JUDGMENT 1. By The Court:- This second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 21.11.1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Ajmer dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 25.4.1986 passed by the learned Additional Munsif, Ajmer (East) in Civil Suit No. 89/80. Since the other two appeals; S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 44/89 Chhitarmal Vs. Shri Guru Singh Sabha and S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 45/89 Sher Singh Vs. Shri Guru Singh Sabha also arise out of the above said judgment, they are also being disposed of by this judgment. Since the facts giving rise to these three appeals are similar and the main judgment was announced by the learned Additional District Judge in the appeal filed by the present appellant (M/s Bagga Cycle Company), the facts of the case of the present appellant are being mentioned for the purpose of convenience and are as under: The appellant M/s Bagga Cycle Company (hereinafter to be referred to as the defendant), is a tenant of Shri Guru Singh Sabha (hereinafter to be referred to as the plaintiff) in respect of a shop situated in the property of the plaintiff in Ajmer. On 7.5.1979, a suit was filed by the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the shop in dispute on the grounds, inter-alia, of default in payment of rent for the period from 1.9.1978 to 30.4.1979 and for recovery of Rs. 120/- by way of arrears of rent/damages. On receipt of notice, the defendant put in appearance in the court through counsel on 23.7.1979 and moved an application stating that without prejudice to his rights to contest the quit the rent payable by him be determined and he be granted time to pay the same and also sought adjournment for filing of the written statement. The learned trial court adjourned the case to 7.8.1979 for filing of the written statement, but on the adjourned date, instead of filing the written statement, the defendant filed an application under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Trust Act) stating that the plaintiff is a public trust and had not got itself registered under the Trust Act and praying that the suit be stayed till the plaintiff got itself registered. Vide order dated 3.9.1979, the learned trial court directed the defendant to file the written statement and to take the objection regarding non-registration of the plaintiff under the Trust Act in it. In the written statement filed by the defendant on 15.10.1979, it was not denied that the rent was due w.e.f. 1.9.1978, but it was stated that it was because the plaintiff had been avoiding to receive the same although the defendant had been trying to pay it to the plaintiff. The suit was also contested on the grounds that the plaintiff having not been registered under the Trust Act the suit was not maintainable and that Shri Shamsher Singh, the Secretary of the plaintiff- society, through whom the suit had been instituted had no authority to institute the same and it was alleged that the suit had been instituted due to the ill-will of the Secretary towards the defendant. On 15.10.1979 itself i.e. on the date of filing of the written statement, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court determined the arrears of rent and directed the defendant to pay the same to the plaintiff or deposit it in court within 15 days from the date of the order and also to pay to the plaintiff or to deposit in court future rent month by month by 15th of each succeeding month. Since, the defendant failed to comply with the order regarding payment of arrears of rent and future rent, an application dated 6.3.1980 was moved by the plaintiff under Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rent Act) praying that the defence of the defendant against his eviction be struck out. In support of .the said application an affidavit dated 28.11.1981 sworn by the Secretary of the plaintiff was filed. In support of .the said application an affidavit dated 28.11.1981 sworn by the Secretary of the plaintiff was filed. In this affidavit, it had been stated that taking into consideration the time extended by the learned trial court, the arrears of rent was to be deposited by 14.11.1979, but it was deposited only on 20.11.1979 and that the rent for the month of October, 1979 which was to be deposited by 15th November, 1979 was deposited on 20.11.1979 and thereafter the rent for the period from November, 1979 to July, 1980 was deposited only on 7.5.1980 and no rent at all had been deposited after July, 1980. After hearing the learned counsel-for the parties, the learned trial court held that the defendant had failed to comply with the order regarding payment of rent passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rent Act and his defence was liable to be struck out and, consequently, vide order dated 10.12.1981, the learned trial court struck out the defence of the defendant. The plaintiff got itself registered under the Trust Act and produced the registration certificate dated 30.11.1981 in the court. The learned trial court framed the necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties (including that of the defendant although his defence had been struck out) and hearing their learned counsel came to the conclusion that Shri Shamsher Singh had the authority to institute the suit and the suit had not been instituted due to any ill-will against the defendant and further that the plaintiff having got itself registered under the Trust Act, could not be denied the relief asked in the suit. It also held that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for a period of more than six months at the time of institution of the suit and having not complied with the order passed by the court for depositing the rent during the pendency of the suit, was liable to be evicted from the shop in dispute and also that the plaintiff was entitled to receive from the defendant rent for the period from 1.9.1978 onwards and the defendant is liable to pay the same after adjusting the amount already deposited in court. Consequently, vide the judgment dated 25.4.1986, the suit for eviction and for recovery of the rent. was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Consequently, vide the judgment dated 25.4.1986, the suit for eviction and for recovery of the rent. was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The appeal filed by the defendant was heard by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 2, Ajmer, who dismissed it vide the impugned judgment dated 21.11.1988. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant has approached this court by filing this second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure . 2. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. 3. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the defendant is that the plaintiff is a public trust and was registered under the Trust Act only on 30.11.1981 and that in view of section 29 of the Trust Act the suit filed by the plaintiff could not be heard, and, as such, the learned trial court could not pass the order under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rent Act before the registration of the plaintiff under the Trust Act and, consequently, the order dated 15.10.79 determining the rent payable by the defendant and directing him to pay the same as also the future rent was illegal. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand is that the defendant himself having moved an application praying that the rent be determined and he be given time to deposit the same cannot question the validity of the order dated 15.12.1979 passed by the learned trial court, as he was a consenting party thereto. It is also contended that no such point having been raised at the time of arguments before the learned trial court, the defendant cannot be allowed to raise it in this appeal. It is further contended that the hearing of the suit starts when the court frames issues and an order under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act has to be passed before the issues are framed. 4. It is further contended that the hearing of the suit starts when the court frames issues and an order under Section 13(3) of the Rent Act has to be passed before the issues are framed. 4. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rent Act reads as under: "13(3) : In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of Sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest or such amount calculated at the rate of 6% per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination: Provided that while determining the amount under this Sub-section the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of filing of the suit." 5. Bare reading of the above said provision shows that no application is required to be made for an order determining the rent and the court has to pass such an order in every case which is instituted on the ground of the default in payment of rent. Admittedly, on receipt of notice of the suit, the defendant appeared in court on 23;7.1979 and moved an application with a prayer that the rent be determined and he be given time to deposit the same, subject to his rights in the suit. The plaintiff did not oppose this application and the order determining the rent was passed on 15.10.1979. Admittedly, on receipt of notice of the suit, the defendant appeared in court on 23;7.1979 and moved an application with a prayer that the rent be determined and he be given time to deposit the same, subject to his rights in the suit. The plaintiff did not oppose this application and the order determining the rent was passed on 15.10.1979. The defendant- appellant was a consenting party to the passing of this order and, it appears, for the same reason, he did not agitate this point while addressing arguments before the learned trial court. There is great force in the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that, in these circumstances, the defendant cannot be allowed to question the validity of the order dated 15.10.1979. In this view of the matter, 1 need not go into the authorities referred at the Bar to determine the question whether while passing an order determining the rent payable by the tenant the court can be said to be hearing the suit within the meaning of Section 29 of the Trust Act. The first contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant is, therefore, rejected. 6. It has next been contended on behalf of the defendant that the amount deposited by way of rent had been withdrawn by the plaintiff and, as such, in view of Section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (the A.P. Act) the plaintiff had waived .,is right of getting a decree for ejectment against the defendant. Before dealing with this argument, it may be recorded that this point has been raised only in this appeal and not in the other two appeals, as no deposit of rent whatsoever was made by the other two appellants Chhitarmal and Sher Singh inspite of the orders dated 23.10.79 passed by the learned trial court determining the rent and directing them to pay or deposit in court the arrears of rent as also the future rent. Section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under : "112. Waiver of forfeiture. Section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under : "112. Waiver of forfeiture. - A forfeiture under Section 11], clause (g), is waived by acceptance of rent which has become due since the forfeiture, or by distress for such rent, or by any other act on the part of the lessor showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting : Provided that the lessor is aware that the forfeiture has been incurred : Provided also that, where rent is accepted, after the institution of a suit to eject the lessee on the ground of forfeiture, such acceptance is not a waiver." 7. This section talks of waiver of forfeiture of lease under clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, which reads as under : "111 (g) by forfeiture, that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor my re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease." 8. Bare reading of the above said provisions make it clear that the question of waiver arises when it is a case of determination of the lease due to forfeiture on the grounds mentioned in, clause (g) of section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Moreover, second proviso to section 112 makes it clear that where the rent is accepted after the institution of the suit for ejectment, it would not amount to waiver. Moreover, second proviso to section 112 makes it clear that where the rent is accepted after the institution of the suit for ejectment, it would not amount to waiver. The present suit has not been filed on the ground of forfeiture of lease under the Transfer of Property Act, but has been filed on the ground mentioned in the Rent Act and in the order determining the rent it has been directed, in accordance with Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Rent Act, that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff or deposit in court the arrears of rent as well as future rent and it is only if the order for depositing of arrears and future rent is complied with that the benefit of Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Rent Act can be claimed by a tenant. The defendant was obliged to make payment of the rent during the pendency of the suit either by paying it to the plaintiff directly or by depositing in court and if the amount had been paid to the plaintiff in compliance with the above said order passed by the court, could it be said that the plaintiff had waived his right to get the decree for eviction against the defendant ? My answer to this is in the negative. For the same reason, I hold that the amount deposited by the defendant in court in this case was meant for payment to the plaintiff who has a right to receive rent for the period that the defendant remains in occupation of the shop in dispute and by withdrawing the said amount, the plaintiff cannot be said to have waived his right of getting a decree for ejectment against the defendant. This contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is also, therefore, without any force and I have no hesitation in rejecting it. 9. This contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is also, therefore, without any force and I have no hesitation in rejecting it. 9. It has next been contended on behalf of the defendant that the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed in default for the non-appearance of the plaintiff on 3.9.1980 and was ultimately restored on 25.3.1981 and that on the dismissal of the suit in default the order determining the rent payable by the defendant as arrears as also future rent in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rent Act came to an end and after the restoration of the suit a fresh order in this respect has to be passed and no such order having been passed, the defendant cannot be said to have committed any default in payment of rent and, as such, neither his defence could be struck out nor could he be denied the benefit of sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Rent Act. Reliance has been placed on the Single Bench decision of this court in Prahalad Singh Vs. Mohan Das, S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 516/86 decided on 15.4.1987 and reported as 1987 (2) R.L.R. page 539 . Before dealing with this argument, it may be relevant to quote the facts in respect thereof which are as under: The suit was fixed for hearing on 3.9.1980 and when it was called, although the defendant was present, no appearance was made on behalf of the plaintiff and, as such, the suit was dismissed by the learned trial court. On 3.9.1980 itself, the plaintiff moved an application for restoration of the suit. The said application was put up before the court on 4.9.1980. The learned trial court, without issuing the notice of the application to the defendant, allowed the application and issued notice of the suit to the defendant for 8.9.1980. Qn 8.9.1980, the defendant appeared and moved an application stating that since the suit was restored without notice to him, he wanted to file a revision in the High Court. and sought an adjournment for that purpose. Qn 8.9.1980, the defendant appeared and moved an application stating that since the suit was restored without notice to him, he wanted to file a revision in the High Court. and sought an adjournment for that purpose. The defendant challenged the order dated 4.9.1980 and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this court vide order passed in S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 373/8() on 6.9.1980 allowed the revision petition and set-aside the order dated 4.9.1980 and gave notice of the application dated 3.9.1980 to the defendant and directed the learned trial court to decide the above said application afresh. The defendant filed reply to the said application and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court restored the suit on payment of Rs. 10/- as cost vide its order dated 25.3.1981 and the cost was paid by the plaintiff and accepted by the defendant in court on the same date. 10. The suit filed by the plaintiff was admittedly a civil suit and was to be tried in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code). The suit in this case was dismissed in default under rule 8 of order 9 of the Code and was restored under rule 9 of order 9 of the Code. Rule 9 of order 9 provides that on the dismissal being set-aside, the court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. It is, therefore, clear that when the suit is restored, the court has to proceed with the suit and not to deal with it "denovo" and this indicates that the further proceedings in the suit have to start from the stage where they were pending before the suit was dismissed and there is no requirement of law that upon such restoration the entire proceedings must be started afresh. Consequently, on the restoration of a dismissed suit, all previous proceedings and the interim orders revive and do not require a fresh order to give them vigour. I am supported in this view by the decision of the Madras High Court in case Vavvala- Veeraswami Vs. Pulim Ramanna reported as AIR 1935 Madras 365 ; by the decision of Patna High Court in case Bankam Chandra and others Vs. V. Chandi Prasad reported as AIR 1956 Patna 271 , by the decision of Allahabad High Court in case Babu Vs. Pulim Ramanna reported as AIR 1935 Madras 365 ; by the decision of Patna High Court in case Bankam Chandra and others Vs. V. Chandi Prasad reported as AIR 1956 Patna 271 , by the decision of Allahabad High Court in case Babu Vs. Dewan Singh reported as AIR 1952 Allahabad 749 , by the decision of the Pepsu High Court in case Karora Singh and others Vs. Babu Ram reported as AIR 1952 Pepsu 22 and by the decision of Delhi High Court in case Smt. Radhey Bai Vs. Smt. Savitri Sharma reported as 1975 Rent Law Reporter 234 11. The facts of the Prahalad Singh's case (supra) were that in a suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff an order under clause (3) of section 13 of the Rent Act was passed and the tenant had deposited the arrears of rent and had also complied with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Rent Act by paying rent for future months and the rent upto the period 31.12.1983 had been deposited by the defendant-tenant in the above said suit. The suit was dismissed in default on 21.10.1982. The plaintiff moved an application for restoration and the learned counsel for the defendant made an endorsement thereon stating that he had no objection to the restoration of the suit. The court, however, did not act on the above said endorsement made by the learned counsel for the defendant and fixed a date for reply and for further proceedings for enquiry about the sufficient cause. Without completing the enquiry and on the basis of the earlier endorsement made on the application for restoration moved by the plaintiff, the court vide its order dated 15.3.1984 restored the suit. The rent for the period from January to April, 1984 was not deposited by the defendant-tenant and, as such, the plaintiff moved an application under sub- section (5) of section 13 of the Rent Act praying that the defence of the defendant-tenant be struck out. The said application of the plaintiff was allowed by the learned trial court who struck out the defence of the defendant-tenant. The said application of the plaintiff was allowed by the learned trial court who struck out the defence of the defendant-tenant. In appeal, the first Appellate Court held that the provision of sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Rent Act is directory in nature and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the defence should not be struck out and, as such, set-aside the order of the learned trial court in this regard. The plaintiff thereupon approached this court by filing the above said revision petition. During the course of arguments two contentions were raised on behalf of the plaintiff landlord; (i) that provision of sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Rent Act is mandatory in nature and; (ii) that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay, if any. It was held that the court had a discretion in the matter and the provision of sub-section 5 of section 13 of the Rent Act is not mandatory in nature and the tenant-defendant could not he said to have committed any default by not depositing the rent during the period that the suit remained dismissed, as he had no right and opportunity to deposit the rent in court till the suit was restored. It was further held that after the restoration of the suit the default for the period during which the suit was not pending should be condoned and the deposit process must start. Although the point was not before the court, it was observed that sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Rent Act cannot come into operation after restoration of the suit and there should be determination of the dues of the intervening period and only thereafter subsection (4) of section 13 of the Rent Act comes into operation because the dispute of the intervening period cannot be resolved without the aid of the court. It may be noticed that while deciding the Prahalad Singh's case (supra), the court was dealing with a case where no default had been committed during the pendency of the suit and before it was dismissed in default and the question before the court was as to whether by not depositing the rent during the period that the suit was not on the file of the court the tenant can be said to have committed default to attract the provision of sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Rent Act and his defence could be struck out. No contention was raised on behalf the defendant that any fresh order is required to be passed for determining the rent for the arrears prior to the date when the suit was dismissed in default is restored and that the provision of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Rent Act in regard to the deposit of future rent would come into operation only after the passing of the fresh order determining the arrears of rent and as such it cannot be said that the decision in Prahalad Singh's case (supra) is an authority on the point. Even otherwise, the ruling in Prahalad Singh's case (supra) is of no assistance to any of the defendants as the defendants in the other two appeals admittedly did not deposit any rent whatsoever after the order dated 23.10.1979 determining the rent and directing them to pay the arrears as also the future rent within the time specified therm were passed and the defendant in this case committed default in complying with the order dated 15.10.1979 even in regard to the rent payable till the date of dismissal of the suit. The learned trial court consequently, was within its power to strike out the defence of the three defendants for such defaults committed by them and neither of them was entitled to the benefit mentioned in subsection (6) of section 13 of the Rent Act. Even after the passing of the order striking out the defence of the defendant, the learned trial court recorded the evidence of the defendant even on the merits of the case and discussed the evidence produced by the parties in regard to the default in payment of rent for a period of more than six months till the date of the institution of the suit. I, therefore, find no substance in this argument also of the learned counsel for the defendant. 12. The last submission made on behalf of the defendant of this case is that since the ground of bonafide personal requirement originally taken in the plaint of the suit was given up it should be taken that the suit was only on the ground of default in payment of rent and the arrears of rent as determined. by the court under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Rent Act had been deposited by the defendant on 30.11.1979 and the proceedings in the suit should be deemed to have come to an end and the suit should be treated as having been dismissed on account of the benefit to be availed of by the defendant under sub-section (6) of section 13 of the Rent Act and the default in payment of rent for future months cannot deprive him of that benefit in the present case. There is no dispute that if a suit is brought on the ground of default in payment of rent, and the tenant deposits the rent as determined by the court without any plea which is required to be tried and decided by the court, the suit would cone to an end and no future rent as mentioned under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Rent Act is required to be deposited. However, if in a suit brought on the ground of default in payment of rent, the certain pleas are raised by the defendant as in the present case, the court has to try the case to decide those pleas of the defendants and the suit has to proceed and, as such, after making the deposit of the arrears of rent a tenant is required to deposit or pay the same month by month by 15th of each succeeding month as provided under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Rent Act and it is only when he has made such payment of arrears of rent already determined as also the future rent in accordance with the order passed by the court and within the period specified in such order that the tenant is entitled to the benefit of provision of sob-section (6) of section 13 of the Rent Act. In this case the order determining the rent was passed on 15.10.1979 and the rent was payable within 15 days. On an application having been moved by the defendant, the time was extended for another period of 15 days and as such the arrears of rent had to be deposited by 15th November, 1979, but the amount of arrears was deposited on 30.11.1979 without making a request to the court to further extend the time and the default was committed in depositing the rent for future months also till the suit was dismissed in default and after restoration no rent was deposited either for the period the suit was not on the file of the court or thereafter. The defendant thus could not claim the benefit of sub-section (6) of section 13 of the Rent Act. Similar argument addressed in case Yogendra Sharma Vs. Narayan Das & ors 1988 (2) Rent Control Reporter 433 was considered by Division Bench of this Court and was rejected. This point is also, therefore, without substance and is rejected. 13. No other point has been raised before me. 14. Finding that this appeal as also the other two appeals are without any substance, I dismiss all of them with costs. The defendant of this appeal as also the defendants of the other two appeals are, however, granted time till 30th April, 1991 for vacating the shops in dispute and for handing over the vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff subject to the condition that they would deposit the entire arrears of rent payable till the date of deposit within one month from today and would also furnish an undertaking before the learned trial court within the above said period to the effect that they would hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the shops in dispute to the plaintiff on or before 1st May, 1991 without the plaintiff going in for execution of the decrees passed against them. It is also subject to the condition that the rent for the future months would be deposited by 15th of each month in advance. It is also subject to the condition that the rent for the future months would be deposited by 15th of each month in advance. If this condition regarding payment of arrears of rent and for payment of future rent or furnishing undertaking to the court within the time specified above is not complied with by the defendants, the decrees passed against them would become executable at once without any further order from this court.Appeals dismissed with costs. *******