Y.I. Singh, J.:- Kumari Laitonjam Kunjalata Devi has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution asking for a writ of habeas corpus for release from detention ordered by the District Magistrate, Imphal under Sections 3 (2) and 3 (3) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 2. Detenu Kunjalata Devi was arrested by the police at 4 A.M. on 25.1.1991 from the house of Km Kangujam Chandrasakhi Devi. A sum of Rs. 11,240/- was admittedly seized by the police from her possession. Some incriminating docu­ments were also allegedly found in her possession. After her arrest, the police continued to detain her by registering a case being F.I.R. Case No. 30 (1) 91 Singjamei Police Station under Section 3 (4) and 4 (1) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. On 18.2.1991 the Designated Court passed an order granting bail to her for one month solely for her better treatment and care in a well equipped hospital outside the jail. It is to be noted here that the Designated Court passed the said order on the basis of the report dated 18.2.91 made by the Medical Officer attached to Manipur Central Jail where the detente was lodged. As it will be necessary to refer to this report to assess the capability of the petitioner to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order it is reproduced here. " With due respect I the undersigned with reference to DJ/E/91 herewith submit my medical report of Miss Kunjalata Devi who is now lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Imphal. Miss Kunjalata Devi is suffering from Chronic urinary tract infection with urethra colitis and peptic ulcer. She was referred to J.N. Hospital Porompat on 11.2.91 and treatment given as advised by them; but she is not showing any improvement; rather she is not taking any food orally. Now she is on 1/2 fluid only, and general health is deteriorating day by day. She needs full investigation in a well equipped hospital to rule out urethra colitis as such facilities are not available in Jail Hospital. Thanking You, Sd/- Medical Officer, 18/2/91 Manipur Central Jail, Imphal." 3. On 19.2.91 the District Magistrate. Imphal made the impugned order of detention. She needs full investigation in a well equipped hospital to rule out urethra colitis as such facilities are not available in Jail Hospital. Thanking You, Sd/- Medical Officer, 18/2/91 Manipur Central Jail, Imphal." 3. On 19.2.91 the District Magistrate. Imphal made the impugned order of detention. As it will be necessary to refer to the terms of the order served on her it is reproduced here: " Whereas the police report has been laid before me that Kumari Laitonjam Kunjalata Devi @ Yang Romila @ Mayang Anabi 29 years d/o L. Nilamani Singh, Heirangoithong Ningthoujam Leikai, Aheibam Leirak, Imphal is acting in a manner sic of public order. Whereas, I, O. Nabakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal District, Manipur am satisfied that her activities are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980. And whereas, it is considered necessary to detain Kumari Laitonjam Kunjalata Devi @ Yang @ Romila @ Mayang Anabi d/d L. Nilamani Singh of Heirangoithong Ningthoujam Leikai, Imphal with a view to prevent her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. Now, therefore, I, O. Nabakishore Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal in exercise of the Powers conferred upon me by Sub-Section 3 of Section 3 read with Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980, read with Govt. of Manipur Home Department Notification No. 17 (1) 49/80-H dated 28th December, 1990 make this order directing that the above said person be detained until further orders. Given under my hand and seal of Court this 19th day of February, 1991. Sd/- (O. Nabakishore Singh) District Magistrate, Imphal District, Manipur. 4. After some days, the grounds of her detention under the "Act" (Annexure A/2) were communicated to her. Given under my hand and seal of Court this 19th day of February, 1991. Sd/- (O. Nabakishore Singh) District Magistrate, Imphal District, Manipur. 4. After some days, the grounds of her detention under the "Act" (Annexure A/2) were communicated to her. In para No. 3 of Annexure A/2, the District Magistrate stated as follows :- "On the grounds stated above I am satisfied that with a view to preventing you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary so to do I have made an order directing that you be detained." From a plain reading of the above lines, it will be candidly seen that the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was that the detention of the petitioner was necessary to prevent her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. It is to be noted here that the above said detention order (Annexure A/1) and the grounds of detention (Annexure A/2) were conspicuously silent about the fact regarding the bail granted to the petitioner by the Designated Court. It appears from the detention order-that the police did not bring this fact to the notice of the District Magistrate in the report dated 19.2.91 on the basis of which the detention order was passed. 5. The petitioner submitted her representation dated 27.2.91 to the Govt. of Manipur as well as the Central Govt. The State Government approved the order of detention on 28.2.1991 and informed the petitioner on 25.3.1991 that her request for release could not be acceded to. On 26.3.1991 the Advisory Board considered the case of the petitioner. On the recommendation of the Advisory Board, the State Govt. by an order dated 8.4.1991, confirmed that detention of the petitioner for 12 months. 6. Shri Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the detention order on several grounds. His first contention is that the impugned order of detention having been mechanically made and suffering from the vice of non-application of mind is vitiated. by an order dated 8.4.1991, confirmed that detention of the petitioner for 12 months. 6. Shri Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the detention order on several grounds. His first contention is that the impugned order of detention having been mechanically made and suffering from the vice of non-application of mind is vitiated. In support of his above contention, the learned counsel has drawn our attention to the order of detention Annexure A/1 and the grounds of detention Annexure A/2 and submits that these documents will clearly show that the District Magistrate issued the order of detention mechanically acting as a rubber stamp of the police without applying his mind to the basic facts and other materials for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or to the security of the State. We find force in this contention of the learned counsel. 7. As stated above, the District Magistrate, Imphal issued the order of detention Annexure A/1 with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also to the security of the State. However, as discussed above, as per grounds of detention Annexure A/2, the satisfaction of the District Magistrate was that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State only and not for public order. Thus, it will now be seen that the detention order so far as public order is concerned, is not based on any ground. Shri Irabot Singh, learned Govt. Advocate submits, though meekly, that no line of distinction can be drawn between the words "public order" and "Security of the State" and, therefore, from the omission of the words "maintenance of public order" in the grounds of detention, no inference can necessarily be made that the District Magistrate passed the impugned order of detention mechanically or that the impugned order suffered from the vice of non-application of mind. The argument seems to have the vaneer of plausibility at the first flush but a moment scrutiny of the concepts of "public order" and "security of the State" will dislodge it by unmasking its spuriousness. The argument seems to have the vaneer of plausibility at the first flush but a moment scrutiny of the concepts of "public order" and "security of the State" will dislodge it by unmasking its spuriousness. We say so, because, the order of detention would not be in terms of the 'Act' unless it could be said that the expression "public order" means the same thing as "security of State" which occur in Section 3 of the Act. We find no reason to think so. After all, an act may affect "public order" but not "the Security of Stale", just as an act may affect" law and order", but not "public order". We may mention here that one of the earliest examples of the attempt of the Supreme Court to distinguish "public order" as distinct notion is to be found in Ramesh Thaper vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 where the question was whether a ban on the entry of a news paper in the State of Madras in the maintenance of Public Order was sustainable in terms of article 19 (2) of the Constitution (as it was prior to the First Amendment to the Constitution) which enable imposition of restriction on the freedom of Press in the interest of security of State, but not maintenance of "public order". The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the expression "public order" was distinguishable from the expression "security of the State". We may also refer to the case of Dr. Lohia and the State of Bihar, AIR 1966 S.C. page 748. In the said case, the Supreme Court, while considering the three concepts viz "Law and Order", "Public Order" and "Security of Slate", generally used in prevention of detention laws, observed that to appreciate the extent and scope of each of them, we should have three concentric circles, the longest of them representing "Law and Order", the next representing "Public Order" and the smallest representing "the Security of the State" and that an act may affect "Law and Order" but not public order, just as an act may affect "Public Order" but not" the Security of State". Iii a number of cases, the Supreme Court, basing on the principles formulated in the said cases, made line of distinction between the aforesaid three concepts. Iii a number of cases, the Supreme Court, basing on the principles formulated in the said cases, made line of distinction between the aforesaid three concepts. We do not propose to realer to those decisions inasmuch as the proposition of law is now well settled. Point is, what would be me affect if the purpose of passing the detention as stated in the order and the ground on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was reached, are at variance with each other as it is done in the present case. In the order of detention Annexure A/1, there are two purposes for passing the order - one for the maintenance of" Public Order" and another for "the Security of the State". In so far as the second purpose is concerned, the order is undoubtedly in terms of the act. However, the order relating to the first purpose is not in terms of the "Act' as it is not based on the ground on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was reached. The result, therefore, is that the detention order mentions two grounds, one of which is in terms of the Act while the other is not. Point is, what would be the effect of that. On this point, we may refer to the decision made in the case of Shiban Lal Saksena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 S.C. 179 . In the said case, it was tersely held that such an order would be a bad order, the reason being that it could not be said in what manner and to what extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his subjective satisfaction which formed the basis of the order and the order has, therefore, to be held illegal though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order of detention could have been based. 8. Shri K. Irabot Singh has submitted that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate which justifies the detention order under the Act is a subjective satis­faction and therefore the Court cannot investigate about the adequacy of the reason which led his satisfaction. The learned Govt. Advocate has cited a number of decisions made by the Apex Court in support of his above contention. The learned Govt. Advocate has cited a number of decisions made by the Apex Court in support of his above contention. However, we do not propose to burden our judgment with those citations as the proposition of law is well settled. After all, the Courts are not to exercise appellate powers over such authority. But, in a catena of cases, the Apex Court held that a detenu can question the validity of the detention order if the order is not proper or valid on its face. It would be a mere waste of time to refer to those decisions as it is now an accepted principle of law. 9. As stated above, in the case of hand, the purpose of passing detention order as stated in the detention order Annexure A/1 and the ground on which the satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Imphal was reached are at variance with each other. In other words, one of the purposes of passing the detention order as stated in the order i.e. to prevent "Public Order" will not be found in the ground of detention Annexure A/2. Thus, the detention order is not proper on its face. When the detention order is invalid on its face, the onus will be on the Detaining Authority to establish that it was made bonafide. But the District Magistrate who was the Detaining Authority made no attempt in his affidavit to explain that the expressions "the Security of the State", as stated in the ground of detention Annexure A/2, meant " Public Order" also. The Detaining Authority did not make even a whisper on this point. There is, therefore, no doubt that the detention order is bad and it suffers from the vice of non-application of mind. It appears that the District Magistrate passed the impugned order of detention Annexure A/1 mechanically as a routine matter without applying his mind to the basic facts and other relevant matters and, therefore, the detention order is illegal and liable to be quashed. 10. It appears that the District Magistrate passed the impugned order of detention Annexure A/1 mechanically as a routine matter without applying his mind to the basic facts and other relevant matters and, therefore, the detention order is illegal and liable to be quashed. 10. Further, since the purpose of passing the order of detention as stated in detention order Annexure A/1 and the ground on which the satisfaction of the District Magistrate was reached, are at variance with each other, the petitioner would not be able to make an effective representation against her detention and, therefore, on this count alone detention order, is liable to be quashed (relied on 7990 Cril. Law Journal 1187). 11. Another interesting point which cannot escape from our scrutiny is that the petitioner was in judicial custody in connection with a serious offence under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. As the detention order was served on her when she was in judicial custody, the District Magistrate, Imphal was quite aware that she was in Jail in connection with a serious offence and therefore he was to satisfy himself that the further detention of the petitioner was necessary. In the instant case, as stated above, when the detention order was served on the petitioner on 19.4.1991 there was an order of the Designated Court passed on 18.4.1991 granting bail to the petitioner on parole for one month for treatment in a well equipped hospital outside jail basing solely on the report submitted by the medical officer attached to Imphal Central Jail where the petitioner was lodged. It appears from the detention order Annexure A/1 that the fact of releasing the petitioner on bail by the Designated Court on medical ground was not pi aced before the District Magistrate by the police. The District Magistrate also did not care to make an enquiry as to whether the further detention of the petitioner was still necessary in the prevailing circumstances. He simply acted on the police report, which did not disclose the fact relating to the bail granted to the petitioner by the Designated Court, mechanically without any application of his mind to the neces­sity of the further detention of the petitioner. This conduct of the District Magistrate is enough to hold that he was not aware of the requisite facts and the necessity of making the order of detention. 12. This conduct of the District Magistrate is enough to hold that he was not aware of the requisite facts and the necessity of making the order of detention. 12. Further due to the non-disclosure of the fact regarding the bail granted to her by the Designated Court on medical ground, the petitioner could not make adequate and effective representation against the order of detention and, therefore, the detention order is illegal. Again, if the police disclosed the fact of granting bail to the petitioner on medical ground by the Designated Court, the District Magistrate might not even passed the order of detention Annexure A/1 inasmuch as the petitioner, on account of her said illness, would not be able to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. 13. Shri A. Nilamani Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised several other points during the course of his argument. However, we do not propose to give our decisions on those points in view of our above decisions that the order of detention is illegal inasmuch as the same suffers from the vice of non-application of mind by the District Magistrate and also that the impugned order of detention is liable to be quashed for not giving opportunity to the petitioner to make effective representation, against the order of detention due to the reasons stated above. 14. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot allow the impugned orders of detention to stand. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the orders of detention dated 19-2-1991 and 8-4-1991 are quashed and the detenu is entitled to be set at liberty unless her detention is required in connection with other cases.