JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE M.S., J.:---By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner seeks a direction quashing the order dated 3rd August, 1988 (Annexure-VI) passed by the respondent No. 1 Director of Education taking over the management of the schools run by the petitioner-Mandal, under section 3 of the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Management) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act'), which was confirmed by the State Government in appeal on the ground that no proper opportunity of showing cause against the intended action had been given to the petitioner and for declaring the provisions of section 3 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. 2. The petitioner is registered society under the Societies Registration Act, as also under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, and runs 14 schools in the districts of Chandrapur Nagpur and Yavatmal, and imparts education from Vth Standard to XIIth Standard, i.e., Secondary and Higher Secondary Education. The Charity Commissioner had instituted Civil Suit No. 5 of 1961 under section 50 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act against the petitioner-Chanda Shikshan Prasarak Mandal for removal of its members, for framing a scheme in supersession of the one which was in force and for recovering certain amounts due. A receiver came to be appointed during the pendency of the suit for managing the affairs of the Mandal. The District Court decreed the claim on 13th October, 1969. In First Appeal No. 129 of 1969, this Court had slightly modified the decree, in that so far as it related to framing and settling of the scheme of the management of the Mandal and its institutions by superseding the Constitution was set aside and the District Judge was directed to hold fresh elections of the Managing Body and the office-bearers of the Mandal according to the Constitution, within six months, from amongst the finalised list of existing members of the Mandal. The District Judge was authorised to appoint such person as he deemed necessary to act as Commissioner for holding the elections, and the receiver was directed to hand over the charge of the entire property to the body which would be so elected. Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982 came to be filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge and stay was granted to the decree passed by the first Appellate Court. Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982 came to be filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge and stay was granted to the decree passed by the first Appellate Court. While, modifying the stay order on 9th August, 1983, it was directed that the District Judge should hold the elections for electing 11 members, including the President, from the list of members enrolled prior to 1961 and the body so elected was to work under the guidance of the District Judge. It was further directed that the receiver should transfer the management to the new body. The letters patent appeal was withdrawan on 10th April, 1990. However, the cross-objections, which were filed by the respondents survived, but all the interim orders passed in appeal stood vacated. The body, which was elected pursuant to the orders passed on 9-8-1983 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982 continued to manage the Mandal. 3. On 16th May, 1988, the Director of Education issued a notice under section 3(1) of the Act asking the petitioner to show cause before 31st May, 1988, why the management of the institution by the Mandal should not be taken over. The petitioner received this notice on 27th May, 1988 and sought time by the telegram dated 28th May, 1988 for showing cause and also sent a letter to that effect, because the matter would have to be placed before the Managing Committee of the Mandal. As many as 12 grounds were listed in the show-cause notice for taking proposed action, and on 29th June, 1988, a detailed reply was sent to the show-cause notice dealing with every ground that was raised, though all the grounds were vague and did not contain any particulars regarding the date or time and the particular institutions of the school in respect of which the allegations were being made. A personal hearing was also sought before action to take over the management was initiated. On 3rd August, 1988, the petitioners was informed that their explanation was not satisfactory and the management of the schools run by the Mandal was being taken over for a period of three years from 19th August, 1988, under section 3(1) of the Act. A personal hearing was also sought before action to take over the management was initiated. On 3rd August, 1988, the petitioners was informed that their explanation was not satisfactory and the management of the schools run by the Mandal was being taken over for a period of three years from 19th August, 1988, under section 3(1) of the Act. A challenge was raised to this order by Writ Petition No. 1955 of 1988, but that writ petition was dismissed on 18-8-1988, on the ground that there was an alternative remedy available, but the effect and operation of the impugned order was stayed for 15 days for enabling the petitioner to file an appeal before the respondent No. 2-Government of Maharashtra. On 18-8-1988, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 2. On 12-9-1988, the respondent No. 2 confirmed the order passed by the Director of Education and took over the management of the schools run by the petitioner. 4. Shri K.H. Deshpande, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the show-cause notice did not give any particulars which would have enabled the petitioner to understand what were the exact grounds on which action was proposed to be taken and the particular institution to which the charges related. Inspite of this, within the short time that was available, with a view to refuting the charges, but without considering any of the objections raised, an order taking over the management came to be passed mechanically, which repeated the charges which were made in the show-cause notice. Though a detailed memo of appeal was filed, all the points which were raised were not considered and a mechanical order was passed also by the respondent No. 2, in appeal. It was urged that it was not open to the respondents to take action against the body which was in charge of the management because it functioned by virtue of an interim arrangement made under the orders of this Court in the letters patent appeal, and the leave of the Court had not been obtained for taking over the management of the schools, though the management was being done under the supervision of the District Judge. Executive action for taking over the management under the orders of the Court was impermissible. Executive action for taking over the management under the orders of the Court was impermissible. It was also urged that the provisions of section 3(1) of the Act were violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(c) and (g) of the Constitution which guarantee the right to form associations, or unions and to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Section 3(1) of the Act is as follows: "3(1) Whenever the Director is satisfied that the Management of any educational institution has neglected to perform any of the duties imposed on it by or under any law for the time being in force, or the memorandum of association, or any instrument (including any Rules, Regulations or Bylaws) which regulates its administration or is being managed in a manner detrimental to public interest, and that it is expedient in the public interest, and in particular, in the interest of education imparted in such institution to take over the management of such institution in so far its activity relates to imparting education, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, after giving the management of such institution, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action, by an order take over the management of such institution in so far as its activity relates to imparting education specified in the order for a limited period not exceeding three years." (Emphasis supplied) The first proviso enables the Director to extend this period, so, however, that the total period for which such management is taken over shall not, in any case, exceed five years, and the extension is not for a period exceeding one year at a time. Sub-section (2) requires the management of the institution taken over to deliver possession of the property of the institution to the Director or any officer authorised by him; while sub-section (3) enables the Director to appoint one or more administrators for maintaining continuity of education imparted in such institution. Sub-section (4) gives a right to the management to appeal to the State Government against the order of the Director, and subject to the decision of the State Government in appeal, the decision of the Director, or the decision of the State Government in appeal, shall be final and shall not be called in question, in any Court. 5. Sub-section (4) gives a right to the management to appeal to the State Government against the order of the Director, and subject to the decision of the State Government in appeal, the decision of the Director, or the decision of the State Government in appeal, shall be final and shall not be called in question, in any Court. 5. The first submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action would be rendered illusory, unless the Director of Education informs the management in what way the institution was being managed in a manner detrimental to public interest, or in what way it was expedient in the public interest, or in the interest of education imparted in such institution, to take over the management, in so far as its activity relates to imparting education. The show cause notice, dated 16-5-1988, after listing the 14 schools, which were being run by the petitioner, only repeats the words of section 3(1) of the Act, by stating that the management was being run in a manner detrimental to public interest, or the interest of education imparted by these institutions; although 12 items have been mentioned, no particulars have been given. 6. The first item refers to the differences between the Chairman and Secretary of the Mandal, without mentioning what the differences were when they arose; whether they pertained to the educational activity and what impact those differences would have on the education activity of the petitioner. The reference in this context to Para 32(2) of the School Code illustrates the perfunctory manner in which the notice was given, because Para 32(2) of the School Code only says that is the absence of the Head of the School, if there is an urgent demand for issue of a leaving certificate, a person authorised by the management will sign the leaving certificate as in-charge head of the school. It was not stated, how Para 32(2) of the School Code was infringed and what bearing it had on the imparting of education by the petitioner. It was not stated, how Para 32(2) of the School Code was infringed and what bearing it had on the imparting of education by the petitioner. The second ground related to the transfers of the employees of the school effected in the midst of the academic year and the cancellation of the orders of transfer passed by the secretary, and the secretary issuing fresh orders of transfer, inspite of such cancellations resulting in confusion and affecting the efficiency and routine work. No particulars were given regarding the orders by which the transfers were made and cancelled; the employees concerned, or in which particular schools, out of the 14 schools listed, this bad happened. Item No. 3 also generally referred to non-compliance of the orders passed by the School Tribunal, without giving any particulars and stating only that it is proved that the orders of the Education Department were not being followed. Item No. 4 mentioned that the necessary documents are not furnished by the petitioner, while making the appointments and it was, therefore, difficult for the Education Officers to ascertain whether the appointments were made in accordance with the Rules, and to grant approval. No particulars were given regarding this item also and even the name of the school in respect of which these deficiencies were noticed, was not given. Item No. 5 spoke about the use of the grants for purchasing the material and the development grants for repairing the school buildings, for institutions other than those for which the amounts were given, without specifying the schools in respect of which this was done, or the year in which it was done. Item No. 6 generally was about interference by the members of the management in the day-to-day affairs of the schools and their objectional behaviour with the teachers, without giving any particulars. It was mentioned that on account of such objectional behaviour, an atmosphere of fear was created amongst the students partially affecting the result and the quality of education imparted. Under Item No. 7, it was mentioned that the Constitution of the working Committees was not in accordance with the Rules, without specifying to what school this deficiency was being attributed. It was mentioned that on account of such objectional behaviour, an atmosphere of fear was created amongst the students partially affecting the result and the quality of education imparted. Under Item No. 7, it was mentioned that the Constitution of the working Committees was not in accordance with the Rules, without specifying to what school this deficiency was being attributed. Item No. 8 refers to the delay in disbursing the pay of the teaching and non-teaching establishments, because though the Head Master is responsible for disbursement of pay, this power was delegated to the supervisors and Assistant Teachers, without specifying even a single instance, when and where this was done. Item No. 9 refers only vaguely to the transfer allowances not being paid to the employees who were transferred, without giving any particulars. Item No. 10 generally referred to non-observance of the orders passed by the School Tribunal, without quoting even a single instance in respect of the suspension and termination of the employees. Item No. 11 referred to the results being less than 20 per cent during the preceding three years, without giving any particulars of the school in which this was found, and only generally alleging that the low passing percentage would show that the academic standard had fallen. Item No. 12 generally referred to the interference by the persons against whom injunctions have been issued by courts in the administrative matters connected with the schools and the management functioning under the directions of unauthorised persons, without naming even a single person or the incident when this happened. 7. Shri Deshpande urged that it was impossible to know from he show-cause notice, what were the exact allegations, and it was impossible for the management to meet such allegations and the management was left with only four days' time to send the reply, because the communication was received on 28th May, 1988 and this had been brought to the notice of the Director of Education by the telegram and the letter of that date (Annexures II and III to the petition). Our attention was drawn to the detailed reply dated 29-6-1988 (Annexure V to the petition), in which an objection was raised to the proposed action, as the management functioned under the orders passed by this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982 and the permission of the Court was not obtained before taking action. Our attention was drawn to the detailed reply dated 29-6-1988 (Annexure V to the petition), in which an objection was raised to the proposed action, as the management functioned under the orders passed by this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982 and the permission of the Court was not obtained before taking action. Every allegation made was denied, and since it was left only to the imagination of the petitioner to ascertain what the exact allegation was, the petitioner completed the exercise of giving a reply by pointing out that in respect of every complaint, there had been a litigation and the action taken by the management was in conformity with the orders passed by courts. It was also pointed out that approvals to appointments were granted and salaries disbursed and, therefore, the allegation that the relevant documents were not furnished with the proposals, was false. With regard to the other allegations also, it was pointed out that those allegations were vague, and in respect of Item No. 8, it was explained that arrangement had to be made for authorising teachers other than the headmasters to disburse pay and allowances, because of the absence of the head masters, and every such instance was mentioned in answer to Item No. 8. With regard to the other items also, it was pointed out that the allegations were vague and were not correct and that the orders of the School Tribunal and the Education Department had been meticulously followed and no action, therefore, could be taken for taking over the management. We see considerable force in the submission of Shri Deshpande that the order, which came to be passed on 3rd August, 1988, was a mechanical order passed without considering the reply given, because it is almost word by word repetition of whatever was stated in the show cause notice, without dealing with the explanations furnished by the petitioner. 8. It was urged that it was not shown how the management of the petitioner was detrimental to public interest and whatever was stated dealt with the internal management of the institutions and there was no obligation on the Education Department to direct how the posting of staff should be done and how it should manage its own affairs in areas which was not governed by the Rules. A 23-page memo of appeal (Annexure VIB) was presented under sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, to the State Government. The confirming order passed by the State Government (Annexure XIV) shows that the Minister of State for Education asked the Director of Education to State his case, and when it was pointed out by the management that it was functioning under the orders of this Court under the supervision of the District Judge and, therefore, no action could be taken, it was observed that in a similar case, while action was being taken for appointing an administrator for the colleges run by the management, it was held by this Court that such action could be taken and, therefore, the objection could not be sustained. 9. The thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the State Government had itself taken the view on 16-4-1986, in response to the application of Principal Band of Janata College, Chandrapur, that it cannot take any action, as the management under the interim orders passed by this Court, had to function, under the supervision of the District Judge, Chandrapur and he should, therefore, approach the District Judge for suitable action. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, referred us to the observations in the judgment in Writ Petition No. 695 of 1986 with Writ Petition No. 701 of 1986, decided on 20th and 21st August, 1986 (Annexure 3 to the return filed by respondents 1 to 3) where, while considering the contentions raised by Principals Band and Jha, challenging the action taken against them by the management, this Court asked the University to take action under section 49 of the Nagpur University Act, within a period of three months, for taking over the management under the Act. However, in Special Leave Application (Civil) No. 14581 of 1986, filed by the petitioner, the Supreme Court clarified that the judgment of the High Court shall not be construed to mean a direction to the University to take over the management, but only to issue notice to show-cause in accordance with the provisions of section 49(9)(c) of the Nagpur University Act and to examine whether circumstances exist for taking over the management of the institution. The question, whether it was permissible for the State Government to take action under the provisions of the Act, when the management was acting under the interim arrangement made by this Court was not considered either by this Court or by the Supreme Court, in those proceeding, and Shri Deshpande urged that no such action can be taken against the management which came into existence under the interim orders of this Court. Whatever action was taken in these two writ petitions and came to be considered in the Special civil application, was done in a different situation, because this Court itself suggested to the University to take appropriate action under section 49 of the Nagpur University Act and, therefore, if the University were to take any action, it would not be on its own, but at the instance or with the leave of the Court. This situation is entirely different from the one, namely, the State Government taking action on its own under the provisions of the Act, without obtaining the leave of the Court. 11. The submission on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 was that no leave would be necessary since the respondent No. 1 was acting pursuant to the authority which he had under section 3 of the Act, and if the requisite conditions existed, the action of the respondent No. 1 would have to be tested upon the criteria furnished under the Act and not under any extraneous consideration, as to whether the leave of the Court was necessary. By the order passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 84 of 1982, the body comprising of 11 members elected from the members enrolled prior to 1961, was to take over the management from the receiver. This body did not come into existence by virtue of any scheme governing the working of the petitioner Mandal, but only under the interim arrangement as directed by the Court, and it was to function under the supervision of the District Judge. Its character was not in any way different from the Receiver who had been appointed earlier and removed and whom it was to substitute. This body was to be accountable to the Court. The following observations in (Everest Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2304, puts the legal position beyond controversy. Its character was not in any way different from the Receiver who had been appointed earlier and removed and whom it was to substitute. This body was to be accountable to the Court. The following observations in (Everest Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2304, puts the legal position beyond controversy. "When a Court puts a Receiver in possession of property, the property comes under Court custody, the Receiver being merely an officer or agent of the Court. Any obstruction or interference with the Court's possession sounds in contempt of that Court. Any legal action in respect of that property is in a sense such an interference and invites the contempt penalty of likely invalidation of the suit or other proceedings. But, if either before starting the action or during its continuance, the party takes the leave of the Court, the sin is absolved and the proceeding may continue to a conclusion on the merits." The following observations from Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure were quoted with approval: "There is no statutory provision which requires a party to take the leave of the Court to sue a Receiver. The Rule has come down to us as a part of the Rules of equity, binding upon all courts of Justice in this country. It is a rule based upon public policy which requires that when the Court has assumed possession of a property in the interest of the litigants before it, the authority of the Court is not to be obstructed by suits designed to disturb the possession of the Court." 12. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (D. Jones Shield v. N. Ramesam)2, A.I.R. 1955 Andhra Pradesh 156, endorsed the view in (King v. Parmanand)3, A.I.R. 1949 Patna 222, that any enquiry with regard to a matter which is subjudice is bound to interfere with the even and ordinary course of justice, and it is a cardinal principle that when a matter is pending for decision before a Court of Justice, nothing should be done which might disturb the free course of justice and to usurp the functions of the Court which has go seisin of the case. In (Jai Prakash Beni Pershad v. Ram Sarup)4, A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 471, it was held that when a Court having jurisdiction in the matter, appoints a receiver to take charge of the property forming subject-matter of the litigation, then no other Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction has any power or authority to interfere or meddle with the property in the hands of the receiver. The Court appointing the receiver must be left untrammelled in its administration of the property regardless of the fact whether the original appointment of the Receiver was erroneous or improvident, for otherwise orderly administration of justice cannot proceed. This Court in the letters patent appeal had made elaborate arrangement regarding administration of the property and it was open to the Director of Education, respondent No. 1, to apply to this Court for obtaining leave to take action under the Act. We have no doubt that the prohibition which applies to lay-litigants would also extend to the statutory authorities, once the property comes under custodia legis. In fact, as we have pointed out earlier, the State Government had, on 16th April, 1986, itself taken this view while considering the request of Principal Band and had asked Principal Band to approach the District Judge who was empowered to supervise the functioning of the petitioner-Mandal, and since the action in taking over the management of the institutions amounted to direct interference with the manner in which the management was directed by the Court, that action cannot be supported and must be struck down. 13. Returning to the statutory requirements of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action, obviously, the opportunity has to be a real and reasonable opportunity. It was observed as far as back as in (M/s. Fedco (P.) Ltd. v. S.N. Bilgrami)5, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 415, that the requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard has two elements. The first is that an opportunity of being heard must be given, the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable. In (M/s. New Samundri Transport Co. The first is that an opportunity of being heard must be given, the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable. In (M/s. New Samundri Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. v. The State of Punjab)6, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 57, in which the requirement of section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fell for consideration, it was held that either a bald-notice making no reference to any particular permit for cancellation or suspension of which action had been taken, it was as if all the 33 permits were going to be suspended or cancelled, and though for each permit, the permit-holder was responsible, the proposed penal action had to be particularised with reference to each permit detailing the particular conditions for breach of which action was sought to be taken in connection with a particular permit, and this was held to be a minimum requirement of section 60. Here, as many as 12 grounds had been catalogued, without furnishing any particulars as to the institution, time and place or the person, or the amount which was involved. Even in respect of an administrative order, it was held in (State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei)7, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269, that if it involves civil consequences, it must be made consistently with the Rules of natural justice, after informing the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. Though (Surath Chandra Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal)8, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 752, dealt with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, it was pointed out that Rule 55 thereof embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. 14. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. 14. The contention that the petitioner had not asked for particulars or complained of vagueness, has no basis, because in the reply to the show-cause-notice as well as in the memo of appeal, the petitioner had stated that the charges could not be answered because of their vagueness and absence of particulars. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4, the petitioner should have asked for those particulars. A similar argument was repelled in (Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan)9, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 995, where though the appellant had participated in the enquiry, as the petitioner did in the present case, it was pointed out that, that by itself did not exonerate the department from bringing home the charges, and it was held that the charges were so vague that it was difficult to meet them fairly and the evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not bring home the guilt of the accused. 15. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged that a contradictory proposition was laid down in (Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 389; (Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee)11, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 965 and (R.S. Dass v. Union of India)12, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 593. This not correct, because in Kesava Mills case, the Government had appointed an investigating body under section 15 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, for the purpose of making full and complete investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case, and the appellants there had not made any grievance against the Investigating Committee regarding the manner in which he carried out the investigation, and they had been heard and a full opportunity of being heard and adducing evidence had been given. In the Board of Mining Examination's case, the respondent had, in the form of an appeal against the report of the Regional Inspector, sent his explanation to the Chairman of the Board, and it was held that he had, thus, been heard and compliance with Regulation 26 was complete, the Court observing that if fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of R.S. Desai's case related to preparation of selection list for promotion to the Indian Administrative Services and when primacy was to be given to merit, recording of reasons was held not to be necessary, for including the name of junior member of State service in preference to senior member in the select list. On the other hand, it was held that the scheme contained under the regulations excluded the applicability of audi alteram partem rule by implication. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the type of action which we are considering did not require anything more than sending a show-cause-notice, allowing time to file a reply and disposing of the matter by written order. As we have already pointed out, the show-cause-notice did not spell out any particulars on the basis of which it would have been possible for the petitioner to understand what the allegations against it were and though the petitioner did attempt to send the reply, even that reply was not considered, and a verbatim reproduction of the grounds in the show-cause notice was made in the order of taking over the management. Having regard to the content of the right of having a reasonable opportunity, which has been settled by the judicial pronouncements, we find that the petitioner had not been accorded a reasonable opportunity and a mere exercise, at the appellate stage, of calling upon the Director of Education to spell out the allegations and confronting them to the petitioner, could not take place of the nature of the opportunity which is contemplated by section 3 of the Act. The action of the respondents in taking over the management cannot, therefore, be sustained, and must be struck down. 16. That brings us to the question of vires of section 3 of the Act. The action of the respondents in taking over the management cannot, therefore, be sustained, and must be struck down. 16. That brings us to the question of vires of section 3 of the Act. Shri K.H. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the taking over of the management was violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, which guarantees to all citizens the right to form associations or unions and the right to possess property for achieving the object of the associations or unions and the right to manage it in the manner in which such an association or union wants, is implicit under Article 19(1)(c). Reliance was placed on the observations in (Asom Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti v. State of Assam)13, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2126, but there the heading of the Act "Asom Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti (Taking over Management and Control) Act (23 of 1984)" was an eye-wash, because at no point of time the State even thought of restoring the body to the normal functioning after holding election in accordance with the Constitution of the society. There, it was not only that the complete control was left to the Board to be nominated by the Government, but about the persons to be nominated no norms had been laid down, and no control was kept to those who formed the society and those who had a right to form an association were kept away, and the society was to be run by group of persons nominated by the Government in accordance with section 3. This was held to be an infraction of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in (Smt. Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India)14, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 966. This is not the position in the present case. The Constitution and the membership of the Mandal have been left untouched and the provisions of the Act do not in any way purport to supplant the membership, or bring out a change in the association, or admit members contrary to the wishes of the original members. In Smt. Damyanti's case, it was pointed out that the right to form an association necessarily implies that the persons formings the association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. In Smt. Damyanti's case, it was pointed out that the right to form an association necessarily implies that the persons formings the association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary Association without any option being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association, and so it was held that Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962 violated Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. 17. The contention that the right to form an association under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution carries with it the right to achieve every object for which it is formed, has been expressly repelled in (All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal)15, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 171. It was laid down there that if an association were formed for the purpose of carrying on business, the right to form it would be guaranteed by sub-clause (c) of Article 19 subject to any law restricting that right conforming to Clause (4) of Article 19. As regards its business activities, however, and the achievement of the objects for which it was brought into existence, its rights would be those guaranteed by sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) of Article 19 subject to any relevant law on the matter conforming to Clause (6) of Article 19, while the property which the association acquires or possesses would be protected by sub-clause (f) of Clause (1) of Article 19 subject to legislation within the limits laid down by Clause (5) of Article 19. In (Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna v. State of Bihar)16, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1136, it was observed that with the taking over of the Institute, the society lost its right of management and control of the Institute, but that is the consequence of all acquisitions. When a property is acquired, the owner loses all control, interest and ownership of the property. Similarly the society, which was the owner of the Institute, has lost all control and ownership of the Institute. When a property is acquired, the owner loses all control, interest and ownership of the property. Similarly the society, which was the owner of the Institute, has lost all control and ownership of the Institute. It may be equally true that the Institute was the only activity of the society, but so long as there is no interference with the society, its Constitution or composition, it cannot be said that because of the taking over or acquisition of the Institute, which was the only property or activity of the society, the fundamental right of the society to form association has been infringed. Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution does not carry with is a further guarantee that the objects or purposes or activities of an association so formed shall not be interfered with by law except on grounds as mentioned in Article 19(4). In (Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat)17, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 494, section 33 of the Gujarat secondary Education Act (18 of 1973) came up for consideration. It provided for taking over of management of any registered private secondary school for a temporary period in the public interest. While holding that the Act was not unconstitutional, it was pointed out that the provision was introduced in the interest of general public and did not, in any way, affect prejudicially the fundamental right of the management guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 18. According to Shri K.H. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the present legislation would not be within the competence of the State Legislature, but it is apparent that the legislation would be covered by Entry 25 of List II in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which is as follows: "25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour." It would also be covered by Entry 42---"Acquisition and requisitioning of property". 19. The Act had received assent of the President on 17th April, 1976. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour." It would also be covered by Entry 42---"Acquisition and requisitioning of property". 19. The Act had received assent of the President on 17th April, 1976. Under Article 31-A(1)(b) of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution; provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. This requirement has been fulfilled in the present case, and no challenge under Articles 13, 14 and 19 of the Constitution can be raised in respect of this law. We are fortified in this view by the observations in (Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. State of Punjab)18, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 232 and (Jitnath Singh v. State of Bihar)19, A.I.R. 1974 Patna 28. In the former, section 5 of the Punjab Local Authorities (Added Schools) Act, 1959, under which the management, control and property in possession of the said schools is transferred to the Government for a limited period not exceeding ten years, was held to be saved by Article 31-A(1)(b) of the Constitution. In Jitnath Singh's case, the taking over by the State of the Management under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 for a limited period, in order to secure better management was, held to be protected by Article 31-A(1)(b) of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that the challenge to the vires of the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Transfer of Management) Act, 1976, is entirely unfounded and the Act is valid. 20. That leaves the contentions of the two interveners before us to be considered. Mrs. We, therefore, hold that the challenge to the vires of the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Transfer of Management) Act, 1976, is entirely unfounded and the Act is valid. 20. That leaves the contentions of the two interveners before us to be considered. Mrs. Khade, who represents the Association of Teaching and Non-teaching Employees who had been allowed to intervene by the order dated 27th September, 1988, made a grievance that these employees were subjected to frequent transfers and harassed by the action of the petitioner and they were interested in seeing to it that the management by the administrator continued. That the teachers had grievances about the transfers, cannot be a matter which would have a bearing on the compliance of the provisions of section 3 of the Act. It appears that the learned District Judge, who had the authority to supervise on the functioning of the petitioner/Mandal, had considered the grievances of the teachers when a representations were made to him and passed an elaborate order on 18th June, 1984, rejecting all the contentions on merits. The learned Counsel adopted the arguments of the Special Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3, which we have considered in detail and nothing more need be said on that aspect. 21. Shri Lambat, who filed the intervention application (C.A. No. 1902 of 1990), contended that the intervener-R.G. Kulte was Vice President of the petitioner-Mandal in 1963, and when all the interim orders were vacated by this Court in the letters patent appeal, he would be entitled to be restored to his original position. It must be noted that the old body ceased to have a say after the appointment of the Receiver. One of the submissions of Shri Lambat was that in Writ Petition No. 790 of 1989, the intervention was allowed and he was allowed to withdraw that petition on behalf of the Mandal, and he should now be permitted to withdraw the present petition also, because his entitlement was accepted by the order passed by the Division Bench in that petition on 26th October, 1990. We allowed time to the parties to state before us whether Writ Petition No. 790 of 1989 was finally disposed of, and we were informed that the Division Bench clarified its order by stating that only the intervention of Shri Kulte was allowed in that petition and the petition was not allowed to be withdrawan or disposed of. An application for interim relief was made by Shri Kulte in Writ Petition No. 1778 of 1990 by filing Civil Application No. 78 of 1991, and by the order passed on 21st January, 1991, this Court traced the background of the case beginning from filing of Civil Suit No. 2 of 1964 and held that Shri Kulte had no locus standi to contend that he had been restored as Vice-President of the Mandal. The interim body, which was an elected body, continued to be in the management of the Mandal, and the only appropriate order would be to direct the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to restore the management of the 14 schools to the petitioner which is represented by the elected body. Any question regarding the title of Shri Kulte cannot be decided in this writ petition and he, obviously, is not entitled to withdraw the present petition and his application is rejected. 22. In the result, we quash and set aside the letter, bearing No. TMS 1085/40796 (5072) Secondary Education 3, dated 12-9-1988 (Annexures X and XIV to the petition); the letter, bearing No. 2/Est/88, dated 16-9-1988 (Annexure VII to the petition) issued by the respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 4 respectively; the impugned order dated 3-8-1988 (Annexure VI to the petition), taking over the management and appointing the arbitrator, and the order dated 15-5-1989 (Annexure XV to the petition); and direct respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to restore the possession, administration and the management of those schools, which have been taken over in pursuance of the aforesaid letters and orders. We hold that the impugned Act — the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Management) Act, 1976 — is valid and is not violative of Articles 13, 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There will be no order as to the costs of the petition. Rule made absolute accordingly. -----