ORDER N.L. Ganguley, J. - These four writ petitions arise out of order dated 23-3-1982 terminating the services of the petitioners. The copy of the order impugned is Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The petitioners appointment were made by the Mandi Samiti on temporary basis. It was specifically provided in the order that the appointment shall be wholly temporary and liable to be terminated with one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu of the notice. 2. The perusal of the order of termination passed in case of all the four petitioners show that the orders are innocuous and assign no stigma therein. It was, stated in the order that the petitioners services were no more required. They were paid one month's salary in lieu of the termination and were relieved from the services. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out to a letter dated 19-3-1982 sent by the Addl. Director of Mandi Samiti informing the Secretary/the Chairman of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ghazipur that the appointment of these four petitioners were made with irregularities. It was said that the services of such irregular employees be terminated. Learned counsel urged that the authority passing the order of termination of the services of the petitioners was guided with the letter dated 19-3-1982 and he simply complied it without applying his own mind. It was submitted that the order of termination amounts to punishment and the services could not be terminated without following due procedure of law. It was said that no opportunity was ever given to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. Thus, the order impugned is violative of Rule of Natural Justice as well as violates provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. The emphasis in the counter affidavit is that the order of termination is a simplicitor order of termination without stigma. They were all temporary appointee and their services were no more required. In such circumstances one month's salary was paid with the notice of termination and services were terminated. There was no illegality or error in the order impugned. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties it is not the case of either of the parties that any one of the appointees appointed along with petitioner has been retained. In such circumstances one month's salary was paid with the notice of termination and services were terminated. There was no illegality or error in the order impugned. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties it is not the case of either of the parties that any one of the appointees appointed along with petitioner has been retained. According to the petitioners services were terminated illegally by violating the principle `First come Last go. It has also not been shown that juniors to the petitioners were retained. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is on the ground that in fact the order of termination is nothing but punishment and opportunity was necessary in such cases. It has not been shown by the petitioners that by the letter dated 19-3-1982 whether any punishment was indicated. Merely irregularities were pointed out and direction was to cure the irregularities by removing such persons irregularly appointed. From the perusal of the order impugned and other Annexures it is not apparent or does not show any inkling that the order was passed by way of punishment. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submissions cited AIR 1985 SC 1046 : 1985 Lab IC 1032 K.C. Joshi v. Union of India. The perusal of the authority cited shows that in the said case the order of termination was passed by the authorities concerned on the ground of unsuitability and unsatisfactory work. The authorities had proceeded into an enquiry in the said matter, but the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with law and following the rules of natural justice. In the said circumstances the Court was pleased to hold that the services could not be terminated in the manner it was done in that case. It was held further that the procedure adopted by the authorities clearly violated the principles of natural justice. In the present case there was neither any such allegation of unsatisfactory work in the order impugned nor in the letter referred by the petitioners sent by the Joint Director dated 19-3-1982. No doubt in the counter affidavit the allegations were made to effect that the work of the petitioners were not satisfactory. That was neither the case in the impugned order nor the stand of the Addl. Director. Rather the ground for the action proposed was irregularity in the matter of appointment. No doubt in the counter affidavit the allegations were made to effect that the work of the petitioners were not satisfactory. That was neither the case in the impugned order nor the stand of the Addl. Director. Rather the ground for the action proposed was irregularity in the matter of appointment. In view of the facts stated above the authority AIR 1985 SC 1046 : (1985 Lab IC 1032) (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Other case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. is AIR 1986 SC 1626 : 1986 Lab IC 1086 Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab. The services of ad hoc employees were terminated in the said case as no longer required while the authorities have retained other employees of the same cadre who were juniors to the petitioners in that case. Further it was held in the said case that there were adverse remarks and allegations of embezzlement against those employees. There had been one order of regularisation of other employees but the petitioners of that case were not regularised instead terminated. The argument of the petitioners in that case was accepted by the Court on the ground that juniors were retained and the services of those employees were terminated arbitrarily. Further there was charge of embezzlement and adverse remarks about their service conduct. The facts and circumstances of the said case were entirely different and the petitioners cannot claim any parity or similarity out of the said case law. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners cited one more case reported in (1990) 1 UP LBEC 223 Munish Kumar Sharma v. District Inspector of Schools, Dehradun. It was the case of an educational institution and the Manager of the Managing Committee had made appointment irregularly on recommendation of some heavy weight and later on the committee of management terminated the services of the petitioners of that case on the ground of procedural irregularities, although the petitioners in that case had successfully worked for more than three years. In view of the facts and circumstances of that case the Court was pleased to hold that the committee of management had to be stopped by principle of estoppel and they cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own action. 8. In view of the facts and circumstances of that case the Court was pleased to hold that the committee of management had to be stopped by principle of estoppel and they cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own action. 8. Lastly the learned counsel for the petitioners cited (1991) 1 UPLBEC 152 , State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla. The Supreme Court in Special Appeal of the State of U.P. observed that the mere fact that prior to the issue of order of termination an enquiry ,against the respondent in regard to the allegations of unauthorised audit of Boys Fund, was held does not change the nature of the order of termination into that of punishment as after the preliminary inquiry the competent authority took no steps to punish the respondent instead it exercised its power to terminate the respondent's services in accordance with the contract of service and the Rules. The Supreme Court further observed that preliminary inquiry held against. temporary Government employee must not be concluded with the regular departmental inquiry which usually follows the preliminary inquiry, after the Government decides to frame charges and to get a departmental enquiry made with a view to inflict one of the three major punishments on the Government servant. So far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned, there is no question of it being governed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, as it is made for the purpose of collection of facts to enable the competent authority to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken in terms and under the contract of service or the rules applicable to a temporary Government servant. A Government servant has no right to insist for affording him opportunity during such enquiry and such an ex parte enquiry is not initiated in law in view of the purpose and object of preliminary enquiry. Thus, this authority, though cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners goes against him and least supports his submission, rather it tends in justifying the action of the respondents. 9. Before arguments of the petitioners learned counsel for the respondents had raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners writ petition were not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. I had requested him to raise this point at a later stage. 9. Before arguments of the petitioners learned counsel for the respondents had raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners writ petition were not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. I had requested him to raise this point at a later stage. Since all the four petitions were admitted in 1982 and were kept pending for more than nine years before the Court, I consider it to be unjust to throw out the writ petitions on the objection of the ground of alternative remedy without entering into the merits of the case. However, learned counsel for the respondents cited 1986 UPLBEC 1233 Brij Kishore Shukla v. State of U.P. The Division Bench of this Court held in the said case that employees of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti are covered within the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and they were entitled for all legal benefits under the said Act. This proposition is not controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioners rather accepted. The other case law is of 1991 All CJ 784 : 1991 Lab IC 2413 Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Union, Lucknow. The Full Bench in the said case considered about the maintainability of writ petition in the matters covered under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. Paragraphs 5 and 14 of the said case law are quoted as under : "Ordinarily, remedy of reference, envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, is an adequate and efficacious remedy available to a person aggrieved by an illegal retrenchment. Of course the aggrieved person can always prove that, on the facts and circumstances of his case, the remedy is neither adequate nor efficacious. But unless he discharges the onus of proving that the remedy of r Terence is either inadequate or inefficacious he should pursue the remedy of reference wider the Industrial Disputes Act. At this juncture it would be pertinent to emphasise that it would not be enough for the person pleading inadequacy or inefficacy of the relief of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act to make merely a bald statement that remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious. At this juncture it would be pertinent to emphasise that it would not be enough for the person pleading inadequacy or inefficacy of the relief of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act to make merely a bald statement that remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious. It is imperative for him to clearly plead, demonstrate and prove as to how and in what manner the remedy of reference is inadequate or inefficacious and in the absence of requisite pleading and material in support thereof it would not be permissible for him to raise the plea of inadequacy or inefficacy of the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and this Court, noted above,- lead to an irresistible conclusion that the High Court must not allow its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to be invoked if the petitioner has got an alternative remedy and such remedy is not pleaded and proved to be inadequate or inefficacious or if it is not established from the material on record that there exist exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to deviate from the well settled normal rule relegating the petitioner to alternative remedy and permit him to by pass the alternative remedy. The hurdle of alternative remedy cannot be allowed to be skipped over lightly on a casual and held statement in the petition that "there is no other equally efficacious or adequate alternative remedy than to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." The petitioner must furnish material facts and particulars to sustain such plea." 10. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court there is no course open except that the petitioner's writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act to the case of the petitioners. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length I do not find any merit in the submission of the petitioners and hold that there is no illegality, error or question of jurisdiction involved in this case to call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution and also on the ground of unmaintainability of the writ petitions. The writ petitions are dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.