JUDGMENT P.K. Shamsuddin, J. 1. In this Original Petition, the petitioner prays for issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing Ext. P3 and also for a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to consider the question of sanctioning the post of UPSA for the period from 15-6­1983 to 1-9-1983 against which the petitioner was appointed by the 5th respondent. 2. The circumstances which led to the filing of this Original Petition may be summarised as follows: The petitioner has passed B. A & B.Ed. Examination. She was appointed as Lower Primary School Assistant by the 5th respondent on 15-6-1983. But her appointment was approved only with effect from l-9-1983.She was retrenched on 30-3-1984 and re-appointed on 4-6-1984. Her continuous service commenced from 4-6-1984. The 6th respondent was also appointed as Lower Primary School Assistant in another school under the same corporate management on 15-7-1983. Her appointment was approved from that date. A vacancy of High School Assistant arose with effect from 15-7-1987. The petitioner was promoted as High School Assistant to that vacancy and that appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer as per Ext. P1 order. The petitioner took maternity leave from 24-8-1989 to 21-11-1989 and her leave was extended upto 21-12-1989. The 6th respondent was promoted in the leave vacancy. When the petitioner rejoined duty the 6th respondent was reverted. 3. While matters stood as above, the 4th respondent issued an order dated 23-6-1990 directing the Manager to revert the petitioner to facilitate the promotion of the 6th respondent on the ground that the petitioner was junior to 6th respondent. Since the order was passed without notice, the petitioner filed O.P. No. 5821 of 1990. This court quashed the order on the ground that she was reverted without notice and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the 4th respondent. Ext. P2 is the judgment. After Ext. P2 judgment, 6th respondent filed a revision before the Director of Public Instruction, who is the 2nd respondent herein on 3-7-1990. Pursuant to the direction contained in Ext. P2, the District Educational Officer issued notice to both the parties and ultimately held that he had no power to review. He also noticed that a revision filed before the Director of Public Instruction is pending. The 6th respondent sent a reminder to the Director of Public Instruction on 17-2-1990 requesting to dispose of the revision. P2, the District Educational Officer issued notice to both the parties and ultimately held that he had no power to review. He also noticed that a revision filed before the Director of Public Instruction is pending. The 6th respondent sent a reminder to the Director of Public Instruction on 17-2-1990 requesting to dispose of the revision. Thereafter, the 6th respondent filed O.P. No. 3522 of 1991 before this court and this court as per judgment dated 27-3-1991 directed the 2nd respondent to dispose of the revisions after hearing all the parties. Accordingly, the Director of Public Instruction afforded opportunities to all the parties to be heard and passed Ext P3 order dated 18-6-1991 holding that by virtue of her seniority, 6th respondent was entitled to promotion and therefore she shall be nationally promoted with effect from 15-7-1987. The 2nd respondent set aside the appointment of petitioner as High School Assistant and directed to recover the difference of pay and allowances from the maintenance grant of the school. 4. In this Original Petition, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that 6th respondent failed to file an appeal under Chapter XIV-A Rule 64 against her original promotion as per Ext. P1. He also argued that the 2nd respondent acted illegally in exercising his powers under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A after lapse of a long period. Learned counsel submitted that though no time limit is prescribed under Rule 8A this court has to treat three months a reasonable period for filing a revision under Chapter XIV-A Rule 8A. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed before me the decision of this court in Narayanan v. Rent Controller ( 1988 (2) K.L.T. 74 ). It was held that though S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not prescribe a time limit for exercises of jurisdiction, it does not mean that the District Court can exercise its jurisdiction at any future time without any limitation whatsoever. It was further observed that a period of 90 days should be treated as reasonable time within which an aggrieved party should move under S. 20. It was further observed that a period of 90 days should be treated as reasonable time within which an aggrieved party should move under S. 20. On the analogy of S. 20 learned counsel for petitioner argued that a period of three months should be treated as a reasonable time to exercise the jurisdiction under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel in this regard. The principle enunciated in Narayanan's case can hardly be called in aid in considering the time limit for filing a revision under Rule 8A in view of the peculiar nature of circumstances that may arise leading to filing of a revision under Rule 8A. The 6th respondent has filed a counter affidavit in this original petition. In the counter affidavit, it is pointed out that the 4th respondent is a corporate management and there are several institutions run by the 5th respondent and it is not possible for the teachers to find out when promotions were effected in each school unless the teachers aggrieved also work in the same school and a seniority list is prepared and circulated among the teachers. The petitioner was promoted as High School Assistant in the Mulavukad High School and transferred to the Perumanoor High School. The 6th respondent was working in the school at Edacochin and was later transferred to Perumanoor on 11-8-1988 subsequent to the promotion of the petitioner as High School Assistant According to 6th respondent there was no seniority list for a long time and it was Ext. R6(c) that was published and circulated for the first time fixing the relative seniority of teachers as on 1-2-1989. There is no dispute on this aspect. When exactly it was circulated among the teachers is not very clear but Serial No. 42 Mary Juliet V.G. has signed R6(c) on 1-3-1989 as having seen the list. In that list the 6th respondent is placed as Serial No. 38 and her date of commencement of service is shown as 15-7-1983. From Ext. R6(c) it appears that originally the name of the petitioner was not there but it was inserted as Item No. 49(B) by handwriting. Her date of commencement of service is shown as 22-6-1983. However her continuous service is shown as 4-6-1984. From Ext. R6(c) it appears that originally the name of the petitioner was not there but it was inserted as Item No. 49(B) by handwriting. Her date of commencement of service is shown as 22-6-1983. However her continuous service is shown as 4-6-1984. Again in the list of High School Assistants the Serial Number of the petitioner is shown as 17. That also is inserted in handwriting in the original list prepared. The date of commencement of service of the petitioner is shown there as 1-9-1983. I find from Ext. R6(c) that the 6th respondent has noted against her name in the list "doubts to be cleared". However the date when she signed is not seen in the document produced. Both parties agreed that the place where date should have been noted was torn off from the original list. It is the case of the 6th respondent in the counter affidavit that she knew about the seniority list only in May 1989 and finding that the petitioner was junior to her in the list, she noted against her name 'doubts to be cleared'. Immediately she made enquiry and found out while 6th respondent had continuous service from 15-7-1983, the petitioner had continuous service only from 4-6-1984. She also alleged that her 1st appointment was on 1-9-1983 and she had continuous service from 15-7­1983 and therefore, undoubtedly she is senior to the petitioner. 6th respondent filed objection on 24-5-1989 soon after she understood the relative seniority from the list. Her objection is produced as Ext. R6(a). Since the Manager failed to take action on her objection she complained to the District Educational Officer also on 23-1-1989 and after considering her objection the order dated 23-6-1990 was passed by the District Educational Officer which was later quashed by this court for the reason that the petitioner was not heard. Thereafter she filed a petition before the 2nd respondent also invoking the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A and ultimately the 2nd respondent passed Ext. P3 order which is impugned in this original petition. 5. I am inclined to believe the statement of the 6th respondent that she came to know appointment of the petitioner as High School Assistant only in May, 1989. P3 order which is impugned in this original petition. 5. I am inclined to believe the statement of the 6th respondent that she came to know appointment of the petitioner as High School Assistant only in May, 1989. She was not working in the school in which the petitioner was working when petitioner was promoted and there was no seniority list circulated among the teachers and it was under those circumstances, she could not file an appeal under Rule 64 of Chapter XIV-A even assuming that such an appeal would lie. In the circumstances, the 6th respondent was justified in invoking powers under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A. The 2nd respondent was fully justified also in exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A and quashing the appointment of the petitioner and ordering the promotion of the 6th respondent with effect from 15-7-1987. 6. I have already found that the analogy of S. 20 cannot be made applicable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 8A. In this connection I may point out that R. 8(6) and in Rule 64 of Chapter XIV-A and in Rule 12 E of Chapter XXIII, time limit is prescribed for exercising the powers of appeal. The absence of time limit in Rule 8A cannot be considered as a mere omission. It appears to me that it has been deliberately maintained having regard to the peculiar nature of situations that may arise which require revision without reference to any time limit It is always open to the revisional authority to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction on the ground of laches or undue delay or on other similar grounds, in the circumstances it would be difficult to apply the dictum laid down by this court in Narayanan v. Rent Controller ( 1988 (2) KLT 74 ) in interpreting Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A. It has to be born in mind that a person aggrieved by the judgment of appellate authority in a rent control matter will be quite aware of the date of disposal and in such situation the theory of "a reasonable period of three months" enunciated in Narayanan's case (supra) is quite reasonable. But adoption of that principle to a case falling under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A will lead to disastrous consequences. But adoption of that principle to a case falling under Rule 8A of Chapter XIV-A will lead to disastrous consequences. On the facts of this case I have no hesitation to hold that there is no laches on the part of the 6th respondent in invoking revisional jurisdiction of 2nd respondent. Foregoing discussion would show that the 6th respondent had more continuous service than the petitioner and therefore the impugned order is perfectly legal and valid. There is no merit in this Original Petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Dismissed.