JUDGMENT T.N. Singh, J. 1. The short question that arises in this appeal is on the interpretation of Section 31(1-A) of M. P. Excise Act, 1915, which I quote : - "(1-A) Before making an order cancelling or suspending a licence, permit or pass under sub-section (1), the authority aforesaid shall record in writing the reasons for the proposed action, furnish to the holder thereof a brief statement of the same and afford him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 2. Plaintiff has appealed as his suit has been decreed in part only in which he had prayed that the recovery warrant issued against him for realisation of Rs. 34,539.50 be declared void. Trial Court has granted him partial relief and there is no appeal by the State. Admittedly, the warrant was issued for recovery from the plaintiff of kists of duty due payable by him under liquor licence issued to him along with the revenue loss which the defendant/State suffered on account of resale of two shops which had been settled with the plaintiff. 3. It is not denied and the fact found admitted is that there was default on the part of the plaintiff in regard to non-payment timely of the kist due under the licences, Exs. P.-l and P-2. Admittedly also, order was passed on 23-8-1976 (Ex.P-6) cancelling the licences. Indeed, resale is also admitted but the fact of the matter is that the first sale proved abortive as the bid was found low. There was second sale and admittedly the revenue loss accruing from the second sale has only been saddled on the plaintiff. Admittedly the resale amount of the subsequent or second bid was higher than the earlier bid. 4. What Shri Chaturvedi urges strongly is that the plaintiff did not have "a reasonable opportunity of being heard" before his licences were cancelled and as such the recovery warrant in its entirety was void. As per Section 31(4)(b), when a licence is cancelled or suspended "Collector may take the grant under management or resale". He has further contended therefore that no prior notice was served on the plaintiff in respect of the order proposed to be passed on 23-8-1976. His further contention is that on 25-8-1976, plaintiff had made an application, Ex.P-3, for default to be condoned and for the shops to be resettled with him. 5. He has further contended therefore that no prior notice was served on the plaintiff in respect of the order proposed to be passed on 23-8-1976. His further contention is that on 25-8-1976, plaintiff had made an application, Ex.P-3, for default to be condoned and for the shops to be resettled with him. 5. Additional Government Advocate, Shri M. G. Khedkar, has, on the other hand, placed implicit reliance on two crucial facts proved during the course of trial. He has submitted that there has been due compliance with the requirement of sub-section (1-A) aforequoted because notice, Ex.D-2, dated 17-8-1976, was served on the plaintiff. Counsel has submitted that in the order, Ex.P-6, the factum of service is duly recorded and the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to disprove service. Rather, strangely, the plaintiff has in his own evidence at para 70 deposed that he did not know if the signature on the notice was his. It is, therefore, Shri Khedkar's contention that that statement of the plaintiff tantamounts to his admission of service as it was his duty to deny positively and affirmatively service and the signature in respect of that transaction borne on Ex.D-2. 6. Before construing the provision aforequoted, I must remind myself of the constitutional position that obtains in regard to liquor cases. In Bishnuram Bora's Case, AIR 1984 SC 898 it has been categorically held, "the grant of a liquor licence was not a matter of right but was in nature of privilege". Evidently, whatever statutory right the plaintiff has is to be read in the provision aforequoted of Section 31(1-A). Beyond that, it is not possible at all to import any consideration of principles of natural justice because that exercise is also interdicted positively by another holding in Bishnuram Bora's case (supra). Evidently, whatever statutory right the plaintiff has is to be read in the provision aforequoted of Section 31(1-A). Beyond that, it is not possible at all to import any consideration of principles of natural justice because that exercise is also interdicted positively by another holding in Bishnuram Bora's case (supra). The requirement contemplated under the said statutory provision, in my view, is as follows; and beyond that no further right can be claimed by liquor licensee : - (a) A prior notice shall be served on the licensee proposing to cancel or suspend the licence; (b) He has to be afforded a reasonable opportunity in regard to the action proposed and as such when any cause is shown against the action proposed, hearing must be given to him; (c) In order to afford him an opportunity of showing cause, in the notice to be served on him he is to be furnished with "a brief statement" of the proposed action; (d) An order in writing shall be rendered in cancelling the licences and reasons shall be stated therein for the action taken; (e) No order can be passed on any extraneous reason as is not contemplated in terms of the statute or the Rules the licence issued thereunder. 7. Reliance is placed by Shri Khedkar on clause (a) of Section 31(1) to submit that licence can be cancelled by the authority issuing the licence for, amongst other reasons, the reason that any duty payable by the holder thereof is not duly paid. In the instant case it is this reason that prevailed with the Licensing Authority passing the order, Ex.P-6. He has also submitted, that the notice, Ex.D-2, gave prior warning in terms to the plaintiff that for the said reason his licence was liable to be cancelled and additionally it has also been mentioned therein that at his risk and loss the shop shall be resettled. The plaintiff being provided with reasonable opportunity, therefore, on showing cause in respect of proposed action and he having waived his right contemplated under Section 31(1-A) by not showing cause against the proposed action, he can have no reasonable and valid grievance to challenge either order, Ex.P-6 or recovery warrant issued on the basis thereof. The plaintiff being provided with reasonable opportunity, therefore, on showing cause in respect of proposed action and he having waived his right contemplated under Section 31(1-A) by not showing cause against the proposed action, he can have no reasonable and valid grievance to challenge either order, Ex.P-6 or recovery warrant issued on the basis thereof. In my view, the contention which Shri Khedkar has pressed is unanswerable because on facts, it has been duly established that the plaintiff has waived the right contemplated under Section 31(1-A) by not showing against the action proposed. 8. I am also of the view that after power being duly exercised by the Licensing Authority under Section 31(1-A) there could not be any occasion for reconsideration of the matter on the basis of application of the plaintiff, Ex.P-3. It is the admitted case of the parties that plaintiff knew that the auction (resale) had to take place on 23-8-1976 and even on the date of auction he did not deposit the kist money though time was given to him in the notice itself to do that. It is indeed for this reason that resale was first ordered, albeit simultaneously, while cancelling also the licence. I do not think therefore that it can be said that the order, Ex.P-6 can be faulted for non-compliance of Section 31(4)(b). The provision does not envisage a rigid sequence of events in regard to cancellation and resale. It will be due and substantial compliance with the provisions of sub-section (4)(b), if simultaneously order is passed cancelling the licence and ordering resale, for the mere fact that in the order one of the two events is not juxtaposed appropriately, the entire order would not fall. 9. For the reasons aforesaid I find no merit in this appeal and accordingly, it is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.