K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE question involved in these writ petitions is identical, pertaining to the rate of sales tax leviable on the "packing shooks" obtained out of timber logs. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, the facts in W. P. No. 18869 of 1990 are referred. The petitioner is a dealer registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act (for short "the Act" ). He is engaged in the business of cut sizes timber. He purchases timber logs from registered dealers or from Forest Department. At the time of his purchase sales tax leviable on the timber logs will be collected by the concerned seller from the petitioner. These timber logs are cut into several sizes in the sawing machine. Thereafter petitioner manufactures packing shooks. According to the petitioner these packing shooks are nothing but cut size planks, which in turn are used in the manufacture of packing boxes. For the period 1st April, 1985 to 31st march, 1986, the petitioner had filed his taxable sales turnover. The petitioner had paid tax at the rate of 2 per cent in respect of the sales of packing shooks. The Additional Commercial Tax officer issued a notice to the petitioner asserting that the packing shooks fall under section 5 (1) of the Act and was taxable at 5 per cent in the light of the clarification issued previously by the commissioner of Commercial Taxes; therefore he proposed to assess the petitioner by levying tax at 5 per cent on the sales of packing shooks. The clarification of the Commissioner referred herein is dated 10th January, 1986. The petitioner immediately filed W. P. No. 3355 of 1987 and thereafter the assessing authority completed the final assessment proceedings. Consequently, he filed W. P. No. 18869 of 1990. In view of this, the earlier W. P. No. 3355 of 1987 does not survive and it will have to be dismissed as unnecessary. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that packing shooks fall within entry No. 45 of the Second schedule to the Act. Entry 45 reads as follows : sl. No. Description of the goods Rate of tax 45. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that packing shooks fall within entry No. 45 of the Second schedule to the Act. Entry 45 reads as follows : sl. No. Description of the goods Rate of tax 45. (a) Timber, rosewood and sandalwood in log Eight per cent form (b) Timber, rosewood and sandalwood in cut or manufactured form of all sizes and shapes : (i) obtained from out of material which Two per cent has already suffered tax (ii) in other cases Eight per cent ( 4 ) THE Revenue contends that packing shooks are not timber pieces at all, but are commercially different and in common parlance also packing shooks will not be equated with the timber. These packing shooks are used to prepare packing boxes. According to the learned Government pleader, the timber has a distinct quality and meaning and a timber in log form is different from a packing shook. The court as usual is faced with the problem of attributing a proper meaning to the word of "timber" and "packing shook" to find out whether packing shook would fall within "timber in cut or manufactured form of all sizes and shapes", as described in Serial No. 45 (b) of the Second Schedule. ( 5 ) IN the decision reported in [1973] 32 STC 66 (Commissioner, Sales Tax v. B. M. Wood works), a Bench of the Allahabad High Court opined that packing boxes made of pine are products of timber, negativing the contention of the Revenue that the packing boxes are not products of timber. This decision was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to point out that by the same analogy packing boxes made out of packing shooks will be products of timber and therefore packing shooks are to be treated as an article made of timber though having a specific use. Similarly, in [1973] 32 STC 309 (G. Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh), the Andhra pradesh High Court held that planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc. , were timber and according to the petitioners packing shook is nothing but a timber in cut sizes similar to a plank. In the writ petitions the petitioners have called it a cut size plank. In [1985] 60 STC 213 (State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd.), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning of timber. , were timber and according to the petitioners packing shook is nothing but a timber in cut sizes similar to a plank. In the writ petitions the petitioners have called it a cut size plank. In [1985] 60 STC 213 (State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd.), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning of timber. The Supreme Court found that the timber and sized and dressed logs are one and the same commercial commodity. Logs are nothing more than wood cut up or sawn and would be timber. Planks, beams and rafters would also be timber. ( 6 ) THE learned Government Pleader, however, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in mukesh Kumar Aggarwal and Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1988] 68 STC 324. In the said case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether the left-overs after the extraction of poles and ballies of eucalyptus trees were merely fire-wood or timber. The Supreme court held that these left-overs were to be treated as fire-wood. The said decision will not aid the revenue in any other manner. The learned Government Pleader also contended that all wood is not timber though all timber is wood. ( 7 ) THE distinction sought to be made out by the learned Government Pleader looks to me inconsequential in the above referred Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal's case AIR1988 SC 563 , JT1988 (1 )SC 50 , 1988 (1 )SCALE1 , 1988 Supp (1 )SCC232 , [1988 ]2 scr501 , [1988 ]68 STC324 (SC ). The question before the Supreme Court was entirely different. The Supreme Court was not concerned with the generic meaning of timber while considering the meaning of cut piece of eucalyptus tree. ( 8 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. case [1985] 60 STC 213 is quite clear when it says that the timber includes all its sizes and shapes inclusive of planks, beams and rafters. In fact in a decision pertaining to the Central Excise Act it was held by this court that there is no manufacturing activity at all involved when the timber logs are cut into planks, beams, rafters, etc. , in a saw-mill, relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme court. It is only a different shape of the timber when it becomes a plank. , in a saw-mill, relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme court. It is only a different shape of the timber when it becomes a plank. Similarly, in the instant case packing shooks are nothing but cut size planks. ( 9 ) THE learned Government Pleader contended that packing shooks will not be accepted as equivalent to a timber either by the consumer or by the dealer in the commercial world. According to the learned counsel when a purchaser wants timber he will not be satisfied with the packing shooks, which itself shows that they are different. This is not a correct approach to the problem. It should be noted that packing shook is a variety of timber cut into or made into a particular shape. The concept of timber would embrace within itself all its varieties and shapes as observed by the Supreme Court in [1985] 60 STC 213 (State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills co. Ltd. ). In the instant case the language used by the Legislature is quite clear and comprehensive. Serial No. 45 (b) brings within its sweep timber in cut or manufactured form of all sizes and shapes, etc. There can be no doubt that packing shooks would fall within this description. ( 10 ) THE legislative practice can be inferred from the amendment made to the above serial No. 45 in the year 1989 when the Legislature specifically excluded casuarina, eucalyptus, etc. , from the concept of timber. If packing shooks are to be excluded from the concept of timber of all sizes and shapes in cut or manufactured form, Legislature would have certainly clarified by excluding them. The word "all" found in serial No. 45 will have to be given its importance and due meaning. In these circumstances, I cannot agree with the contention of the learned Government pleader. ( 11 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the petitioners in all these petitions are entitled to succeed. However, W. P. No. 3355 of 1987 has to be dismissed as unnecessary. It is accordingly dismissed. All other writ petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. ( 12 ) WRIT petitions allowed.