JUDGMENT : S.K. Dhaon, J. This petition is directed against the order dated 23rd February, 1982, passed by the District Magistrate Banda, in the purported exercise of powers u/s 3 of the U.P. Storage Requisition Act, 1955, whereby the property mentioned in Schedule A to order had been requisitioned. 2. Indisputably the property, which is the subject matter of requisition was in the tenancy of the State Government and the State Government treated the Petitioner as its lessor and paid rent for the accommodation to the Petitioner. The Petitioner instituted a suit for ejectment of the State Government from the accommodation in question. The suit was pending when the impugned order was passed. Thereafter the suit was decreed. 3. It is not necessary to express any opinion on the first contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner that the impugned order had been passed on mala fide considerations to forestall the decree in the suit, as we feel that the second submission made on behalf of the Petitioner must prevail. 4. In paragrah 15 of the writ petition it has been categorically averred that no opportunity whatsoever was afforded to the Petitioner before the impugned order was passed. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sri B.K. Saxena, the Senior Marketing Inspector, Banda. In really to paragraph 15 it is averred in this affidavit that the fact that an order of requisition was about to be passed was brought to the notice of the Petitioner by the Respondents we may indicate that there are five Respondents before us and they are the District Magistrate Banda, the U.P. State, through Collector, Banda, the Regional Food Controller, Jhansi, the Deputy Regional Marketing Officer Banda and the Senior Marketing Inspector, Banda. It is significant to note that the particular Respondent, who brought the said fact to the notice of the Petitioner, has not been pin pointed in the affidavit. It is difficult to believe that all the five Respondents aforementioned either individually or jointly informed the Petitioner of the impending order of requisition. Even the Senior Marketing Inspector, who has sworn the affidavit, has not mustered courage to state that he informed the Petitioner that the order of requisition was about to be passed. It is difficult to believe that all the five Respondents aforementioned either individually or jointly informed the Petitioner of the impending order of requisition. Even the Senior Marketing Inspector, who has sworn the affidavit, has not mustered courage to state that he informed the Petitioner that the order of requisition was about to be passed. It is implicit in the averments made by the Senior Marketing Inspector that no written information was given to the Petitioner that an order of requisition was about to be passed and he may give his version to the District Magistrate. We are satisfied that, infact, the Petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to lodge his objection against the proposed order of requisition. 5. In Madan Gopal Agarwal Vs. District Magistrate, Allahabad and Others, (1973) 1 SCC 89 , Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, which read "if in the opinion of the District Magistrate it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for any public purpose, he may, by order in writing requisition such accommodation and may direct that the possession thereof shall be delivered to him within such period as may be specified in the order, provided that the period so specified shall not be less than fifteen days from the date of the service of the order" came up for consideration. Their Lordships noted that even though the provision as contained in Section 3 did not specifically provide for an opportunity of a hearing before the passing of an order of requisition, such an opportunity was implicit in the scheme of Section 3. 6. Section 3 of the U.P. Storage Requisition Act, 1955 is some what analogous to Section 3 which was before the Supreme Court. Having considered the provisions of Section 3 along with the other provisions of the Act, we are of the opinion that even in Section 3 of the Act, which is involved in the present petition, the giving of an opportunity to the person concerned before passing the order of requisition is implicit. We, therefore, take the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal's case is apposite. The result is that we have no option but to record a finding that even though it was the requirement of Section 3 to give an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner that was not done. The impugned order, therefore, is not sustainable. The result is that we have no option but to record a finding that even though it was the requirement of Section 3 to give an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner that was not done. The impugned order, therefore, is not sustainable. 7. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 23rd February 1982 is quashed. 8. There shall be no order as to costs.