JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against the notice dated 23rd December, 1985 and the order dated 28th January, 1986 seeking a further direction for reinstatement of the petitioner in the service of the Bank with all consequential benefits. 2. The petitioner's case is that he was appointed with the United Commercial Bank in the year 1961 as Clerk-cum-typist and, he was promoted as Officer in the year 1976 on the basis of the recommendation of the selection committee. When pillai Committee's recommendations were implemented, the petitioner was fitted in the Junior Management Grade Scale I, in the year 1976. When the petitioner was posted as Branch Manager of Dausa Branch of the Bank, he was placed under suspension by an order dated 19th September, 1983, passed by the Deputy General Manager (Personal Administration). The petitioner ' as placed under suspension because a case was registered with the Central Bureau of Investigation regarding offices under Sections 428, IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(D) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The aforesaid case registered against the petitioner was investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Jaipur and ultimately a final report was filed on 25th May, 1984, by the CBI. This final report given by the CBI in the Court of Special Judge dealing with the CBI cases, was accepted by the court on 27th July, 1984. A certified copy of this FR along with the order of acceptance thereof has been placed on record as annx. 1. After the submission of the final report on 25th May, 1984 and before its acceptance on 27th July, 1984, the petitioner was served with a memorandum dated 11th June, 1984, along with a charge-sheet under Regulation 6 of the United Commercial Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, which is on record as Annexure/2.Reply Annx.3 was filed by the petitioner giving a- detailed explanation therein.The petitioner has alleged that one Shri K.L. Sharma was appointed as Enquiry Officer and he held the charges proved and on the basis of this enquiry, an order was passed on 27th July, 1985, whereby a penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect for each of the charges was imposed against the petitioner, which is Annx. 4 on the record. There were five charges against the petitioner. 4 on the record. There were five charges against the petitioner. In accordance with the punishment order dated 27th July, 1985, five annual increments of the petitioner could be with held with cumulative effect, but it was further ordered that the punishment of stoppage of increments will be concurrent. Therefore, in all, one grade increment, in effect, is to be stopped with cumulative effect. A copy of the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner along with the punishment order. Al,though, the final order in the enquiry had been passed on 27th July, 1985, the petitioner's suspension was not revoked. The petitioner was continued under suspension. After a lapse of five months, a letter dated 3rd January, 1986, was sent to the petitioner under the signatures of the Divisional Manager and a notice was, thus, given to the petitioner proposing penalty, along with a notice dated 23rd December, 1985, issued by the General Manager (Personnel Inspection and Vigilance) Reviewing Authority, enhancing the punishment of removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. The notice dated 23rd December, 1985, is on record as an enclosure to the letter dated 3rd January, 1986, Annexure/5.The petitioner sent a reply to this notice enhancing punishment under his cover dated 8th January, 1966, and, through this reply the petitioner contested the notice of enhancement of punishment. Personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner and there after the order dated 28th January, 1986 was served upon him, here by the punishment of removal from service was imposed against the petitioner. It is against the order dated 28th January, 1986, read with notice dated 23rd December, 1985, that the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. A reply to the writ petition was filed on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2. In the reply, the stand taken by the respondents is that this Court is not a Court of Appeal and there is no error in the impugned order. The order had been passed in accordance with United Commercial Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Shri Garg has submitted that under these Regulations, there is a provision for review under Regulation 18 and the impugned order has been passed after following the procedure as has been laid down in Regulation 18. Regulation 18 with regard to the review is reproduced as under: "18. Shri Garg has submitted that under these Regulations, there is a provision for review under Regulation 18 and the impugned order has been passed after following the procedure as has been laid down in Regulation 18. Regulation 18 with regard to the review is reproduced as under: "18. Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Reviewing Authority may call for the record of the case within six months of the date of the final order and after reviewing the case pass such orders thereon as it may deam fit: Provided that - (i) if any enhanced penalty, which the Reviewing Authority proposes to impose, is a major penalty specified in clauses (a),(0, (g) or (h) of regulation 4 and an enquiry as provided under regulation 6 has not already been held in the case, the Reviewing Authority shall direct that such an enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6 and thereafter consider the record of the enquiry and pass such orders as it may deem proper; (ii) if the Reviewing Authority decides to enhance the punishment but an enquiry has already been held in accordance with the provisions of regulation 6, the Reviewing Authority shall give show cause notice to the officer employee as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass an order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer employee." 4. On behalf of the petitioner, the order dated 28th January, 1986 has been assailed on the ground that the same has been passed without application of mind and the order is not a speaking order as no reasons have been given in support of the order. Shri Keshote has submitted that the order does not even recite that the reply to the notice of enhancement of punishment given to the petitioner was not satisfactory and, that the petitioner's reply has not at all been considered before passing the impugned order. Shri Keshote has submitted that the order does not even recite that the reply to the notice of enhancement of punishment given to the petitioner was not satisfactory and, that the petitioner's reply has not at all been considered before passing the impugned order. Shri Keshote has further submitted that as per the enquiry report itself, though the allegations have been found proved, it has been recorded in the end of the enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer, that while awarding punishment to the delinquent officer the Disciplinary Authority may keep in mind that this O.D. account was adjusted subsequently on 12th April 1983 and was ultimately closed in June, 1984 and the Bank was not directly put to financial loss as regards this over draft is concerned. Shri Keshote has submitted that in view of the observations made in the enquiry report, when the Bank has not suffered any loss even if it is taken that the petitioner had exceeded the limits of his powers in the matter of giving over-drafts, it cannot be said that it was a case of misconduct and at the most it is a case of irregularity committed by the petitioner for which he could not have been subjected to the extreme penalty of removal from service and the Punishment of stoppage of increments as was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was sufficient. 5. Shri C.K. Garg appearing for the respondents has submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction, nor any error apparent on the face of the record, nor the order has been passed in breach of the principles of natural justice and, there fore, there is no question of issue of a writ of certiorari and, he has relied upon Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) , Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque ( AIR 1955 SC 233 ) , and Gan pat v. Shashi Kant, ( AIR 1978 SC 356 ) , In the aforesaid cases, the principles and scope of writ of certiorari have been laid down and, therefore, there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions. However, I find that the requirements of giving reasons in support of an order is a part and parcel of the requirement of principle of natural justice and, if an order is not a speaking order, it certainly suffers from an error of law apparent on the fact of the record, as has been laid down in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, ( AIR 1979 SC 798 ) . The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduce as under: " The Order is clearly vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record if it contains only the final and operative order made by the Commission and does not record any reasons whatsoever in support of it." 6. Therefore, it has to be examined in the facts of this case as to whether the impugned order Annx.7 dated 28th January, 1986 as has been passed in this case, is a speaking order or not and whether it has been passed after active application of mind and after considering the reply to the show cause notice filed by the petitioner or not? 7. The notice dated 23rd December, 1985 which was sent to the petitioner by the General Manager shows that he did not consider the punishment awarded to the petitioner to be adequate and commensurate with the wrongful acts committed by the petitioner because in his view allowing clean over-draft in the current account of Dr. G.S. Chawla, which was beyond the discretionary powers of the petitioner and which was allowed by the petitioner without the knowledge and sanction of the higher authorities was a grave misconduct. G.S. Chawla, which was beyond the discretionary powers of the petitioner and which was allowed by the petitioner without the knowledge and sanction of the higher authorities was a grave misconduct. The petitioner's reply to this show cause notice - as enclosed with Annexure/6, shows that apart from the other submissions made by him explaining the circumstances in which the over-draft was allowed, he has also referred to that part of the finding in the enquiry report in which it was observed that the Bank had not suffered any loss due to the aforesaid over-draft, and that the decision to allow over-draft pending consideration of the formal application for loan under the scheme for personal loan to the medical professionals was taken by him in the interest of the Bank to increase its business in lending to the priority sector and the Bank had earned interest thereon and further that the only mistake which the petitioner committed in allowing the over-draft was to give it beyond the discretionary powers vested in him. But the over draft was got adjusted as soon as it was desired by the higher authorities of the Bank with due amount of interest. The petitioner has further stated in this reply that no motives were imputed against him for the genuine decision taken by him in the interest of the Bank and exceeding the discretionary powers of the Branch Manager by him to meet out the immediate and urgent need of the genuine borrower was a common part of practice in the banking industry. It has been further stated by the petitioner that in his opinion Dr. G.S. Chawla could be a person instrumental in mobilising deposits in future and has acted in the bank's interest. It was further submitted by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice for enhancement of the punishment that in similar other cases where discretionary power has been exceeded by the Managers in allowing over-drafts or advances much lesser punishment was imposed and in number of cases only warning had been issued, or the officer concerned was only censured. It was after this reply that the order dated 28th January, 1986 was passed, which is Annexure/7 on the record. 8. I have gone through the order Annexure/7. It was after this reply that the order dated 28th January, 1986 was passed, which is Annexure/7 on the record. 8. I have gone through the order Annexure/7. I find that after narrating the facts, the Reviewing Authority has recorded as under : "I have since received Shri Sharma's reply dated 8th January 1986 to my above mentioned letter dated 23rd December, 1985. He also appeared before me for a personal hearing on 21st January, 1986. I have carefully examined his reply and also the submission made before me on 21st January, 1986. I do not find any extenuating circumstances of fresh points to reconsider the enhanced punishment proposed by me. In the above premises, I pass the following order under Regulation 4(g) of the United Commercial Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, "Shri B. S. Sharma is removed from the Bank's service with immediate effect which shall not be a disqualification for future employment." 9. It is clear from the reading of this order dated 28th January,1986, that the various submissions made by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice, some of which have been mentioned above, have not at all been dealt with by the Reviewing Authority and he has rest contented by passing the order in a slip,shod manner in saying that he had carefully examined the reply and the submissions made before him and did not find any extenuating circumstances or fresh points to re- consider the enhancement proposed by him. Disposal of the disciplinary cases in this manner, particularly relating to the enhancement of the punishment resulting in removal from service, as is the case here, cannot be said to be in accordance with the requirement of passing a reasoned and speaking order. The impugned order dated 26th January, 1986, Annx. 7, cannot be said to disclose that the Reviewing Authority had applied its mind to the various submissions made by the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice for enhancement of the punishment and the disposal of the reply by use of stock phrases that the latter has been carefully examined and no extenuating circumstances or fresh point was found cannot be held to be justified. It cannot be said that the submission made by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice were not even worth mentioning and the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of punishment without addressing itself to any of the points raised. The employees are entitled to just and reasonable treatment by reason of the protection conferred upon them by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (apart from the requirement of passing a reasoned and speaking order), such protection is available to them throughout the service and accordingly, it was incumbent upon the Reviewing Authority to have stated reasons in a manner which would disclose as to how each of the submissions made by the petitioner was considered and how and for what reason they did not find favour with the Reviewing Authority, Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. In the instant case, Annx.7 only shows the conclusion arrived at by the Reviewing Authority, but it does not disclose the reasons for which such a conclusion was arrived at. How there was active and objective application of mind by the Reviewing Authority on the points raised by the petitioner is not discernible from the order dated 28th January, 1986. In my opinion, it is not enough to say that the matter has been carefully examined and no extenuating circumstances have been found. The Reviewing Authority had issued the show cause notice for enhancement of the punishment because it considered that the nature of the misconduct committed by the petitioner was grave and, therefore, the punishment which had been imposed against the petitioner was inadequate. It is a fact which cannot be lost sight of that the original order of punishment which had been passed by the Divisional Manager after enquiry had been passed without affording a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner before passing the order dated 27th July, 1985. The order dated 27th July, 1985, whereby the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment with cumulative effect for which of the five charges was imposed against the petitioner with the further mention that the punishment stoppage of increments will run concurrently and at the end of this order it has been clearly mentioned that a copy of the enquiry report is enclosed. Thus, the copy of the enquiry report had been made available to the petitioner simultaneous to the service of the order of punishment and not in advance. The petitioner did not prefer any appeal against the order dated 27th July, 1985. Therefore, it is clear that so far as the Reviewing Authority is concerned, before it, the whole record of the enquiry proceedings, including the enquiry report was there at the time of the issue of the show cause notice for enhancement of the punishment, but the petitioner's version had come before him for the first time through his reply to the show cause notice and, therefore, the Reviewing Authority before passing the final order with regard to the enhancement of the punishment ought to have considered the petitioner's reply with an open mind and, even if the Reviewing Authority did not consider to pass an elaborate order, reasons in brief ought to have been given so as to inspire confidence that the points raised by the petitioner had at least received the attention of the Reviewing Authority. 10. Shri C.K. Garg has invited my attention to Union of India v. Rani Bali : 1983 (3) SLR 565 and has submitted that according to this judgment the Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Authority need not to give any reason in his order. However, it is not a case of this nature, rather it is a case for which the punishment order had already been passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Reviewing Authority had given a notice for enhancement of the punishment and the obvious purpose of giving the notice for enhancement of the punishment was to consider the petitioner's version before passing the impugned order of punishment. Therefore, even if the finding on the question of allegation of misconduct is affirmed, and on the question of finding of misconduct the Reviewing Authority was not required to give any reasons, it was certainly under an obligation to give reasons for passing the order of enhancement of punishment and such reasons could only be given after dealing with the sub,missions made by the petitioner in his reply. It is the trite law as laid down in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), that "It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of quasi- udicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every judicial order must be supported by reasons. That is the minimum requirement of law laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Textiles Ltd., Civil Appeal No.245 of 1970 D/- 17/12/1975 and Siemens Engineering Co. v. Union of India, 1976 Suppl. SCR 489 ( AIR 1976 SC 1785 ) ." Shri Keshote has invited my attention to Kripal Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, (1980 RLW 330) , in which the order of rejection of appeal and review summarily by a non-speaking order passed under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 was set aside by this Court. Shri Keshote has also placed reliance on Ram Chander v. Union of India, ( AIR 1986 SC 1173 ) , which was a case under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. In this case, it was argued that in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty cast on an appellate authority to give reasons where the order is of affirmance. The Court found that Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therein and observed in para 5 of the judgment as under:- "To say the least, this is just mechanical reproduction of the phraseology of R.22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules without any attempt on the part of the Railway Board either to marshall the evidence on record with a view to decide whether the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority could be sustained or not. There is also no indication that the Railway Board applied its mind as to whether the act of misconduct with which the appellant was charged together with the attendant circumstances and the past record of the appellant were such that he should have been visited with the extreme penalty of the removal from service for a single lapse of a span of 24 years of service. Dismissal or removal from service is a matter of grave concern to a civil servant who after such a long period of service, may not deserve such a harsh punishment. There being non-compliance with the requirements of R.22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules, the impugned order passed by the Railway Board is liable to be set aside." 11. So far as the regulations of the Bank, in the instant case, are concerned, the review has been provided under Regulation 18 according to which the Reviewing Authority shall pass an order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer employee. Thus, of course, there is no express requirement to record reasons, but when the Regulations say that the Reviewing Authority had to pass the order after taking into account the representation, the requirement of dealing with the submissions made in the representation is implicit. The bald mention that the reply had been carefully examined as also the submissions made before it and no extenuating circumstances or fresh point was found, does not amount to taking into account the representation. Taking into account of the representation is meant to account for the points raised in the representation and the Reviewing Authority was certainly under an obligation to deal with and decide the same. In Datar Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors, 1989 (1) RLR 757 , it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that an order passed by an executive authority in appeal must be a speaking order and it was observed in para 7 that the order (Annx.8) of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur dated December 4, 1987, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner does not contain any reason. Similarly, in Vasudeo K.Hardasani v. The. State of Rajasthan & Anr., ( 1989 (1) RLR 99 ) , the impugned order was set aside because it was found that the same was cryptic and laconic and, it was observed in para 10 while relying upon Ram Chander v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (supra) that the Appellate Authority should pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised before it in appeal. A mechanical production of phraseology of the rule will not be sufficient. (supra) that the Appellate Authority should pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised before it in appeal. A mechanical production of phraseology of the rule will not be sufficient. The Appellate Authority should marshall the evidence on record with a view to decide about the substantiality of the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority and the order passed should show that the appellate authority has applied its mind and considered the objections raised in appeal. In the case at hand, the Disciplinary Authority has not at all discussed any point raised by the petitioner in his lengthy memo of appeal (Annx. 7). It is not a speaking order. 12. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, neither the argument of Shri Garg that no speaking order was required to be passed in the case, can be accepted nor his argument that the order dated 28th January, 1986 is a speaking order, can be accepted and, I hold that it was incumbent upon the Reviewing Authority to have passed a reasoned and speaking order after dealing with the points raised by the petitioner and the submissions made by him in his reply to the show cause notice and accordingly, the impugned order dated 28th January, 1986 cannot he sustained, in the light of the above discussion and the same is quashed and set aside. 13. Shri C.K. Garg has also submitted before me while referring to Chernbur Co-op. Industrial Estate v. M.K. Chhatra, ( AIR 1975 SC 1725 ) that even if the impugned order of removal from service is quashed and set aside, the petitioner shot Id not be reinstated in the service because it is a case of loss of confidence and, as was done in Chembur Co-operative Industrial Estate v. M.K. Chhatra (supra), only compensation be paid to the petitioner. I have considered the aforesaid submission of Shri C.K. Garg and, I do not find that it is worthy of acceptance for the simple reason that the facts of this case do not show that the petitioner had been removed from service on the/ground of loss of confidence.The Enquiry Officer had clearly observed that the Disciplinary Authority may keep in mind that the over-draft amount had been adjusted subsequently on 12th April, 1983 and that the Bank had not directly been put to any financial loss and the Disciplinary Authority also did not find it to be a case of loss of confidence and passed an order of stoppage of annual grade increment with cumulative effect only. It appears that after considering the mitigating circumstances of this case, the Disciplinary Authority had taken(a reasonable and practical view of the matter. Even in the notice for enhancement of the punishment it was not indicated that it was a case of loss of confidence.-It was never the case of the respondent Bank against the petitioner at any stage that it was a case, of loss of confidence. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment, to which Shri C.K. Garg made a reference, cannot be invoked so as to deprive the petitioner of the relief of reinstatement 40 which he is otherwise entitled more particularly when the petitioner had stated in his reply to the show cause notice that in similar other cases where the Managers had exceeded the discretionary power in the matter of advancement of over-drafts much less punishment had been given and in some cases only warning had been issued, or the officer concerned was only censured. In the rejoinder to the reply also the petitioner in para I, page 9 (page 87 of the paper-book) has given the particulars of some cases. These cases may or may not be exactly identical, but the same have not been controverted, by filing any counter to the rejoinder. In the impugned order also the Reviewing Authority had not dealt with this submission of the petitioner made in the reply to the show cause notice that in similar cases much less punishment had been imposed. These cases may or may not be exactly identical, but the same have not been controverted, by filing any counter to the rejoinder. In the impugned order also the Reviewing Authority had not dealt with this submission of the petitioner made in the reply to the show cause notice that in similar cases much less punishment had been imposed. In the circumstances, when the petitioner has set up a case that there are number of officers who are under trial with ,CBI, or before the Court and in the case of Shri S.B. Maheshwari, Manager of Bobairlk-Ajmer Who had committed clear frauds and the frauds were proved by the batik authorities and, yet Shri Maheshwari was reinstated in Bank's service and` has been posted at Simla, there is, no justification to deny the relief of reinstatement to which the petitioner is otherwise entitled consequent upon the setting aside the impugned order dated 28th Janaury, 86 whereby the petitioner had been removed from service with immediate effect. 14. The impugned order dated 28th January, 1986 passed by the Reviewing Authority against the petitioner removing him from Bank's service with immediately effect, which shall not be a disqualification for future employment stands quashed and set aside and, it is directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in the service of the Bank on the post he was holding at the time of passing of the impugned- order and the petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits as if the impugned order dated 28th January, 1986 had never been passed against him. It will, however, be open for the respondent to pass any order with regard to the petitioner in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. 15. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Writ Petition Allowed - Order of removal from service quashed - No order as to costs. *******