Judgment :- In the original petition, petitioner seeks to quash a notification issued by the Government in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1) of S.25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, for short, the Act. By the notification, Government exempted in public interest, Building No. XVI/186ABCDE situated in Survey Numbers 1042/3 6,11 of Kunnumkulam Municipality and owned by the Chavakkad Taluk Muslim Orphanage Association from all the provisions of the Act. Copy of the notification is Ext. P3. It is dated 10th April, 1984. 2.Petitioner submits that the notification vitally affects his interest insofar as in respect of the building referred in the notification, petitioner has entered into an agreement for taking the ground floor and the first floor on lease. Petitioner has agreed to pay an advance of Rs. 5 lakhs. It was agreed that the ground floor and the first floor of the building will be given on lease on a monthly rent of Rs. 6.000/-. For specific performance of this agreement, petitioner has filed a suit, O.S. No. 51 of 1983 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Trichur. True copy of the plaint is produced a1ongwith the original petition, marked as Ext. P1. 3. Petitioner filed I.A. No. 233 of 1983 in the suit under Order 40 Rule 1 and S.151 C.P.C. for appointment of an interim receiver and further prayed that the petitioner may be permitted to take possession of the ground floor and the first floor excluding the portion intended to be set apart for conducting prayers. The application was seriously contested. The court, after considering the circumstances involved in the case, appointed the petitioner as receiver. Petitioner submits that he had even before the (filing of the suit, paid an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- to the second respondent-Association, towards the advance agreed upon. 4. When the petitioner was appointed as Receiver, the court ordered that the remaining sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- should also be deposited in the court and that the petitioner should pay rent at the rate of Rs. 7,500/- per month from the date of taking possession of the premises. The quantum of rent was fixed on a provisional basis subject to the final result of the suit. Ext. P2 is the true copy of the order of the Subordinate Judge, appointing the receiver. Ext. P2 is dated 8th April, 1983. 5. 7,500/- per month from the date of taking possession of the premises. The quantum of rent was fixed on a provisional basis subject to the final result of the suit. Ext. P2 is the true copy of the order of the Subordinate Judge, appointing the receiver. Ext. P2 is dated 8th April, 1983. 5. Subsequently, the case was tried. Plain tiff-petitioner was partly examined. According to the petitioner, since respondents 2 and 3 found it difficult to defend the case, they approached the Government and managed to obtain a notification Ext. P3, exempting the building in question from all the provisions of the Act. Petitioner submits that the notification is a clear abuse of the power granted by the Legislature to the executive under S.25(1) of the Act and this will give a cause of action to the person, who is affected by the result of the misuse of the power. Petitioner is affected and so, he seeks to quash the notification. 6. Petitioner wants to highlight certain circumstances to emphasise the fact that the power under S.25(1) of the Act is exercised under certain pressure and that it was not a lawful exercise of the power. While the suit was pending trial, after the passing of the interim order appointing receiver, petitioners were moved before the then Deputy Chief Minister and the Minister for Industries. The petition is dated 28-7-1983. Counsel for petitioner submits that the Deputy Chief Minister or the Minister for Industries have nothing to do with the question regarding the issue of notification under S.25(1) of the Act. The Deputy Chief Minister made a note on the petition thus: "Please exempt if we can. Examine and put up within 15 days". The note is dated 29-7-1983. 7. In the petition submitted to the Minister for Industries, a note was put up indicating that the petition may be considered favourably. The note is dated 29-7-1983. A member of the Legislative Assembly has also made a request to the Minister for Revenue stating that a representation for exemption of Rent Control Act is being forwarded for consideration by the Minister for Revenue. 8. The building in question is a four storied building. The ground floor and part of first floor, according to the petitioner, had been agreed to be leased out to the petitioner. 8. The building in question is a four storied building. The ground floor and part of first floor, according to the petitioner, had been agreed to be leased out to the petitioner. Part of the first floor, excluding the portion intended to be leased out is used as a place for offering prayers. The remaining two floors in the building are in the direct possession and occupation of the second respondent-Association and it is running a lodge in the name and style crecent Lodge. Counsel for petitioner pointed out that the exemption was sought even with respect to portions of the building, which are exclusively in the possession of the second respondent. 9. The Minister for Revenue has put a note on a letter from a Member of the Legislative Assembly to the effect that the Secretary, Revenue should examine the question whether the building can be exempted under the Act. The Collector of Trichur has submitted a report and in the report, the Collector has said that the second respondent herein is a Charitable Association and is registered under the Societies Act, bearing Registration No. 43/79. The building in question is on the eastern side of the Kunnamkulam Municipality Bus Stand. It is stated that portions of the buildings a & b have been leased out to different persons on the basis of monthly rent. Portion C is used as a prayer hall and the remaining portions D and E are used as lodgings. It is also stated that the annual rent that they may fetch will come to Rs. 76.000/-. It is further stated that the Chowghat Muslim Orphanage Association is a charitable institution. The Collector has recommended in the report that the Chowghat Muslim Orphanage Association deserves favourable consideration and so the building may be exempted from the provisions of the Act. 10. Counsel for petitioner submitted that the Collector does not point out the fact that the entire building does not require exemption at all in the circumstances of the case. The Collector has recommended in the report that the Chowghat Muslim Orphanage Association deserves favourable consideration and so the building may be exempted from the provisions of the Act. 10. Counsel for petitioner submitted that the Collector does not point out the fact that the entire building does not require exemption at all in the circumstances of the case. Further counsel for petitioner submitted that the report is patently wrong, insofar as at the time when the report was made on 25-2-1984, the petitioner was appointed as a receiver and he got possession of the ground floor, and in fact, there were no tenants for buildings a & b. So, counsel submits that the statement in the report that 'portions of the buildings A and B have been leased out to different persons on the basis of monthly rent', is totally incorrect. Counsel also submitted that had a proper enquiry been made by the Collector, he could have reported the fact of the pendency of the suit and interim order passed in the suit. Counsel further submits that since the notification has been issued on the basis of a report, which is, on vital facts, incorrect, the action taken by the Government surfaces legal mala fides. He submits that no one can predicate what action Government could have taken, if the Government was appraised of the fact of the pendency of the suit and the interim order appointing the petitioner as receiver in regard to portions of the building A and B. 11. There is no dispute that the notification has been issued primarily based on the Collector's report. Immediately after the report, without any further enquiry in the matter, the notification has been issued. The explanatory note in the notification only states that it has become necessary in public interest to exempt the building owned by the second respondent from all provisions of the Act. 12. government alone has filed a counter affidavit in this case. In the counter affidavit also it is stated that portions of the building A and B have been leased out to different persons on the basis of monthly rent. Obviously this must be on the basis of the report of the Collector. Factually, it is incorrect. 12. government alone has filed a counter affidavit in this case. In the counter affidavit also it is stated that portions of the building A and B have been leased out to different persons on the basis of monthly rent. Obviously this must be on the basis of the report of the Collector. Factually, it is incorrect. Further in the counter affidavit, it is stated that the allegation that the ground floor and the first floor had been agreed to be leased out to the petitioner is no? known to the first respondent and the "pendency of the suit in the Sub Court" Trichur was also not brought to the notice of this respondent at the time of issuing notification", (emphasis added). 13. It is reiterated in the counter affidavit that the existence of a suit and its stage was not known to the first respondent. It is also stated that the existence of any dispute or suit between the parties in respect of the lease of the building was not known at the time of enquiry. In paragraph six of the counter affidavit it is stated that the exemption is granted after proper enquiry and in good faith. Along with that statement, the first respondent has stated that the dispute pending before the civil court was not known to the respondent. The reason stated in the counter affidavit for exempting the building in question from the provisions of the Act is thus:- "The Chavakad Muslim Orphanage Association is a Charitable Philenthropic institution registered under the Societies Act, 1860. It was in view of this that process under S.25(1) of the Act were invoked Since it is charitable institution the public interest involved in the matter is clear. Ext. P3 is issued finding that it is a charitable institution and involves pubic interest". 14. counsel for petitioner pointed out that in the explanatory note to the notification, the only reason stated is that "it has become necessary in public interest to exempt the building". 15. A reading of the counter affidavit would clearly indicate that the notification was issued without knowing the pendency of the suit and the interim order passed by the court. Further, it is clear that the notification has been issued on the basis of the report of the Collector, which is not very accurate in details. 15. A reading of the counter affidavit would clearly indicate that the notification was issued without knowing the pendency of the suit and the interim order passed by the court. Further, it is clear that the notification has been issued on the basis of the report of the Collector, which is not very accurate in details. Further the report contains an incorrect statement of fact that the ground floor and portions of the first floor are with tenants. In these circumstances, counsel for petitioner submits that the notification has been issued without a full appraisal of the facts and proper application of mind and also relying on. facts which are incorrect and without knowing some relevant facts. So, counsel submits, that this court should exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, and quash the notification Ext. P3, since the power granted under S.25 of the Act, has not been exercised after due consideration of the relevant materials to be considered in exercising the power under S.25 of the Act. Counsel repeatedly submits that not only relevant materials have not been considered, but some materials which are incorrect, were also placed before the authority, who issued the notification. 15. Counsel for the second respondent submitted that this court's jurisdiction in interfering with a notification under S.25(A) of the Act is very limited and only if this court is satisfied that the notification has been issued without any material or with patent illegality, which can be treated as an abuse of the power, this court can interfere. 17. The scope and content of the power granted by the Legislature to the executive under S.25 of the Act can be understood with reference to the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1961 S.C.1731 (P.J. Irani v. State of Madras). 17. The scope and content of the power granted by the Legislature to the executive under S.25 of the Act can be understood with reference to the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1961 S.C.1731 (P.J. Irani v. State of Madras). The Supreme Court observed, while considering the power vested in Government to exempt a particular building or buildings from the operation of the Madras (Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act thus:- "Where the exemption granted is not of any class of buildings which would ex facie disclose a classification, but the exemption is of a specified building owned by A or in which B is a tenant, then prima facie it would be discriminatory and when the legality of the order is challenged, its intra vires character could be sustained only by disclosing the reasons which led to the passing of the order. In such a case, the High Court is not in error in calling for the reasons which induced the Government to pass the order of exemption, when no reasons are disclosed by the order". 18. Though in this case, one reason is stated in the explanatory note that the notification has been issued, since it has become necessary in public interest, the above reason is very general in character. S.25 of the Act certainly empowers the Government to exempt any building or class of buildings in public interest. But the statement that it has been done in public interest, will not be a sufficient answer, when only a particular building and not a class of buildings or buildings owned by a class of persons are exempted under S.25 of the Act and while the question is examined by this Court exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Of course, in the counter affidavit it is stated that since the second respondent is a charitable institution, the exemption of the provisions of the Act in regard to the building will involve public interest. 19. Of course, in the counter affidavit it is stated that since the second respondent is a charitable institution, the exemption of the provisions of the Act in regard to the building will involve public interest. 19. The Act itself deals with buildings belonging to religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions, when it deals with eviction under S.11 and the provision made is S.11(7), wherein it is stated that where the landlord of a building is a religious, charitable, educational or other public institution it may, if the building is needed for the purposes of the institution, apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building. From the scheme of the enactment, it cannot be said that on the sole ground that the building is owned by a charitable institution, that building earns a right to be exempted from the provisions of the Act. If that be so, the Act itself would have provided for it. So, each case has to be considered on its merits. 19. In this case, Government wanted an enquiry in the matters and for that purpose, got the report of the Collector. But, the Collector's report, as I have already indicated, is incomplete and incorrect on factual situations. One of the relevant matters, which ought to have brought to the notice of the authorities empowered to issue the notification is the fact of pendency of the suit, and in the counter affidavit filed in this case, I would say, in an apologetic tone submits that the first respondent was not aware of the pendency of the suit and the in term order passed by the court, before issuing the notification. It is not slated in the counter affidavit that the information of the pendency of the suit and the interim order passed in the suit were not at all relevant matters for considering the question, whether the building has to be exempted under the provisions of the Act, exercising the power under S.25 of I he Act. 20. In A.I.R.1961 S.C.1731, the Supreme Court observed thus:- "The further point urged regarding the learned judges of the High Court having erroneously constituted themselves into a Court of appeal need not detain us long. The short answer, to it is that the learned judges had not done so. 20. In A.I.R.1961 S.C.1731, the Supreme Court observed thus:- "The further point urged regarding the learned judges of the High Court having erroneously constituted themselves into a Court of appeal need not detain us long. The short answer, to it is that the learned judges had not done so. The submission ignores the distinction between findings on facts which the Court in proceedings under Art.226 must save in very exceptional cases, accept as correct and the relevance of those facts for considering whether their establishment satisfied the grounds necessary for the exercise of the power vested in Government under S.13 of the Act. For instance in the case on hand, no fact found by the Government or stated by them as the reason or reasons which induced them to grant the exemption were even challenged before the High Court, the only contention urged by the second respondent which was accepted by the High Court, being that these facts were irrelevant for justifying the order". In paragraph 19 of the same decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the learned judges of the High Court that ground No. 3 is not germane, for granting an exemption. 21. This court, on an examination of the files, feels that the Government has issued the notification relying on certain incorrect facts placed before it and without knowing some material facts relating to the building in question. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of exemption under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in AIR 1985 S.C. 257 (S. Kandaswamy Chettiarv. State of Tamil Nadu). Irani's case (AIR 1961 S.C.1731) was also considered in this case. In AIR 1985 S.C. 257, of course, the Supreme Court found that the notification is valid and further found that "the manner in which exemption from rent control provisions should be granted whether it could be partial or total and if so on what terms and conditions would be matters for each State Government to decide in the light of the scheme and provisions of the concerned enactment and the facts and circumstances touching the classification made". 22. In A.I.R.1986 S.C. 515 (Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India), the Supreme Court was considering the scope of interference with a notification which was in the nature of a piece of subordinate legislation. 22. In A.I.R.1986 S.C. 515 (Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India), the Supreme Court was considering the scope of interference with a notification which was in the nature of a piece of subordinate legislation. The notification that was considered was one issued under the Customs Act, withdrawing an exemption from duty on newspapers. The Supreme Court observed thus:- "In India arbitrariness is nor a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. In India any enquiry into the vires of delegated legislation must be confined to the grounds on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the ground that it is contrary to the statute under which it is made, to the ground that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or that it is so arbitrary that it could not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution". After observing thus, the Supreme Court said:- "We do not, therefore find much substance in the contention that the courts cannot at all exercise judicial control over the impugned notifications. In cases whore the power vested in. the Government is a power which has got to be exercised in the public interest as it happens to be here, the court may require the Government to exercise that power in a reasonable way in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution". 23. I feel that if all said and done the exercise of the power under S.25 of the Act by the Government is not immune from the overseeing power under Article 226 of the Constitution. That power under S.25 can be exercised in public interest, itself is a guarantee that the power will be exercised reasonably. If the action by the Government is not reasonable, it will easily slip into the ditch of arbitrariness. If the action is arbitrary, it is against the interdiction of Article 14 of the Constitution. I say so on the observations of the Supreme Court, which I have quoted above. 24. The incidental question that has to be considered is what is the exact content of saying 'acting reasonably'. Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) I.K.B. 223. "It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does not mean? 24. The incidental question that has to be considered is what is the exact content of saying 'acting reasonably'. Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) I.K.B. 223. "It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. What does not mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to the exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be clone. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. lie must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably". 25. This Wednesburv's Principle has been. approved by the Supreme Court in many cases - vide AIR 1986 S.C. 515 and (1989) 1 S.C.C. 187. In Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (1987) 2 SCC 720, Chinnappa Reddy, J. has observed that "price fixation being a legislative activity, it was "neither the function nor the forte of the court". We concern ourselves neither with policy nor with rates. But we do not totally deny ourselves the jurisdiction to enquire into the question in appropriate proceedings, whether relevant considerations have not gone in and irrelevant considerations kept out of the determination of the price". 26. I am referring to the above observation of the Supreme Court in order to clarify the position as to the limit of the examination of a subordinate legislation by the court, if subordinate legislation is legislative in character. This I do so, since in AIR 1986 S.C. 515, the Supreme Court has said that "a distinction must be made between delegation of a legislative function in the case of which the question of reasonableness cannot be enquired into and the investment by statute to exercise particular discretionary powers". 27. This I do so, since in AIR 1986 S.C. 515, the Supreme Court has said that "a distinction must be made between delegation of a legislative function in the case of which the question of reasonableness cannot be enquired into and the investment by statute to exercise particular discretionary powers". 27. In (1989) 4 SCC 187 (Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India) the Supreme Court said thus:- "An act is ultra vires either because the authority has acted in excess of its power in the narrow sense, or because it has abused its power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness: see the principle stated by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All E.R.680)". 28. I may also refer to a decision reported in 1978 K.L.T. 342 (State of Kerala v. Vijayan). In he above decision, a Division Bench of this court held that "the act of granting exemption under S.25(1) is a legislative Act". Further the court held that such an act of exemption need not be by an order disclosing reasons. The court also observed that even if the act of granting exemption were not to be regarded as legislative, there is enough authority that the public interest underlying the exemption need not be expressly recited in the notification itself. It is enough if it is made to appear de hors the notification, as for instance, in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government. 29. In regard to the opinion to be formed. by the Government before issuing a notification, the Division Bench relied on the observation in AIR 1977 S.C.183 (Narayan v. State of Maharashtra), which reads thus:- "It is true that, in such cases, the formation of an opinion is a subjective matter, as held by this Court repeatedly with regard to situations in which administrative authorities have to form certain opinions before taking actions they are empowered to take. They arc expected to know better the difference between a right or wrong opinion than Courts could ordinarily on such matters. Nevertheless, that opinion has to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which Courts do impose". They arc expected to know better the difference between a right or wrong opinion than Courts could ordinarily on such matters. Nevertheless, that opinion has to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which Courts do impose". If the Government forms an opinion on incomplete and incorrect report of an officer, it is difficult for this Court to say that Government has acted on the formation of an opinion however subjective it may be. 31. When once the Government has exercised the power in public interest, the court may require the Government to exercise the power in a reasonable way and after forming an opinion as to the necessity for issuing the notification. Taking all the circumstances preceding the issue of notification Ext. P3,1 feel that the Government was not able to form a wholesome and sober minded opinion, since the Government was not fully aware of all the factual situation pertaining to the building in question, the litigation pending in civil court and orders passed by the court. In the counter affidavit by the Government, there is no statement that even if the Government were aware of the pendency of the case, the Government would have issued the same notification. 31. Counsel for the second respondent submitted that the petitioner is debarred from instituting a suit against the second respondent since at the time of institution of the suit being a member of the managing committee of the second respondent, he was holding the position of a trustee. The second respondent has not filed a counter affidavit in this Original Petition. The suit instituted by the petitioner now stands decreed and I am told that an appeal is pending before this Court. I see no merit in this contention. In these circumstances, I declare that the notification is invalid and I quash Ext. P3 notification, G.O. (MS) No. 34/84/PW dated 10-4-1984. Original Petition is allowed. No order as to costs.