JUDGMENT 1. 1. This order will decide two separate preliminary objections filed by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 on Sept. 10,'90, and the additional preliminary objection filed by respondent No. 1 on November 23, 1990 in this election petition. 2. The two petitioners Mohan Singh and Pooran Singh are residents of village Palan Heda, Tehsil Mahua, District Sawai Madhopur. They have alleged that they are voters of the Mahua Assembly Constituency. During the last general elections of Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, the election from Mahua Assembly Constituency was held on Feb. 27, 1990. 13 candidates contested the election from Mahua Assembly Constituency. Hari Singh respondent No. 1 was the Congress (I) candidate and he was declared to be elected from the said Mahua Assembly Constituency No. 87 on March 1, 1990 defeating his nearest rival Shri Veer Bahadur Singh, a B.J.R candidate. Hari Singh respondent No. 1 secured 44,970 votes, Veer Bahadur Singh secured 39,702 votes. Accordingly, Hari Singh respondent No. 1 was declared to be elected from Mahua Assembly Constituency. 3. The present election petition was presented by Mohan Singh and Pooran Singh on April 11, 1990 before the Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. The election petition was placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for 1 assignment for trial under section 80A(2) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short hereinafter, 'the Act of 1951'). Hon'ble the Chief Justice by his order dated April 30, 1990 assigned this election petition to me for trial and disposal. The election petition j was registered as Election Petition No. 3/1990 at the permanent Bench of the i Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. Summons were sent to the respondents. On behalf of the respondents, preliminary objections as against the maintainability of the election petition were filed on Sept. 10, 1990. Additional preliminary objections were submitted by respondent No. 1 on 23rd Nov.,'90. The learned counsel for the parties were heard at length on the preliminary objections. 4. Five-fold preliminary objections have been raised on behalf of respondent No.1. The first preliminary objection is that the present election petition was presented by the petitioners on April 11,1990 to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The learned counsel for the parties were heard at length on the preliminary objections. 4. Five-fold preliminary objections have been raised on behalf of respondent No.1. The first preliminary objection is that the present election petition was presented by the petitioners on April 11,1990 to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The election petition was never presented by the petitioners to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur within or beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the election-petition. It is stated that this election petition was transmitted by the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur to the Additional Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench at Jaipur and was received in the Registry of this Court at Jaipur Bench on 28th April,'90 much after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by section 81 of the Act of 1951. It is pleaded that section 79 clause (e) of the Act of 1951 defines High Court as meaning the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to which the election petition relates has been held and section 81 of the said Act provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 100 and section 101 of the Act of 1951 to the High Court. The election petition filed by the petitioners calls in question the validity of the election from Mahua Constituency which is in Sawai Madhopur district of the State of Rajasthan. By clause (2) of the Presidential order issued on Dec. 8,1976, there was established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, to sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. Consequently, order was issued by the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur defining the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jaipur. Consequently, order was issued by the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur defining the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jodhpur and the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jaipur. It is pleaded that the areas falling within the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jodhpur and the said High Court sitting at Jaipur are fully specified and delineated by the Presidential order dated Dec. 8,1976 and the consequential orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The Rajasthan High Court sitting at Jodhpur could only exercise jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Jaisalmar, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pah, Sirohi and Udaipur and not in respect of cases arising in the revenue district of Sawai Madhopur. Consequently, the present election petition in respect of which the entire cause of action has arisen in the revenue district of Sawai Madhopur could only be presented, tried and disposed of by the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The presentation of this election petition before the Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur was, therefore, void ab initio as the same was not presented to the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to which the election petition related had been held. The Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur was neither competent nor had any jurisdiction to transmit this election petition to the Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur and the latter had no jurisdiction to entertain the election petition on April 28, 1990 and to put it for orders before Hon'ble the Chief Justice Under section 80A(2) of the Act of 1951 as on the said date. It was clearly barred by limitation provided for presentation of the election petition by section 81 of the Act of 1951. 5. The second preliminary objection taken is that the election petition does not comply with the mandatory requirements of section 83(l)(a) clause (b) and the proviso to clause (c) and sub-section (2) of the said section as the petitioners have neither pleaded a concise statement of the material facts relating to the alleged corrupt practice of booth capturing on which the petitioners rely nor they have set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioners have alleged. Various deficiencies in the pleading of material facts and full particulars have been pointed out by the respondent No. 1 in paras 20 to 33 of the preliminary objections and it is stated that the averments regarding corrupt practice pleaded in the election petition do not give rise to any triable issue and do not reveal a completed cause of action and, therefore, the election petition is liable to be dismissed. The various deficiencies pointed out in this regard by the respondent No. 1 would be dealt with in detail in a latter part of this order when this preliminary objection will be dealt with. 6. The third preliminary objection raised is that the election petition was never presented, 'accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned therein'. Copy of the election petition was never sent to the respondent No. 1 along with summons and it was given to him only when he made his appearance for the first time before this Court on August 10, 1990. 7. Fourth objection raised is that the election petition has not been verified as required by section 83(l)(e) of the Act of 1951 in the manner laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of pleadings and likewise the Schedule enclosed to the election petition has also not been verified in accordance with law. 8. Last objection raised is that the petitioner has not filed the affidavit as required by the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 83 of the Act of 1951 as the so called affidavit does neither disclose the source of information nor the accurate facts of the alleged information and about the time when the same was received. The petitioner has not stated in the affidavit that each and every particular paragraph specifically numbered in the election petition about the commission of the corrupt practice is correct on the basis of the information believed by him to be true and the source of such information. 9. So far as Bhanwar Singh, respondent No. 2 is concerned, he has raised the objection that he is not alleged to be a candidate in the election contest and he was only on election agent of respondent No. 1. In such circumstances, his name deserves to be struck off from the array of parties to the election petition. 10. 9. So far as Bhanwar Singh, respondent No. 2 is concerned, he has raised the objection that he is not alleged to be a candidate in the election contest and he was only on election agent of respondent No. 1. In such circumstances, his name deserves to be struck off from the array of parties to the election petition. 10. On behalf of the petitioners, reply was filed to the preliminary objections. The petitioners have stated that the respondents were granted time to file written statement on July 5,1990 and August 10, 1990. The respondents have failed to submit the written statement within the time allowed to them under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC and, therefore, their defence is liable to be forfeited under Order 8 Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code It is further said that the election petition had been validly presented before the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and it could not be submitted at Jaipur, as Registrar of the High Court does not sit at Jaipur. The Election Petition Rules of Rajasthan High Court specially provide that election petition can be presented before the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and the security for costs is also to be deposited at Jodhpur. There is not a single election petition which has ever been presented at Jaipur. Even Bhanwar Singh, respondent No. 2 had presented an election petition at Jodhpur by which he had challenged the election of Dr. Kirori Lal held in March, 1985. That I election petition was submitted by the present counsel for the respondents at Jodhpur. S As regards material facts and particulars, it is submitted that as required Under section 83 of the Act of 1951, they have been pleaded and the election petition and Schedule enclosed thereto are to be read as a whole. The cause of action has been fully disclosed and the petition is not liable, to be dismissed on that score. The petitioners had submitted four copies of the election petition along with the Schedule before the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and had obtained receipt in respect thereof. It is also said that wherever in the election petition, the word 'respondent' has been used, it clearly refers to respondent No. 1 when the petition is read along with the Schedule. The petitioners had submitted four copies of the election petition along with the Schedule before the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur and had obtained receipt in respect thereof. It is also said that wherever in the election petition, the word 'respondent' has been used, it clearly refers to respondent No. 1 when the petition is read along with the Schedule. Verification of the election petition has been made according to Order 6 Rule 15 CPC and the affidavit has been sworn in the prescribed form. As regards the preliminary objections filed by respondent No. 2, it is stated that he had submitted nomination paper for contesting election from Mahua Assembly Constituency and thus he was a nominated candidate. However, later on, he withdrew his candidature in favour of respondent No. 1 and thus according to section 82 of the Act of 1951, he was a necessary party to the election petition as allegation of corrupt practice have been made against respondent No. 2 as well as is clear from paras Nos. 4(f), 4(g), 4(j) and 4(k) of the election petition read with the Schedule. 11. Coming to the factual aspect of the first preliminary objection regarding invalid presentation of this election petition at Jodhpur, as already stated, the petitioners presented this election petition before Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur on April 11,1990. The election petition in its heading was also addressed to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. There is a note dated 28th April, 1990 for placing the file before Hon'ble the Chief Justice Under section 80-A(2) of the Act of 1951 for assigning the election petition for trial. Then there is order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice that the election petition is assigned to me for trial and disposal. That is how the election petition was listed before me on May 3, 1990. 12. The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the court possess no common law power. 12. The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the court possess no common law power. The Act of 1951 is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which means that wherever we have to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections, we have only to look at the Act of 1951 and the Rules made thereunder. (See N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency ( AIR 1952 SC 64 ) - per Fazl Ali, J.; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & others ( AIR 1954 SC 210 ) Per Mahajan, C.J.; Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and others ( AIR 1954 SC 411 ) per Venkatarama Ayyar, J.; Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and others v. Lachhi Ram and others at page 688-para 5 AIR 1954 SC 686 ) - per Vivian Bose, J.; K. Kamraja Nadar v. Kunja Thevar and others ( AIR 1958 SC 687 ) - per N.H. Bhagwati, J.; Mallappa Basappa v. Basavaraj Ayyppa ( AIR 1958 SC 698 ) - per N.H. Bhagwati, J.; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal ( AIR 1982 SC 983 ) ; and Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Shri Rajiv Gandhi ( AIR 1987 SC 1577 ) . 13. Article 329(b) provides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, no election to either House of Parliament or House of Legislature of State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. Inter-alia with respect to the decision of disputes arising out of or in connection with elections to the Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislatures of each State, the Parliament enacted the Act of 1951. Section 80 of the said Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of part VI. Section 80A(1) states that the court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be the High Court. Section 80 of the said Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of part VI. Section 80A(1) states that the court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be the High Court. Sub-section (2) of section 80A states that such jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by a Single Judge of the High Court and the Chief Justice shall, from time to time, assign one or more Judges for that purpose. Then there is sub-section (3) which provides that the High Court in its discretion may, in the interest of justice or convenience, try election petition wholly or partly, at a place other than the place of seat of the High Court. Section 81 of the Act of 1951 provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more on the grounds specified in sub- section (1) of section 100 and section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within 45 days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and dates of their election are different, the latter of those two dates. It is clear from section 81 that an election petition is to be presented to the High Court. The expression "High Court" is defined in section 79(e) as meaning the High Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to which the election petition relates has been held. It is, therefore, necessary to decide as to what are the local limits of jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan was erected and established by the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. Section 3(1) of the Ordinance provided that the High Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and such number of other Judges, as the Rajpramukh may deem necessary to appoint. Section 10 of the Ordinance stated that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and such other place or places if any, as the Rajpramukh may time to time appoint, either permanently or for a specified period. India, that is Bharat, is a Union of States. Section 10 of the Ordinance stated that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and such other place or places if any, as the Rajpramukh may time to time appoint, either permanently or for a specified period. India, that is Bharat, is a Union of States. The territory of India comprise of the territories of the States, the Union territories specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution; and such other territories as may be acquired. Article 1(2) of the Constitution states that the States and the territories thereof shall be specified in the First Schedule. Item 12 in the First Schedule to the Constitution specify the territories of the State of Rajasthan. The territories specified are the territories specified in section 10 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 but excluding the territories specified in the First Schedule to the Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (Transfer of Territories) Act, 1959. The State Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force on 1st Nov., 1956 which was the appointed day. As from that date, by virtue of section 10 of the Act, a new State to be known as the State of Rajasthan was formed comprising the following territories namely: (a) the territories of the existing State of Rajasthan, except Sironj Sub, Division of Kota district; (b) the territories of the existing State of Ajmer; (c) Abu Road Taluka of Banaskantha district in the existing State of Bombay; and (d) Sunel Tappa of Bhanpura Tehsil of Mandsaur district in the existing State of Madhya Pradesh. These were the territories of the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. 1st November, 1956. It may be stated that the territories of the existing State of Rajasthan before 1st Nov., 1956 were those comprised in the former princely states of Alwar, Banswara, Bharatpur, Bikaner, Bundi, Dholpur, Doongarpur, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, Jhalawar, Karauli, Kishangarh, Kota, Mewar, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk. Article 214 of the Constitution provides that there shall be a High Court for each state. Article 216 states that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary for each State. Article 231 states that Parliament may by law establish a common High Court for two or more states or for two or more states and a union territory. Article 216 states that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary for each State. Article 231 states that Parliament may by law establish a common High Court for two or more states or for two or more states and a union territory. Article 225 inter aha provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that legislature by the Constitution, the jurisdiction of any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of court and to regulate the sittings of court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. These provisions of the Constitution would clearly indicate that there can be only one High Court for one state.There cannot be two High Courts for one state, although, there can be one High Court for two or more states or for two or more states and a union territory. 14. The United State of Rajasthan was inaugurated on March 30, 1949, and started functioning on and from April 7,1949. At that time, the component units of the United State of Rajasthan were the former State of Rajasthan, the Matsya Union, the Jaipur State, the Jodhpur State, the Bikaner State and the Jaisalmer State. Barring Jaisalmer, each of these units had a High Court of its own. As a result of the formation of the Union, it became necessary to abolish the High Courts in the various integrated units and to establish a High Court for the United State of Rajasthan, that is, the old State of Rajasthan. Accordingly, the Rajpramukh on June 21, 1949, promulgated the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. As has already been stated that section 10 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, provided that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and at such other place or places if any, as the Rajpramukh may from time to time, either permanently or for a specified period. As has already been stated that section 10 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, provided that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and at such other place or places if any, as the Rajpramukh may from time to time, either permanently or for a specified period. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan was inaugurated at Jodhpur in pursuance of a Notification dated 25.8.1949 published in Rajasthan Gazette Under section 1(3) of the Ordinance. That Notification also directed that the High Court shall also sit simultaneously (i) at Jaipur to dispose of the work arising in Jaipur and Kota Divisions, and (ii) at Udaipur to dispose of the work arising at Udaipur Division. As from the commencement of the Constitution w.e.f. 26th January, 1950, the old State of Rajasthan became a Part 'B' State. Section 49(2) of the States Reorganisation Act provided that as from the appointed day i.e. 1st Nov., 1956, there shall be established a High Court for the new State of Rajasthan. Section 50(1) of the Act provided that as from the said appointed day, the High Courts of all the existing Part 'B' states i.e. including the State of Rajasthan shall cease to function and stand abolished. By a Presidential order dated 27th October, 1956, issued Under section 50(1) of the Act, it was directed that the principal seat of the High Court for the new State of Rajasthan shall be at Jodhpur. After the appointed day, the Chief Justice in exercise of his powers Under section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, established a temporary Bench of the High Court at Jaipur w.e.f. 1st Nov., 1956. Subsequently, the Chief Justice by his order dated 14th July, 1958, abolished the Jaipur Bench of the High Court. Thereafter, the question of establishing a permanent Bench remained under consideration of the Central Government for quite a long time. Eventually in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section(2) of section 51 of the Act, the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, issued the Presidential order cited as the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 for establishing a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The said Presidential order came into force on 31st January, 1977. The said Presidential order came into force on 31st January, 1977. The Presidential order dated 8th Dec., 1976 reads as under:- "Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice) NOTIFICATION New Delhi, the 8th December, 1976. G.S.R. 911 (E)The following Order made by the President under sub-section (2) of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) is hereby published as required by that sub-section:- THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT BENCH AT JAIPUR) ORDER, 1976. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), the President, after consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, is pleased to make the following Order, namely 1. Short title and commencement(1) This Order may be called the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976. (2) It shall come into force on the 31st day of January, 1977. 2. Establishment of a Permanent Bench the Rajasthan High Court at , Jaipur. There shall be established a permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, and such Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan, being not i less than five in number, as the Chief Justice of that High Court may, from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk: Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jodhpur. Sd/- EA. Ahmed New Delhi President." December, 9, 1976. 15. Thereafter, the Acting Chief Justice issued consequential order dated 23rd (December, 1976 under the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 which runs as follows "RAJ. Sd/- EA. Ahmed New Delhi President." December, 9, 1976. 15. Thereafter, the Acting Chief Justice issued consequential order dated 23rd (December, 1976 under the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 which runs as follows "RAJ. HIGH COURT JODHPUR NOTIFICATION No. 1/J.D. Dated December, 23,1976 In pursuance of the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976, and in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of section 44 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, read with sections 54 and 57 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been pleased to order that with effect from the 31st day of January, 1977:- (a) all cases arising in the revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chhitorgarh, Churu, Doongarpur, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Sirohi and Udaipur (except such case or class of cases as may be special order be transferred to the Jaipur Bench) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jodhpur, and (b) all cases arising in the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar; Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk (except such case or class of cases as may be special order be transferred to the Court at Jodhpur) shall be disposed of by the Court at Jaipur : Provided that a Vacation Judge, whether sitting at Jodhpur or at Jaipur may hear any case irrespective of the district in which it has arisen for the purpose of deciding any matter which in his opinion requires immediate action. Explanation - A writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the first order pertaining to that case was passed by a Court, Tribunal or Authority irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision." Sd/-Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice 12.1.1976" 16. The above order was modified on 12.1.1977 by the insertion of a new Explanation reading as below : "In the above order for the Explanation the following may be substituted : Explanation - A writ case shall be deemed to arise in the district where the cause of action for issuing the first order pertaining to that case passed by a Court, tribunal or authority has arisen irrespective of the district in which the appeal or revision from that order is heard and irrespective also of the fact whether or not there has been any modification or reversal of the order in appeal or revision.' Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice 12.1.1977" 17. To facilitate the functioning of the High Court Bench at Jaipur from 31.1.1977, the Acting Chief Justice made three other orders dated 23.12.1976 relating to matters incidental thereto, which read as follows:- "To facilitate the functioning of the High Court Bench at Jaipur from January 31,1977, cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk shall not be listed in Court at Jodhpur for hearing with effect from the 3rd of January, 1977, unless specially ordered to be heard at Jodhpur. Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice 23.12.1976" "In pursuance of the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976, it is ordered that all pending cases as per Annexures A, B and C which have arisen out of the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk shall stand transferred to the Jaipur Bench with effect from the date the Jaipur Bench is established. Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice 23.12.76" "In view of the establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur vide the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976, it is ordered that all part-heard cases which have arisen out of the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk, shall not be treated as part heard. It is further ordered that if a case or class of cases which has arisen out of any of the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawaimadhopur, Sikar and Tonk, is linked with a case or class of cases arising out of any of the revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Churu, Doongarpur, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Sirohi and Udaipur, it shall be treated as delinked. Sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice 23.12.76" 18. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether the Presidential Order dated 8th December, 1976 and the consequential order issued by the Acting Chief Justice (reproduced above) had the effect curtailing the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court having its principal seat at Jodhpur with respect to cases arising in the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk and whether with respect to these districts, the exclusive jurisdiction was of the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. It has already been observed by me that under the constitutional provisions, there can be only one High Court for a State. It has also been stated that by virtue of section 51(1) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the principal seat of the High Court of a new State including the State of Rajasthan was to be such as the President, by notified order, appointed. By Presidential Order dated 27th October, 1956 issued Under section 51(1) of the Act, Jodhpur had been appointed as the principal seat of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. 19. Sub-section (2) of section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act provided that the President may, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for that State, by notified order, provided for the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court at one or more places within the State other than the principal seat of the High Court or for any matters connected therewith. In exercise of these powers, the President had issued the (High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976. In exercise of these powers, the President had issued the (High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976. By this Order, there was established a permanent Bench of the High Court at Jaipur in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power tor the time being vested in the High Court of Rajasthan in respect of cases arising in the districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. The conferring upon the permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur with the jurisdiction and power vested in the High Court with respect to the above districts was done by the President in exercise of the powers vested in him Under section 51(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 to issue a notified order apart from the establishment of a permanent Bench at a place other than the principal seat of the High Court, in respect of 'matters connected with the establishment of the permanent Bench'. Without conferring jurisdiction and power of the High Court in the above manner upon the permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, the establishment of the permanent Bench would have been meaningless. The permanent Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan established at Jaipur was a part and parcel of the High Court of Rajasthan having its principal seat at Jodhpur. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Rakh Vyas v. The Union of India reported in 1977 RLW 65 and specially upon the observations in para 24 at page 73 made by his Lordship A.P. Sen, J. (as he then was) that 'the curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of a High Court is a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench, under section 51(2) of the Act.' The point in controversy in the case of Ram Rakh Vyas (supra) was the validity of the establishment of a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. In this connection three-fold arguments had been advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant in that case. In this connection three-fold arguments had been advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant in that case. The first argument advanced, while challenging the constitution of a permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, was that prior consultation with the Chief Justice was a sine qua non to the making of an order under section 51(2) of the Act and the holding of consultation with the Acting Chief Justice was no consultation. The second argument was that the President had no power Under section 51(2) of the Act to curtail the jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur or to divide the High Court into territorial jurisdictions. Nor could exclusive jurisdiction be conferred on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction as detailed in the Presidential Order. The last contention was that the States Reorganisation Act being of a transitory nature to meet certain exigencies arising out of the Reorganisation of States on the appointed day, that is 1.11.1956, the exercise of power by the President of India Under section 51(2) after a lapse of 21 years was a complete nullity. All these three contentions were rejected by the Division Bench. With regard to the second contention, it was observed as follows:- The next contention Was that the President has no power under section 51(2) of the Act to curtail the jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur or to divide the High Court into two territorial jurisdictions, cannot also be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that the President could not by issuing the Presidential Order confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court Bench at Jaipur to hear the cases arising in the districts falling within its jurisdiction. These contentions are wholly devoid of substance. The curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of a High Court is a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench Under section 51(2) of the Act ....It must follow as a necessary corollary that having provided for the establishment of a permanent Bench, there must be the demarcation of the jurisdiction of the Bench in relation to the main seat. That is a matter incidental thereto..............The President by a notified order issued Under section 51(2) could make provision for any matters connected therewith. That is a matter incidental thereto..............The President by a notified order issued Under section 51(2) could make provision for any matters connected therewith. The words 'for any matters connected therewith' clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the main seat as also for the conferal of the exclusive jurisdiction to the permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction." 21. In this connection, their Lordships relied upon the decision of the Kerala High Court in Maniram Pillai v. The Assistant Registrar, High Court Kerala (AIR 1958 Kerala 188) and the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai v. The Union of India ( AIR 1977 MP 116 ) . 22. The learned counsel for the respondents next referred to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nirmal Dass Khaturia v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR 1972 Allahabad 200) . In a writ petition, following four questions had been referred for the opinion of the Full Bench:- "1. Can a case falling within the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of this Court be presented at Allahabad ? 2. Can the Judges sitting at Allahabad summarily dismiss a case, presented at Allahabad, pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench ? 3. Can a case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, presented and entertained at Allahabad, be decided finally by the judges sitting at Allahabad, without there being an order as contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U.P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ? 4. What is the meaning of the expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 ? Has this expression reference to the place where the case originated or to the place of sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court ?" 23. The factual aspect was that by Letters Patent of March 17, 1866, a High Court for the North Western Provinces called the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was consisted. In 1856, the territories falling within Oudh had been brought under the British Crown and a hierarchy of courts was established. The factual aspect was that by Letters Patent of March 17, 1866, a High Court for the North Western Provinces called the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was consisted. In 1856, the territories falling within Oudh had been brought under the British Crown and a hierarchy of courts was established. By the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879, the Judicial Commissioner was constituted the head of the judiciary, i In the year 1901, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh was created. The judicial administration in the two regions of the province, however, continued to remain separate. In the year 1925, the court of Judicial Commissioner was replaced by the Oudh Chief Court with jurisdiction extending over the same area. The two judicial administrations wielded jurisdiction over the two separate regions of the United Provinces for many years. Then in deference to a growing volume of opinion in favour of a single judicial administration throughout the United Provinces, Governor-General made the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, which came into force on July 19,1948. It was provided by Article 3 of the Amalgamation Order that as from the appointed day, namely, July 26, 1948, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh would be amalgamated and would constitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The judges of the existing High Courts, namely, the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court became judges of the new High Court. The Chief Justice of the existing Allahabad High Court became the Chief Justice of the new High Court. Article 7 of the Amalgamation Order provided that the new High Court shall have in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately, before the appointed day, was exercisable in respect of any part of that province by either of the existing High Courts. Then Article 14 stated that the new High Court, and the judges in division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint. Then Article 14 stated that the new High Court, and the judges in division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint. The first proviso to Article 14 stated that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice otherwise directed, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice may from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court. The further proviso to Article 14 stated that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad. The majority of Judges of the Allahabad High Court held as follows: "(i) The seat of the High Court at Allahabad was a permanent seat. (ii) Judges at Lucknow Bench will hear cases arising in specified Oudh areas as the Chief Justice directs. (iii) The second proviso creates an inroad into the above rule. It empowers the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in the specified Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. The judges at Allahabad will then be empowered to hear those cases. (iv) When the second proviso speaks of a case being heard at Allahabad, it refers not merely to the actual hearing of the case in the strict sense of the word but includes the preceding stage of its institution by the party and its being entertained by the court. (v) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution also constitutes a case for the purpose of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order." 24. The answer of the Full Bench to the four question referred to it was by majority as under: "Question No. 1: A case falling within the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow and not at Allahabad. Question No. 2 : However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad the judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. Question No. 2 : However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad the judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. The case should be returned for filing before the judges at Lucknow, and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad, direction should be made to the High Court office to transmit the papers of the case to Lucknow. Question No. 3 : A case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow and presented before the judges at Allahabad cannot be decided by the judges at Allahabad in the absence of an order contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U.R High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Question No. 4 : The expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 refers to legal proceedings, including civil cases, criminal cases, petitions under Articles 226,227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132,133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression "arising in such areas in Oudh" refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place of sitting of the last court or authority, whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court." 25. It may be mentioned that the Allahabad case had gone in appeal to the Supreme Court and the decision of the Supreme Court is in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( AIR 1976 SC 331 ) . The Bench of four judges of the Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court that the permanent seat of the High Court was at Allahabad. It also disagreed with the views of the Allahabad High Court that it was open to the Chief Justice to reduce the areas in Oudh referred to in view of first proviso to paragraph 14 of the Amalgamation Order. It also disagreed with the views of the Allahabad High Court that it was open to the Chief Justice to reduce the areas in Oudh referred to in view of first proviso to paragraph 14 of the Amalgamation Order. The Supreme Court further disagreed with the interpretation given by the Allahabad High Court to the word 'heard' in the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order. It held that the word 'heard' means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice be directed to be heard at Allahabad. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the conclusion as well as the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court with regard to the meaning given by it to the expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" with regard to the applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, on several points, the Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusions as well as the reasonings of the Allahabad High Court. However, despite that, it agreed with the answers given by the High Court to the first three questions save as modified by its conclusions. The answers to the fourth question was set aside. The Supreme Court summed-up its conclusions as follows : "To sum up, our conclusions are follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be/changed, in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas of Oudh, from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has no power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the , j order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of 1 cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of 1 cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. In the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at/Lucknow or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place." 26. Reference may next be made to the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai v. The Union of India reported in AIR 1977 MP 116 . The judgment was by a majority of 3 : 2 Oza, J. (as he then was) delivered the majority judgment. In Madhya Pradesh, after the States Reorganisation Act, the High Court of the new State was established and the President by Notification dated 27th Oct. 56, notified that the principal seat of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh will be at Jabalpur. In Madhya Pradesh, after the States Reorganisation Act, the High Court of the new State was established and the President by Notification dated 27th Oct. 56, notified that the principal seat of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh will be at Jabalpur. Immediately after inauguration of the High Court at Jabalpur, the Chief Justice by his order dated 1st Nov.,'56, exercising power under section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act established temporary Benches at Indore and Gwalior. In 1968, the President issued two orders exercising powers under section 51(2) of the States Reorganisation Act establishing permanent Benches at Indore and Gwalior. The jurisdiction of these two Benches were also specified. However, the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court by two separate orders dated 30th Nov.,'68 provided that all petitions challenging the vires of any Act, referred under Income-tax Act, Wealth-tax Act etc., all petitions arising out of orders or jurisdiction of certain authorities will be heard at Jabalpur. This order was modified on 25th June, 1969-Even the modification did not make substantial difference as cases arising out of orders of the State Tribunals or authorities were being instituted and heard at Jabalpur. It was contended before the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the President by providing for permanent Benches at Indore and Gwalior could not prescribe exclusive jurisdiction of these Benches, as provided for the exclusive jurisdiction would amount to curtailment of the jurisdiction of the High Court at its principal seat and to that extent, if would be in contravention of Article 214 of the Constitution. This argument was rejected by the majority of the judges and it was stated that this contention was based on the misconception that High Court means the High Court, the building and the seat. But in fact, the High Court cannot be made synonymous with the building or the place. Article 216 of the Constitution clearly goes to show that the High Court of Madhya Pjadesh meant the Chief Justice and judges of that court. Their Lordships relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra) and held that the Amalgamation Order in Allahabad case and the Presidential Order in Madhya Pradesh case constituting permanent Benches had been enacted to meet identical situations and were pari materia. Their Lordships relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra) and held that the Amalgamation Order in Allahabad case and the Presidential Order in Madhya Pradesh case constituting permanent Benches had been enacted to meet identical situations and were pari materia. It was concluded that in view of the scheme of the States Reorganisation Act and in view of the context, it could not be doubted that the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act contemplated the sitting of the High Court at different places with jurisdiction exercised by the judges while sitting at those places in respect of areas allotted to those places for that purpose. It was also observed that the language of the notifications constituting permanent Benches as also the language of section 41 of the Bombay Act, wherein by a proviso the Chief Justice had been authorised to transfer some cases for hearing at the principal seat, went to show that it contemplated that without that proviso, the cases arising out of those areas could not be heard at the principal seat. This also went to show that the Constitution of the permanent Benches contemplated exclusive jurisdiction with the Benches in respect of areas indicated by the Presidential Order. It concluded that the President's Notification confers exclusive jurisdiction on the respective Benches and it was not in contravention of Article 214 of the Constitution or item No. 3 in list 2 of the seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 27. In State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik & other reported in AIR 1983 SC 46 , the Bombay High Court had struck down an order dated August 27, 1981 by which the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court in exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act had directed that the judges in division courts of the High Court of Bombay shall also sit at Aurangabad w.e.f. August 27, 1981 for the disposal of cases arising out of the Marathwada region of the State of Maharashtra. The Presidential Order Under section 51(1) of the Act had been issued on 27th Oct.,'56 appointing Bombay to be the principal seat of the High Court for the new State of Bombay w.e.f. Nov. 1,'56. The Presidential Order Under section 51(1) of the Act had been issued on 27th Oct.,'56 appointing Bombay to be the principal seat of the High Court for the new State of Bombay w.e.f. Nov. 1,'56. There was continued demand of the people of Maharashtra region for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act. On 27th August, 1981, the Chief Justice issued an order under sub-section (3) of Section 5l of the Act appointing Aurangabad as a place at which the Hon'ble Judges and division courts of High Court at Bombay may also sit. Before the Supreme Court, three questions arose for consideration in the appeal, namely, (i) whether the power of the President Under section 51(2) or that of the Chief, Justice Under section 51(3) can no longer be exercised due to lapse of time,(ii) whether the exercise of power by the Chief Justice Under section 51(3) appointing Aurangabad to be a place at which the judges and division courts of the High Court shall also sit was co-related to the Reorganisation of the States or had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act, and (iii) whether the power of the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act did not include a power to establish a Bench or Benches at such place or places carving out territorial jurisdiction for such Benches and authorising the filing or institution of proceedings at such places. His Lordship A.P. Sen J., speaking for the court, observed as under : "Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that power of the President under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act, or that of the Chief Justice of the High Court I of a new State under sub-section (3) of that section, can no longer be exercised due to lapse of time.................The power of the President under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act and that of the Chief Justice of the High Court under sub-section (3) thereof are intended and meant to be exercised from time to time as occasion arises, as there is no intention to the contrary manifested in the Act within the meaning of Section 14 of the General Clauses Act................... Pending the decision of the Central Government regarding the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act at Aurangabad for the Marathwada region, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court issued the impugned order for the establishment of a Bench at Aurangabad w.e.f. August 27,1981...................... It is difficult to comprehend how the Chief Justice can arrange for the sitting of the judges in division courts at a particular place unless there is a seat at that place. It may be true in the juristic sense that the seat of the High Court must mean "the principal seat of such High Court", i.e. the place where the High Court is competent to transact every kind of business from any part of the territories within its jurisdiction. It is impossible to conceive of a High Court without a seat being assigned to it......................Where there is only one seat of the High Court, it must necessarily have all the attributes of the principal seat. But where the High Court has more than one seat, one of them may or may not j De principal seat according to the legislative scheme. It is both sound reason and common sense to say that the High Court at Bombay is located at its principal seat at Bombay, but it has also a seat at the permanent Bench at Nagpur, when the Chief Justice makes an order in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that judges and division courts of the High Court shall also sit at such other places, the High Court in the generic sense has also a seat at such other places ......................................................... It is necessary to emphasise that besides administering justice, the High Court has the administrative control over the subordinate judiciary in a State. The High Court must necessarily carry on its administrative functions from the principal seat, i.e. the place where the High Court transacts every kind of business in all its capacities. The High Court as such is located there, but it may have more than one seat for transaction of judicial business ................................The decision in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) recognised that there can be two seats of the High Court without a principal seat. The High Court as such is located there, but it may have more than one seat for transaction of judicial business ................................The decision in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) recognised that there can be two seats of the High Court without a principal seat. Further, the court held that a case "instituted" at a particular Bench had to be heard at that Bench.................. It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly, the President has the power under sub-section(1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under sub-section (2) thereof,..................pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must, therefore, bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court.........................................The opinion of the Chief Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at a place other than the principal seat under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act must, therefore, normally prevail because it is for the more convenient transaction of judicial business.................................Under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act, the President has to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers as ordained by Article 74(1) of the Constitution. In both the matters the decision lies with the Central Government. In contrast, the powers of the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51..............is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High Court. In both the matters the decision lies with the Central Government. In contrast, the powers of the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section 51..............is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice. It is basically an internal matter pertaining to the High Court. He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from the provisions contained in sub- section (3) of Section 51 of the Act but inheres in him in the very nature of things...............There is no territorial bifurcation of the High Court merely because the Chief Justice directs under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that the judges and division courts shall also sit at such other places as he may with the approval of the Governor appoint. It must accordingly be held that there was no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned notification issued under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the judges and division courts shall also sit at Aurangabad." 28. It is true that the case before the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (supra) was in relation to the provisions of Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act and not with respect of the establishment by the President of a permanent Bench Under section 51(2) of the Act. However, his Lordship A.P. Sen, J. clearly held, in relation to permanent Benches constituted Under section 51(2) of the Act that it must bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court and Section 51(2) confers that power upon the President. He clearly stated that it was both sound reason and common sense to say that High Court of Bombay was located at its principal seat at Bombay but it-also had a seat at the permanent Bench at Nagpur. For administrative purposes, it is the principal seat which functions. The High Court can have more than one seat for transaction and judicial business. For administrative purposes, it is the principal seat which functions. The High Court can have more than one seat for transaction and judicial business. His Lordship referred to the decision in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) for this limited purpose and observed: "It is however an authority for the proposition that after the amalgamation of the High Court of Allahabad and the Chief Court of Oudh, the two High Courts ceased to exist and became Benches of the newly constituted High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Further, the court held that a case instituted at a particular Bench had to be heard at that Bench. It recognised that there can be two seats of the High Court without a principal seat." 29. In Manickam Pillai v. Assistant Registrar, High Court Kerala (AIR 1958 Kerala 188) , it was observed by the Kerala High Court that curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of the High Court of a new State was a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act. While contrasting sub-section (3) with sub-section (2), the Supreme Court in Narayan Shamrao Puranik's case (supra) only over-ruled the other part of the observations made by the Kerala High Court whereby it was held that the temporary Bench of the High Court of Kerala created by the Chief Justice at Trivandrum Under section 51(3) was not the High Court of Kerala and the judges and division courts sitting at Trivandrum were precisely in the same position as judges and division courts sitting in the several court rooms of the High Court at its principal seat in Ernakulam. 30. It would, therefore, appear that the consistency in the judicial opinion is for the view that the President Under section 51(2) of the State Reorganisation Act, after consultation with the Governor of the new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court, can establish a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court at one or more places other than the places where the principal seat of the High Court is located and can provide for any matters connected therewith. The expression "for any matters connected therewith" confers power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at its principal seat is a necessary concomitant to the establishment of a permanent Bench Under section 51(2) in contrast with the powers of the Chief Justice under mb-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act. It is also borne out that even after the lapse of time mce the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, the President can exercise his powers under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act, at any time and from Lime to time when occasion arises. Jaipur is the capital of Rajasthan. It had a Chief Court before it integrated with the covenanting States. Even after the formation of Rajasthan, a Bench of the High Court continued to sit at Jaipur to dispose of the work arising in Jaipur and Kota divisions. There was a Bench of the Rajasthan High court at Jaipur. After the coming into force the States Reorganisation Act, a temporary Bench at Jaipur was also created which was abolished by the Chief Justice by order dated 14th July, 1958. There was constant demand for the establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur and the matter remained under consideration of the Central Government. Ultimately, by the Presidential Order dated 8th Dec.,'76, permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court was established at Jaipur w.e.f. January 31, 1977. The permanent Bench at Jaipur provides convenience to the litigating public of the eastern part of the State of Rajasthan. Ultimately, by the Presidential Order dated 8th Dec.,'76, permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court was established at Jaipur w.e.f. January 31, 1977. The permanent Bench at Jaipur provides convenience to the litigating public of the eastern part of the State of Rajasthan. In the light of the view taken by the Kerala High Court in Manickam Pillai v. Assistant Registrar, High Court Kerala (AIR 1958 Kerala 188) , the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court decision in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( AIR 1976 SC 331 ) , the majority decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai v. Union of India & others ( AIR 1977 MP 116 ) , the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Rakh Vyas v. The Union of India (1977 RLW 65) and the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik ( AIR 1983 SC 46 ) , I hold that by his Presidential Order referred to above, the President was not only competent to establish permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur but he was also competent to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur and also to confer exclusive jurisdiction to the permanent Bench at Jaipur to hear cases arising in the districts already referred to above falling within its jurisdiction. This necessarily brought about a territorial bifurcation of the jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to judicial cases. Since the election questioned in the present election petition relates to Mahua Constituency in Sawai Madhopur district and since Sawai Madhopur district falls within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur, the election petition could only be presented at the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur and not at the principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. 31. I have already stated that the present election petition in its heading was not even addressed to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur, but it was addressed to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at its principal seat at Jodhpur. It was also presented to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar (Admn.) at Jodhpur. 32. 31. I have already stated that the present election petition in its heading was not even addressed to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur, but it was addressed to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at its principal seat at Jodhpur. It was also presented to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar (Admn.) at Jodhpur. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the rules made by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan with regard to election petitions under the Representation of People Act, 1951. These rules were issued under Notification No. 1/S.R.O. dated March 28, 1967 and in exercise of the powers conferred by section 46 of the Rajasthan; High Court Ordinance, 1949, read with Article 225 of the Constitution of India and all other powers enabling in that behalf. Particular attention was invited to rule 4 of the said rules which provides that election petitions shall be presented, either in person or by an Advocate duly authorised in this behalf by the party concerned, to the Registrar of the High Court or to such other officer as the Registrar may, special or general orders, passed from time to time, appoint in this behalf. Then rule 6 provides that immediately after the election petition is presented, the date of presentation shall be endorsed thereon, and the petition shall be entered in a special register maintained for the registration of election petitions. Information about the presentation of the election petition shall be sent to the Election Commissioner of India. It is then stated in rule 7 that after the petition is presented, the party or Advocate shall attend the office on the third day from the date of the presentation or any other date, fixed by the Registrar to remove objections, if any. The petitioner shall furnish his address (preferably in Jodhpur) where any communication may be addressed to or served on him. Rule 25 provides for security of costs and it inter aha states that the security for costs shah be paid in cash. The payment shah be made by means of a printed tender from in triplicate duly filed in English by the payer. The payer shah present the form to the Registrar between the hours of 10.30 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. (or when the Court is observing morning hours between 7.30 A.M. and 8.30 A.M.). The payment shah be made by means of a printed tender from in triplicate duly filed in English by the payer. The payer shah present the form to the Registrar between the hours of 10.30 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. (or when the Court is observing morning hours between 7.30 A.M. and 8.30 A.M.). The Registrar shah put his signatures on the tender form, shah get the tender entered in register of tenders and sign the order to receive payment on the duplicate and triplicate forms of the tender. Thereafter cash chahan (Form No. GA 57) shah be filled in duplicate by the Superintendent, Accounts Section, and handed over to .the payer for presentation and payment of the money to the State Bank of India, Jodhpur. Rule 28 of the rules provides that where no specific provision is made in the Act, the Code or the above Rules, the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 shah apply mutatis mutandis or as the Judge may direct. Expression "Registrar" is defined in Rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court of Rajasthan, 1952 as including(i) any other officer, with respect to such functions and duties of the Registrar, as may have been assigned to such officer by the Chief Justice; and (ii) in the absence of the Registrar, Deputy Registrar or any other officer authorised to act on his behalf. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that according to role 4 of the rules in regard to election petitions framed by the High Court, the election petition has to be presented to the Registrar of the High Court or to such officer as the Registrar may, with the approval of the Chief Justice, by special or general orders, appoint. The Registrar has to fix 'any other date' on which the party or Advocate has to attend the office to remove the objections. The petitioner has to furnish his address preferably of Jodhpur. The tender form for deposit of security for costs has to be presented to the Registrar and the tender form is signed by the Registrar. Cash challan has to be presented for payment of the amount of security for costs to the State Barak of India at Jodhpur. It was urged that the principal seat of the High Court of Rajasthan being at Jodhpur, the Registrar sits and has his office at Jodhpur and not at Jaipur. Cash challan has to be presented for payment of the amount of security for costs to the State Barak of India at Jodhpur. It was urged that the principal seat of the High Court of Rajasthan being at Jodhpur, the Registrar sits and has his office at Jodhpur and not at Jaipur. The petitioner has to attend at the office of the Registrar at Jodhpur to remove - his objections. The amount of security for costs has also to be deposited in the State Bank of India at Jodhpur. On this basis, it was urged by the learned counsel- for the petitioner that the presentation of the present election petition at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur and to the Additional Registrar (Administration) at Jodhpur was quite legal and competent. 34. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection relied upon the orders of this Court in S.B. Election Petition No. 8 of 1980 Ram Karan Singh v. Sri Ram and others (order passed on December 23, 1980 by N.M. Kasliwal, J.) and in ( Jagmotian Lal and another v. Hari Singh and others (S.B. Election Petition No. 9 of 1980 Order passed on April 21, 1981 by S.C. Agrawal, J.) . In Ram Karan Singh's case (supra), the election challenged pertained to Kotputli Constituency in Jaipur District within jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The result of the election was declared on June 1, 1980 and the election petition was presented by the petitioner to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur on 14th July, 1980 and was sent by an order of the Acting Chief Justice on July 23, 1980 and was registered at Jaipur Bench on July 25, 1980. By the time the election petition was registered at the Jaipur Bench on July 25, 1980, the period of limitation of 45 days had admittedly expired on 15th July, 1980. On behalf of respondent No. 1, in the Election Petition No. 8 of 1980, a preliminary objection was raised that the petition had not been properly presented as required by section 80- A read with section 79(e) of the Act of 1951 and as such the petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. On behalf of respondent No. 1, in the Election Petition No. 8 of 1980, a preliminary objection was raised that the petition had not been properly presented as required by section 80- A read with section 79(e) of the Act of 1951 and as such the petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It was urged in that case that in view of the order issued by the Chief Justice on 23rd December, 1976, the Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench had been assigned all the powers and authorised to perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jbalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. Thereafter by virtue of notification dated 6th May, 1977 the post of Joint Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench had been re-designated as Additional Registrar. Consequently, it was urged that the Additional Registrar, Jaipur Bench alone was authorised to entertain the election petitions in respect of cases arising in Jaipur District. His Lordship N.M. Kasliwal, J., rejecting the preliminary objection, raised in Ram Karan Singh's case (supra) observed: "It is no doubt correct that the Jaipur Bench of the High Court is functioning since January 31, 1977 and the cases arising in the districts mentioned in the Presidential order issued on December 8, 1976, and the consequential order of the Acting Chief Justice dated December 23,1976, are being entertained in the office of the Additional Registrar at Jaipur, but in my view, unless the order of the Chief Justice dated Dec. 23, 1976, authorising the Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench (Additional Registrar) to perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar was published in Rajasthan Gazette or made known to the litigating public, the petitioner, who relied on the relevant Rules framed by the High Court in regard to election petitions, cannot be penalised. Admittedly till date no amendment has been made in the aforesaid Rules (i.e. in rules relating to election petitions under Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 framed by the High Court) and as such these rules held the field in Rajasthan as regards the presentation etc., of the election petitions. Admittedly till date no amendment has been made in the aforesaid Rules (i.e. in rules relating to election petitions under Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 framed by the High Court) and as such these rules held the field in Rajasthan as regards the presentation etc., of the election petitions. Rule 745-D clearly lays down that election petition shall be presented to the Registrar of the High Court Or to such other officer as the said Registrar may with the approval of the Chief Justice, by special or general order passed from time to time, appoint in this behalf. The respondent has neither contended nor placed any order passed by the Registrar under the aforesaid Rule. It appears that these Rules in regard to election petitions as mentioned above were published in Gazette in April, 1967, when there was only one High Court at Jodhpur and the Bench at Jaipur was not in existence. All the provisions were thus made, making a reference to the Registrar alone. The High Court Bench at Jaipur started functioning from January 31, 1977, and thereafter no consequential amendments seem to have been made with regard to election petition to be filed at Jaipur. Be that as it may, when in the Rules with regard to election petitions framed by the High Court, it is laid down for presentation of the election petition to the Registrar alone and for the amount of security to be deposited in the State Bank of India, Jodhpur, in my view, the petitioner was right in presenting the election petition at Jodhpur." 35. Thus in Ram Karan Singh'case (supra), the presentation of the election petition before the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur was held to be valid because the orders of the Chief Justice dated 23rd Dec., 1976 and 6th May, 1977 assigning the functions of the Registrar to the Joint Registrar of the permanent Bench at Jaipur and the re-designation of the post of Joint Registrar as Additional Registrar were not published in the Rajasthan Gazette, because the rules pertaining to election petitions framed by the High Court by Notification No. 1/S.R.O. dated March 28, 1967, which were framed when there was no permanent Bench of the High Court at Jaipur, were not amended consequentially after the establishment of the permanent Bench at Jaipur and because the rules pertaining to election petitions framed by the High Court in 1967 provided for presentation of the election petition to the Registrar alone. 36. In the second case of of Jagmohan Lal and another v. Hari Singh and others (supra), the same objection was raised by respondent No. 1 in that petition as was taken in Ram Karan Singh' case. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was placed on the order dated 23rd Dec., 1980 of his Lordship N.M. Kasliwal, J., in Ram Karan Singh's case. His Lordship S.C. Agrawal, J., was primarily concerned with the question as to whether the election petition could be presented before the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur, and was such a presentation a valid and proper presentation. Dealing with the preliminary objection, S.C. Agrawal, J., observed: "From a perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Kasliwal, J., I find that he has taken note of the definition of "Registrar" as contained in Rule 3 of the High Court Rules, as well as the orders dated 23rd Dec., 1976 and 6th May, 1977 passed by the Chief Justice..................The learned Judge has taken the view that for the purpose of Rule 745-D of the High Court Rules, the Additional Registrar could not be treated as the Registrar in as much as the relevant orders, whereby, the powers of the Registrar were conferred on the Additional Registrar, had not been duly published. Apart from the aforesaid reason given by Hon'ble Kasliwal, J., there is one more reason for holding that for the purpose of Rule 745-D, the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur cannot be treated as the Registrar. The definition of "Registrar" contained in Rule 3(i) is subject to the qualification "unless the context otherwise requires" contained in the operating part of Rule 3(i). A perusal of the rule 745-D shows that under the said Rule an election petition can be presented to the Registrar of the High Court or to such officer as the said Registrar may, with the approval of the Chief Justice, appoint in this behalf. In other words, Rule 745-D enables the Registrar to appoint, with the approval of the Chief Justice, any other officer to whom an election petition may be presented. If the term "Registrar" in Rule 745-D is construed to include the i Additional Registrar by virtue of the delegation of powers of the Registrar to whom under the orders of the Chief Justice, the result would be that it would be i open to the Additional Registrar to further delegate the powers with regard to j the presentation of election petition to another officer. Such a course would be impermissible in law in view of the settled principle that a delegate cannot further delegate the powers delegated to him. A construction which leads to such a consequence, must be avoided. Such a consequence would be avoided if the term "Registrar" in Rule 745-D is given its normal meaning as contained in Rule 3 of the High Court Rules. The word "Registrar" in Rule 745-D cannot, therefore, be construed to include an Additional Registrar or any other officer to whom the powers of the Registrar has been delegated under Rule 3 of the High Court Rules, and in so far as Rule 745-D is concerned, the definition of "Registrar" contained in Rule 3 cannot be applied, and the Additional Registrar or any other officer to whom the powers of the Registrar have been conferred by the Chief Justice, cannot exercise the powers of the Registrar under Rule 745-D of the High Court Rules. For the reason aforesaid, I am in full agreement with the view addressed by Hon'ble Kasliwal, J., in Ram Karan Singh v. Sri Ram and others (supra) that under the Rules framed by this Court with regard to election petition filed under the Act, as they stand today, an election petition can only be presented before the Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur, and there was no infirmity in the presentation of the election petition by the petitioners before the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur. I am further of the view that even if it be assumed- that the term "Registrar" in Rule 745-D includes the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur, that, would only mean that the election petition could also be entertained by the Additional Registrar of the High court at Jaipur, but, it would not invalidate the filing of the election petition before the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur. In a case, where an election petition arising out of a revenue district assigned to the Jaipur Bench, is presented at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur, it would be open to the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur to transmit the papers to the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur for further proceedings." 37. His Lordship S.C. Agrawal, J., referred to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nirmal Dass Khaturia and others v. The State Transport Appellate, Tribunal ( AIR 1972 All. 200 ) and that of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) and observed: "In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it must be held that even if it be assumed that the election petition should have been presented before the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur, and it has been mistakenly entertained by the Registrar of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur, it could be transmitted by the High Court at Jodhpur, to the Jaipur Bench at Jaipur, and the said presentation of the election petition at the principal seat of the High Court, cannot be said to be an invalid presentation so as to entail the dismissal of the election petition. The present election petition was admittedly transmitted from the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur to the Bench at Jaipur. There is, thus, no substance in the first objection raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the election petition, and it is, therefore, rejected." 38. The learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that all the election petitions in the past have been filed at the principal seat of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur even if they pertained to elections held in districts within the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of the High Court at Jaipur. Even the present counsel for the respondents had filed in the year 1985 Election Petition No. 6 of 1985 at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. 39. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in B.M. Ailsinghani v. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and others (Election Petition No. 12 of 1980 decided by J.P. Chaturvedi, J. on August 12,1980) . In that case, the election of respondent No. 1 Smt. Indira Gandhi from the Rai Bareilly Parliamentary Constituency was challenged by an election petition. The election petition was presented before the Additional Registrar at Allahabad and not at Lucknow. A preliminary objection was raised that the election petition having been presented at Allahabad instead of Lucknow, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to hear it as the entire cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the High Court at Lucknow. The learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the election petition was not presented before a proper court and, therefore, it must necessarily be dismissed as provided in section 86(1) of the Representation of People Act. It was further held that section 86(1) of the Act of 1951, by necessary implication, excluded the application of the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code so far as election petitions were concerned. 40. It may be stated that the Chief Justice had issued the following order on December 23,1976: "No. 12 Misc. Dated 23rd December, 1976. The Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar in respect of cases arising in the revenue Districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. Dated 23rd December, 1976. The Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar in respect of cases arising in the revenue Districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bundi, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kota, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. sd/- Ved Pal Tyagi Chief Justice." 41. By order of the State Government dated 6th May, 1977, the post of Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench was re-designated as "Additional Registrar". Neither the above order of the Chief Justice nor the order of the State Government were published in the official Gazette and nor in any other manner made known to the litigating public. In Johnson v. Sargent, (1918) 1 K.B. 101 , it was held that an order of the Food Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition) Order, 1917, does not become operative until it is made known to the public, and the difference between an order of that kind and an Act of the British Parliament was stressed. The difference was obvious. Acts of British Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredited representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so Royal Proclamations and, Orders of a Food Controller and so forth. There must, therefore, be promulgation and publication in their cases. The mode of publication can very what is a good method in one country may not necessarily be the best in another. But s reasonable publication of some sort there must be in Harla v. The State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1951 SC 467 ) , Vivian Bose, J., observed : "In the absence of any special law or custom, we are of opinion that it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural Justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. Natural Justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so those men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and property by the mere passing of a Resolution without anything more is abhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or customs, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential." 42. That was so held by N.M. Kasliwal, J., in Election Petition No. 8 of 1980Ram Karan Singh v. Sri Ram and others (supra) and it was also accepted by S.C. Agrawal, J., in Election Petition No. 1 of 1980 Jagmohan Lal and another v. Hari Singh (supra) and I do not propose to dissent with that. 43. It may pertinently be mentioned here that both in Ram Karata Singh's case and in Jagmohan Lal's case, the election petitions were presented by the respective petitioners to the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. In the present case before me, the election petition was not presented by the petitioners to the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur. It was as a matter of fact presented to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar (Administration), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur. In the present case before me, the election petition was not presented by the petitioners to the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur. It was as a matter of fact presented to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar (Administration), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur. While the Joint Registrar, Jaipur Bench (re-designated as Additional Registrar) was authorised by the Chief Justice to exercise all the powers and perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts within the jurisdiction of the permanent Bench of the High Court at Jaipur by his order dated 23rd Dec., 1976 the Additional Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jaipur had not at all been authorised by the Chief Justice to exercise all the powers and to perform all the functions and duties of the Registrar in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts within the jurisdiction of the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur or even with respect to cases arising in the territories of the State of Rajasthan as a whole. This Court by its order dated 5.12.90 required the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court to sent to this Court all notifications and orders whereby the Chief Justice or even the Registrar had authorised the Additional Registrar (Administration), Jodhpur to receive election petitions presented at Jodhpur. The Registrar of the High Court, with his letter dated 9.1.91 has sent to this Court, two standing orders dated 20th February, 1984. They only deal with disposal of administrative matters of the High Court and movement of files on administrative side. It inter aha provides that normally all cases/files on administrative side shall be routed through the Additional Registrar. It also specifies matters which will be submitted directly to the Additional Registrar by the concerned Assistant Registrars who would, in his turn, place them before the Registrar. These matters inter aha are, creation of posts of ministerial and class-IV staff, recruitment of staff and other purely administrative matters. The Standing Orders dated 20th February, 1984 do not at all deal with judicial matters. It is thus clear that the Additional Registrar of the High Court at its principal seat at Jodhpur was not at all competent to accept even at Jodhpur any election petition or any other judicial matters like appeals, revisions and writ petitions etc. The Standing Orders dated 20th February, 1984 do not at all deal with judicial matters. It is thus clear that the Additional Registrar of the High Court at its principal seat at Jodhpur was not at all competent to accept even at Jodhpur any election petition or any other judicial matters like appeals, revisions and writ petitions etc. The presentation of the present election petition by the petitioners to Shri Harbans Lal, Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur was totally invalid. The presentation, in the case before me, was not before the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur as was the position in Ram Karan Singh's case (supra) and in Jagmohan Lal 's case (supra) and as provided for in rule 4 of the Rules in regard to election petitions under the Act of 1951 framed by the High Court on March, 28,1967. In the light of the above view, it is not necessary for me to examine the question whether the Chief Justice could or could not, in relation to election petitions, assign the functions and duties of the Registrar to any other officer under Rule 3 of the High Court Rules, 1952 and whether such a course would be impermissible on the ground that if the term "Registrar" in Rule 4 of the rules relating to election petitions of the year 1967 is construed to include the Additional Registrar by virtue of the delegation of the powers of the Registrar made to him by the Chief Justice under rule 3 of the High Court Rules of 1952, it would be against the principle that a delegate cannot further delegate the powers delegated to him as held by S.C. Agrawal J., in Jagmohan Lal's case (supra). I may only observe that I have my own views in the matter. 44. My views are that if the Chief Justice assigns to any other officer, the functions and duties of the Registrar to entertain the presentation of election petitions, he would be Registrar on account of the inclusiveness of the term "Registrar" as defined in rule 3 of the High Court Rules of 1952. 44. My views are that if the Chief Justice assigns to any other officer, the functions and duties of the Registrar to entertain the presentation of election petitions, he would be Registrar on account of the inclusiveness of the term "Registrar" as defined in rule 3 of the High Court Rules of 1952. What would be bad would be appointment by that officer, with the approval of the Chief Justice any other officer for the purpose of presentation of the election petition to such other officer on the ground that a delegate cannot further delegate and not the assignment of the power, functions and duties of the Registrar to that officer to receive election petitions made by the Chief Justice under rule 3 of the High Court Rules of 1952. Be that all as it may, it is not necessary for me to go into and decide this question in view of the conclusion that the Additional Registrar, Jodhpur had not been assigned the functions and duties of the Registrar to accept the election petitions under rule 3 of the High Court Rules of 1952, and, therefore, Additional Registrar Jodhpur did not fall within the ambit of the definition of "Registrar" as contained in the said rule for the purpose of accepting the presentation of the election petitions including the present election petition and that the present election petition had not been presented to the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur as was the position in Ram Karan Singh's case and in Jhgmohari Lal 's case (supra). The result is that the presentation of the present election petition by the petitioners before Shri Harbans Lal , Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur on 11.4.90 was not a valid presentation of the petition to the Rajasthan High Court. 45. It may next be stated that his Lordship S.C. Agrawal, J., in Jagmohan's case (supra) had adopted one more reasoning. He stated that even if it be assumed that the term 'Registrar' in rule 745-D includes the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur, it would not invalidate the filing of the election petition before the Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. He said that it would be open to the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur to transmit the papers to the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur for further proceedings. He said that it would be open to the Registrar of the High Court at Jodhpur to transmit the papers to the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur for further proceedings. The learned Judge then stated that "even if it be assumed that the election petition should have been presented before the Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur, and it has been mistakenly entertained by the Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur, it could be transmitted by the High Court at Jodhpur to the Jaipur Bench at Jaipur, and the said presentation of the election petition at the principal seat of the High Court, cannot be said to be an invalid presentation, so as to entail the dismissal of the election petition. It is quite clear that these observations were made by his Lordship S.C. Agrawal, J., on an assumption that the term 'Registrar' includes the , Additional Registrar of the High Court at Jaipur and where the election petition had been presented before the Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. But in the case before me, as already notified, the election petition was not presented before the Registrar at the principal seat of the High Court at Jodhpur. It was as a fact presented before the Additional Registrar at Jodhpur who had not been by any order of the Chief Justice assigned with the functions and duties of the Registrar for accepting the presentation of the election petitions and was not 'Registrar' within the meaning of the term as defined in rule 3 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules of 1952. The above observations of his Lordship S.C. Agrawal, J., have, therefore, no application to the factual aspect of the present case. The Registrar High Court in his letter dated 9.1.91 has stated that on 11.4.90 he was on duty. He was not on privilege leave and had not handed over charge of the post of Registrar to any other officer of the Registry. He has only said that he had left Jodhpur on 11.4.90 for attending official work at Jaipur and as such he did not attend the office at Jodhpur. It is clear that on 11.4.90 the Registrar of the High Court was not on leave and was on duty. He might have left for Jaipur on that day for official work. He has only said that he had left Jodhpur on 11.4.90 for attending official work at Jaipur and as such he did not attend the office at Jodhpur. It is clear that on 11.4.90 the Registrar of the High Court was not on leave and was on duty. He might have left for Jaipur on that day for official work. That did not make the Additional Registrar, Jodhpur, the 'Registrar'. 46. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon answer given by the Allahabad High Court to question No. 2 referred to it in Nirmal Dass Khaturia v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal (AIR 1972 Allahabad 200 at page 215) as follows: "Question No. 2 : However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad, the judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. The case should be returned for filing before the judges at Lucknow and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad a direction should be made to the High Court office to transmit the papers of the case to Lucknow." 47. It was urged that this answer to question No. 2 was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( AIR 1976 SC 331 ) . The learned counsel on this basis argued that even if this election petition was mistakenly or inadvertently entertained by the Additional Registrar at Jodhpur, it was transmitted to the Jaipur Bench of the High Court and the mistake was cured.It may be mentioned that answer to question No. 2 given by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Nirmal Dass Kathuria was of general nature. The reference before the Full Bench arose from the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and a criminal reference. Matter relating to presentation of an election petition was not before the Allahabad High Court. It had no occasion to consider the general principle qua the provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951. As has already been observed that an action to challenge an election is not a common law action and is also not based on equity. The right to elect and vote is statutory and so are all the processes connected with the election. There is no element of any common law right in the process of election. As has already been observed that an action to challenge an election is not a common law action and is also not based on equity. The right to elect and vote is statutory and so are all the processes connected with the election. There is no element of any common law right in the process of election. The right conferred being purely a statutory right, the terms of the statute governing elections and election disputes has to be complied with. Section 87(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 provides that "subject to " the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder," every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908) to the trial of suits." The words "subject to the provisions of this Act and any rule made thereunder impose restrictions on importing the entire Civil Procedure Code for the trial of suits in the trial of election petition. 48. Section 86(1) of the Act of 1951 clearly provides that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117. Section 81(1) of the said Act clearly provides that an elections petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (1) of section 100 and section 101 to the High Court. In Hukum Deo v. Lalit Narain Misra (AIR 1974 SC 482) , the Supreme Court observed at page 490 as follows : "Section 86 of the Act (Representation of the People Act, 1951) gives a pre-emptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81,82 and 117." At page 493, it was further observed: "If for non-compliance with the provisions of section 82 and 117 which are mandatory, the election petition has to be dismissed under section 86(1), the presentation of election petition within the period prescribed in section 81 would be equally mandatory, the non-compliance with which visits the penalty of the petition being dismissed." 49. Section 86(1) of the Act of 1951, therefore, by necessary intendment and t implication, excludes the application of the provisions of Order VII rule 10 C.P.C., so far as election petition are concerned. 50. Section 86(1) of the Act of 1951, therefore, by necessary intendment and t implication, excludes the application of the provisions of Order VII rule 10 C.P.C., so far as election petition are concerned. 50. Again it was futile to transmit the election petition to Jaipur Bench. The limitation period of 45 days for the filing of the election petition expired on 15th April, 1990. The election petition was transmitted to the Jaipur Bench of the High Court on 28.4.1990. The Act of 1951 does not empower the High Court to condone the delay. Thus even when the election petition was transmitted to Jaipur Bench, it was barred by limitation. At its best, it can be said that when the present election petition reached at the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, it could be deemed to be re-presented at the Jaipur Bench on 28.4.90. But unfortunately on 28.4.90 the election petition was barred by limitation. I may here refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sharina reported in AIR 1968 SC 453 . In that case, a writ petition tinder Article 226 of the Constitution had been filed by the appellant on November 3, 1966. The High Court of Assam was in vacation from September 17, 1966 to November 19, 1966. Mr. Justice S.K. Dutta was nominated as the vacation Judge for the vacation. Mr. Justice Dutta was also working as a Commissioner of Enquiry during that time. For that purpose he had to go out of Gauhati, which was the seat of the High Court. Mr. Justice Dutta went away to Sibsagar after the vacation sitting on October 31, 1966. On the day of the filing of the writ petition, Mr. Justice Dutta was not available at Gauhati even though he was the Vacation Judge and even though the order relating to vacation sittings said that if any matter was extremely urgent it could be heard on any other day by appointment through the Registrar. As the matter was urgent, the Advocate for the petitioner went to Sibsagar where Mr. Justice Dutta was holding the Commission of Enquiry and presented the writ petition there. The writ petition was entertained by Mr. Justice 'Dutta and he passed interim order thereon. As the matter was urgent, the Advocate for the petitioner went to Sibsagar where Mr. Justice Dutta was holding the Commission of Enquiry and presented the writ petition there. The writ petition was entertained by Mr. Justice 'Dutta and he passed interim order thereon. Thereafter, the papers relating to the writ petition were to sent to Gauhati and the Court had occasion to deal with the writ i petition. One of the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the respondent was that j Mr. Justice Dutta could not exercise the jurisdiction of the Assam High Court while at Sibsagar for the seat of the High Court was at Gauhati. Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed: "Even assuming that, all that can be said is that the presentation of the writ petition before Dutta, J., at Sibsagar was irregular....................and if he received the petition at Sibsagar all that can be said is that the petition was irregularly presented there when it should have been presented at Gauhati. But assuming that the presentation of the petition at Sibasagar was irregular, the fact remains that the petition was sent to Gauhati later and was dealt with there. We do not see why the petition should have been dismissed because the presentation was irregular.... The presentation should have been taken in such circumstances to have been made at Gauhati when the petition reached Gauhati and the petition should have been dealt with as such.............................................The petition must be held to have been re-present to the High Court when it reached the seat of the High Court at Gauhati and should have been dealt with as such and could not have been thrown out merely on the-ground that the original presentation of November 3,1966 was irregular. We send it (the case) back to the High Court with the direction that the High Court should re-consider whether the petition should be admitted, taking it as represented on the day it reached Gauhati and if so it should be set down for hearing in due course." 51. We send it (the case) back to the High Court with the direction that the High Court should re-consider whether the petition should be admitted, taking it as represented on the day it reached Gauhati and if so it should be set down for hearing in due course." 51. It may be stated that in Alok Kumar's case (supra) it was a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the question of limitation was not at all involved in it even on the date when the papers relating to writ petition reached Gauhati and even in May, 1967 when the writ petition came up for hearing before the High Court at Gauhati. In the present case, even if this election petition is treated to have been re-presented at Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court when the election petition was transmitted from Jodhpur to Jaipur Bench on 28.4.90, it was barred by limitation on that day. The limitation period available for the election petition had already expired on 15.4.90. Besides, in Alok Kumar's case Mr. Justice Dutta was Vacation Judge and the presentation of the Writ petition before him at Sibsagar was only assumed to be irregular. In the present case, the presentation of the election petition before the Additional Registrar, Jodhpur was wholly invalid. It may also be mentioned that the Allahabad High Court had decided the case of Nirmal Dass Kathuria ( AIR 1972 All. 200 ) and that very High Court in Election Petition No. 12 of 1980, B.M. Ailsinghani v. Mrs. Indira Gandhi (decided on 12.8.80) held that the presentation of the election petition at Allahabad was not a presentation before the proper court and neither it could be returned to the petitioner for presentation at the seat of the High Court at Lucknow under Order VII Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code nor it could be transmitted to Lucknow. Moreover, even if the petition was transmitted to Lucknow Bench, it would be barred by limitation. I agree with the views of Hon'ble J.P. Chaturvedi, J., in B.M. Ailsinghani's case (supra). Thus, the present election petition was neither presented to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, nor to the Rajasthan High Court at its permanent Bench at Jaipur within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to which the election petition relates had been held. I agree with the views of Hon'ble J.P. Chaturvedi, J., in B.M. Ailsinghani's case (supra). Thus, the present election petition was neither presented to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, nor to the Rajasthan High Court at its permanent Bench at Jaipur within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to which the election petition relates had been held. Consequently, this election petition has necessarily to be dismissed as provided in section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on this preliminary ground alone. 52. As I have upheld the first preliminary objection raised by the respondents and decision thereon goes to the very maintainability of the present election petition, it is not necessary to deal with and decide the other preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents. 53. This election petition is consequently dismissed under section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 on the ground that the election petition was neither presented to the permanent Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election from Mahua Assembly Constituency (in Sawai Madhopur district) to which the election petition relates had been held nor to the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. Respondent No. 1 who has raised the preliminary objections will get his costs from the petitioners. 54. The Additional Registrar of this Court will immediately intimate the substance of this decision to the Election Commissioner and to the Speaker of the Rajasthan State Legislative Assembly and shall further send to the Election Commissioner an authenticated copy of this decision.Election Petition Dismissed. *******