of this Court in the cases of Ram Tahal Modi alias Ram Tahal Chaurasia v. Ratan Lal alias Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi (1988 P.L.J.R. 950) and Sayeed Abdul Wahab v. Md. Sakman alias Lokman (1989 P.L.J.R. 587) as well as on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge and others (1988 3 Supreme Court cases, 137) 7. The cases of this Court, referred to above, deal with the question of attornment in a suit for eviction on the ground of default. In my opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision cannot be said to the relevant for the purpose of deciding the question in the context of a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The provisions in regard to the rights of the lessor's transferee and the lessee are contained in section 109 of the Transfer of property Act, the relevant part of which reads as follows : “109 If the lessor transfers the property lease or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it, but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lesses ejects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him. Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that, if the leasee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee." It would, thus, appear that in a case of absolute assignment of the lessor's right, the, transferee derives all the rights of the lessor, except his entitlement to the arrears of rent due prior to the transfer, in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Thus, whole the default in payment of rent and the consequent cause of action for eviction of the tenant has arisen prior to the transfer, in the absence of any contract otherwise, ren cannot be said to be duo or in arrear so as to entitle the transferee to evict the tenant in terms of section 11(1)(d) of the Act. In such cases, the transferee is not entitled to evict the tenant on the ground of default since the cause of action does not continue after the transfer, unless of course the tenant has attorned to pay the arrears to the transferee. The question of attorrnment, therefore, may have bearing on the question of default within the meaning of Section 11(1)(d) of the Act. In a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, however, the cause of action arises after the transfer. The analogy, therefore, to cases based on the ground of default, in my opinion, is not appropriate. 8. The question of attorrnment, therefore, may have bearing on the question of default within the meaning of Section 11(1)(d) of the Act. In a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, however, the cause of action arises after the transfer. The analogy, therefore, to cases based on the ground of default, in my opinion, is not appropriate. 8. So far as the decision in the case of Tej Bhan Madan (supra) is concerned, it would appear that in the aforementioned decision it had been held by the Supreme Court that where the tenant paid rent to the landlord, he is precluded from challenging his title on the general principle of estoppel between tile landlord and tenant, perhaps in my opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment also may not be applicable on the facts of the instant case for the reason that it was held in the judgment, on the facts of that case that there was no misrepresentation on the part of the assignee nor a mistake on the part of the tenant in making the attronment, while in the instant case, as noticed above, according to the defendant, payment of rent was by mistake, and I do not intend to go into that question. I am, therefore, not inclined to base my judgment on the aforesaid decision either. 9. The question for consideration is whether upon transfer of interest, attornment by the tenant is necessary or sine qua non in order to constitute a landlord, tenant relationship between the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not able to point out any provision making such an attornment necessary. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the provisions of section 8 of the T.P. Act, the relevant part of which reads as follows : “8. Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the legal incident thereof.” 10. A division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sri. Manindra Chandra Dey & Brothers v. Sm. Gita Sen & others (73 Calcutta Weekly Notes. A division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sri. Manindra Chandra Dey & Brothers v. Sm. Gita Sen & others (73 Calcutta Weekly Notes. 856) had occasion to deal with the question of attornment and their Lordships answered the same in the following words:- “The second point is : the lessor transferring a tenanted house, the tenant does not become the tenant of the transferee, so long as he does not attorn to the transferee as his new landlord by paying rent such a one amicably, or so long as he is not forced to pay rent to such a one by a decree of the court. It completely beats us how a proposition as this can be contended for, in all seriousness. We find no warrant for such an extravagant proposition which throws the transferee landlord at the mercy of a sitting tenant. Worse still, it writes off the positive and plain enactment in section 109 of the Transfer of property Act,4 of 1982, which bears in so far as it is material here : “If the lessor transfers the property leased, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights of the lessor as to the property transferred” The following observation in the same judgment show ho., the learned Judge reacted to the contention, as is being advanced in the instant case : "The relationship of landlord and tenant is there between the lessee and lessor's assignee. And still the necessity of a fresh attornment, which means acknowledgement by the lessee of the lessor's assignee as his landlord. It looks like acknowledging then the fact that the sun rises on the cast." In the case of Daulatram v. Haweli Sao and others (AIR 1939 Lahore, 49) it was said :- "A fresh attornment by the lessee to the leasor's assignee is not necessary under the transfer of property Act." The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, AIR 1945 Bombay,399 (supra) is not relevant to the contention or the point at issue. 11. In my considered opinion, attornment is not a necessry condition to create landlord tenant relationship between the patties. It has no beating whatsoever in cases of eviction on the ground of personal necessity. 11. In my considered opinion, attornment is not a necessry condition to create landlord tenant relationship between the patties. It has no beating whatsoever in cases of eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The transfer takes place with all incidents of right, title and interest of the lessor and the transferee is entitled to sue the existing tenant on the ground of personal necessity even if the tenant has not attorned to his tenancy under him. The suit for eviction all the ground of default, of course, stands on a different footing and so far as the question of attronment is concerned, the principle has already been laid down in the aforementioned decision of this Court in 1988 PLJR, 950 (supra). 12. Learned counsel has next argued, with emphasis, the question of partial eviction. I has been submitted that the suit premises as described in Schedule of the plaint comprises 13 kathas of lands, with two houses standing thereon. According to learned counsel, the finding of the trial court on the question of partial eviction dated 21.12.1990 shows complete lack of awareness on its part in regard to existence of two houses. In other word, according to learned counsel, the trial court was obliged to consider as to whether the need of plaintiff could be reasonably and substantially satisfied by evicting the defendant from one of the shops, while allowing him to occupy the other shop. Learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, referring to the interrogatory served on the defendant, his reply thereto, report of the pleader commissioner as well at the oral evidence of P.W. 14 and D.W. 10, has submitted that the finding of the court does not suffer from any illegality, impropriety and arbitrariness. Learned counsel did not deny that the premises as described in Schedule A of the plaint contains one pucca room and one asbestos covered room, besides vacant land, measuring in all 13 kathas. However, he submitted that the defendant was carrying on business in stationeries in only one of the rooms facing the main road which really is the subject matter of the dispute. Learned counsel took me through the oral evidence and submitted that the parties had full idea about the identity of the disputed premises, and led evidence only with respect to that. Learned counsel took me through the oral evidence and submitted that the parties had full idea about the identity of the disputed premises, and led evidence only with respect to that. At the stage of enquiry on the question of partial eviction, a petition along with the sketch map giving length and width of the suit premises was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on 31.8.1990, but no objection was raised as to its identity or description. My attention was also drawn to the commissioner's report dated 22.11.1990, which shows that at the time of local inspection by the commissioner in presence of both the parties as well as their lawyers, the suit premises was identified as consisting of the pucca shop room having a definite boundary as mentioned therein. 13. In the case of Shreedar Thakur and others V. Keshs Sao and others (AIR 1962 patna, 468) the final order passed in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure was challenged on the ground of vegueness in the proceeding, alleging that the subject matter of despute was not ascertainable. This Court held that where the parties have entared into the proceding without any dispute or objection as to identity of the land and whore on the basis of materials on the record such an identification is possible the defect in regard to non description or mis-description of subject can be condoned. The following observations in paragraph 11 of the said judgment may be noticed.- "The Correct principles may be stated as follows. The initial proceeding should contain full descriptions of the subject of dispute so that it can be definitely ascertained without any difficulty. The following observations in paragraph 11 of the said judgment may be noticed.- "The Correct principles may be stated as follows. The initial proceeding should contain full descriptions of the subject of dispute so that it can be definitely ascertained without any difficulty. If that is not done, the defect is ordinarily fatal; but, in cases where the parties have not raised any dispute as to the identity and there are materials on the record which can lead to its positive identification, the defect may be condoned." On the basis of the evidence and other materials on the record, I am satisfied that the suit premises, as understood by the parties consists of only one room i.e. the pucca room facing the main road on the south and, therefore, the trial court was not obliged to consider the question of eviction of the defendant from the other asbestor covered room situate in the same premises, for the purpose of consideration of the question of partial eviction. 14. The question that next arise, for consideration is whether assuming that the suit premise consists of only one shop room, as indicated above, the need of the plaintiff can be substantially satisfied by evicting the defendant from only a portion there of. In this connection learned counsel for the opposite party has, with reference to the sketch map of the shop room in question (Exhibit 9), pointed out the manner in which it is proposed to be used by the plaintiff by providing racks, almirahs, counters chairs for the customers and Gaddi. It has been submitted that if the defendant is evicted from only portion of the premises, the same cannot be used in the manner desired by the plaintiff and, therefore, his need cannot be satisfied by partial eviction. 15. Learned counsel for the opposite party has also addressed me on the question as to whether it is possible to allow the petitioner occupation of the other asbestos covered room. On the basis of topography of the premises, it has been pointed out that the other room is situate behind the disputed shop room, and the re is no separate and independent access for going into that room. On the basis of topography of the premises, it has been pointed out that the other room is situate behind the disputed shop room, and the re is no separate and independent access for going into that room. He has submitted that if the defendant is to be allowed occupation of the other shop room, necessarily it would mean that the same passage or access would have to be provided to him through the main disputed shop room on the front. That, according to learned counsel, would frustrate the very object of own occupation of the plaintiff in doing the business in crockery. Further, in order to provide the passage or access, necessary alterations would have to be made by removing the windows and. doors as at present existing in the room. The partial eviction of the defendant from the premises does not mean that structural alterations should be made. Besides, as indicated above, carving out such passage or access will also reduce the available space in the shop room which may fall short of the requirement of the plaintiff. That may also disturb and hamper the flow of plaintiff's proposed business in the suit premises. 16. Having considered all aspects of the matter. I am of the opinion that the finding of the trial court in regard to partial eviction cannot be laid to be arbitrary or improper. As such, I hold in agreement with the trial court that the plaintiff's need cannot be satisfied by partial eviction of the defendant from the suit premises. 17. Mr. Raghib Ahsan had indicated while opening his arguments, other points, namely, that the plaintiff's need, as stated in the plaint, was not specific since he bad not stated clearly as to whether he wanted to do retail or wholesale business in crockery. Further. according to him; in the absence of necessary evidence in regard to the availability of the fund etc., the order for eviction cannot be sustained. These points, however, were not pressed. However, I have considered these aspect of the matter also and I do not find that the grounds as indicated above, deserve any detailed consideration. 18. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any error in the impugned judgment. The order of eviction is, accordingly, upheld. This revision application is, thus dismissed but without any order as to costs. Application dismissed.