OM PRAKASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a first appeal from order for setting aside the order dated 24. 7. 1980 passed by the commissioner, Workmens Compensation, Aligarh (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner)rejecting the claim of the appellant under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. (briefly the act, 1923) ( 2 ) ADMITTED facts are that on 30. 12. 1976 when the appellant was under employment of the respondent-Company he met with an accident, that at the time of the accident he was operating seamer machine being used for seaming Ghee containers and that on the aforesaid date while he was working in Ghee packing department he lost one of his fingers of his right hand, when the accident occurred. For such injury, the appellant claimed Rs. 2,723/- in lump sum towards compensation by application dated 31. 7. 1978 before the Commissioner. The latter recorded the statement of the appellant and of the witnesses produced by the Management and then rejected the claim of the appellant by the impugned order dated 24. 7. 1980. ( 3 ) THE Management set up its case before the Commissioner that the appellant was put on duly for filling the Ghee containers and that it was not his duty to operate the Seamer machine, to seam the Ghee containers; that one Shri Jaivir Singh, who was trained to operate the Seamer machine, was put on duty to operate that Seamer machine; that the accident occurred in the first shift in the night on 30. 12. 1976; that Sri Jaivir Singh at about 3. 25 a. m. had gone to the urinal having put off the machine; that he warned all the workmen working around him not to operate the said machine during his absence; that he also informed the Supervisor, namely, Sri Harish babu, of his temporary absence; that during his absence the appellant unauthorisedly and negligently operated the Seamer machine and got himself injured; that the appellant exposed himself to that important risk in violation of the instructions of Sri Jaivir Singh, therefore, the case falls within the exception under Section 3 (1) proviso (b) (ii) of the Act, 1923 and that the appellant is not entitled to any compensation. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the case of the appellant is that he was put on duty on Seamer machine, which was defective; that he and his co-employees reported that fact to the Management orally and in writing; that the Management failed to pay any heed to their report and that the appellant sustained the injury when he was working on Seamer machine. ( 5 ) THE Commissioner accepted the version of the Management that the appellant wilfully disobeyed the instructions of the co-workman not to operate the Seamer machine during his absence and, therefore, no compensation was payable to the appellant for the injury, which he suffered on account of wilful disobedience. ( 6 ) THE Commissioner held in the impugned order that the statement of the appellant could not be read in evidence, because the latter added a work nahi in Hindi in the certificate given at the end of his statement so as to read that the said statement was not signed by him after reading and understanding the purports thereof. It appears that the Commissioner excluded the statement of the appellant from the evidence on a queer ground. Assuming that the appellant added the word nahi in the certificate, that by itself would not entitle the Commissioner to exclude the appellants statement from the evidence. If the appellant made unwarranted insertion in the certificate, which was signed by him, it was the duly of the Commissioner to ascertain whether the statement was duly read over to the appellant and whether he understood the statement. If the commissioner was satisfied that the statement was duly read over to the appellant and the latter fully understood the whole statement, then the former should not have relied on the insertion made by the appellant in the certificate. Instead of excluding the statement of the appellant on that ground from the evidence, the Commissioner should have ignored the insertion if he was satisfied that the insertion was contrary to the factual position and the appellants statement should have been read in evidence along with other evidence. ( 7 ) THEN the question is whether the Commissioner rightly concluded that on the facts and circumstances, the case falls within the exception carved lout by provisio (b) (ii) to Section 3 (1)of the Act, 1923. ( 7 ) THEN the question is whether the Commissioner rightly concluded that on the facts and circumstances, the case falls within the exception carved lout by provisio (b) (ii) to Section 3 (1)of the Act, 1923. Before answering this question, it will be advantageous to have a harried look on the scope and true interpretation of Section 3 (1) of the Act 1923, which is relevant in this case. Section 3 (1), in so far as relevant, is produced below: "3 (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable: (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to: (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workman, or ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in Makhinon Mackanzie and Co. Private Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammad issak 1969 (19) FLR 281 (SC) interpreted Section 3 (1) thus: "to come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in course of employment. The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do; and which is incidental to it". The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do; and which is incidental to it". The words "arising out of employment" arc understood to mean that "during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered. " in other words, there must be casual relationship between the accident and the employment. . . . . . . . To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. . . " ( 9 ) IN the case on hand the appellant suffered injury when he was in the employment of the respondent. If the appellant were not in the employment of the respondent, then he would not have lost his finger at the given time. Casual relationship of the employment and the accident is clearly established and, therefore, it cannot be said that the injury did not arise in the course of employment or out of the employment. It is due to this employment that the appellant happened within the factory and exposed himself to the risk inherent in the factory operation. ( 10 ) SECTION 3 of the Act, 1923, is modelled on the lines of the provisions contained in the corresponding English Act and English decisions furnish a due that progressive and liberal approach are useful in understanding and applying this section. In the leading case Fenton v. Thorby and Co. Ltd. (1903) AC 443 at pages 448 and 449, Lord Machnaughten said that the word "accident" should be understood in the popular and ordinary sense "as denoting an unlocked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. ( 11 ) THE accident, the appellant suffered from, cannot be said to be designed one. The appellant suffered injury when he was on duty and no inference can be drawn that he caused the accident to be done deliberately for taking any advantage or benefit. Therefore, the accident dated 30. 12. ( 11 ) THE accident, the appellant suffered from, cannot be said to be designed one. The appellant suffered injury when he was on duty and no inference can be drawn that he caused the accident to be done deliberately for taking any advantage or benefit. Therefore, the accident dated 30. 12. 1976 not being a result of designed act on the part of the appellant is fully covered by section 3 (1) of the Act, 1923. ( 12 ) THE stand taken by the Management is that the appellant was deployed only for filling the ghee containers and that it was not his duty to seam them by Seamer machine. It is averred that the appellant in wilful disobedience ignored the instructions of Jaivir Singh, whose duty was to operate the Seamer machine that the seamer machine put off by him when he went to urinal at 3. 25 a. m. in the night of 30th December, 1976, should not be operated by any one else, and operated the Seamer machine. It is stated by Jaivir Singh that he reported his temporary absence to the Supervisor, namely, Harish Babu who was then on duty. If the Seamer machine was not to be operated by anyone except Jaivir Singh, then it was the duty of the Supervisor, whose presence at the site can be reasonably inferred, to prevent the appellant from operating the said machine in the absence of Jaivir Singh. There is no evidence that Harish Babu (Supervisor) ever asked the appellant not to operate the machine. On these facts, it cannot be said that the appellant did not suffer injury in the course of employment or out of the employment within the meaning of Section 3 (1) of the Act, 1923. ( 13 ) THEN comes the question as to what is the correct interpretation of the word "order" occurring in provisio (b) (ii) to Section 3 (i) and whether the instructions, if any given by Jaivir singh to the co-workers, can amount to "order" within the meaning of proviso (b) (ii)? The proviso so far as relevant says that the employer shall not be liable in respect of any injury claused by an accident which is directly attributable to the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing safety of workmen. The proviso so far as relevant says that the employer shall not be liable in respect of any injury claused by an accident which is directly attributable to the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing safety of workmen. There is no case that any order was passed by the Management prohibiting the appellant and his co- workmen, except Jaivir Singh, to operate Seamer Machine. It is pleaded that jaivir Singh, when he was going to urinal, asked the workmen working in the vicinity, not to operate the machine, which he had switched off. Can the disobedience of Jaivir Singhs instructions amount to an order within the meaning of provisio (b) (ii)? ( 14 ) ORDER can either be issued in exercise of statutory powers by a statutory authority or by the management or by any other authority administratively. There is no indication that any order was passed by the Management or under a statute prohibiting employees like the appellantant from operating Seamer machine. Mere disobedience to the instructions of a co-employee does not mean disobedience of an order and that does not fall within the exception carved out by proviso (b) (ii ). ( 15 ) IT is not disobedience but wilful disobedience which comes within proviso (b) (ii ). Disobedience may be the result of forgetfulness or the result of impulse of the moment. Such would not be sufficient as the statute exempts the employer from liability only when the disobedience is wilful, that is, deliberate and intended Bhut Nath Dal Mills v. Tirat Mistry AIR 1949 Cal. 295. A man does a thing wilfully when he does it intentionally, because he expects some benefits to himself either some convenience or any easy way of doing a piece of work and so forth. Mere negligence of the worker cannot be regarded as wilful disobedience by the workman to an order expressly given. The record docs not show that the appellant made an attempt to Seam containers on Seamer machine with a view to deriving any benefit to himself. So long as an employee does something to the benefit of the employer, without violating the order or rule as envisaged by proviso (b) (ii), it may be held that the workman has acted in the course of employment and out of the employment. So long as an employee does something to the benefit of the employer, without violating the order or rule as envisaged by proviso (b) (ii), it may be held that the workman has acted in the course of employment and out of the employment. Contributory negligence on the part of the employee does not exonerate the employer from liability to compensate the employee if the accident could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care and deligence. (See bhuranoya Coal Co. Ltd. v. Schabian Mian and Anr.) AIR 1956 Patna 299. In the instant case there is no evidence that there was any order or rule to the effect that only trained employees would operate Seamer machine and that employees working on co-ordinate jobs for attending a sequential or incidental job in the Ghee packing department were prohibited from operating the seamer machine. After a container is filled then the next stage is to seam it. There is no evidence that there was complete dichotomy between the two activities of filling and seaming the containers and that the employees deputed for filling containers were precluded from seaming those containers. Taking the liberal view, which should be taken, for the interpretation of Section 3, I hold that there was no wilful disobedience on the part of the appellant and the Commissioner wrongly held that the case fell within the proviso (b) (ii) to Section 3 (1) of the Act. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons, I hold that the claim of the appellant for compensation was wrongly 5 rejected by the Commissioner. The appellant having suffered injury while he was on duty, which he would not have otherwise suffered, is entitled to compensation. ( 17 ) THE appeal, therefore succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order dated 24. 7. 1980 passed by the Commissioner is set aside and the application for compensation is allowed. .