JUDGMENT : N.L. Ganguly, J. This revision u/s 25 of the Provisional Small Causes Court Act is directed against the judgment and decree passed in Small Causes Suit No. 31 of 1988, decreeing the Plaintiffs suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. The Plaintiff Yogendra Kumar Singh filed the suit with the allegation that he is the sole owner and landlord of the accommodation at building No. 356 Baghambari Grihsthan Yojna, Allahabad and the Defendant applicant is the tenant occupying the accommodation Rs. 250/- per month, besides water tax and charges for the electricity consumed. The Plaintiffs stated in the plaint that the house in question was assessed for the first time by Nagar Mahapalika on 1-4-82. As such U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the building in question. 2. The Plaintiff served a notice dated 4-7-88 demanding the arrears of rent from the tenant besides the water charges and also for terminating the tenancy. A copy of the said notice is annexed as Annexure 5 with the counter affidavit filed by the landlord to the affidavit filed along with the stay vacation application. The Defendant contested the suit on the ground that she is occupying the accommodation since 1-10-1979 and the building in question was constructed in the year 1976, hence U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was applicable to the tenancy. The Defendant denied that the Plaintiff is the sole owner and landlord of the house in question. The suit at the instance of the Plaintiff was not maintainable. The Defendant pleaded that the accommodation in question was let out by Khajan Singh after executing a rent note and it was settled that the rent for the accommodation would be Rs. 250/- p.m. besides Rs. 10/- water charges and the electricity bill would be payable according to electric sub meter reading. It was also stated that since December 1987 the owner of the building refused to receive the rent hence the amount of rent was deposited u/s 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in the court of Munsif West, Allahabad and the rent was being continuously deposited in the said account. 3. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent had filed caveat and the parties exchanged between themselves the counter, rejoinder and supplementary rejoinder affidavits annexing the necessary copies of the documents and statements of the parties intended to rely in their arguments. 3. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent had filed caveat and the parties exchanged between themselves the counter, rejoinder and supplementary rejoinder affidavits annexing the necessary copies of the documents and statements of the parties intended to rely in their arguments. Since the parties have agreed that the revision itself may be heard and decided at the stage, I proceed to decide the revision finally without passing orders for admission and summoning the record of the court below. 4. Issue No. 2, with regard to the applicability of the Act No. 13 of 1972 of the accommodation in question is one of the important questions for decision. It is admitted between the parties that the accommodation in question was let out to the Defendant since 1-10-1979 by Plaintiff's father Khajan Singh. The Defendant pleaded that the house in question was built in the year 1976 and that on the date of filing of the suit, provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 would be applicable. The Plaintiff's case is that the building in question was assessed by the Nagar Mahapalika for the first time on 1-4-82, as such the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not be applicable. 5. The court below relying on Bishan Chand Vs. Vth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr (Uttar Pradesh) and Another, (1982) 1 SCC 626 and Dr. Virendra Swarup Goel v. Smt. Malti Agarwal 1981 (1) ARC 192, held that since the building in question was assessed for the first time by the Nagar Mahapalika on 1-4-82, it shall be presumed in law that the building was constructed on the date of its first assessment. In view of the said fact, it was held that the building in question is not covered by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 6. In view of settled law, I have no reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the court below to the applicability of the Act No. 13 of 1972 and I also hold that the building in question was deemed to be constructed w.e.f. 1-4-1982 the date of its first assessment by the Nagar Mahapalika. 7. 6. In view of settled law, I have no reason to interfere with the finding recorded by the court below to the applicability of the Act No. 13 of 1972 and I also hold that the building in question was deemed to be constructed w.e.f. 1-4-1982 the date of its first assessment by the Nagar Mahapalika. 7. The next important question to be considered in the case is that whether the suit by the Plaintiff alone as Plaintiff landlord of the premises is maintainable and the decree could be passed for ejectment and arrears of rent of the Defendant which was initiated after serving the notice dated 4--7-88. This is not disputed that Khajan Singh was originally landlord of the premises who had let out the accommodation to the Defendant after executing a rent note. The Plaintiff pleaded that there was a suit for partition filed by him against his father Khajan Singh and others a copy of the decree passed in the said partition suit has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the stay application of the applicant. A perusal of the terms of the compromise shows that according to the compromise decree the Plaintiff and Khajan Singh his father, were held to be joint owner of the portion of the house according to the compromise decree. The paragraph of the compromise decree shows that the first and fifth parties jointly would get building with land on the western side of the plot aforesaid delineated in blue in the annexed plan and shown by letters I.J.K.H.G. comprising of the two rooms, kitchen, one latrine and one bath room and a courtyard and in addition the entire constructed and non-constructed area over this portion on the roof will be entirely in possession of the first and fifth parties. So also the entire constructed and non-constructed portion over the second floor of the entire building would be the sole property of the first and fifth parties where they may take (sic) legal construction and own use them. This copy of compromise is not controverted and a perusal of the said compromise decree clearly shows that the Plaintiff alone had not become the owner and landlord of the accommodation in question occupied by the Defendant-applicant. This copy of compromise is not controverted and a perusal of the said compromise decree clearly shows that the Plaintiff alone had not become the owner and landlord of the accommodation in question occupied by the Defendant-applicant. It appears that the court below had completely lost sight of the copy of the partition decree and erroneously held that the building in question was owned by the Plaintiff alone. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff had filed the copy of the notice dated 15-6-87 sent by Khajan Singh, father of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Yogendra Kumar Singh. The said notice stated that the accommodation is a new construction and the Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to it and the landlords needed the accommodation for their use and occupation and thus the tenancy was terminated. This notice is annexed as Annexure 3 with the counter affidavit. Another notice was also sent by the Plaintiff dated 4-7-88 which was sent through Sri Gopal Das Sinha, Advocate on behalf of Yogendra Kumar Singh, Plaintiff alone demanding the arrears of rent, water charges and electricity charges for the period since 1-7-1987. This notice was replied by the tenant, a copy of the reply notice is annexed as Annexure 6 with the counter affidavit of the Plaintiff. It was informed by the reply that since the rent was offered to be paid by her but it was refused in the circumstances money order for rent, water charges was sent for the month of December 1987, January 1988 and February 1988 which too was refused and 1 hereafter the amount of rent was deposited u/s 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in Misc. Case No. 221 of 1988 Smt. Damayanti Devi v. Yogendra Kumar Singh. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the Defendant admitted and acknowledged the fact that Yogendra Kumar Singh had become owner and landlord, as such the decree for ejectment on the notice of Yogendra Kumar Singh alone is just and legal in the circumstances of the case. It was also urged that the Defendant had deposited the rent in the name of the Plaintiff alone which fact also shows that the Defendant accepted and acknowledged the Plaintiff as an owner and landlord of the premises. It was also urged that the Defendant had deposited the rent in the name of the Plaintiff alone which fact also shows that the Defendant accepted and acknowledged the Plaintiff as an owner and landlord of the premises. The learned Counsel for the Defendant pointed out that besides the amount deposited u/s 30 of the Act, no amount was ever paid to the Plaintiff as rent. Thus, no relation of landlord and tenant was created between him and the Plaintiff. The learned Counsel for the Defendant pointed out that the court below misread the reply notice Annexure CA 4. It was not said in the reply notice dated 27th May 1988 that any amount of rent was paid to Yogendra Kumar Singh. The court below misread the raply notice and wrongly said that Defendants have paid the arrears of rent to Yogendra Kumar Singh. The learned Counsel for the applicant cited, Tara Chand v. Vishambhar Nath. 1981 All. RC 1688 to emphasise that the suit filed after serving the notice u/s 106, Transfer of Property Act by the Plaintiff alone is illegal. It is evident from the copy of the compromise decree and notice dated 15-6-1887 served earlier by Khajan Singh and Plaintiff that Plaintiff-Respondent is not owner and landlord of the accommodation in tenancy of the Defendant. It was clear that Plaintiff and Khahan Singh are owners of the accommodation. It is also admitted that in the notice demanding arrears of rent, dues of water taxes and electricity charges and terminating the tenancy u/s 106 T.P. Act was sent on behalf of the Plaintiff alone which is the basis of this suit. It was no where stated that the notice was on behalf of Khajan Singh also. The learned Counsel for the applicant relied on Ganga Narain v. IX Alld. District Judge Kanpur 1984 (1) ARC 342. P.K. Tandon v. Smt. Ganga Devi Rathore 1969 ALJ 405, Mahesh Dutt Awasthi v. III Addl. District Judge Kanpur 1981 (7) ALR 272, and Smt. Uma Singh v. Virendra Kumar Agrawal 1981 (7) ALR 364. It is abundantly clear that the suit filed by the Plaintiff Yogendra Kumar Singh alone after serving the notice for arrears and ejectment alleging himself to be the owner landlord is bad in law and no decree for eviction could be legally passed. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondent cited Gopal Das v. I Addl. It is abundantly clear that the suit filed by the Plaintiff Yogendra Kumar Singh alone after serving the notice for arrears and ejectment alleging himself to be the owner landlord is bad in law and no decree for eviction could be legally passed. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondent cited Gopal Das v. I Addl. District Judge Varanasi AIR 1987 (FB) 261, A perusal of the decision shows that it does not help the case of Respondent at all. In the said case the joint family property which was occupied by a tenant was partitioned and the person which got the portion after partition occupied by tenant had filed case u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of his personal use and occupation. A case was filed without impleading the earst-while co-owners. It was held that in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) and 3(J) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 was competent and there was illegality in it. Anr. case Girraj Kishore Vs. Dr. Trilokinath Vimal, AIR 1988 All 305 , was also cited by the Respondents counsel for showing that one of the co-owners is competent to serve notice terminating the tenancy and is competent to file suit for eviction. The facts of the present case if examined would show that Plaintiff was not the co-owner at the time of inception of the tenancy. The tenancy was created after a rent note between Khajan Singh and Defendant applicant. It was Khajan Singh who had been receiving the rent from the applicant. It was the Plaintiff-Respondents' suit for partition of the house in question and in the compromise decree the Plaintiff and Khajan Singh both were held as co-owners of the premises in tenancy of applicant. Khajan Singh in his notice sent to the applicant had demanded rent and eviction. But that notice is not the basis of the present suit, nor the Defendant-applicant acknowledged the plaint ff to be owner entitled to recover the rent. It was also not communicated that Plaintiff also became co-owner after partition suit. This would be no legitimate to hold that since the Defendant-applicant deposited rent in the name of Sri Yogendra Kumar Singh u/s 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it shall have to accept that Defendant acknowledged and accepted the Plaintiff alone as landlord of the accommodation. This would be no legitimate to hold that since the Defendant-applicant deposited rent in the name of Sri Yogendra Kumar Singh u/s 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it shall have to accept that Defendant acknowledged and accepted the Plaintiff alone as landlord of the accommodation. The Respondent cannot claim any advantage of Section 30 deposit made in his name. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises on the date of the suit and the proceedings u/s 30 of UP. Act No. 13 of 1972 was misconceived. It was all confusion created by the Plaintiff and his' father Khajan Singh. The Defendant applicant in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances had no way except to make deposit u/s 30 of the said Act under a belief that the said Act was applicable to the premises. The Defendants have explained the facts and circumstances. It is not justified to reject the case of a party only on the ground that Defendant herself failed to appear in person before the Court. This fact cannot be ignored that aged more than 70 years, ailing sends her son to depose on her behalf. 9. The suit filed by the Plaintiff alone for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction as filed in the present case, was liable to be dismissed for the facts and legal aspect stated above. The decree for eviction passed against the applicant is set aside and the other relief granted by the court below is maintained. 10. The revision is, thus, partly allowed. The parties to bear cost themselves.