Judgement SUKUMARAN, J. :- Kerala is caressed by a sea coast all along. On the western horizon it is the sea, as far as eyes could see; and close by is a deeper ocean. Adventurous fishermen, set out in the traditional boats with their oars and sails, to collect from the depths, much of fishery wealth and haul them to the shore. The debut of mechanised vessels brought about visible changes in the economy and export performance of the State. Increased activities into uncertain waters and in unpredictable weather, had their attendant perils and risks for the boats and the crew. Modern business organisations plan in advance the averting of unexpected tragedies. Insurance was necessarily popular with the fishing vessels. Such insurance policies, by and large, were modulated on the settled forms of marine policies. The terms and conditions, the warranties and the exemptions, were all there - sometimes loosely couched and sometime wrongly understood. Warranties certainly had their legal significations. The implications of such warranties have to be elucidated by courts when doubts and disputes surface as between the Insurers and the insured. Interpretation of one such warranty clause arises in this appeal. With this somewhat prolix prefatory note, we would now face the facts, pose the questions and pronounce our decision. 2. The plaint averred the insurance of the boat, the events of 3-4-1977, the missing of the boat from 4-4-1977, the submission of the claim on 7-5-1977, the refusal of the defendant to settle the claim the ultimate repudiation by the defendant of the plaintiffs claim by letter dated 16-9-1977, and the unjustifiable stand of the defendant in the matter. The Insurance Company relied on clause 7 of the policy, a warranty, reading : "When not in use Vessel should be safely anchored, moored or secured with proper watch and ward." According to the defendant, the words "with proper watch and ward" were to be read distinctively and not conjunctively. The Insurance Company relied on clause 7 of the policy, a warranty, reading : "When not in use Vessel should be safely anchored, moored or secured with proper watch and ward." According to the defendant, the words "with proper watch and ward" were to be read distinctively and not conjunctively. It was further averred : "At the time of the casualty the vessel was anchored and the plaintiff had by way of abundant caution engaged Deck hand A. Ahammed Kunju to keep watch and ward over the Vessel, though plaintiff had no obligation to do so under the warranty clause when once the Vessel is anchored." The further averments only refer to the communication sent by the plaintiff on 27-10-1977, the reiteration of the defence stand as contained in the letter dated 21-11-1977 where in there was a direction to the plaintiff to contact the Average Adjusters whose opinion had been sought by the Insurance Company. It was stated that the plaintiff had sent a representation to the Average Adjusters but did not obtain any reply from them. The inability to consider the claim of the plaintiff was reiterated in its letter dated 26-9-1979. The defendant had referred to the views of the Average Adjusters that the defendant was guilty of breach of warranty in regard to the maintenance of watch and ward. Contending that such a stand was untenable the suit was brought. 3. The Insurance Company averred that the claim was not maintainable due to violation of warranty No. 7. It further averred that the weather at and around the time during which the alleged loss took place was not of an abnormal nature. Reliance, was also placed on a breach of warranty No. 10 casting an obligation on the insurer to ensure that the serang and driver should have certificate of competency issued under the Kerala State Port Harbour Craft Rules, 1970. (The latter plea is unavailable and has not been pursued.) 4. The court below granted a decree awarding compensation of Rs. 99,800/- with interest and costs. The interpretation which the plaintiff sought to place on clause 7 was unacceptable to the court. (The latter plea is unavailable and has not been pursued.) 4. The court below granted a decree awarding compensation of Rs. 99,800/- with interest and costs. The interpretation which the plaintiff sought to place on clause 7 was unacceptable to the court. The court held : "On a plain reading of the clause it is clear that the words "with proper watch and ward" qualify the words "anchored", moved or "secured." The evidence was assessed by the court and ultimately its conclusion was expressed thus : "A warranty clause of this nature is to be presumed to have substantially complied with if the watch and ward were there at the time when the condition of the vessel became in a perilous situation. It is not expected by the parties that the watch and ward should be on board even at the time when the boat is sinking." 5. The defeated defendant has come upon appeal. The factual details and the legal position demand a close scrutiny and careful examination. It is a sad experience of current time that the courts are not adequately assisted in its difficult task of resolving delicate controversies which sometimes involved in highly technical matters. It is so even when powerful public sector undertakings equipped with all finances and facilities that could be thought of, are parties to the litigation. There does not appear to be an earnest attempt at overseeing the functioning of such concerns, and the accountability such undertakings have to the public. Our experience too had not been different from the general pattern. That, however, is a poor alibi for a court which has to do its duty. 6. We shall now refer to the evidence, their effect and our impression. 7. The plaintiff was the owner of the fishing vessel Anjalipuram registered as M F V N D 379. The boat was insured with the defendant. The policy of insurance Ext. A1 was taken on 3-7-1976. It was to be valid and alive up to 9-6-1977. According to the plaintiff the vessel had its usual fishing operation on 2-4-1977; at about 5.30 p.m. it anchored off Purakkad (the sandy shore near Alleppey, now immortalised by Thakazhi's novel chemmeen). The 3rd April was a Sunday. Generally, no fishing operation takes place on Sundays. It was to be valid and alive up to 9-6-1977. According to the plaintiff the vessel had its usual fishing operation on 2-4-1977; at about 5.30 p.m. it anchored off Purakkad (the sandy shore near Alleppey, now immortalised by Thakazhi's novel chemmeen). The 3rd April was a Sunday. Generally, no fishing operation takes place on Sundays. The plaintiff alleged that the boat was found missing when, in the early morning of 4-4-1977, the fishing crew proceeded to the boat to start the day's work. The plaintiff sent a telegram to the office of the insurance company at Quilon. As a first communication, it has its significance. It reads : "Fishing boat Anjalipuram No. MFVND 379 missed morning Purackad Ambalapuzha weather wet." The Insurance Company by its communication dated 5-4-1977 requested the plaintiff to conduct the salvage operation immediately; to let the Insurance Company know the current position and the details of the salvage operation arrangements. Ext. B1 would appear to be the letter sent by the plaintiff to the Insurance Company in continuation of the telegram dated 4-4-1977. Greater details are given in that letter The relevant extract reads : "The above fishing Boart Anjalipuram was lying anchored at the fishing centre of Purakad in Ambalapuzha on 3-4-1977 night. On 4-4-1977 early morning when the crew went to the spot as usual in order to go for fishing the above boat was found missing. Even though they searched at the spot suspecting sinking they could not trace it. On getting information of missing of Anjalipuram Boat from the site I have arranged 2 Fishing Boats to be sent in search. It may be noted that on 3-4-1977 night, there was heavy rain and change of claimate." The later paragraph indicated the futile search made up to Cape Comorin, and even beyond Mandapam. It also stated that the District Police Supdt., Alleppey, had been informed about the incident, that the missing of the boat was intimated to all Port authorities of Quilon, and Alleppey and that other State Port Officers including the one at Tuticorin had been also alerted. (The documents evidencing the intimation given to the Supdt. of Police Alleppey, or to the other Ports or Port officers, have not been produced in the case). There are no details about the fishing boats which had conducted the search operations. 8. (The documents evidencing the intimation given to the Supdt. of Police Alleppey, or to the other Ports or Port officers, have not been produced in the case). There are no details about the fishing boats which had conducted the search operations. 8. In the usual course, the defendant wrote on 9-4-1977 to the surveyors by Ext. B3. The surveyors were requested to confirm that they had proceeded with the survey. This document does not throw any light on the background in which the boat was found missing. The plaintiff sent a letter to the surveyors on 23-4-1977. That was in answer to the surveyors' letter dated 13-4-1977 Ext. B5 by which the plaintiff was called upon to furnish information about the Serang and the other two deck hands - Allocious, Edward and Peter. The letter refers to the interview the surveyors had with the driver and one of the deck hands and the enquiries made at Purakkad. The further documents called for were : 1. Weather report to be obtained from Meteorological Department, Trivandrum/ Madras. 2. Statement of loss. 3. Note of protest made, if any. 4. Position of investigation by police officials. 5. Reply, if any, regarding investigations from port officials. 6. Pre-insurance inspection report. The reply Ext. B4 pointed out that the Serang and the two deck hands had been directed to the Cochin office of the surveyors for recording the statements. The plaintiff requested the surveyors to directly write to the Meteorological department to obtain the weather report. The reason for such a request was stated as the difficulty in obtaining a report, if an individual addresses the Department. The plaintiff admitted : "Generally Port Office will have a record of the weather and hence it is easy to get the same from them." The letter specifically refers to the information obtained by the plaintiff from the Port Officials about the steps taken by the officials in time "through wireless messages etc. for locating the missing vessel. " The affidavits of the Serang, driver, deck hands and the principal insurance inspection report were stated to have been forwarded. (Ext. B4 does not contain those accompanisment). The statement of loss was not furnished on the ground that salvaging and searching operations were still going on. It was stated that a few days earlier; a plank of wheelhouse of the boat has been obtained from the sea beyond Purakkad. (Ext. B4 does not contain those accompanisment). The statement of loss was not furnished on the ground that salvaging and searching operations were still going on. It was stated that a few days earlier; a plank of wheelhouse of the boat has been obtained from the sea beyond Purakkad. The plaintiff also claimed that on a thorough search by the fishing boats, an obstruction caused by the presence of a material in the bottom of the sea at 11/12 fathoms was noted. He continued : "Therefore it is doubted to be the missing fishing vessel Anjalipuram." The plaintiff concluded by stating that he was making all efforts to identify the materials by the help of drivers and that the details would be forwarded shortly. 9. The statement of loss was forwarded on 7-5-1977 under Ext. B6. A request was made for settling the claim. An assertion was made therein that the boat had sunk in the sea beyond Purakkad on the same night of 4th April, 1977. He claimed that during trawling on 30-4-1977 one plank had been obtained. According to the letter, the top frame and the wooden frames were trapped in the net during the last week of April near Thottappally. The difficulty in tracing the exact location where the boat had sunk was indicated. The plaintiff stated that he had abandoned the salvaging operations. The claim is evidenced by Ext. B7 of the same date. 10. The following passage in Ext. B8 report of the surveyors appears to be relevant in the context: "The proximate cause of the accident appears to be bad weather. However, this cannot be confirmed in the absence of the weather report. " The surveyors also reported about the absence of any information from the port offices at Neendakara and Cochin. It referred to the parts of the boat, which according to the plaintiff had been recovered. Paragraph 4 particularly made an observation relevant in the context of the compliance with the warranties. It stated : "There was no watch and ward on board whilst at anchorage. " 11. The plaintiff reacted on 27-9-1977 by writing Ext. B10. The plaintiff maintained that the statements of the serang, driver and deck hands indicated the employment of watchman in the vessel. It stated : "There was no watch and ward on board whilst at anchorage. " 11. The plaintiff reacted on 27-9-1977 by writing Ext. B10. The plaintiff maintained that the statements of the serang, driver and deck hands indicated the employment of watchman in the vessel. He further stated : "It may also be noted that I have adopted those steps by way of abundant caution even though watch and ward is not obligatory as per the warranty clause you have quoted in your letter. " The letter asserted that the boat had been anchored in a claim area of the sea. "But against all natural expectations the vessels got drifted away." According to him, the warranty clause could not be relied on to deny the insurance claim. 12. The plaintiff sent another communication Ext. B12 dated 5-1-1978. This communication addressed to the surveyors gives additional information, and some developments in the story of the plaintiff. The material portions read : "After fishing operations, my boat was safely anchored at the fishing centre of Purakkad in the evening of 2-4-1977. 3-4-1977 being a Sunday, there was no fishing operation. At about 4.30 a.m. on 4-4-1977 the crew of the boat went to the sea side for the day's work, when they found that the vessel was missing. The deck-hand Mr. Ahmed was also present along with the other members of the Crew. He was entrusted with the work of watching the boat, by way of abundant caution ........... deck-hand Ahmed who was keeping watch over the vessel had to retire to ashed on theshore nearby, owing to heavy rain attached with strong wind, that occurred on the 3rd, after midnight. Presumably, due to this sudden unexpected and unnatural change of weather, the vessel, in all probability would have lost its anchor and would have drifted into the sea." (Emphasis supplied) 13. In relation to the warranty, his specific plea was as follows : "The warrantee clause No. 7 quoted by your Company is per se inapplicable and irrelevant to the facts of this case. There is no obligation on my part to secure my boat with a proper watch and ward when it is safely anchored. In relation to the warranty, his specific plea was as follows : "The warrantee clause No. 7 quoted by your Company is per se inapplicable and irrelevant to the facts of this case. There is no obligation on my part to secure my boat with a proper watch and ward when it is safely anchored. Even otherwise, a literal inter-pretation of the clause is also wrong and moreover I have employed one of the crew of the vessel, to keep watch over the vessel by way of abundant caution, in spite of the absence of any such obligation on my part. ............Assuming, but not admitting that our deck hand a crew of the vessel has committed any negligence in the performance of his duty, I am protected by the 1st clause contained in the Institute standard T.L.O. Clause (Hulls). The negligence of master, officers, crew or pilots is also covered by the said clause." 14. The affidavit of the deck hand Ahamed Kunju is Ext. B15. Paragraphs 5 to 7 are relevant : "5. There was rain during the night of 3rd/4th April, 1977: 6. Because of the rain for want of proper shelter, I returned to shed by about 1 a.m. on 4-4-1977. 7. Later, by about 4.30 a.m. all the crew of the boat went to the anchoring point of the boat, to proceed for fishing." There is no other document which would give further light on the development of watch and ward in the vessel. The documents clearly evidence the fact that at the relevant time, the watch and ward was not on board the vessel. 15. The oral evidence consists of the testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 5. P.W. 1, the plaintiff has no direct information. His hearsay evidence is of no use in the ascertainment of relevant facts relating to the satisfaction of the warranty provisions. P.W. 5 claimed to be the manager of another boat. A close reading of his testimony would indicate that he has no direct knowledge with the movements of the boat on the 3rd April, 1977 or matters intimately connected therewith. There has not been any independent assessment of his evidence by the court below. The court below observed about his evidence : "......... some of the boats which were anchored near Purakkad sea shore were lost. There has not been any independent assessment of his evidence by the court below. The court below observed about his evidence : "......... some of the boats which were anchored near Purakkad sea shore were lost. " There is no statement about the loss of any boat let alone "some boats on that day". His evidence is only to the effect that the boat belonging to his proprietor had been pulled out of its anchor by the wind and that it had been drifted. If at all the evidence is adverse to the plaintiff. If a boat in identical situation could be brought back after drifting, a compliance with the warranty clause and the presence of watch and ward on board the vessel would have effectively insured the safety of the plaintiff's vessel as well. 16. The court below committed a sad but substantial error when it misread the evidence of P.W. 5 as indicating that some of the boats anchored near Purakkad had been lost. This grossly erroneous impression has vitiated the conclusion of that Court. P.W. 2 is the person directly concerned with the incident. A close reading of his testimony would bring about the fact that he was a regular worker of the fishing vessel. According to him, at about 7.30 p.m. on Sunday, the 3rd April, 1977 he came to the boat to sleep, but could not remain in the boat because of the rain. This is a total destortion about the structure of a fishing vessel. The insurance policy itself would indicate that only during the heavy monsoon period, the fishing vessels have to keep off fishing operations. Rain is therefore a contingency faced by the fishing vessels, while engaged in the fishing. That has been admitted by the witness himself. There was a suggestion that near the hull there is a place affording protection from the rain. On his own showing, he was not performing the watch and ward duty at a time when his presence was really required on board the vessel. The wind according to him, was a mild wind (vernacular matter omitted....Ed.). He admitted that he would have dozed off in the shed on the shore, and that from that place the vessel could not be seen. He further admitted that the boat was not under his control during the relevant time. The wind according to him, was a mild wind (vernacular matter omitted....Ed.). He admitted that he would have dozed off in the shed on the shore, and that from that place the vessel could not be seen. He further admitted that the boat was not under his control during the relevant time. He also admitted that closeby there were many other boats. Yet, no evidence is forthcoming about the loss of any one of them. If any other boat has been so lost, it would have been immediately and intimately known to all the boat owners of the locality. A further crucial admission is about his profound ignorance about the contents of the affidavit Ext. B15. He stated : "I signed it without knowing the contents thereof. I do not read and understand the same." He did not know who prepared it. Even the attempt at retrieving his affidavit made in the course of the re-examination signally failed when he disclaimed knowledge whether Ext. B15 was the same thing as one signed before an Advocate at Quilon. He could not recollect the owner of the boat, who, according to him, came by the side of the fishing vessel apparently to deal in the miscellaneous fish. This story is also extremely artificial. On the 2nd the fishing operation was over. No one would keep the miscellaneous fish in the vessel when the entire crew go ashore. Sunday is a rest day. No one would dare or expect any sale of miscellaneous fish from the vessel during the night of 3rd April, 1977. If the sea is rough, it is unlikely that a country-boat would have gone to the deeper sea to expose itself to a distinct danger. P.W. 2 does not remember the owner of that country-boat. We have no hesitation in holding that the evidence of P.W. 2 does not help the plaintiff to establish his case. 17. P.W. 3 was examined to confirm the version of P.W. 2 about his having been taken to the shore when it rained at about 1 a.m. on 4-4-1977. He also stated that the wind was a mild one. The boat was not visible from the shed on the shore. As noted earlier, this evidence also only tends to corroborate the fact that at about the relevant time no one was on board the vessel. He also stated that the wind was a mild one. The boat was not visible from the shed on the shore. As noted earlier, this evidence also only tends to corroborate the fact that at about the relevant time no one was on board the vessel. P.W. 4 has given evidence that he was engaged in taking the crew of the plaintiff's boat from shore to the vessel and vice versa. He took P.W. 2 to the fishing vessel at about 6 p.m. The time does not tally with that given in the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3. He was not aware of anything which happened between 7 p.m. and 4.30 a.m. His evidence, therefore is of no use in furnishing relevant evidence about the presence of watch and ward on the vessel during the relevant time. 18. We have adverted to all the details of the evidence of the witnesses. Their evidence was relevant to find out whether the provision in the warranty had been satisfied. A vague and bare statement about rain and about a mild wind would not be a satisfactory substitute for the evidence actually required to establish a punctitious performance of the conditions in the warranty. Even a wholesale acceptance of the evidence of the witnesses would only reveal that during the crucial time there was no watch and ward on the vessel. The fact that someone slept in a shed on the shore, is insufficient as a compliance with the terms of warranty No. 7. The finding of the court below about compliance with warranty No. 7 cannot be sustained in the backdrop of the evidence as indicated above. 19. We have already indicated how there had been a total misreading in relation to the evidence of P.W. 5 by the court below. The judgment is also replete with surmises and conjectures, frequently appearing in the course of the discussion of evidence. At least some of them could be profitably referred to demonstrate how the Court below has been swayed by irrelevant considerations and non-existent evidence. 20. While adverting to the defence contention about the signal failure of the plaintiff, the court below got itself into a deep mire of surmises and conjectures. Some of them may be illustrated. 21. At least some of them could be profitably referred to demonstrate how the Court below has been swayed by irrelevant considerations and non-existent evidence. 20. While adverting to the defence contention about the signal failure of the plaintiff, the court below got itself into a deep mire of surmises and conjectures. Some of them may be illustrated. 21. While discussing the defence argument about development made by the plaintiff from "heavy rain" in the initial stage to "gale" and "strong wind" in the later stage, the court observed : "Heavy wind might have occurred subsequently". (Emphasis supplied) 22. Again, another subsequent statement in the judgment reads: "The rain started at 1 p.m. Therefore, it is quite natural that the weather may change at any time and the heavy rain or storm may occur at any point of time." (Emphasis supplied) 23. In yet another place, it observed : "Even if it is assumed that the warranty clause would be strictly complied with, I do not think that the watch and ward should remain in the boat even at the risk of his life. Even if he had been there, nothing could have been done by him to escape from the peril of the sea." As noted above, a gale of the velocity indicated in the Meteorological report, is not one which could not be managed by anyone on board the vessel, particularly where large number of other boats were anchored around the area. 24. The State of Kerala has very many institutions having an expertise in the operation of fishing vessels. There are research organisations functioning under the Central Government, which study all aspects of fishing and fish technology. Ranging from the ideal conditions relating to the quality of the water, the temperature thereof, the current flow and the like and the type of gears fitted to the fishing vessel and out-boards and nets which would ensure the maximum catch. Useful publications and research papers are also available about the weather conditions of the coast, about the data of fishing vessels missing and later recovered. A Naval establishment at Kochi comes to the aid of the fishing vessels whenever they are in distress. The plaintiff has not chosen to substantiate his case by drawing on the material information so available. 25. A Naval establishment at Kochi comes to the aid of the fishing vessels whenever they are in distress. The plaintiff has not chosen to substantiate his case by drawing on the material information so available. 25. The construction of a fishing vessel and its essential equipments could have been usefully proved by evidence in the case. That has not been done. The court need not necessarily be driven to hunt out for itself helpful information, such is available from decided cases. (Some of the important parts of a fishing vessel had been noted in The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport (The "Ard Aidham" case) (1985) 2 Lloyd's Rep 412 and the earlier cases, Dayspring, (1965) 1 Lloyd's Rep 103 and (1968) 2 Lloyd's Rep 204. The failure to adduce the required evidence would generally have its deleterious consequence on the plaintiff who seeks the aid of the court to have a decree for his claim. The point was highlighted by a decision of the House of Lords in The Popi M, (1985) 2 Lloyd's Rep 1, reading : "The Judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to discharge that burden." The non-existence of a space where the watch and ward could effectively function on board the vessel, is a matter on which the plaintiff was bound to let in evidence. It is doubtful whether when a warranty clause clearly stipulates for watch and ward on board the vessel, the insured could seek exoneration from an obligation to comply with the same on the ground that the vessel was ill-equiped for the same. In any event, it was for him to prove such a deficiency and difficulty even if it would be of any avail in that situation. The plaintiff failed in that regard. He has thus disentitled himself to the decree sought for. 26. We shall now examine at some length, the interpretation placed on the warranty clause by the plaintiff. In any event, it was for him to prove such a deficiency and difficulty even if it would be of any avail in that situation. The plaintiff failed in that regard. He has thus disentitled himself to the decree sought for. 26. We shall now examine at some length, the interpretation placed on the warranty clause by the plaintiff. The entirety of the warranty clause may be extracted : "Warranted vessel not to be employed during unsafe weather conditions and when not in use vessel should be safely anchored or moored or secured with proper watch and ward." Three other warrantees are numbers 6, 8 and 10. Warranty No. 6 contains the prohibition on the employment of the vessel for the period from 1st June to 15th August along the Kerala and Karnataka coasts. Warranty No. 8 makes the loss or damage to equipment or accessories payable conditionally only if a claim for loss or damage to hull is admitted under the policy. Insistence on the certification and licensing for trading by competent authorities, is covered by warranty No.10. 27. Former part of warranty No. 7 contains an indication about the scope of that warranty. It totally prohibits the employment of the vessel during unsafe weather conditions. In other words, even during the permitted period if 16th August to 31st of May, the vessel should not be employed, if the weather condition is unsafe. Weather conditions could be due to high waves, strong gale, stormy rain and the like. It can, quite often, happen when the mode of nature changes quickly and what was a bright face can soon become a pervasive gloom accompanied by rude winds and lashing rains. The warranty provides against an added peril in the form of unfair weather conditions, whether existing or unexpected. The later limb of the clause provides for the safety measures of the vessel even when the vessel is not employed. A vessel not employed, could be anchored or moored or secured. The crew of the vessel cannot totally desert the vessel in that condition. The warranty insists that at least the watch and ward should be available on board the vessel. This is the plain meaning and reading of the warranty. The court below also has adopted the above view. A vessel not employed, could be anchored or moored or secured. The crew of the vessel cannot totally desert the vessel in that condition. The warranty insists that at least the watch and ward should be available on board the vessel. This is the plain meaning and reading of the warranty. The court below also has adopted the above view. The view accords with the opinion expressed by Metcalfe and Hodgkinson (Pvt.) Ltd., Bombay, who are Ship and Engineer Surveyors and Consultants in Ext. B21. They interpreted the warranty clause to mean : "Warranted vessel shall be safely anchored or moored or secured and in each case watch and ward to be maintained." (Emphasis supplied) It is also stated by the expert that the phrase "Watch and Ward" means, "person or persons involved/required for maintaining a continuous watch/vigil for the purpose of guarding. (emphasis supplied). Marine insurance cases reveal the existence of such rigid provisions in the warranty clauses. A warranty to keep 24 hour watch over the site was adverted to in a recent case (Vests v. Butcher) (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 19. According to them, the express warranty clause is one which is generally incorporated in the vessel's Marine Hull Insurance Policy and as such any terms/phrases should be read in the context of their meaning in marine usage and practice. The experts concluded that the clause would mean : "Warranted vessel shall be safely anchored or moored or secured and in each case Watch and Ward to be maintained." 28. The learned Judge underscored the legal character of a warranty when he observed: "Even if it is assumed that the warranty clause would be strictly complied with,......." There is no scope for such assumption, when the law is clear. It has never been in doubt from the time of Bond v. Nutt, (1777) 2 Cowp. 601, when Lord Mansfield declared the law on the point. That was a case where a ship was warranted "to have sailed on or before August 1." The classic observation is : "Had she or had she not sailed on or before that day? No matter what cause prevented her, if the fact is that she had not sailed, though she stayed behind for the best reasons, the policy was void. " In a later case, the court reiterated that exact compliance of the warranties required. No matter what cause prevented her, if the fact is that she had not sailed, though she stayed behind for the best reasons, the policy was void. " In a later case, the court reiterated that exact compliance of the warranties required. In that case, the court rejected the extreme contention that something more than such compliance was needed. In Simons (Trading as Acme Credit Services) v. Gale: The "Cap Tarifa", (1958) 2 Lloyd's Rep 1, the Privy Council held that an action by the insured failed for non-compliance with the warranty. It is unnecessary to over burden the judgment with decisions insisting on exacting compliance with the warranty clause, in the light of the statutory coverage of that area under the Marine Insurance Act, 1963. Section 35(3) of the Act states: "A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy the insurer is discharged from liability.........." 29. In the light of our conclusion regarding the scope and amplitude of the warranty, and our finding on the failure of the plaintiff in establishing due compliance with the terms of the warranty, the suit has necessarily to fail. The decree granted by the court below, consequently, is unsustainable and has to be vacated. We do so. The appeal is allowed. We do not, however, make any order as to costs, inasmuch as the defendant- Insurance Company has not been diligent and vigilant as is expected of a strong and public undertaking. No one in that office appears to have rushed to the place from where the vessel was reported as missing. Apart from a routine communication and thrusting every work of the surveyors, no interest or involvement on the part of the officers in the Quilon office are discernible from the evidence adduced in the case. We disapprove of such indifferent attitude of responsible officials in organisations like the Insurance Company. Winking the eyes for a dishonest claim to be allowed is a deceit practise on the public and the public exchequer. Denial or delay in the settling of a claim will defeat the very purpose of the insurance cover and will ultimately lead to the institution losing its credibility against the business community. Winking the eyes for a dishonest claim to be allowed is a deceit practise on the public and the public exchequer. Denial or delay in the settling of a claim will defeat the very purpose of the insurance cover and will ultimately lead to the institution losing its credibility against the business community. What is needed is a swift action, swift honest action, with an open but critical mind so as to ensure that only a bona fide and real claim is allowed and that it is allowed in the quickest possible time. The conduct of the officials before the nationalisation in relation to their business activities and the conduct of the cases before the court has left such an impression in the minds of those who had occasion to deal with this type of litigation during the different periods. It is time that the deficiencies are looked into seriously at the highest level of the Government of India. A copy of the judgment will be forwarded to the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, for that purpose. Appeal allowed.