JUDGMENT (Per T. D. Sugla, J.) This is assessee's reference. The assessment years involved are 1966-67 to 1969-70. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred to this Court the following two questions of law under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1967 : "1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the provisions of section 280ZB the Tribunal erred in law in holding that there was a mistake apparent from records within the meaning of sec. 154 and in upholding the action of the ITO in taking back the benefit of tax credit certificates originally granted in respect of the following items of receipts : (a) Profit on sale of assets. (b) Interest on back deposits. (c) Rent received. (d) Other interest ? 2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that the assessee company was wholly engaged in the manufacture and production of biscuits and confectionery, the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the items mentioned in question No. 1 above though formed part of the business income were not income attributable (sic) the manufacture or production of biscuits and confectionery within the meaning of section 280ZB ?" The assessee was admittedly entitled to relief under section 280ZB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on profits and gains attributable to the manufacture and/or production of articles mentioned in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development) Act, 1951. There is no dispute that the assessee has been deriving profits and gains attributable to such an activity. Accordingly, while completing assessee's assessments for the assessment years 1966-67 to 1969-70 the Income-tax Officer granted to the assessee tax credit certificates of amounts representing 20% of the difference in the tax payable on the income in the base year i.e. assessment year 1965-66 and the tax payable in the subsequent assessment years involved herein. Subsequently, however, the Income-tax Officer felt that while computing the amount of the tax credit certificates he had committed a mistake. The mistake was that instead of difference in tax on the entire income of the assessee for different years, he should have taken tax on that portion of income only which was attributable to the assessee's manufacture and/or production activities. Accordingly, after giving notice to the assessee he rectified the assessment order under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The mistake was that instead of difference in tax on the entire income of the assessee for different years, he should have taken tax on that portion of income only which was attributable to the assessee's manufacture and/or production activities. Accordingly, after giving notice to the assessee he rectified the assessment order under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As a result of rectification orders he excluded the income such as rent received, profit on sale of assets, interest on bank deposits and miscellaneous receipts from the total income of the assessee both for the base year and other years calculated tax payable on the income so reduced and correspondingly reduced the amount of relief allowable under section 280ZB. This was done on the assumption that such types of income were not attributable to the manufacturing and/or production activities. The assessee filed appeals. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the assessee that the question whether kinds of income such as rent received, profits on sale of assets do or do not constitute profits or gains attributable to the assessee's manufacturing and/or production activities was not free from doubt. Accordingly, he held that the rectification orders passed by the Income-tax Officer on that behalf were not tenable in law. The matter was carried to the Tribunal by the department. The Tribunal agreed with the department that the mistake pointed out by the Income-tax Officer was apparent and glaring. There could possibly be no debate or doubt about it and therefore, Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the orders under section 154 rectifying original assessment orders. The Tribunal also held that even though the items of income in dispute formed part of the business income, they were not attributable to the assessee's manufacture or production of biscuits and confectionery. The counsels have been heard at length. The first question as urged by Dr. Balasubramaniam for the revenue is whether it was open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal to go into the merits of the impugned rectification orders. He pointed out that the orders of rectification herein clearly referred to two facts namely : (i) order of assessment for the assessment year 1965-66 was rectified which was not challenged and had thus, become final and (ii) the order for assessment year 1966-67 and other years had already been rectified excluding rental income, interest income, etc. He pointed out that the orders of rectification herein clearly referred to two facts namely : (i) order of assessment for the assessment year 1965-66 was rectified which was not challenged and had thus, become final and (ii) the order for assessment year 1966-67 and other years had already been rectified excluding rental income, interest income, etc. as not being profits and gains attributable to the assessee's manufacture and or production activities the rectification order in dispute being only to give effect to such orders i.e. to reduce the amount of tax credit certificates issued under section 280ZB. In our judgment this argument of the learned counsel required to be rejected for more than one reason. In the first place, both the Appellate assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have proceeded on the basis that these were the only orders of rectification and there were no other orders. Secondly, we have not been shown by the learned counsel for the revenue that the Income-tax Officer had passed any rectification order earlier either for assessment year 1965-66 or for the years under reference. That apart, the manner in which the computation is made in the impugned order of rectification for assessment year 1966-67 clearly suggests that these are the only orders of rectification. If the impugned orders were passed merely as a consequence of earlier rectification order/s, there would be no necessity of referring to different kinds of income in the impugned order. The Income-tax Officer in that case would have merely referred to the profits and gains attributable to the assessee's manufacture and/or production activities already computed in the earlier orders of rectification. Accordingly, we would proceed on the basis that these are the only rectification orders and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Tribunal have correctly considered them on merits. Our Court has already held in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. N. N. Mistry, Addl. 1st, Income-tax Officer, reported in 145 ITR 435 that the question whether the income by way of miscellaneous receipts such as rent, interest and surplus on sale of assets under section 41(2) in the case of manufacturing company is or is not attributable to the manufacture activities is not free from doubt. Ltd. v. N. N. Mistry, Addl. 1st, Income-tax Officer, reported in 145 ITR 435 that the question whether the income by way of miscellaneous receipts such as rent, interest and surplus on sale of assets under section 41(2) in the case of manufacturing company is or is not attributable to the manufacture activities is not free from doubt. In the above view of the matter, it is not possible to accept that for the purpose of our considering the validity of orders of rectification that this question is free from doubt. Accordingly, we hold that rectification of the assessment orders for this purpose by taking recourse to the provisions of section 156 was not justified. The law in this regard is well settled in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of T. S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers and anr., 82 ITR 50 that a mistake which is not glaring and obvious from records could not be rectified under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It cannot certainly be said in a case like the one before us that a mistake if any was patent or glaring on the face of record. There is another aspect argued before us by Shri Dilip Dwarkadas. He stated that while condition for application of section 280ZB is that the assessee must be engaged in the manufacture or production of certain articles and liable to pay any tax in respect of its profits for assessment year 1965-66, relief to be computed under section 280ZB is, on the difference of tax which the assessee is liable to pay in the base year and subsequent year. This argument was not advanced by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. In any event it was certainly not advanced in the manner in which it is advanced before us. Since in our view this is only one more aspect of the question, having regard to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., 42 ITR 589, we are inclined to consider this aspect of the matter also. Section 280ZB sub-section (1) reads as under : "280ZB. Since in our view this is only one more aspect of the question, having regard to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., 42 ITR 589, we are inclined to consider this aspect of the matter also. Section 280ZB sub-section (1) reads as under : "280ZB. - Tax credit certificate to certain manufacturing companies in certain cases - (1) Where any company engaged in the manufacturing or production of any of the articles mentioned in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), is, in respect of its profits and gains attributable to such manufacture of production - (i) liable to pay any tax for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the base year), and for any one or more of the five assessment years next following that year; or (ii) not liable to pay any tax for the base year but becomes so liable for any succeeding year (hereinafter referred to as the succeeding base year) and else for any one or more of the assessment years following that year, not being an assessment year commencing on the first day of April 1971, or any subsequent assessment year, and the tax for any such succeeding year exceeds - (a) in the case referred to in clause (i), the tax payable for the base year; (b) in the case referred to in clause (ii), the tax payable for the succeeding base year, then the company shall be granted a tax credit certificate for an amount equal to twenty per cent of such excess : Provided that the amount of the tax credit certificate shall not for any assessment year exceed ten per cent of such tax payable by the company for that year. (2) ..................." Prima facie part of sub-section (1) of section 280ZB provides the condition for eligibility. Once the assessee is eligible, the relief is to be composed under clauses (i), (ii), etc. The expression used in clause (i) is "liable to pay any tax for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1965". This liability is as contained in sub-section (1) of the main section of "any company". There is no indication that this tax has to be in respect of the manufacturing activity only. The expression used in clause (i) is "liable to pay any tax for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1965". This liability is as contained in sub-section (1) of the main section of "any company". There is no indication that this tax has to be in respect of the manufacturing activity only. Therefore, to say the least, it cannot be said that this aspect is also free from doubts. Thus looked from any point of view rectification of the order under section 154 and the consequential reduction of amount in the tax credit certificate cannot be sustained. The question are accordingly answered thus : The impugned orders of certification passed by the Income-tax Officer are invalid and cannot be given effect to. No order as to costs.