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1991 DIGILAW 146 (PAT)

Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Limited v. State of Bihar

1991-04-05

S.N.JHA

body1991
JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. The petitioner, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, has challenged the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Lohardaga, respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure-5, awarding compensation or 18,500/- for having damaged certain raiyati lands of respondent no. 3. 2. A petition was filed by respondent no. 3 herein, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 3 of 1984-85 alleging that as a result of the mining and other connected activities being carried on by the petitioner-company the lands in question had become unfit for agricultural purposes and therefore he should be awarded damages. Notice of the aforesaid proceeding was issued to the petitioner and finally, on consideration of the show cause and the report of the Anchal Adhikari, the impugned order was passed on 18.4.1985. 3. Mr. V. Sheonath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner accepted the legal position that by virtue of the provisions of Section 21 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the occupancy raiyats have certain rights in regard to use and enjoyment of their raiyati lands and in appropriate cases they are also entitled to claim damages. He, however, contended that in terms of Section 139 of the Tenancy Act such an application is maintainable and the power thereunder is to be exercised only by the Deputy Commissioner. In absence of any provision for delegation, the Deputy Commissioner cannot delegate the authority to entertain or decide such a suit or application to the Sub-divisional Officer. 4. Section 3 (viii) of the Act defines the term 'Deputy Commissioner' so as to include any Revenue Officer or Deputy Collector who is specially empowered by the State Government to discharge any of the functions by Deputy Commissioner; and any Deputy Collector to whom the Deputy Commissioner may by general or special order, transfer any of his function. In other words, in terms of the aforesaid clause, the Sub-divisional Officer besides other officers may be vested with the power of the Deputy Commissioner by the State Government. There is no averment in the writ petition that the State Government has not empowered the Sub-divisional Officer to entertain or decide an application/suit under Section 139 of the Act. Therefore, I am not inclined to examine the validity of the aforesaid contention in this case. 5. There is no averment in the writ petition that the State Government has not empowered the Sub-divisional Officer to entertain or decide an application/suit under Section 139 of the Act. Therefore, I am not inclined to examine the validity of the aforesaid contention in this case. 5. Learned counsel next contended that a proceeding under Section (3) (d) of the Act can lie only between the landlord and the raiyat. The petitioner being a third party, if the raiyat wanted compensation in respect of the alleged impairment of value of the land, the only course available to him was to institute a suit in the Civil Court. 6. Section 139 contemplates different categories of suits and applications which are exclusively to be tried by the Deputy Commissioner. The relevant Clause (d) of Section 139 (3) reads as follows: "(d) All applications for damages in respect of exceeding, or in respect of interference with the enjoyment of" (land). In order to examine the validity of the contention of the learned counsel it is necessary to consider first the scope of Section 21 of the Act. The said provision, inter alia, lays down that an occupancy raiyat has got the right to use the land in any manner which is authorised by local custom or usage or, irrespective of any local custom or usage, in any manner which does not materially impair the value of the land or render it unfit for the purposes of the tenancy. Thus, Section 21 protects and recognises certain inherent rights of the occupancy raiyat in regard to use and enjoyment of the land. A situation may arise where while using the land, the raiyat has exceeded the aforesaid right so as to materially impair the value of the land or render it unfit for the purposes of tenancy giving rise to a cause of action in favour of the landlord to file an application for damages against the raiyat. Alternatively, a situation may arise where such a right of user or enjoyment is obstructed or interfered with by the landlord, giving rise to a similar cause of action in favour of the raiyat against the landlord. Alternatively, a situation may arise where such a right of user or enjoyment is obstructed or interfered with by the landlord, giving rise to a similar cause of action in favour of the raiyat against the landlord. Having regard to language of Clause (d) of Section 139 (3), it would be clear that applications contemplated thereunder refer to both the aforesaid situations, namely, where the raiyat has exceeded the right of user of the land or alternatively where such a right of the raiyat to enjoy the land is interfered with. An application in both the situations will be maintainable before the competent authority under Section 139 of the Act. 7. The question that arises for consideration is where such an obstruction or interference is caused by a person who is not the landlord, whether the application for damages can be entertained within the meaning of Section 139 (3) (d). Having regard to the scheme of the provisions, in my opinion, the suit or proceeding which are between the landlord and raiyat i.e. person having interest in the land, whether inter se amongst themselves or between themselves. The petitioner, obviously does not claim any tenancy right or any other interest in the lands in question either as raiyat or landlord. Therefore, any application claiming damages against the petitioner cannot be said to be entertain-able by the Deputy Commissioner within the meaning of Section 139. The remedy, in such a situation, for the aggrieved party is by way of regular suit in the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. 8. For the reasons stated above in my opinion, the application, which was filed before the Sub-divisional Officer, Lohardaga by respondent no. 3, was not entertain-able before him and accordingly, it has to be held that the impugned order (Annexure-5) is without jurisdiction. It may be mentioned, that respondent no. 3 has not entered appearance in this Court. 9. In the result, the order dated 18.4.1985 (Annexure-5) is quashed. The application is, thus, allowed but without any order as to costs.