Judgment :- Plaintiff is the appellant. Appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for partition and redemption. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal areas follows: Plaintiff and 1st defendant are sisters and defendants 2 to 4 are the children of the 1st defendant. Plaint A schedule property belongs to plaintiff and defendants. On 28-1-1959, there was a partition under Ext. A2, under which, the property having an extent of 181/2 cents on the southern portion of plaint A schedule property was allotted to plaintiff and Scents was allotted to Indirabai Amma, another sister of plaintiff and 1st defendant. 1st defendant subsequently got an assignment of the property allotted to Indirabai Amma. Property allotted to the plaintiff is described as B schedule in the plaint. On 24-11-1122, Gouri Amma mother of the plaintiff and 1st defendant executed Ext. A3 otti in respect of plaint A schedule property for a consideration of Rs. 1,400/-.1st defendant filed O.S.No. 369 of 1970 for redemption of the entire extent and he took delivery on 25-10-1976 of the entire plaint A schedule property in execution of the decree. Plaintiff filed the above suit for recovery and redemption of 5 cents of the property allotted to her. 3. The suit had a chequered career. Originally, the suit was decreed. The matter was taken in appeal and there was a remand. Again, a decree was passed. That was taken in appeal as A.S.No. 217 of 1983, out of which, the above CM. Appeal has arisen. The appellate court confirmed the decree for partition and redemption. However, it remitted back the matter to the trial court for determining the value of improvements for the construction of a granite wall. It also directed the trial court to. remit the report of the Commissioner for an additional report in regard to the value of improvements for construction of granite wall, if any, as claimed by defendants 1 to 4. 4. In this appeal, plaintiff has challenged the order of remand passed by the appellate court. Sri. B. Krishnamani, learned counsel for appellant strenuously contended that the granite wall was not constructed by 1st defendant after redemption, that he never wanted the Commissioner to estimate the value of the construction of the wall and that in the circumstances, the remand made by the lower court is improper and unsustainable. 5. Sri. B. Krishnamani, learned counsel for appellant strenuously contended that the granite wall was not constructed by 1st defendant after redemption, that he never wanted the Commissioner to estimate the value of the construction of the wall and that in the circumstances, the remand made by the lower court is improper and unsustainable. 5. On going through the judgment, I find that the court has not considered the question whether a granite wall was constructed by 1st defendant after redemption. Asa matter of fact, the expression 'if any' used in the judgment makes it clear that the court has not come to a definite finding one way or other in regard to this question. I feel that the remand order, without entering a definite finding on the question whether granite wall was constructed by the defendants is not justified. In the circumstances, I set aside the order of remand passed by the lower appellate court and direct the lower appellate court to consider the question whether any granite wall was constructed by 1st defendant after redemption. If the lower appellate court feels that the materials on record are insufficient to enter a finding, it will be open to the lower appellate court to issue afresh commission or to direct the same Commissioner, to file an additional report touching the question. On the basis of the report and other materials, the lower appellate court will enter a finding on the question whether the granite wall was constructed by the 1st defendant. If it comes to the conclusion that the 1st defendant constructed a granite wall after redemption, it goes without saying that he will be entitled to value of the wall. The other findings of the lower appellate court are confirmed. 6. It appears that before the CM. Appeal was filed, the suit was dismissed for default. The question to be considered is whether by reason of that fact, the CM. Appeal has become infructuous. 7. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court has considered the question in Kota Kanakayya v. Kamepalli Lakshmayya (AIR 1951 Mad. 218). 6. It appears that before the CM. Appeal was filed, the suit was dismissed for default. The question to be considered is whether by reason of that fact, the CM. Appeal has become infructuous. 7. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court has considered the question in Kota Kanakayya v. Kamepalli Lakshmayya (AIR 1951 Mad. 218). The court observed: "There is no provision anywhere in the Code that takes away the right of a party to appeal from a preliminary decree or the order of remand, if a final decree happens to be passed in the suit before the appeal against the preliminary decree or the order of remand is presented. Nor is there any provision in the Code that an appeal against a preliminary decree or an order of remand properly presented becomes defunct by the passing of final decree pending the appeal." The view taken by Viswanatha Sastri, J. in the above case was upheld by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S.Venkatarama Iyer v. UnnamalaiAmmal (AIR 1951 Mad. 883). A Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has also taken the same view in Haridas v. Banshidhar (AIR 1962 Raj. 57). It was held in that case that if the remand order is set aside, the final decree which was passed would also topple down. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the above decisions. It follows, that the dismissal of the suit would not render the appeal infructuous. In the result, the CM. Appeal is disposed of as above. Parties will bear their respective costs.