JUDGMENT - SAVANT A.V., J.:---By this petition under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the petitioner has challenged the award dated 2nd September, 1987 under which a sum of Rs. 8,92,342.98 has been directed to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent within one month from the date of the publication of the award with interest at the rate of 21% per annum of Rs. 7,30,778/- from 1st May, 1987 till the date of payment. The facts which gave rise to the petition are as under: 2. Admittedly, the petitioner and the respondent were having certain dealings in respect of supply of cotton bales by the respondent-East India Company, a partnership firm, to the petitioner M/s. Ramalinga Choodambika Mills Ltd., which is a company having its registered office in Tamilnadu. It appears that in respect of the 7 transactions, between 17th February, 1986 and 14th March, 1987, 7 invoices were prepared between 26th February, 1986 and 5th April, 1986. Deducting the amount of lorry fares, an amount of Rs. 8,38,739 was payable by the petitioner. Along with the statement of claim, a statement of account of the petitioner-company with the respondent-firm was filed. The said statement shows that the opening debit balance was Rs. 8,57,454.84. At the foot of the account, the petitioner had to pay Rs. 13,62,842 as on 30th April, 1986. Admittedly, in respect of the transactions entered into between the parties, there is a clause which reads as under: "We confirm having SOLD to you subject to the bye-laws of East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay as under:" The petitioner is not a member of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay (in short E.I.C.A.) whereas the respondent is a member of the said Association. However, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in (M/s. Arthur and Co. v. M/s. Shamji Kalidas and Co.)1, A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 345, if the contract provides that the bye-laws of the E.I.C.A. would govern the relationship between the parties, then irrespective of the question of the membership of the E.I.C.A., they would be so governed by the bye-laws of the E.I.C.A. 3. It appears that on disputes having arisen between the parties, the respondent appointed Shri C.K. Dani as their arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of Bye-law 38(A)(e) of the E.I.C.A. Bye-laws. Bye-law 38(A)(e) of the E.I.C.A. is as follows: "38(A). It appears that on disputes having arisen between the parties, the respondent appointed Shri C.K. Dani as their arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of Bye-law 38(A)(e) of the E.I.C.A. Bye-laws. Bye-law 38(A)(e) of the E.I.C.A. is as follows: "38(A). All unpaid claims whether admitted or not, and all disputes and difference (other than those relating to quality) arising out of or in relation to--- (a) Cotton transactions between members including any dispute as to the existence of such transactions; or (b) .......... (c) ........... (d) ........... (e) Cotton contracts covered by such arbitration agreement shall be referred to the arbitration of two disinterested persons, one to be chosen by each party from amongst the members or their authorised or nominated representatives for the purpose of determination, settlement and adjustment of disputes or differences in respect of cotton transactions referred to above. The arbitrators shall have power to appoint an umpire and shall do so if and when they differ as to their award." Though the petitioner was called upon to appoint its own arbitrator, the petitioner failed to appoint its arbitrator. Under Bye-law 38(B) it is provided as under: "Upon application and on payment in advance of the minimum fees of arbitrators as provided by Bye-law 41 by their disputant, the Chairman shall appoint the two arbitrators (having power to appoint and umpire) in any of the following cases:--- (i) If after one party has appointed an arbitrator ready and willing to act, the other party refuses or neglects to appoint a second arbitrator (ready and willing to act) within ten days after service of written notice of that appointment in Bombay or within fifteen days after service thereof elsewhere than in India. (ii) If the arbitrators appointed do not within 3 months or such extended period as may have been fixed by the Chairman, either make an award or appoint an umpire. (iii) If either of the arbitrators dies, refuses or neglects to act or becomes incapable of acting before an award is made by them." Since the petitioner failed to appoint its arbitrator within 10 days after service of written notice in that behalf, the Chairman of the E.I.C.A. appointed two arbitrators in exercise of his powers under Bye-law 38(B)(i). This was done on 7th May, 1987 as is clear from Exhibit B, to the petition. This was done on 7th May, 1987 as is clear from Exhibit B, to the petition. Under the said letter, Shri C.K. Dani and Shri R.P. Shah were appointed as arbitrators under Bye-law 38(B)(i) in the dispute between petitioner and the respondent. 4. Shri Jain, the learned Counsel for the respondent has, at the outset, raised a preliminary objection on the ground of the unexplained delay in filing of the present application for setting aside the award. He has contended that the application filed by the petitioner in this Court on 3-9-1990 was beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act. Under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, the time for filing an application for setting aside the award is 30 days from the date of the service of the notice of filing of the award. In the present case, after the award was filed in this Court, notice was served on the petitioner on 18-4-1990. The petitioner applied for certified copy on 23-4-1990. The petitioner has not yet been able to obtain the certified copy. The petition has been filed on 3-9-1990. Shri Jain has placed reliance on an unreported judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court where a distinction has been drawn between the phraseology appearing in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and section 12(4) of the Limitation Act. Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act uses the words "the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award." Relying upon the said judgment of the Calcutta High Court, the argument is that as much as the petitioner had already obtained an ordinary copy of the award, the delay in filing the present application on 3-9-1990 cannot be condoned by resorting to the provisions of section 12(4) of the Limitation Act. The submission is that the time spent for obtaining certified copy need not be excluded while calculating the time spent for filing the application for setting aside the award. 5. As against this, Shri Samdani, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 15 of 1976 decided by Lentin, J., on 3rd February, 1977. 5. As against this, Shri Samdani, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 15 of 1976 decided by Lentin, J., on 3rd February, 1977. Relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Additional Collector of Customs v. M/s. Best and Co.)2, reported in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1713, this Court has taken a view that the words appearing in section 12(4) of the Limitation Act must be construed to mean that the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy. Inasmuch as the certified copy has not yet been made available to the petitioner, in my opinion, the petition filed on 3-9-1990 must be deemed to have been filed in time. Shri Samdani the learned Counsel has also invited my attention to the another Bombay judgment in Arbitration Petition No. 125 of 1987 decided on 10-12-1987 by Suresh, J., following the judgment of Lentin, J., in Arbitration Petition No. 15 of 1976 where it has been held that the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award will have to be excluded. I am bound by the above judgments of this Court and hence the preliminary objection of Shri Jain to the filing of the arbitration petition on 3-9-1990 is untenable. 6. Shri Samdani, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised four principal contentions as under: i) There was no agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration subject to the bye-laws of E.I.C.A. ii) The arbitrator has conducted the proceedings in contravention of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as sufficient opportunity was not given to the petitioner to file the written statement and/or to put forth his case. iii) The appointment of the two arbitrators was not in accordance with the true spirit of Bye-laws 38(A) and 38(B) and E.I.C.A. iv) The award was not made within the prescribed period of 3 months from the date of the appointments of the arbitrators, namely within 3 months of 7-4-1987 inasmuch as the award was made on 2-9-1987. 7. iii) The appointment of the two arbitrators was not in accordance with the true spirit of Bye-laws 38(A) and 38(B) and E.I.C.A. iv) The award was not made within the prescribed period of 3 months from the date of the appointments of the arbitrators, namely within 3 months of 7-4-1987 inasmuch as the award was made on 2-9-1987. 7. As against this, Shri Jain, the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents has contended that in the first place, in view of the specific clause contained in the contract that the transaction was subject to the bye-laws of the E.I.C.A., the parties would be subject to the arbitration of E.I.C.A. Secondly, he contended that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner as would he evident from the number of adjournments referred to hereafter. After the service of the notice on the petitioner and after the service of the copy of the statement of claim even as per the case made out by the petitioner himself he could have attended the hearing on 6-8-1987 and/or 2-9-1987. Thirdly, on the question of appointment of the two arbitrators, Shri Jain contended that there was nothing in the scheme of Bye-law 38(A) and/or Bye-law 38(B) which would disqualify Shri Dani who was earlier appointed as arbitrator of the petitioner. In as such, as there was a separate appointment of the two arbitrators by the Chairman of the E.I.C.A. the appointment was in order. Finally, he contended that the period of three months for making the award must be counted from the date when the arbitrators effectively applied their mind. The initial stages of ministerial acts being done by the arbitrators without any effective steps being taken, must, therefore, be excluded. 8. Coming to the first submission of Shri Samdani, learned Counsel, it is clear that the 7 transactions which are the subject matter of arbitration were subject to the bye-laws of the E.I.C.A. The relevant clause is already quoted in para 2 above. It may be that the petitioner is not a member of E.I.C.A. and the respondent alone is a member of E.I.C.A. However, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of M/s. Arthur and Co. v. M/s. Shamji Kalidas and Co., reported in A.I.R. 1972 Bom. It may be that the petitioner is not a member of E.I.C.A. and the respondent alone is a member of E.I.C.A. However, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of M/s. Arthur and Co. v. M/s. Shamji Kalidas and Co., reported in A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 345 (supra), it is clear that where a cotton contract between two non-members incorporated a term that the contract would be subject to the bye-laws of the E.I.C.A., the bye-laws of the said E.I.C.A. became incorporated into the said contract and would, therefore, apply. If that be so, the concluding portion of the bye-law 38(A) of the bye-laws would amount to an arbitration agreement. Shri Samdani, learned Counsel, however, wanted to distinguish between the amount due at the foot of the account and amount due under the 7 transactions. According to him, what is annexed at Exhibit H to the petition is a running account between the parties for the period 20-2-1986 to 30-4-1986. It is true that there is an opening balance of Rs. 8,57,454.84 which is a debit balance, representing the amount payable by the petitioner to the respondent. It is also true that the closing debit balance was Rs. 13,62,842/-. A perusal of the details of the 7 transactions between the period 17-2-1986 and 14-3-1986 as evidenced by the 7 invoices Nos. 580, 581, 888, 889, 890, 896 and 900 would show that an amount of Rs. 7,30,778/- was due from the petitioner under the said 7 transactions. If this be so, it is difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that there was no agreement to refer the dispute to the arbitration. I must mention here that the correspondence exchanged between the parties shows that, on merit, the petitioner has no defence whatsoever. In this view of the matter, I am not impressed by the first submission of the petitioner's Counsel. 9. Coming to the question of the alleged failure to comply with the principles of natural justice, it appears that the matter was initially placed before the arbitrators on 10-6-1987, and was adjourned on 8-7-1987, 14-7-1987, 6-8-1987 and finally to 2-9-1987 when the award was made. The petitioner has admitted in the petition itself in para 12 that he had received the copy of the statement of claim along with the letter dated 14-7-1987 sometime towards the end of July 1987. The petitioner has admitted in the petition itself in para 12 that he had received the copy of the statement of claim along with the letter dated 14-7-1987 sometime towards the end of July 1987. There is some controversy as to whether the copies sent to the petitioner earlier one by registered post and one under certificate of posting was received by the petitioner or not. While the copy sent by registered post was refused, it is not clear as to whether the copy sent under certificate of posting was received by the petitioner or not. Without, however, going into that controversy, it is clear that on his own admission, by the end of July, the petitioner had received the copy of the statement of claim. If that be so, there was no justification for the petitioner to remain absent at the meeting of 6-8-1987 and 2-9-1987 the notice dated 9-7-1987 regarding the meeting of 6-8-1987 and the notice dated 7-8-1987 regarding the meeting of 2-9-1987 made it clear that it was to be the final meeting. Beyond sending a telegram the petitioner has not taken any steps either to remain present or even to file a written statement. It is difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that he did not have sufficient opportunity of remaining present before the arbitrators or that the arbitrators did not comply with the principles of natural justice. Speed is the very essence of such commercial arbitrations. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention also. 10. The third contention is about the appointment of the arbitrators being not in accordance with the true spirit of the provisions of Bye-law 38(A) read with 38(B) of the Bye-laws of E.I.C.A. I have already reproduced the said bye-laws above. A scrutiny of Bye-law 38(B) would show that in the event of the other party failing to appoint its own arbitrator, the Chairman of the E.I.C.A. has been given power to appoint two arbitrators. There is no bar on the Chairman appointing one of the arbitrators who was already appointed by one of the parties. There are no grounds alleged against Shri Dani which could disqualify Shri Dani from functioning as an arbitrator. The Chairman was within his power under Bye-law 38(B) when he appointed Shri Dani and Shri Shah to act as arbitrators. There is no bar on the Chairman appointing one of the arbitrators who was already appointed by one of the parties. There are no grounds alleged against Shri Dani which could disqualify Shri Dani from functioning as an arbitrator. The Chairman was within his power under Bye-law 38(B) when he appointed Shri Dani and Shri Shah to act as arbitrators. I find no merit in this contention of the petitioner that the appointment of Shri Dani in particular was in contravention of the true spirit of Bye-law 38(B). 11. The last submission is regarding the period within which the award had to be made. Relying upon the provisions of Bye-laws 38(A) and 38(B) the argument is that the award had to be made within the period of 3 months of the date of appointment irrespective of the question when the arbitrators entered upon the arbitration. However, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (M/s. Jolly Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)3, reported in A.I.R. 1979 Bom. 214, has clearly distinguished between the stage dealing with the ministerial acts performed by the arbitrators and the stage where effective adjudication commenced in furtherance of the work of arbitration. It has been held that the arbitrator cannot be said to have entered upon a reference unless the second stage had reached. The mere fixation of the time schedule for the parties to file their pleadings and take inspection etc. would not tantamount to commencement of the effective adjudication by the arbitrator. If that be so, in this case, the time spent between 7-5-1987 and 6-8-1987 was, in my opinion, spent in doing the ministerial acts. There was no effective hearing or an attempt to adjudicate the dispute between the parties before 6-8-1987. The only two effective dates of hearing were 6-8-1987 and 2-9-1987. The award made on 2-9-1987 is, clearly within the period of limitation of three months granted by the bye-law. There is thus no merit in the last contention also. 12. In view of the above, the petition for setting aside the award fails. However, as far as the provisions for payment of interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the amount of Rs. 7,30,778/- payable from 1st May, 1987 till the date of payment is concerned, this part of the award will have to be modified. 12. In view of the above, the petition for setting aside the award fails. However, as far as the provisions for payment of interest at the rate of 21% per annum on the amount of Rs. 7,30,778/- payable from 1st May, 1987 till the date of payment is concerned, this part of the award will have to be modified. In view of the settled legal position, the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite i.e. to say during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings before him till the award was declared on 2nd September, 1987. Interest can be awarded only from 3rd September, 1987 till the date of payment. In the absence of any specific rate of interest being agreed upon between the parties, in my opinion, it would be fair in the facts and circumstances of this case to direct the petitioner to pay interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the sum of Rs. 7,30,778/- from 3rd September, 1987 till the date of payment. 13. In the result, the Arbitration Petition No. 178 of 1990 is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. -----