Judgment BINOD KUMAR ROY, J. 1. The plaintiffs assail an order by which after setting aside of the order of dismissal of their eviction suit filed under Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) a fresh order has been passed on their disposed of application under Sec. 15 of the Act in the circumstances set forth below. 2. The Facts: The suit in question was filed in the year 1983 for realisation of arrears of rent from November 1980 to November 1983 and for eviction of the opposite parties on account of default in payment of rent. On 27-4-1984 the opposite parties filed their written statement stating inter alia, to the effect that the petitioners have no title to the disputed house and prayed to dismiss the suit. On 23-13-1984 the petitioners filed a petition under Sec. 15 of the Act for directing the opposite parties to deposit rents The said petition was allowed by an order dated 9th February 1985 (as contained in Annexure-1) directing the opposite parties to deposit arrears of rent till 23rd February, 1985 and also to deposit current and future rents within the time mentioned therein, in the event of failure thereof the defence against ejectment was also directed to be struck off. The said order was not complied with rather on 13-3-1985 an application was filed by the opposite parties for issuance of a chalan for depositing the rent. This prayer was opposed by the petitioners. The petition was directed to be heard on 19-4-1985. On that day, however, the petition was not pressed rather time was taken by the opposite parties. It is said that thereafter till 25th June, 1986 the hearing of the petition dated 13-3-1985 was adjourned repeatedly on petitions for adjournments filed by the opposite parties. On 26th June, 1986 they filed yet another petition praying to allow them to deposit arrears of rent through chalan in court. That prayer was also opposed by the petitioners by filing a rejoinder. The petition dated 26-6-1986 was heard and rejected by order dated 4th July, 1986 as contained in Annexure-2. The suit, however, was dismissed for default on 23rd July, 1986. The opposite parties filed C.R. No. 1266 of 1986 challenging that order. The said revision was placed for admission on 25th August, 1986. The petition dated 26-6-1986 was heard and rejected by order dated 4th July, 1986 as contained in Annexure-2. The suit, however, was dismissed for default on 23rd July, 1986. The opposite parties filed C.R. No. 1266 of 1986 challenging that order. The said revision was placed for admission on 25th August, 1986. By an order dated 25th August, 1986 it was disposed of as follows: After making some submissions Mr. Dhrub Narayan, learned Counsel for the petitioners, sought permission to withdraw this application so that, if the law so permits and the petitioners are so advised, they may file an application in the court below itself for extension of time. If and when such an application is tiled, the court below shall apply its mind to the facts of the case and shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The prayer is allowed and the application is dismissed as withdrawn with, liberty to the petitioners as aforementioned. The suit was restored back on 5th January 1987. The opposite parties thereafter re-appeared in the suit on 5-5-1987 but took no further steps even in terms of the liberty granted by order dated 25th August 1986. They on 7-4-1988, i.e. to say after about 18 months, filed yet another petition (as contained in Annexure-4) for extension of time granted by order dated 9-2-1985. The petitioners filed a rejoinder and prayed to reject it. The court below by the impugned order rejected that petition but passed a fresh order on the petition dated 23-11-1984 holding that due to dismissal of the suit the order could not be complied with by the opposite parties. 3. This civil revision application was admitted on 11-9-1989 and further proceeding in the court below was stayed. From the office notes it appears that the notices were validly served on the opposite parties. They, however, have not entered appearance, Accordingly I proceed to dispose of this civil revision application even in their absence. 4. The submissions: Mr. 3. This civil revision application was admitted on 11-9-1989 and further proceeding in the court below was stayed. From the office notes it appears that the notices were validly served on the opposite parties. They, however, have not entered appearance, Accordingly I proceed to dispose of this civil revision application even in their absence. 4. The submissions: Mr. Anjani Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits as follows: the court below has committed a serious jurisdictional error in not considering that its earlier order dated 9th February 1983 was res judicata, this court never permitted the opposite parties to file a fresh application for extension of time save and except, if provided under law but the court below has failed to appreciate that law did not provide filing of another application; the court below has failed to consider the legal position, that no sooner the suit was restored back on 5th January 1987 the earlier orders dated 9-2-1985 and 4-7-1986 revived automatically and that the opposite parties had in fact made no honest endeavours promptly in pressing their prayer for making deposit before the dismissal of the suit or after the restoration of the suit, the court below had illegally found favour with the argument made on behalf of the opposite parties that the earlier orders do not automatically revive with the restoration of the suit and passing of a fresh order under Sec. 15 of the Act after rejecting the petition dated 7-4-1988 was apparently not permissible and beyond jurisdiction. 5. My findings: The repeated taking of time by the opposite parties in regard to the hearing of their petition dated 13-3-1985 is demonstrative of their intention. The order dated 25-8-1986 passed in C. R. 12666 of 1986 does not show that the fact of the dismissal of the suit for default on 23-7-1986 was brought to the notice of this court. From the impugned order itself it is clear that even though the opposite parties re-appeared in the suit after its restoration on 5-1-1987, on 5-5-1987 they did nothing for about 18 months i.e. to say till 7-4-1988. Law helps only those who are vigilant and not those who are not prompt. Thus there was no question of exercise of any power in the interest of justice in favour of the opposite parties. 6. Law helps only those who are vigilant and not those who are not prompt. Thus there was no question of exercise of any power in the interest of justice in favour of the opposite parties. 6. Besides, Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure runs as follows: (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from brinbing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise at it thinks fit, shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit The order of the dismissal of the suit for default was set side by order dated 5-1-1987 but without any special terms in regard to the order on the petition under Sec. 15 of the Act. (Emphasis added) 7 In Bankim Chandra V/s. Chandi Prasad -- , a Division Bench of our own High Court after following a Full Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in AIR 1935 Madras 365, held as follows: Once a suit or appeal dismissed for default is restored by the order of the court all ancillary orders passed in the suit or application before its dismissal also revive and operate since that date with all their legal implications unless there is any other factor on the record or in the order passed to show to the contrary. No special section as envisaged in the later part of Sub-sec. (1) of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code was made while passing the order dated 5-1-1987. 8. In Smt. Radhe Bal V/s. Smt. Jawitri Sharma 1975 All India Rent Control Journal 279 the Delhi High Court following the aforesaid decision held that an order for payment of rent would automatically revive on restoration of the petition filed for eviction of the tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act. 8. In Smt. Radhe Bal V/s. Smt. Jawitri Sharma 1975 All India Rent Control Journal 279 the Delhi High Court following the aforesaid decision held that an order for payment of rent would automatically revive on restoration of the petition filed for eviction of the tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Apart from the aforementioned Delhi decision I find that there is a Division Bench judgment of this court also in Ranchod Lodha V/s. Madhavji Kanji reported in -- wherein this court considered the legal position emerging in regard to an order passed under Sec. 11-A of the 1947 Act (which now corresponds to Sec. 15 of the present Act) after restoration of an eviction suit dismissed for default and it held that the order passed under Sec. 11-A of the Act would be deemed to have revived from the date of restoration of the suit (see para 4 of the judgment). 9. For the reasons aforementioned I hold that the earlier order dated 9-2-1985 and 4-7-1986 revived automatically and the court below has committed an apparent jurisdictional error in holding to the contrary and in passing a fresh order under Sec. 15 of the Act. 10. The impugned order is thus set aside and this civil revision application allowed. Since opposite parties have not entered appearance there shall be no order as to cost. 11. Since the suit has by now remained pending for about 6 years, I direct the trial court to dispose it of within 4 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order curbing all unreasonable adjournments which may be made by one or the other party, but it will grant firstly atleast 15 days time to them to file their documents and list of witnesses.