JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - Cattle fairs, a common feature in rural life, can sometimes result in interminable rivalry, and, not infrequently also in the breakdown of law and order. And when the cattle fairs are held by the rivals on the same dates, the problem becomes even more acute. 2. The present petition furnishes a classic example of this malaise. It is second in the series of litigation's that have been going on between the petitioner on the one hand and the fourth respondent on the other, both claim-outing to possess the right to hold cattle fair over their respective lands in the village in question, and on the same dates. 3. The immediate cause which gave rise to this petition presented in 1988 was an order passed by the District Magistrate, Etah on 27-9-1988 rejecting once again the application filed by the petitioner for permission to hold cattle fair in the concerned village over the land belonging to him on certain dates on the ground that considerable tension was prevailing between the two rivals as a consequence of which there is an apprehension of the breach of peace in the area. 4. The order has been assailed by the petitioner on a variety of grounds, the chief among which is that the District Magistrate has not had regard to the directions issued by this court by its judgment and order dated 3-10-1986 pertaining to the same matter upon an earlier petition filed by the petitioner. It was also urged by the learned counsel in the alternative that as the petitioner has been holding the cattle fair since long before the fourth respondent entered the arena it is the latter who should have been restrained from holding the cattle fair and not the petitioner. 5. Shortly, the petitioner's case is that be has been holding the cattle fair over his agricultural plots with the permission of the authorities since 1972 without any let or hindrance. In 1978, however, Lakhan Singh, the late husband of the fourth respondent was also granted permission on hold cattle fair over his land but on different dates, on 3-7-1982. 5. Shortly, the petitioner's case is that be has been holding the cattle fair over his agricultural plots with the permission of the authorities since 1972 without any let or hindrance. In 1978, however, Lakhan Singh, the late husband of the fourth respondent was also granted permission on hold cattle fair over his land but on different dates, on 3-7-1982. the District Magistrate passed an order on the application of the fourth respondent, the widow of Lakhan Singh changing the dates of the fair held by her subject to the condition that the same shall be withdrawn in case there was a law and order problem. The dates allotted by this order to the fourth respondent, however, clashed with those stated to have been allocated for the fair of the petitioners giving rise to some disputes and tension as a result of which an order was passed by the Additional District Magistrate on 15-10-1984 asking him not to hold the fair in view of the apprehension of breach of peace. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in 1982 and 1984, the petitioner approached this court by way of a petition (No. 13848 of 1985) which was eventually disposed of with certain observations by the judgment and order dated 3-10-1986. The observations by the Bench with respect to the impugned orders of 1982 and 1984 are pertinent and important for our purpose. Their Lordships said : "Having considered the two orders which have been impugned, this court feels that the orders themselves have outlived their utility with the passage of time. Any apprehension of breach of peace, indeed, if there was any, cannot exist after four years since the first order was passed and after two years since the second order was passed. Thus, the two orders which have been impugned, ceased to have any meaning to day." 7. It is apparent that the apprehension of breach of the peace to which the District Magistrate had given expression while relevant to the year or years in question cannot have any permanent application. The learned Judges, with respect were therefore, right in concluding that the orders assailed before them had ceased to be of any relevance. 8. It is apparent that the apprehension of breach of the peace to which the District Magistrate had given expression while relevant to the year or years in question cannot have any permanent application. The learned Judges, with respect were therefore, right in concluding that the orders assailed before them had ceased to be of any relevance. 8. As regards the claim of the petitioner that he had been holding cattle fair for the last 14 years and that he should, therefore, be allowed to continue to do so in further without any interference, the Bench declined to go into that controversy and observed that such an issue should more appropriately be left to be determined by the District Magistrate. 9. We respectfully agree with the above approach. These are hardly the proceedings in which the issue whether the petitioner has been holding the cattle fair for a longer period than the fourth respondent or her predecessor can be effectively adjudicated. The issue necessarily involves determination of disputed question of fact finding forum. 10. The learned Judges also referred to certain observations made by the Supreme Court in regard to the regulation of cattle markets which are held over private lands and the nature and degree of control the may be exercised by the licensing authority for the purpose of preventing any breach of the peace. Attention of the District Magistrate was also drawn to the recitals made in the Government Order touching the subject. 11. With these observations the case was remitted to the District Magistrate for appropriate orders. Upon remand, both the parties filed numerous affidavits before the District Magistrate in support of their respective claims. In addition, the District Magistrate also called for and obtained a report from the Superintendent of Police, Etah. After referring to the affidavits filed in support of the respective parties, and the report of the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate rejected the petitioner's application for permission by the order dated 27-9-1988 which is the subject of challenge in this petition. 12. After referring to the affidavits filed in support of the respective parties, and the report of the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate rejected the petitioner's application for permission by the order dated 27-9-1988 which is the subject of challenge in this petition. 12. The District Magistrate has observed that from a perusal of the affidavits and the report of the Superintendent of Police, it appears that the dispute between the parties as regards the right to hold cattle fairs on the dates allocated to them for that purposes has given rise to tension and consequently for reasons of security, it would not be expedient to give permission to the petitioner. There is. however, no discussion in the impugned order about the period since when the petitioner may have been holding the cattle fair, nor even about the other matters to which his attention was specifically directed by this Court. 13. It is apparent from a perusal of the impugned order that the District Magistrate completely ignored the observations made by this Court in its order dated 3-10-1986. 14. No effort was made by him, for instance, to the policy smelled out by the Government in its order dated 8-8-1988 to which reference was made in the judgment of this court. Nor was any attempt made by the District Magistrate to determine the question as to which of the two parties has been holding the fair from],before. The petitioner's case was that he has been holding the fair since 1972 and that it was only because of the allocation of the same dates to the fourth respondent by the District Magistrate in 1982 and 1984 that the trouble arose. It seems to us that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to all the these issues and other matters which he was called upon to consider in pursuance to the directions contained in the order of this court dated 3-10-1986. 15. The impugned order dated 27-9-1988 is, therefore, liable to be quashed on the simple ground that the District Magistrate totally failed to follow the directions specifically issued by this Court in its order dated 3-10-1986 while disposing of writ petition No. 13848 of 1985. 16. Even otherwise the order assailed in this petition has ceased to be of any effect or relevance after the lapse of more than three years since it was passed. 16. Even otherwise the order assailed in this petition has ceased to be of any effect or relevance after the lapse of more than three years since it was passed. As stressed by this Court on the previous occasion, the supposed apprehension of the breach of peace even if it existed in 1988 cannot last indefinitely. The question whether the permission to hold the fair should or should not be granted in any particular year for reasons of maintaining public order, has to be considered afresh in the light of the actual state of things as it obtained in that year. The finding of the District Magistrate, therefore, that there was likelihood of the breach of the peace in that year, therefore, ceased to be effective or of relevance now. Further, this court had given time to the learned Standing Counsel as well as the petitioner's counsel to obtain instructions with regard to the state of things which may be prevailing at present. 17. No material has, however, been placed before us by any of the parties to suggest that the conditions are still not conductive for permitting the petitioner to hold the fair. No instance of breach of peace has been brought to our notice during the intervening period. In any case, the impugned order has with the lapse of time spent itself and has ceased to be of any relevance now. 18. The District Magistrate must, therefore, consider the petitioner's application for permission afresh in the light of the prevailing circumstances keeping in view the observations made by this court in its judgment dated 3-10-1986 in writ petition No. 13848 of 1985 with only this modification that if the Government order referred to in that judgment has been replaced by some other Government orders, the District Magistrate may have regard to the latest Government Order governing private cattle fairs in villages. 19. In conclusion, we may observe that if the District Magistrate is of the opinion that there is a likelihood of the Branch of peace if both the rivals are allowed to hold cattle fairs on the same dates, he must address himself to the further question as to which one of the two has been holding the fair from before and finally who among the rival contenders should be restrained from holding the fair. 20. 20. There, however, remains to be considered a preliminary objection raised by Sri Dhruv Narain learned counsel for the fourth respondent. He submitted that the petitioner does not yet possess a valid licence for holding cattle fair and therefore, the petition should be dismissed on the short ground of lack of locus-standi to seek any relief in this petition. 21. We find no substance in this objection. There is reliable material on the record to show that he has been depositing the licence fee year after year for the grant of licence. The licence is, however, being refused to him only because of the impugned order. Without a valid permission from the District Magistrate, he cannot be granted licence. His claim cannot, therefore, be scuttled at the very threshold on the finding that he does not hold a formal licence. The petitioner, is in our view perfectly competent to approach this court for appropriate reliefs. 22. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 27-9-1988 passed by the District Magistrate, Etah (Annexure 8 to the petition) is quashed. The District Magistrate shall dispose of the petitioner's application for permission afresh according to law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. He shall hear both the parties before passing the orders on the petitioner's application. He shall also make an en-devour to dispose of the petitioner's application within one month of the date on which a certified copy of this order is submitted before him. No order as to costs. 23. A certified copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel on payment of requisite charges in three days.