JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - The petitioner No. I claims to be a registered association. Its members are truck owners. They are aggrieved by the levy and collection of toll on the vehicles plying under the permit issued by an authority outside the U. P. at the point of their entry into this State in the purported exercise of powers under the U. P. Motor Transport Vehicles Toll Act, 1979. 2. The levy is challenged on the ground that the Transport Commissioner of U. P. had issued a notification dated 23-7-1979 stating that no toll tax shall be realised from transport vehicles plying under a permit issued by an authority outside the State of U- P. but countersigned by the Transport Authority in this State. The members of the petitioner association were thus enjoying immunity from the toll because they fell within the purview of the notification, dated 23-7-1973 until recently when the officers and employees of the Transport Authority of U. P. started realising the toll at the rate of Rs. 60 per vehicle at the entry check post of this State. Upon enquiry, it was revealment that the Transport Commissioner has issued instructions to the officers of that Department to realise the toll from the vehicles even if they are plying on permits issued by the authority outside the State and countersigned by the Transport Authority of this State. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner challenges the levy and collection of the toll on the ground that in view of the notification/circular, dated 23-7-1979 the collection of the toll from the petitioners is wholly unauthorised. 4. We are unable to agree. Section 3 of the U. P. Motor Transport Vehicles (Toll) Act, 1979 provides that there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a toll on every transport vehicle plying under a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by an authority having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh, entering the limits of Uttar Pradesh, at such rate not exceeding one hundred rupees per vehicle, as the State Government may by notification specify provided that where toll has been paid once in respect of the entry of the vehicle, no toll shall be levied for any subsequent entry on the same day. The toll is, therefore, leviable in terms of section 3 of the aforesaid Act irrespective of whether the permit issued by an authority outside U. P. is countersigned by the Transport Authority of this State. 5. Section 11 of the Act, however, provides that where there is a reciprocal agreement relating to the levy, collection and payment of the toll entered into by the State Government with any other State Government, the levy shall be governed by the terms and conditions of the agreement. From the counter affidavit, it appears that the notification, dated 23-7-1979 was issued because of a reciprocal agreement between the States of U. P. and Madhya Pradesh. The Transport Authority of Madhya Pradesh, it is said, went back upon it and started realising toll from the vehicles entering into that State on permits granted to them by the Transport Authority of U. P. Consequently, the Transport Commissioner of U. P. has directed that toll be realised from the vehicles entering into this State which are plying on permits granted by the Transport Authority of Madhya Pradesh. 6. We see no impropriety or illegality in the Transport Authority of this State taking the above stand. The reciprocal agreement had in fact broken down. It was, therefore, open to the Transport Authority of this State to start realising toll from the vehicles entering this State as there was no such corresponding and reciprocal gesture or facility extended to the operators of this State upon their entry into the other State. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that this Court should direct the present Government to respect the agreement and continue to extend the facility which the petitioners were enjoying hitherto. We cannot accept the contention. The agreement was a matter between the two States. It was bilateral and reciprocal in nature. The petitioners not being parties to the contract cannot insist that the two States must abide by its terms. At any rate, such a complaint cannot be entertained in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, more so when one of the two States is stated to have resided from the agreement. 8. The next contention of the learned Counsel was that no service is being rendered by the State. At any rate, such a complaint cannot be entertained in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, more so when one of the two States is stated to have resided from the agreement. 8. The next contention of the learned Counsel was that no service is being rendered by the State. It is urged, toll is in the nature of fee, and must, therefore, be backed by quid pro quo between the amount realised and the service rendered by the respondents. The assertion of the petitioner that no service is being rendered by the respondents has been specifically refuted in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit in which it has been categorically stated that the various local authorities within the limits of which these vehicles are plying are expending substantial amounts on the maintenance of the roads as well as for keeping them clean and lighted. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of these assertions. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention either. 9. Finally, learned Counsel submitted that by not realising toll from the vehicles plying under the permits issued by the Transport Authority of this State, the State is showing undue preference to the local operators which stance plainly violates the guarantee enshrined under Article 303 of the Constitution. We regret, the contention must fail for more than one reason. No foundation has been laid in the petition for this orai submission. The issue whether the State of U. P. is showing undue preference to the local operators as against the petitioners is undoubtedly one which must depend on the relevant data. The petitioners have not made the same available to the Court. Such an issue, it must be granted, cannot be determined in vacuum and as an abstract proposition. The question must in each case, we do venture to think, depend on the burden of tax imposed upon the class of traders-operators in the present case of the two States. Moreover, it has not been shown that local transporters of the other State are not enjoying similar immunity from such a tax. Still further, the imposition of tax by a State Legislature would not per se amount to showing undue preference vis-a-vis another State. Moreover, it has not been shown that local transporters of the other State are not enjoying similar immunity from such a tax. Still further, the imposition of tax by a State Legislature would not per se amount to showing undue preference vis-a-vis another State. The flow of trade between different States depends on diverse factors such as trading facility, rates, freights or the conditions of road and other transport facilities and the like Without a comprehensive and comparative study of these factors, it is not possible to pronounced on a plea based on Article 303. 10. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed. We may, however, make it clear that the observations made hereinabove should not be taken as precluding the two States from reviving the reciprocal agreement referred to above.