Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This application is directed against the order dated 26-7-1990 passed by the District Judge, Singhbhum at Chaibassa in matrimonial Suit No.64 of 1988 whereby any whereunder the said learned court granted interim maintenance @ Rs.500/- per month and Rs.200/-per month as cost of proceeding to the opposite party. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass :- The plaintiff/petitioner filed an application for divorce in terms of section 13 (1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to and called for the sake of brevity as the said Act) as against the opposite party inter alia on the ground that she is guilty of desertion of the petitioner as also on the ground of cruelty and misbehaviour on her part. 3 In the said proceeding, the opposite-party filed a written statement on 27-3-1990 denying and disputing the allegations made in the said application. In the said proceeding the opposite party filed an application under Sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , is contained in (sic)application wherein inter alia it was alleged that she had been deserted by the petitioner in the year 1981 without making any provisions for her rnaintenanee. It was further alleged that the opposite party was provided with a provisional job by Kalyan Niketan A. I. W. C. on payment of gross salary of Rs.600/- (Net salary Rs.550/- per month), out of which she has to pay a sum of Rs.225/- towards house rent ; a sum of Rs.50/- to the private tutor of the child and Rs.25/- by way of school expenses. In the said application the opposite party further stated :- "that the petitioner is a permanent employee in TISCO Deptt. Structural Shop, Personal No.67707 gets Rs.2500/- per month working for whole month. " 4. The petitioner filed a rejoinder to the said application which is contained in Annexure-2 to the civil revision application wherein inter alia it was stated that the petitioner had all along been ready and willing to take the child to his own protection and look after his care and development. It was further alleged that it is difficult to believe that the opposite party is spending Rs.225/- per month towards house rent while getting rs.550/- per month as salary. It was further alleged that it is difficult to believe that the opposite party is spending Rs.225/- per month towards house rent while getting rs.550/- per month as salary. It was further alleged that the opposite party had all along been living at quarter No.42 Cross road No.13, sidhgora and the petitioner was not aware as to under what circumstances, the opposite party had vacated the said house and is living in a rented house. 5. In reply to paragraph 10 of the application filed by the opposite party, the petitioner stated thus :- "that the statements occurring in paragraph 10 of the petition are denied. The basic salary of the petitioner is Rs.1107.00. The earning of the petitioner as shown in the said paragraph is highly inflated. The respondent is well aware that the petitioner wants to undertake a course of Ph. D. in Economics and his research work in this connection, frequently takes him to ranchi and Calcutta etc. The petitioner is, therefore, rarely able to attend to his duties in the TISCO Ltd. , for the whole month and the average monthly income of the petitioner has never travelled beyond Rs.1250/- per month approximately. The father of the petitioner is aged and infirm and is wholly dependant on the (sic) to his pre-occupation in his academical activities the petitioner has to remain satisfied with a low earning from bis salary, and the money which comes to hands of the petitioner per month is hardly sufficient for his own needs. " 6. Before the learned court below apart from the petition and rejoinder filed by the parties aforementioned, the pay sheet of the petitioner was filed, from a perusal whereof it appears that in the month of february, 1990, the petitioder worked for about 15 days and received a sum of Rs.1350/- by way of emoluments. 7. Mr. S. K. Chattopadhyay, learrned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the opposite party is not living with him since 1981. In the year 1983, a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of ciriminal Procedure was initiated as against him and in the year 1988, the application for divorce was filed. Learned counsel submitted that from 1981 to 1986, opposite party did not have any necessity of obtaining maintenance from the petitioner and only in the said year he filed an application under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel submitted that from 1981 to 1986, opposite party did not have any necessity of obtaining maintenance from the petitioner and only in the said year he filed an application under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned couusel further submitted that the aforementioned application under Sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed on 6.2.1989. It was further submitted that an application for custody of child was filed on 23.11.1989 and although at an earlier stage, the opposite party contended that the child had been residing at Jhargram, she in her reply, which was filed on 15.12.1989, alleged that the said child had been residing with her. Learned counsel submitted that in this case, the learned court below acted illegally and without jurisdiction in granting the maintenance for the child which falls outside the scope of Sec.24 of the Act. Learned counsel in this connection relied upon Bankim Chandra Roy V/s. Smt. Anjali roy, AIR 1972 Patna : (1971 PLJR 309) and in AIR 1981 J and K 5 (Puran chand V/s. Mst. Kamla Devi ). Learned counsel further submitted that the learned court below acted illegally in arriving at a finding that the petitioner shall be earning rs.3000/- if he attends to his duties without taking into consideration the statements made by him to the effect that in relation to his research work, he is often required to visit Calcutta and Ranchi and thus he is not in a position to attend to his duties regularly which would be evident from the pay-sheet (Annexure C to the counter-affidavit)Learned counsel further submitted that even the learned court below has found that the petitioner had been getting a sum of Rs.1207/- per month. 8. It was further submitted that in the rejoinder filed by the petitioner to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party in this civil revision application, a subsequent event has been brought to the notice of the court to the effect that the petitioner hed met with an accident and he was required to undergo physiotherapy and because of that also he has not been able to attend his duties regularly. Learned counsel submitted that as income of the husband is a relevant factor, the learned court below has committed an illegality is not taking the same into consideration. Learned counsel submitted that as income of the husband is a relevant factor, the learned court below has committed an illegality is not taking the same into consideration. Learned counsel in this connection has referred to Rishi Dev Anand V/s. Smt. Devender Kaur reported in AIR 1985 Delhi 40. 9. Mr. Chattopadhyay next contended that as an employee of TISCO, the child can be admitted in any educational Institution run by the said company and in that event, no tuition fee etc. would be payable. Learned counsel further submitted that in any event as the opposite party herself does not want to live with the petitioner, which would be evident from the fact that even, the pendente lite proceeding ended in a failure, she must be held to be not entitled to any maintenance. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of Rajasthan High court in Mukhan Kumar and others V/s. Ajeetchand reported in AIR 1958 Rajasthan 322. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel that the learned court below committed an illegality in granting expenses for litigation at the rate of Rs.200/- per month. 10. Mr. N. K. Prasad learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that an application for alimoni pendente lite and the expenses of litigation could be filed by the opposite party only upon filing of an application for divorce by the petitioner under Sec.10 of the hindu Marriage Act. Learned counsel submitted that the question as to how the opposite party was maintaining herself before filing of an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or an application under Sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is wholly irrelevant. 11. Learned counsel further submitted that the relevant considerations for grant of maintenace in favour of a destitute wife is, making provision of her and the childs food, clothing shelter, education of the child and health. According to the learned counsel, the opposite party even in her application under Sec.24 of the Act clearly stated that she could obtain a job for peltry sum of Rs.550/- per month and in view of the fact that she has to pay house rent of about 225/- per month, it cannot be said that her income is sufficient to maintain herself and the child. 12. 12. According to the learned counsel, the court in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Sec.24 of the Act may also grant maintenance for the child in view of the fact that an application for custody of the child is pending consideration. Learned counsel submitted that such an application is maintainable under Sec.26 of the Act. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon the following decisions :- AIR 1983 Orissa 74 (Mahendra Kumar Mishra V/s. Smt. Snehalata ). AIR 1987 Calcutta 230 (Manoj Kumar Jaiswal V/s. Sm. Lita Jaiswal ). AIR 1976 Karnataka 215 (Dr. D. Thimmappa V/s. R. Nagaveni ). AIR 1988 J and K 22 (Gulab Chand V/s. Sampati Debi ). AIR 1990 P and H 168 (Smt. Kamlesh Arora V/s. Jugal Kishore Arora ). AIR 1990 HP 86 (Mrs. Rajni Abrol V/s. Adarsh Abrol ). 13 Learned counsel further submitted that from a perusal of the wage-sheet of the petitioner as contained in Annexure C to the counter-affidavit, it would be evident that for working for about 15 days, he had been getting a salary of Rs.1350/-per month and, thus, if he attends to his duties for the whole month, he would be getting a net salary of rs.2700/-per month and in that view of the matter, the interim maintenance granted by the learned court below to the extent of Rs.700/- per month cannot be said to be excessive keeping in view the fact that not only the opposite party has to bring up the child, but also the fact that she has to go to Chaibassa for attending to her case regularly from jamshedpur. 14. It was further submitted that in this view of the matter, this court should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 15. 14. It was further submitted that in this view of the matter, this court should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 15. Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as follows :- "maintenance, pendente lite and expenses of proceedings : where in any proceedings under this Act it appears to the Court that either the wife or the hasband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her case or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the Court to be reasonable," 16. From a perusal of the aforementioned provision, it would appear that the object and purport of the said provision is to protect any of the parties who does not have sufficient income to maintain himself/herself during the pendency of a proceeding in a case where the other spouse is able to pay the requisite maintenance and litigation expenses. The word maintenance means any amount which may be sufficient for subsistence and reasonable living of the party concerned. Sec.24 of the Act ex-faice provides for grant of pendente lite maintenance either to the husband or to the wife. Reference in this connection may be made to Akasam Chinna Babu V/s. Akasam Parbati and another, reported in AIR 1967 Orissa 163 ; AIR 1981 J and K 5 ; Puran Chand V/s. Mst. Kamla Devi ). AIR 1972 Patna 80 : 1971 PLJR 309. (Bankim Chandra Roy V/s. Smt.)Anjali Roy ). 17. In the aforementioned cases, it has categorically been held that grant of monthly allowance not only for the support of the respondent but also for the support of the children is contrary to law and an order to that effect must be held to have been made by committing an illegality in exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court under Sec.24 of the Act. Hawever, in those cases, attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to Sec.26 of the Act which reads as follows :- "26. Hawever, in those cases, attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to Sec.26 of the Act which reads as follows :- "26. Custody of Children.-In any proceeding under this Act, the court may from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes wherever possible, and may after the decree, upon application by petition with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining such decree were still pending, and the court may also from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and provisions previously made. " 18. Section 26 of the said Act confers upon the court a wide dower to make such orders as it may deem fit and proper taking into consideration the welfare of the minor which includes maintenance of the child. Maintenance pendente lite for the children in terms of the aforementioned provision includes, in all cases, provision for fooding, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment, but its scope may be enlarged under special circumstances to include within its ambit any other contingency. Where, thus, in an application under Sec.24 of the Act, the wife prays for maintenance pendente lite for the children also, I do not see any reason as to why the court cannot exercise its power both under section 24 and Sec.26 of the Act together so as to dispose of the same by one order. In the instant case, evidently the petitioner had filed an application for the custody of the children. 19. It is now well known that if a court has a power to pass an order, the same shall not be invalidated only by reason of the fact that a wrong provision of law had been mentioned. It is also well settled that if there are two sources of power and if it is found that the court exercised power under one provision of law, which was not available the order would not be invalidated as the source of the power can be found out in the other provision. 20. It is also well settled that if there are two sources of power and if it is found that the court exercised power under one provision of law, which was not available the order would not be invalidated as the source of the power can be found out in the other provision. 20. In Smt. Pratibha Singh and another V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1988 PLJR 646, it has been held ;- "in this connection, it may also be useful to notice another well settled principles of law that where there are two sources of power vested in an authority to frame rules or issue instructions, even if it be found that in certain circumstances one source of power was not available at the time of framing such rule or issuing such direction ; such action does not become invalid if it is found that there had been another valid source of power available to the maker of the rule or the statutory instruction for the said purpose. It is also well settled that wrong labelling of a statutory provision in the notification or circular as a source of power to issue the same is wholly immaterial, if in fact there exists a power referable to such action. Apart from Basistha Narain choudharys case (supra), reference in this connection may be made to P. Balakotaiah V/s. Union of India and others ( AIR 1958 SC 232 ). In Afzal Ullah V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, ( AIR 1964 SC 264 ), the Supreme Court held as follows :- It is true that the preamble to the bye-laws refers to clauses A (a), (b) and (c) and J (d) of Sec.298 and these clauses undoubtedly are inapplicable ; but once it is shown that the impugned bye-laws are within the competence, of the Municipality, the fact that the preamble to the bye-laws mentions Clauses which are not relevant, would not affect the validity of the bye-laws. The validity of the bye-laws must be tested by referrence to the question as to whether the Board had the power to make these bye-laws. If the power is otherwise established, the fact that the source of the power has been incorrectly or in accurately indicated in the preamble to the bye-laws, would not make the bye-laws invalid. The validity of the bye-laws must be tested by referrence to the question as to whether the Board had the power to make these bye-laws. If the power is otherwise established, the fact that the source of the power has been incorrectly or in accurately indicated in the preamble to the bye-laws, would not make the bye-laws invalid. In J. K. Steel Ltd V/s. Union of India and others, ( AIR 1970 SC 1173 )in paragraph 45 at page 1188, it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows :-"there is no dispute that the officer who made the demand was competent to make demands both under Rule 9 (2) as well. as under Rule 10. If the exercise of a power can be traced to a legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power does not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. This is a well settled proposition of law. " In N. B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and others V/s. The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1971 sc 2039 ) in paragraph 14 it has been held as follows :- "dr. Syed Mohammad is, no doubt, well founded in his contention that if the appellants have power to issue notice either under Rule 10-A or Rule 9 (2), the fact that the notice refers specifically to a particular rule, which may not be applicable, will not make the notice invalid on that ground. " 21. Both the provisions of Sections 24 and 26 of the said Act are beneficient in nature. Such a power is exercised by the Court not only out of compassion but also by way of judicial duty so that an indigent spouse may not suffer at the instance of the affluent spouse. A parent has a legal as well as moral duty to maintain his or her child. When a parent fails to discharge his duty, the court has a wide jurisdiction to pass such an. order by directing either of the parents to provide such maintenance to the child which would be necessary for his maintenance as also for his welfare. The court, whether exercising its power under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 keeps the welfare of the child uppermost in his mind. order by directing either of the parents to provide such maintenance to the child which would be necessary for his maintenance as also for his welfare. The court, whether exercising its power under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 keeps the welfare of the child uppermost in his mind. The impugned order passed by the learned court below granting maintenance to the respondent as also to the child must be viewed from that angle. 22. In Mahendra Kumar V/s. Smt. Snehalata Kar reported in AIR 1983 orissa 74, the Orissa High Court took into consideration its earlier decision in AIR 1967 Orissa 163 (supra) as also the decision of this Court in bankim Chandra Roys case (supra) and held :- "being of the view that provisions contained in Sections 24 and 26 are beneficial provisions and literal interpretation would be unsound, I hold that on an application claiming maintenance for the husband or the wife, as the case may be, and for the child, maintenance can be granted to the child howsoever labelled the petition may be. The substance matters, not the form. If there be authority under the provisions, there is end of the matter. The next question is the effect of the Division Bench decision of this court in Akasams case (AIR 1967 Orissa 163 ). Unfortunately, the attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to the provisions contained in Sec.26 of the Act.1 have no doubt in my mind that the Bench would not have refused maintenance to the child if the provisions contained in Sec.26 of the Act had been brouought to its notice. If the application was labelled as one under Sec.24, the present to (sic) the necessary averments claiming maintenance for the child, the same can be treated as one under Sections 24 and 26 of the Act. " 23. In Manoj Kumar Jaiswal V/s. Smt. Lila Jaiswal, reported in AIR 1987 Calcutta 230, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court again dissented from the judgment of the Orissa High Court in Akasam Chinna babu V/s. Akasam Parbati (supra) and Bankim Chandra Roys case (supra)and held ;- 4. " 23. In Manoj Kumar Jaiswal V/s. Smt. Lila Jaiswal, reported in AIR 1987 Calcutta 230, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court again dissented from the judgment of the Orissa High Court in Akasam Chinna babu V/s. Akasam Parbati (supra) and Bankim Chandra Roys case (supra)and held ;- 4. It is true that some High Courts have taken the view that while allowing an application under Sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage act, the Court has no power to grant pendente lite maintenance for the minor children and reference in this connection may be made, among others, to a Division Bench decision of the Orissa high Court in Akasam Chinna V/s. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 orissa 163 at page 164 and to a single Judge decision of the patna High Court in Bankim Chandra V/s. Anjali Roy, AIR 1972 patna 80 at page 81. We have examined those decisions and we have felt, and this we say with great respect that these decisions have adopted a rather technical and literal approach and the effect and impact of Sections 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, have not at all been considered in these decisions. The single judge decision of the Karnataka High Court in D. Timmappa V/s. N. Nagveni, AIR 1976 Kant 215 is, however, in full accord with our view where it has been held (at 217) that when the wife makes an application under Sec.24 of the Act to the court for the grant of interim maintenance for the children also the Court can grant the relief to the children also in exercise of its power under Sec.26 wherever it considers it to be iust and proper. The single Judge decision of the rajasthan High Court in Baboolal V/s. Prem Lata, AIR 1974 Raj 93 is also to the same effect where it has been held (at 96) that if a case is made out to that effect, interim maintenance can be granted to the minor children! while considering an application under Sec.24 by the wife even in the absence of separate application under Sec.26 of the Act. We are, therefore of the view that in granting maintenance to the minor daughter, while disposing of and allowing the application under Section 24 by the wife, the learned Judge has not made any illegal assumption or illegal exercise of jurisdiction to warrant our intervention in revision. " 24. We are, therefore of the view that in granting maintenance to the minor daughter, while disposing of and allowing the application under Section 24 by the wife, the learned Judge has not made any illegal assumption or illegal exercise of jurisdiction to warrant our intervention in revision. " 24. In Gulab Chand V/s. Sampati Devi reported in AIR 1988 Jammu and kasmir 22, the Jammu and Kasmir High Court distinguished its earlier decision in Puran Chand V/s. Mst. Kamla Devi, AIR 1981 J and K 5 and in rakesh Chandok V/s. Smt. Vinod, AIR 1982 J and K 95 and followed the decision of Calcutta High Court aforementioned as also the decision of the karnatak High Court in Dr. D. Thimnappa V/s. V. R. Nagaberi, reported in air 1976 Karnataka 215 and in Smt. Subhasini V/s. B. R. Umakantha, reported in AIR 1981 Karnataka 215 and other decisions and held that the court should combine an application under Sections 24 and 26 of the hindu Marriage Act and grant maintenance not only to the wife but also to the child. 25. In Smt. Kamlesh Arora V/s. Jugal Kishore Arora, reported in 1990 punjab and Haryana 168, a learned Single Judge of the said Court considerd various earlier decision and followed an earlier Division Bench decision of the said Court in Smt. Usha V/s. Sudhir, 1975 Hindu Law Reports page 1 wherein it was held :- "there is no doubt that under Sec.24 of the Act the child cannot claim maintenance and it is only either of the two spouses who can make a claim. At the same time it is clear that a claim can be made for maintenance of a child during a proceeding under the Act and the Court can in exercise of powers vested in it by Sec.26 of the Act pass such interim orders in anv proceeding under the Act, from time to time, as it may deem just and proper with respect to the maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes wherever possible. " 26. In Mr. " 26. In Mr. Rajni Abrol V/s. Adarsh Abrol, reported in AIR 1990 Himachal Pradesh 86, chief Justice N. M. Kasliwal, as he then was again took into consideration the earlier decisions of various High Courts as referred to hereinafter and held ;- "i see no force in the technical objection that no formal application was filed under Sec.26 of the Act inasmuch as the mere mention of a particular section on an application is of no consequence and the application filed under Sec.24 could have been considered under Sec.26 also. " 27. It may, however, be mentioned that in Kartarchand Dalliram jain V/s. Smt. Taravati Kartarchand Jain, reported in AIR 1982 Bombay 15 also it was held as follows: - "now, it may be pointed out that on a reading of Sec.24 it becomes evident that section makes provision for granting maintenance pendente lite to a party who has no independent income sufficient for his or her support. This section does not provide for granting maintenance for the children. Sec.26 of the said Act provided for interim orders from time to time as also for making provision in the decree with regard to custody, maintenance arid education of minor children consistently with their wishes. Sec.26, therefore, empowered the Court to provide for the maintenance of minor children. It provided for maintenance both pendente lite as also after the passing of the decree. " 28. Question which now arises for consideration is as to whether the decision of this Court in Bankim Chandra Roys case (supra) is binding on me ? there is no doubt that a co-ordinate Bench is bound by judgment of another co-ordinate Branch of the same Court. But as noticed in Bankim chandra Roys case, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to section 26 of the Act nor the submissions which have been made before me were made in the said case. 29. It is well known that a judgment which is rendered without considering the statutory provisions passes sub-silentio. It is also well known that a decision on the question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent. Reference in this connection may be made to A. R. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak, reported in 1988 Vol.2 SCC 602 ; in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, reported in 1989 Vol.1 SCC 101 ; in Union of Indian. Reference in this connection may be made to A. R. Antulay V/s. R. S. Nayak, reported in 1988 Vol.2 SCC 602 ; in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, reported in 1989 Vol.1 SCC 101 ; in Union of Indian. Raghubir Singh reported in 1989 Vol.2 SCC 754 ; M/s. Goodyear India ltd. V/s. State of Haryana, reported in 1990 Vol.2 SCC 72 at page 96 which have been followed by me in a recent Full Bench decision in Md. Zainul ansari V/s. Md. Khalil, reported in 1990 Bihar Law Times 371-1990 Vol.2 pljr 378. It, therefore, must be held that the decision of this Court in Bankim chandra Roys case (supra) is not a binding precedent and must be held to have been passed sub-silentio. 30. In the result, it must be held that the learned court below has no committed any illegality in granting maintenance to the child of the parties. 31. Coming now to the merits of the case, there cannot be any doubt that in the matter of grant of pendente lite maintenance, the court may consider the conduct of the parties as also other relevant factors. 32. In this case, admittedly, the respondent has been getting a sum of Rs.550/- per month as salary. According to her, she has to pay house. rent for occupation of a rented premises Rs.225/- per month and further she has to maintain certain expenditure towards the education of the child. It is also evident that the petitioner gets about Rs.1350/- per month for attending his duties for about 15 days a month. 33. A matter under Sections 24 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act is normally decided on affidavits. It has not been denied that the petitioner has been doing research work and for that purpose he has to remain out of Jamshedpur. The petitioner has categorically stated on oath and no material has been brought before the court below to disbelieve the said statement that he is paid only salary for such period during which he is able to attend to his duties. In such a situation, in my opinion, the learned court below did not exercise its jurisdiction correctly in holding that the petitioner would be receiving an emoluments of about Rs.2700/-per month if he works for 30 days. In such a situation, in my opinion, the learned court below did not exercise its jurisdiction correctly in holding that the petitioner would be receiving an emoluments of about Rs.2700/-per month if he works for 30 days. As noticed hereinbefore, even the respondent in her application under Sec.24 of the Hindu Marriage Act stated that the petitioner would be earning a sum of Rs.3000/- if he works for 30 days. 34. In Rishi Dev Anand V/s. Devinder Kaur, reported in AIR 1985 delhi 40, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court has held that when a husband remained on medical leave withbut pay for certain period, the order directing him to pay maintenance for the period when he was ill and without salary was improper. I am in respectfully agreement with the aforementioned view. 35. In paragraph 25 of the rejoinder to the counter-affidavit, the petitioner has stated as follows :- "that with regard to the statements made in paragraph 16 the affidavit under reply, it is stated and submitted that those are false and as such denied. The petitioner states on oath that his basic rate is Rs.2190/- per month in February, 1990 but as the petitioner has been doing his Ph. D. in economics, he has obtained an approval from the authorities of the TISCO on the condition that as the petitioner has no earned leave at present he will get the leave without pay. " 36. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, interest of justice will be sub-served if the petitioner is directed to pay a sum of Rs.400/- per month to the respondent by way of her maintenance and that of the child. Besides the aforementioned amount, the petitioner shall pay a further sum of Rs.3000/- to the respondent towards litigation expenses. 37. Before parting with the case, it may be mentioned that I have not taken into consideration the purported subsequent event sought to be brought to my notice by the petitioner to the effect that he has met with an accident inasmuch as he categorically stated that he had still been working. 38. 37. Before parting with the case, it may be mentioned that I have not taken into consideration the purported subsequent event sought to be brought to my notice by the petitioner to the effect that he has met with an accident inasmuch as he categorically stated that he had still been working. 38. I am also of the opinion that at this stage it was not necessary to take into consideration the conduct of the opposite party in refusing to resolve the dispute between the parties at this stage in view assertions of the petitionsrs in the application for divorce as also in view of the fact that before the court below, recourse to conciliatory measure will have to be taken by the court below. 39. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is also desirable that the suit itself be heard and disposed of at an early date. The learned court below shall make endeavour to dispose of the suit within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, it is made clear that in the event the suit is not decided within a period of two months and if and when the petitioner is able to do his duties throughout the month, it would be open to the respondent to file an application for enhancement of maintenance and necessary orders in this regard shall be passed by the court below. The amount which has been deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court on 26-11-1990 and 20-2-1990 shall be adjusted from the arrears of the amount which has to be paid in terms of the direction of the learned court below as modified by this order. 40. In the result, this application is allowed in part and subject to the aforementioned observations and directions. In the facts and circumstaces of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Let the records of the court below be sent down forthwith. Civil revision partly allowed.