JUDGMENT S. Sagbir Ahmad, J. - The petitioner by means of the present petition has challenged the order dated 7991 passed by opposite party no. 3 by which the petitioner's appeal filed against the assessment order dated 6390 for the period April, 1978 to December, 1989, amounting to Rs: 13,79,263.00 has been dismissed as barred by time. 2. We have heard Sri P.K. Sinha, for the petitioner, Sri Rakesh Bajpai for opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 and Sri K.D. Nag for opposite party no. 3 and 4. 3. The original order of assessment was passed on 6390. The order was communicated to the petitioner by the U.P. Pollution Control Board through their letter dated 9390, which was received by the petitioner on 15390. The appeal was filed on 19790. Since the appeal was filed beyond 30 days, which is a period of limitation prescribed by Rule 9(3) of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1973, the petitioner also filed an application for condonation of delay. The opposite parties, however, rejected the application and the memo of appeal as barred by time. It has been held by the opposite party no. 3 that the Chairman of the Cess Appellate Committee had the power to condone a delay of 15 days only but since the appeal was beyond time by 96 days, the Committee had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. 4. The period of limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days from the date of the communication of the order. The period of limitation is prescribed by Rule 9(3) of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1973 which provides as under ; 9(3) Such appeal shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of communication of the order of assessment or the order imposing penalty on the appellant: Provided that if the Chairman of the Appellate Committee is satisfied that there was good and sufficient reason for the delay in preferring the appeal, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow the appeal to be preferred after the expiry of the aforesaid period of thirty days and before the expiry of forty five days from the date of communication of the order of assessment, or the order imposing penalty, on the appellant. 5. 5. A perusal of the provision quoted above would indicate that in appropriate cases the Chairman of the Appellate Committee, on being satisfied that there was sufficient reason for the delay in preferring the appeal, may condone the delay in filing the appeal but the appeal should in that case must have been filed before the expiry of 45 days from the date of communication of the order of assessment. This indicates that although the period for filing the appeal is 30 days, the appeal can be entertained and the delay can be condoned provided the appeal is filed before the expiry of 45 days. 6. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1973 have been made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 17 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (Act No. 36 of 1977). 7. The provision for appeal has been made in Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 provides as under: 13(1) Any person or local authority aggrieved by an order of assessment made under Section 6 or by an order imposing penalty made under Section 11 may, within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to such authority in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Every appeal preferred under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. (3) After the receipt of an appeal under subsection (1) the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard in the matter, dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. (4) Every order passed in appeal under this section shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law. 8. A perusal of the above provision would indicate that the appeal can be filed within such time as may be prescribed. The word prescribed has been defined in Section 2{b) which means prescribed by rules made under the Act, 9. The Central Government has been vested with the powers to make rules under Section 17 of the Act. Section 17(2)(g) provides that the rule may provide for the authority to which an appeal may be filed under Section 13 (1) of the Act and the time within which and the form and manner in which such appeal may be filed. 10. Section 17(2)(g) provides that the rule may provide for the authority to which an appeal may be filed under Section 13 (1) of the Act and the time within which and the form and manner in which such appeal may be filed. 10. As pointed out above Rule 9(3) is the relevant rule made in this regard which prescribes a period of 30 days as the period for the filing of the appeal. This proviso to Rule 9(3), which has been extracted in the earlier part of the judgment, has made a provision for the condonation of delay for the period of 15 days. 11. The language of the rule is specific and clear. Since the statutory provision does not give jurisdiction to the appellate committee to condone the delay beyond 15 days for filing the appeal against the assessment order, the appeal of the petitioner was, incur opinion, rightly dismissed as barred by limitation. 12. It may be pointed out that in Mohammad Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. and others (1976) 4 Supreme Court Cases 330 provisions similar to those contained in Rule 9(3) were considered by the Supreme Court in connection with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 13. Section 58(2) and (3), which were considered by the Supreme Court, provided as under: 58(2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: Provided that the application for the renewal of a permit shall be made (a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, not less than one hundred and twenty days before the date of its expiry; and (b) in any other case, not less than sixty days before the date of its expiry: Provided further that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso to subsection (2), the Regional Transport Authority may entertain an application for the renewal of a permit after the last date specified in the said proviso for the making of such an application, if the application is made not more than fifteen days after the said last date and is accompanied by the prescribed fee. 14. 14. On a consideration of the above provision the Supreme Court held that the delay beyond the maximum period indicated in subsec. (3) quoted above, cannot be condoned. 15. The scheme of Rule 9 is not different, 16. Under the circumstances mentioned above, we see no infirmity in the judgment passed by the opposite party no. 3 and dismiss the petition at the admission stage. (Petition dismissed.)