Dharam Dass Dutta v. VIII Additional District Judge
1991-10-31
M.P.SINGH
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M.P. SINGH, J. 1. Disputed premises is D-34/130 Hauz Katora, Varanasi. Respondents No. 3 and 4 are the owners and landlords residing at Calcutta. 2. M/s. Ramington Rand of India Ltd. was the tenant. Two rooms of the said premises were let out to it for office purposes on a monthly rent of Rs. 62.50 paise. It did not pay the rent after 1st April, 1977. It committed default in payment of rent for more than four months. Petitioner is the sub-tenant of the company. Notice terminating the tenancy was served on the tenant but the arrears of rent were not paid. Hence the suit was filed. 3. M/s. Remington Rand of India Ltd. was arrayed as Defendant No. 1. The Petitioner who was the sub-tenant was shown as Defendant No. 2. 4. Defendant No. 1 did not file any written statement. 5. The Petitioner contested the suit stating that he was a tenant and not a sub-tenant. According to him initially the tenancy was created in favour of the company. The Petitioner was in its employment. The company closed its business in Varanasi. The Plaintiff has accepted the Petitioner as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. The rent was paid to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant No. 1 after deducting the amount from his salary. After sometime he resigned from the service of the Defendant No. 1 and occupied the premises in his own independent capacity as a tenant. He has paid rent up to March, 1977. Thereafter the rent was offered to the Plaintiffs. They refused to accept the same. The amount was deposited u/s 30 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 6. The learned Judge Small Causes decreed the suit for ejectment of the Defendant No. 1 and for recovery of arrears of rent. It was found that the Defendant No. 1 was in arrears of rent for more than four months and has inducted Defendant No. 2 as a sub-tenant. An order directing the Defendant No. 2 to vacate the premises within three months was also passed. Against the said order the Petitioner filed a revision which was also dismissed. The present writ petition is directed against this order. 7. Heard Sri A.C. Tripathi, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and perused the record. 8.
An order directing the Defendant No. 2 to vacate the premises within three months was also passed. Against the said order the Petitioner filed a revision which was also dismissed. The present writ petition is directed against this order. 7. Heard Sri A.C. Tripathi, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and perused the record. 8. The only point to be considered in this writ petition is whether the Petitioner was a sub-tenant or not. 9. This much has been admitted by the Petitioner that the Defendant No. 1 was in possession of the accommodation as a tenant. It vacated the premises in 1971 after closing its business at Varanasi. 10. The Petitioner's case was that after 1971 the landlords have admitted him as a tenant. He has paid rent from 1971 to 1977. Thereafter he deposited the rent u/s 30 of the U.P. Act. No. XIII of 1972. There was no default. 11. The Petitioner has miserably failed to prove the mode of his admission as a tenant. Neither any contract of tenancy has been filed nor any other documentary evidence in proof of the same is on record. There was only a vague and oral statement but it has been disbelieved by both the courts below. I do not find any legal infirmity in the concurrent findings that the Petitioner was a sub-tenant. 12. Now I come to the validity of the deposit made by the Petitioner u/s 30 of the Act. Once it has been found that the Petitioner was not a tenant but a sub-tenant, the deposit u/s 30 of the Act becomes invalid. It contemplates about the deposit to be made by a tenant. He has also failed to prove that rent was offered to the landlords by him but it was refused. 13. The Plaintiffs were residing at Calcutta. They could not know the fact that the company has closed its business at Varanasi and has admitted the Petitioner as a sub-tenant. As soon as they came to know about the same, the suit for ejectment was filed. The first contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that he became a statutory tenant u/s 14 of the Act. The submission is misconceived. 14. Section 14 of the Act contemplates regularisation of occupation of existing tenant.
As soon as they came to know about the same, the suit for ejectment was filed. The first contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that he became a statutory tenant u/s 14 of the Act. The submission is misconceived. 14. Section 14 of the Act contemplates regularisation of occupation of existing tenant. According to it any licensee, within the meaning of section 2-A or a tenant, in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the U.P. Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)(Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement, shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building. 15. u/s 2-A a short term licence is created by the landlord or a tenant in possession admitting any other person to occupy for purely temporary residential accommodation for a period not exceeding three months without any order of allotment u/s 16 of the Act. It is not the case of the Petitioner that he occupied the premises as a licensee of the landlords or of Defendant No. 1. 16. Another equally important ingredient of section 14 is that the possession should be with the consent of the landlord. There is no evidence on record that the landlords have given their consent to the Petitioners. Section 14 of the Act has absolutely no application in the present case. 17. The next contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that in the instant case the burden lay on the Plaintiffs to prove that the Petitioner was a sub-tenant. In support of his contention he has relied upon a decision Peshawari Lal v. Surendra Kumar 1979 U.P. RCC 175. I do not find any merit in it. 18. The constant view of the Supreme Court now is that the question of burden of proof loses its importance when both sides have adduced their evidence. 19. The expression "burden of proof" really means two different things. It means sometimes that a party is required to prove an allegation before judgment can be given in its favour. It also means that on a contested issue one of the two contending party has to adduce evidence.
19. The expression "burden of proof" really means two different things. It means sometimes that a party is required to prove an allegation before judgment can be given in its favour. It also means that on a contested issue one of the two contending party has to adduce evidence. After both the parties have entered into issue and led evidence, the matter becomes of only academic interest Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others, AIR 1960 SC 100 , Smt. Prem Lata v. Arhant Kumar Jain AIR 1973 SC 625, Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 , Babban (deceased by L.R's.) Vs. Shiv Nath and Others, AIR 1986 All 185 . 20. Both the courts below have recorded categorical finding of fact that the Defendant No. 1 was the tenant. A sub-tenancy was created in favour of the Defendant No. 2 (Petitioner). The Defendant No. 1 was in arrears for more than four months. Accordingly a decree for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent was passed. 21. After examining the record carefully I find that the impugned order does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. There is no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.