RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) CERTAIN goods are manufactured but not cleared and therefore not assessed to excise duty, when the Act imposing duty of excise comes into force. On such goods whether duty of excise can be levied and collected at the time when the goods are sought to be cleared ? If yes, would the Act be not retrospective? What, then, is the meaning of the term retrospective? These are some of the questions which arise in this petition consequent upon the imposition of additional duties of excise on certain textile articles. ( 2 ) THE Facts and the Controversy : the petitioner Mill Company manufactured cellulosic spun yarn as well as cotton yarn, and cotton fabrics. These products were excisable goods falling under Tariff Item Nos. 18, 18a and 19 respectively of the First schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1944") as in force at the relevant time. On 3/10/1978 the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile articles) Ordinance, 1978 was promulgated which became an Act called the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978. This Act was passed on 6/12/1978, but it was given effect from the date on which the ordinance came into force, i. e. , 4/10/1978. The Ordinance as well as the Act of 1978 provided for levy and collection of additional duty of excise equal to 10% of the total amount of central excise duty chargeable on 9 textile commodities enumerated in schedule to the Act of 1978. ( 3 ) THE petitioner contends that the Act of 1978 would not be applicable to the goods manufactured prior to midnight of Octrober 3/ 4, 1978. Since manufacture is the taxing event, as far as the duty of excise is concerned, no duty of excise can be levied on the goods which were already manufactured when the Act of 1978 came into force. In his submission, whether goods were removed or not from the factorys storeroom or other permissible premises is not material. If the goods were already manufactured at the time when the Act of 1978 came into force, additional duty of excise under the Act of 1978 cannot be levied on such goods. In his submission, whether goods were removed or not from the factorys storeroom or other permissible premises is not material. If the goods were already manufactured at the time when the Act of 1978 came into force, additional duty of excise under the Act of 1978 cannot be levied on such goods. ( 4 ) IN this behalf a letter dated 23/01/1979 has been written by the Deputy Collector, Central Excise, Baroda, addressed to the Mill owners Association, Ahmedabad wherein it is stated that goods fully manufactured before midnight of 3/10/1978 would not attract additional duty of excise. He opined that the fabrics which were in packed condition and which were lying in the godown of the petitioner-Company prior to 3/10/1978 would not attract the additional duty of excise. But the fabrics which were not packed in bales or cases prior to midnight of 3/10/1978 will be subject to the additional levy under the Act of 1978. Hence the petition praying that the fabrics already manufactured but not packed in bales and cases and not cleared before midnight of 3/10/1978 cannot be subjected to the additional duty of excise under the Act of 1978. ( 5 ) LEGISLATIVE Background : for resolving the controversy, the legislative background needs to be examined. The Act of 1944 was enacted with an object to consolidate and amend the law relating to Central duties of excise and to salt. This act is in force since the year 1944. At the relevant time the goods specified in the First Schedule to the Act of 1944 were "excisable goods". There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the product manufactured by the petitioner were excisable goods" within the meaning of the phrase defined in the Act of 1944. The rules called the Central Excise Rules, 1944 framed by the Government under the provisions of Sees. 6, 12 and 37 of the Act of 1944 were also in force at the relevant time. ( 6 ) AS disclosed in the statement of objects and reasons to the Act of 1978, the Government removed the obligation of textile mills to produce "controlled cloth". 6, 12 and 37 of the Act of 1944 were also in force at the relevant time. ( 6 ) AS disclosed in the statement of objects and reasons to the Act of 1978, the Government removed the obligation of textile mills to produce "controlled cloth". Thereupon, with a view to minimise the liability of the exchequer consequent on the outgo of subsidy, for the production of "controlled cloth" for the weaker section of the society, it was decided that the financial burden should be borne by the entire textile industry. Hence the Government considered the manner of sharing the burden by textile industry. It was decided that levy in the nature of additional excise duty at the rate of 10% of the effective excise duty on specified products of textile industry would bring the amount of funds to subsidise the production of controlled cloth for weaker sections of the society. Therefore, the Ordinance of 1978 and subsequently the Act of 1978 "with a view to provide for the levy and collection of additional duties of excise on certain textiles and textile articles (See preamble to the Act of 1978 and the statement of object and reasons ). ( 7 ) SECTION 3 of the Act of 1978 is relevant. Hence it is reproduced hereinbelow :"3. (1) When goods of the description mentioned in the Schedule chargeable with a duty of excise under the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with any notification for the time being in force issued by the Central Government in relation to the duty so chargeable, are assessed to duty, there shall be levied and collected a duty of excise equal to ten per cent of the total amount so chargeable on such goods. (2) The duties of excise referred to in sub-sec. (I) in respect of the goods specified in the Schedule shall be in addition to the duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any other law for the time being in force and shall be ievied for the purposes of the Union and the proceeds thereof shall not be distributed among the States. (I) in respect of the goods specified in the Schedule shall be in addition to the duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any other law for the time being in force and shall be ievied for the purposes of the Union and the proceeds thereof shall not be distributed among the States. (3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duties, shall, so far as may be apply in relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise leviable under this section in respect of any goods as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise of such goods under that Act or those Rules. "reading of Sec. 3 (3) indicates that this is a case of legislation by reference. There is a distinction between legislation by reference or citation and legislation by incorporation. If there is a mere reference to a provision of one statute in another without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears the reference would be considered as reference to the provision as may be in force from time to time in the former statute. But if the provisions of one statute is incorporated in another then subsequent amendment in the former statute or even total repeal thereof would not affect the provisions as incorporated in the later statute. Law on this point is settled by the decisions of the Privy Council and Supreme Court commencing from Secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. , reported in AIR 1931 PC 149, to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M/s. Attesse (A. I. T. Corporation), AIR 1989 SC 222 . We, therefore, refrain from elaborating this aspect in further details. ( 8 ) BOTH the Acts are supplemental to each other. It is evident that the Act of 1944 and the Rules framed thereunder including those relating to refunds and exemption from duties have become an integral part of the act of 1978. We, therefore, refrain from elaborating this aspect in further details. ( 8 ) BOTH the Acts are supplemental to each other. It is evident that the Act of 1944 and the Rules framed thereunder including those relating to refunds and exemption from duties have become an integral part of the act of 1978. They would be applicable to the levy of duty under Sec. 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 as they would apply in relation to the levy and collection of duties of excise on such goods under the Act of 1944 or the rules framed thereunder. ( 9 ) EXAMINATION of the contentions : learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that at the point of time (i. e. , the midnight of 3/10/1978) when the Act of 1978 came into force, the fabrics were manufactured but not packed in bales and/or cases. In his submission once the goods were manufactured at the point of time when the Act of 1978 came into force, the additional duty under the Act of 1978 cannot be levied and collected on the goods which were already manufactured by that time, for the reason that the taxing event manufacture of the goods had already taken place by that time. The submission may be examined. It is true that as far as the levy of excise duty is concerned, taxable event is manufacture or production of goods. Even so, the duty can be levied and collected at a later stage for administrative convenience. The only condition is that there should be nexus with the taxing event i. e. manufacture and the levy and collection of the duty. ( 10 ) IT is well recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that language of the Act has to be given effect unless it is shown that the intention of the legislature was to the contrary. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court need not, rather should not, go elsewhere in search of the intention on the legislature. The Act of 1978 has been enacted with an object to provide for levy and collection of additional duties of excise on certain textiles and textile articles (see preamble to the Act of 1978 ). Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 indicates the point of time at which the duty is to be levied and collected. The Act of 1978 has been enacted with an object to provide for levy and collection of additional duties of excise on certain textiles and textile articles (see preamble to the Act of 1978 ). Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 indicates the point of time at which the duty is to be levied and collected. When the goods mentioned in the schedule and chargeable with a duty of excise under the Act of 1944 read with the notification for the time being in force are assessed to duty, there shall be levied and collected a duty of excise equal to 10% of the total amount so chargeable on such goods. Thus Sec. 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 provides for the time and manner of charging the duty and it also provides for the measure (i. e. 10% of the basic duty of excise) of the duty to be levied and collected under the Act of 1978. Section 3 (2) specifically states that duties referred to in Sec. 3 (1) shall be in addition to the duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the Act of 1944, or any other law for the time being in force. ( 11 ) THE legislature has made itself clear that the imposition of the additional duty is at the stage of assessment of the excisable goods. It is only when the goods are assessed to duty that the additional duty is levied and it is only at that stage it becomes leviable and subject to collection. Language of Sees. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act of 1978 read with the statement of object and reasons for passing the Act and the preamble to the Act, leaves no room for doubt that the duty to be levied and collected under the Act of 1978 is an additional duty. It is an addition to the duty chargeable under the Act of 1944. The term additional means joining or uniting one thing to another, so as thereby to form one aggregate (See Blacks law Dictionary ). In the case pertaining to Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act, 1975 (M/s. Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa) reported in AIR 1983 sc 394 , the Supreme Court has approvingly adopted this meaning of the term additional (see para 18 of the reported decision ). In the case pertaining to Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act, 1975 (M/s. Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa) reported in AIR 1983 sc 394 , the Supreme Court has approvingly adopted this meaning of the term additional (see para 18 of the reported decision ). Thus the additional duty of excise to be levied and collected under the Act of 1978 is an addition to the duty of excise leviable under the Act of 1944. It is in the nature of surcharge. It is also evident that the additional duty is to be levied and collected at the stage of assessment of duty of excise on the excisable goods. Such goods arc assessed for excise duty under the Act of 1944 and the rules framed thereunder. This being the position as per the language used by the legislature, there is no reason why the intention of the legislature so clearly expressed be not given effect to. ( 12 ) WILL the levy be retrospective ? learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if this interpretation is given, levy of additional duty would be retrospective in its operation inasmuch as the taxing event for excise duty is manufacture. Manufacture of the product having been completed prior to the Act coming into force, the Act of 1978 would not apply to the goods which were already manufactured before the Act came into force. The submission takes within its sweep misconception as regards the term retrospective. If the misconception is cleared, the submission will not survive, because the very basis of the submission is the misconception or lack of clarity as regards the meaning of the term retrospective. Therefore let us examine what does the term retrospective mean ? ( 13 ) MEANING of retrospective : in Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition, page 387) meaning of the. term retrospective is stated as follows :"a statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past. But a statute "is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a lime antecedent to its passing. But a statute "is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a lime antecedent to its passing. " (Emphasis supplied) the aforesaid meaning of the term retrospective has been approvingly adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of D. G. Gouse and Co. v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1980 SC 271 . In that case the question arose as regards the validity of certain provisions of the Kerala Buildings Tax Act (7 of 1975 ). It was inter alia contended that though the Act was passed on 2/04/1975 it has imposed a tax on buildings with retrospective effect from 1/04/1973 and, therefore, it was unconstitutional. In that context the Supreme Court referred to the meaning of the term retrosi pective as stated in Crqiey on Statute Law, and thereafter observed :"it rnay be that there was no liability to building tax until the promulgation of the Act (earlier the Ordinances) but mere absence of an earlier taxing statute cannot be said to create a vested right, under any existing law, that it shall not. be levied in future with effect from a date anterior to the passing of the Act. Nor can it be saidthat by imposing the building tax from an earlier date any new obligation or disability has been attached in respect of any earlier transaction or consideration. The Act is not therefore retrospective in the strictly technical sense. "similar view has been expressed in the case of Union of India v. Madan gopal. AIR 1954 SC 158 . Therein (para 15 of the report) it is observed that simply because the Act is to take into account the income earned before the statute came into force, it cannot be said to be retrospective. Such an enactment cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be retrospective legislation, though its opsration may affect acts done in the past. Again in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 (para 21 of the report) the Supreme court has observed : a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisite for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Again in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 (para 21 of the report) the Supreme court has observed : a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisite for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. ( 14 ) THE Act of 1978 is not retrospective : thus when the Act of 1978 seeks to levy and collect the additional duty of excise even on the excisable goods which were already manufactured, but were not cleared and were not assessed to duty, at the time when the Act came into force, the Act cannot be said to be retrospective in its operation. Except the fact that the goods were manufactured prior to the time of the Act coming into force, no other ground is advanced in support of the contention that the act is retrospective. As indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of D. G. Gouse and Co. , (supra), simply because there was no liability of tax prior to the Act coming into force, it does not create vested right, under any existing law that it shall not be levied in future with effect from a date anterior to the passing of the Act. No existing right, much less vested right, has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the intervenors, as having been acquired by the manufacturers that when the goods were manufactured there was no tax liability and therefore in future the goods cannot be taxed. A manufacturer cannot say that the goods manufactured by him shall not be subjected to excise duty after they are manufactured. If such imposition retains the essential characteristics of excise duty, there is nothing in law to say that by imposition of exciss duty on goods already manufactured" any right of the manufacturer is adversely affected or impaired. ( 15 ) DUTY of excise is a tax on articles produced or manufactured in a taxing country (AIR 1939 Federal Court I, at page 6 ). This tax, subject always to the legislative competence of the taxing authority, can be levied at a convenient stage so long as the character of the impost, i. e. it is a duty on the manufacture or production, is not lost (R. C. Jail v. Union of India, air 1962 SC 1281 ). This tax, subject always to the legislative competence of the taxing authority, can be levied at a convenient stage so long as the character of the impost, i. e. it is a duty on the manufacture or production, is not lost (R. C. Jail v. Union of India, air 1962 SC 1281 ). After considering the aforesaid two decisions, in the case of J. R. G. Mfg. Association v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1589 it is observed by Supreme Court that excise duty could obviously be imposed at the stage which was found to be most convenient and lucrative as that was a matter of the machinery of collection and did not affect the essential nature of the tax. ( 16 ) IN the case of J. R. G. Mfg. Assocn. (supra) the Supreme Court has extracted the following paragraph from the case of R. C. Jail (supra) and has reiterated the position of law almost in the same terms. The relevant para reads as follows :"excise duty is primarily a duty on the production, or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country. It is an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer passes on to the ultimate consumer, that is, its ultimate incidence will always be on the consumer. Therefore, subject always to the legislative competence of the taxing authority, the said tax can be levied at a convenient stage so long as the character of the impost, that is, it is a duty on the manufacture or production, is not lost. The method of collection does not affect the essence of the duty, but only relates to the machinery of collection for administrative convenience. Whether in a particular case the tax ceases to be in essence an excise duty, and the rational connection between the duty and the person on whom it is imposed ceased to exist, is to be decided on a fair construction of the provisions of a particular Act. "therefore, all that is necessary is to see that even when the tax is levied and collected at the stage of removal of the goods, does it affect the essence of the duty ? Is there anything to show that the rational connection of the duty and the commodity or the person on whom it is imposed, cease to exist ? Is there anything to show that the rational connection of the duty and the commodity or the person on whom it is imposed, cease to exist ? ( 17 ) IT is not even argued that because the goods manufactured prior to the point of time of the Act coming into force are subjected to additional duty of excise the essence of the duty changes and that the rational connection between the manufacture and impost of duty is snapped. If the duty is imposed at the stage of removal of the goods manufactured, it would not be correct to say that the taxing event would be shifted from manufacture to removal. At the stage of removal of the goods from the store-room of the factory or from other permissible place, if the tax is levied and collected, the character of the excise duty that it is imposed on manufacture is not in any way changed or diluted. Therefore, there is nothing to show that any of the rights, either existing or vested, of a manufacturer is affected or impaired by the provisions of the Act of 1978. ( 18 ) MOREOVER, if the take is levied and collected at the stage of removal of the goods, no new obligation or disability has been attached in respect of any earlier transaction or consideration. Provision for increase or decrease of the purchase price of goods by reason of the imposition, increase, or remission of customs or excise duty has been made by the legislature by insertion of Sec. 64a in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. This amendment has been made in the year 1940. Therefore, even if there be any concluded contract for manufacture of goods, the manufacturer is very well protected by the provisions of Sec. 64a of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. ( 19 ) AS held by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Chhotabhai v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1006 , Sec. 64a of the Indian sale of Goods Act, 1930 provides for recovery by the seller of the amount of increase in duty from the purchaser where the increase takes effect subsequent to the contract. It also provides for the right of the purchaser to recover from the seller the duty in cases where there is a similar decrease. It also provides for the right of the purchaser to recover from the seller the duty in cases where there is a similar decrease. This right of the seller and purchaser exists both before the delivery is given, taken and price received or paid as the case may be (para 59 of the report ). Thus it is evident that no new obligation is created nor any disability is attached if the goods already manufactured prior to the point of time of coming into force of the Act are subjected to excise duty. Therefore, the provisions of the Act of 1978 cannot be said to be retrospective. ( 20 ) EVEN otherwise the Act of 1978 will be retrospective by necessary implication : it is true that in the Act it is not stated that the Act will be retrospective to certain extent. But having regard to the language used by the legislature and all other relevant facts and circumstances we would have held that to certain extent the Act of 1978 is retrospective, because other interpretation would lead to inconvenience, complexity and several uncertainties and also to inequitable result. Neither the revenue nor the consumers would be in a position to know the exact details about the goods which were manufactured before a particular point of time. It would lead to uncertainty and much inconvenience both to the manufacturer as well as to the tax collector. The essential characteristics of good taxation that it should be least cumbersome and simple both to the tax payer as well as to the tax collector will be lost. Above all such interpretation is likely to lead to inequitable result inasmuch as the manufacturer or the trader would be in a position to manipulate the prices by telling the people that a particular lot of goods was manufactured prior to the point of time of the Act coming into force and a particular lot of goods had been manufactured thereafter. . . ( 21 ) ON the other hand the purchasers would not be in a position to say no to the manufacturers and the traders for payment of the excise duty on account of the provisions of Sec. 64a of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which inter alia provides for recovery by the seller of the amount of the increase in duty from the purchaser where the increase of tax is effected subsequent to the contract. In order to check manipulation of stocks by the manufacturers and the traders the revenue will have to take several measures to prevent such manipulations. On the other hand it would create so many difficulties in the way of the manufacturers and traders inasmuch as an honest manufacturer or trader also will have to undergo the difficulties of preparing statements and getting the same certified by chartered accountants. While giving ordinary and usual meaning to the language employed by the legislature, if retrospectivity can be inferred by necessary implication the same has got to be inferred to avoid uncertainty, complexity and also to avoid possible dishonesty and corrupt devices, for the reason that the legislature never intends to breed corruption however, we do not wish to elaborate on this aspect of retrospectivity of the Act of 1978 to certain extent by necessary implication since we have already held that the Act of 1978 is not retrospective its operation. ( 22 ) UNDERSTANDING of an Excise Officer and alleged practice of the department - Can they determine the correct Interpretation of Law ? learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Deputy Collector of Central Excise, Baroda allowed the goods fully manufactured prior to the act coming into force to be cleared, without payment of the additional duty of excise under the provisions of the Act of 1978. The dispute was only with regard to the unpacked fabrics. Whether such unpacked fabrics can be said to be fully manufactured or not was the only point of dispute. Therefore it is submitted that once the department has taken a stand and if the unpacked fabrics can be said to be already manufactured, these goods cannot be subjected to additional levy of excise duty. In our opinion the submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the representation made by the Deputy collector, Central Excise, Baroda would not change the position of law. In our opinion the submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the representation made by the Deputy collector, Central Excise, Baroda would not change the position of law. He had no authority to grant exemption to certain goods. At the most he interpreted the law in erroneous manner. But then, the error committed by an officer of the Government and that too with respect to the interpretation of law cannot bind the Government. ( 23 ) IN the case of Vasantkumar Radhakishan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1991 SC 14 , the Supreme Court has in para 12 of the report observed :"promissory estoppel cannot be used compelling the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government of the public authority to make. "if the Deputy Collector of Central Excise has opined about the duty liability in respect of the manufactured goods prior to the Act of 1978 coming into force, that opinion does not become law. The Deputy Collector had no authority or power to change the position of law. Therefore, the Department cannot be bound down by the letter written by the Deputy Collector of Central excise. ( 24 ) IT was contended that every year when the budget is introduced in the Parliament and when new tax proposals come into force, the Department of Excise takes stock in order to see which are the goods already manufactured and which are the goods which have been cleared. In short it is submitted that it has been the practice of the department not to apply the provisions of the Act to the goods which are already manufactured at the point of time when the Act came into force. There is no material on record of the petition to show that such is the practice of the department. Even assuming for a moment that there is such practice then even such practice does not become law. ( 25 ) IN case such is the practice, the correct position of law as regards the meaning of the term retrospective needs to be taken into account by the persons responsible for implementing the laws. Even assuming for a moment that there is such practice then even such practice does not become law. ( 25 ) IN case such is the practice, the correct position of law as regards the meaning of the term retrospective needs to be taken into account by the persons responsible for implementing the laws. If there is such practice, it appears that the same may be on account of some erroneous impression about the correct position of law. We are not sure for what reasons the aforesaid practice is adopted. If it is on account of the erroneous understanding of the law, we hope and trust that the persons responsible to implement the law correctly will take suitable measures so that inequitable results are avoided and unnecessary uncertainty and complexity are not introduced in the manner and method of collection of the excise duty. ( 26 ) DUTY as defined under Rule 2 (v) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 -Can it be a duty under the Act of 1978 also ? it was contended that Rule 2 (v) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 defines duty. It means duty payable under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1944. Imposition of additional duty is as per the provisions of the Act of 1978. Therefore, it is submitted that additional duty under the provisions of the Act of 1978 does not become a levy under the provisions of the act of 1944. Both are separate duty. Additional duty may stand or fall on its own strength. In short it was submitted that having regard to the definition of duty occurring in Rule 2 (v), duty of excise leviable under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1944 is separate from the additional duty leviable under Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978. Such additional duty cannot be levied in respect of the goods manufactured prior to the Act having come into force. ( 27 ) THE argument cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the language of Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 is clear enough to take within its sweep the goods manufactured prior to the Act coming into force. Moreover, as indicated hereinabove, the duty of excise imposed under the act of 1978 is additional duty. It is in addition to the duty charged under the Act of 1944. Moreover, as indicated hereinabove, the duty of excise imposed under the act of 1978 is additional duty. It is in addition to the duty charged under the Act of 1944. The term additional embraces the idea of joining one thing to another. Additional duty gets itself annexed to the basic duty, at the point of time and place when the basic duty is also required to be assessed. It is in the nature of surcharge. ( 28 ) MOREOVER, as indicated hereinabove. Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 is an instance of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Act of 1944 and the Rules framed thereunder also become integral part of the act of 1978. Hence the provisions of Rule 9a of the Central Excise rules, 1944 would also be applicable to the goods which are made chargeable to additional duty under the provisions of the Act of 1978. The argument that the term excisable goods used in Rule 9a would not cover excisable goods under the provisions of the Act of 1978 cannot be accepted. If such interpretation is given, it would run counter to the scheme of the Act of 1978 and also against the very object of adopting the device of legislation by reference. ( 29 ) IS the provisions of the Act interpreted by first reading the provisions of Rule and therefore, is it Inverse logic ? it was submitted that the provision of the Act cannot be interpreted by first reading the provisions of Rule framed under the Act. In the instant case it was contended that it would amount to adopting inverse logic if the provisions of Rule 9a and Rule 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 are read first in order to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 1978. It was submitted that because certain provisions for assessment and collection of duty at the stage of removal of the goods are made under Rule 9a of the Rules, the provisions of Sec. 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 cannot be read so as to shift the taxing event from manufacture to the stage of removal of the goods. And it was argued that Sec. 3 of the Act of 1944 and Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 was a charging Section as far as additional duty of excise is concerned. And it was argued that Sec. 3 of the Act of 1944 and Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 was a charging Section as far as additional duty of excise is concerned. The charging Section should be read first without having recourse to the provisions of the Rule. Provisions of the Rule may be read only with a view to elucidate what is stated in the provisions of the Act, but by reading the provisions of the rule the provisions of the Act cannot be interpreted. ( 30 ) BASIC falacy as regards charging Section : the contention based on the misconception as regards the provisions of sees. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1944. It is assumed that Sec. 3 of the Act of 1944 alone is the charging Section. This is the basic falacy. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1944 taken as a whole enblock and read conjointly constitute the charging Section. If both the Sections are not read as supplemental and complementary to each other the impost cannot be given effect to at all. If Sec. 4 were not there, the result would be that under sec. 3 the goods are made excisable at the rates set forth (formerly in the first Schedule to the Act and now) under the Tariff Act which inter alia provides for levy of duty at ad valorem rates. The rate of duty is linked to the value of the goods because this is the very concept of ad valorem. Therefore there has to be provision which spells out what is meant by value ? It should also provide as to how the value is to be calculated. Value at what time ? Value to whom ? Which value -retail or wholesale ? Valuation to be made by whom ? Unless this provision is made levy would be ineffective and meaningless. It would be impossible to work it out unless the provisions of Sees. 3 and 4 are read conjointly. Value at what time ? Value to whom ? Which value -retail or wholesale ? Valuation to be made by whom ? Unless this provision is made levy would be ineffective and meaningless. It would be impossible to work it out unless the provisions of Sees. 3 and 4 are read conjointly. ( 31 ) IN this connection the observations made by the Full Bench of this high Court in the case of Calico Mill v. Union of India, reported in [1983 (1)] XXIV (1) GLR 1 (in para 18 of the report)may be referred to :"what is overlooked is that Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 of the Act taken as a whole en-block and read conjointly constitute the charging section. It is fallacious to assume that Sec. 3 standing alone is the charging section. This is as evident as day light if the test we will presently formulate is applied. Can the impost be given effect at all if both the sections are not read as supplementary and complementary ? If Sec. 4 were not there, the result would be that under Sec. 3 goods are made excisable at the rates set forth in first schedule to the Act which inter alia provides for ad valorem rates. The rate by its very nature is linked to the value, that being the very concept of ad valorem. And unless there is a provision which spells out what is meant by value and how it is to be computed several unanswerable questions will arise. Value to whom? Manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or consumer? wholesale value or retail value? Value at which place? At which time ? valuation as made by whom ? How ? Then the levy would become a dead letter-an impotent paper levy. It cannot be made workable unless Sec. 4 is read conjointly as constituting another part of a complete Code made up of sees. 3 and 4. It will otherwise be a part of a zig-zag puzzle; unless all the parts are put together it will not be in a piece and the picture of the levy will not emerge. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that though separate numbers are given, in fact the two sections are two incomplete parts of the whole charging section composed of Sees. 3 and 4 read in a conjoint manner as two supplementary parts of a complete Code. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that though separate numbers are given, in fact the two sections are two incomplete parts of the whole charging section composed of Sees. 3 and 4 read in a conjoint manner as two supplementary parts of a complete Code. "in the same para it is further observed that :"excise duty is payable on manufacture (at the time of clearance, since the rules so provide and yet is linked to manufacture of the article. "if the misconception as regards the charging section and machinery section is cleared, the falacy in the argument that the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 are sought to be interpreted by referring to the provisions of Rule 9a and Rule 49 has no basis. On the contrary it is the otherway round. It is on account of the provisions of Sees. 3 and 4 of the Act of 1944, both of which are required to be read together, that provisions in the rule is made which makes the entire scheme workable. ( 32 ) AS far as the provisions of the Act of 1978 are concerned, be it noted that sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 conjointly puts in a nutshell what is provided in two Sections (Sections 3 and 4) of the Act of 1944. Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 provides for impost of additional duty and also for its measure, i. e. , the quantum of duty. It further provides for its assessment, time and manner of valuation of the goods. If read in this fashion it would be clear that what is provided in two Sections (Sections 3 and 4) of the Act of 1944 is provided in Sec. 3 (1) of the act of 1978. After reading the provisions of the Act in this fashion if one reads the provisions of Rule 9a and Rule 49 it would be clear that the provisions of the Rule are read in the light of what is provided in the act. Even when the realisation of the duty is postponed for administrative convenience upto the point of time and place of removal of the goods from the factory, the nature of impost does not change. It remains duty on manufacture and therefore, duty of excise. It does not make removal of goods a taxable event. Even when the realisation of the duty is postponed for administrative convenience upto the point of time and place of removal of the goods from the factory, the nature of impost does not change. It remains duty on manufacture and therefore, duty of excise. It does not make removal of goods a taxable event. Therefore, the argument that inverse logic is adopted in interpreting the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act of 1978 has no merits and the same has got to be rejected. ( 33 ) CASE Law cited at the bar and other relevant decisions : in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Company Ltd. v. Collector of central Excise, 1989 (44) ELT 598 (SC), it has been held that excise duty is on manufacture or production, but the realisation of the duty may be postponed for administrative convenience to the date of removal of the goods from the factory. Rule 9a of the Rules merely does that. That is the scheme of the Act. It does not make removal a taxable event. Taxable event is manufacture. But the liability to pay duty is postponed till the time of removal under Rule 9a of the said Rules. Therefore it was held that when the goods were unconditionally exempt from duty, the duty on goods manufactured were payable on the date of removal because under Rule 9a of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 the Central Excise authorities are within the competence to apply the rate prevailing on the date of removal. ( 34 ) IN the case of Mihir Textiles Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. , [1988 (1)] XXIX (1) GLR 654, a Division Bench of this Court has taken a similar view. In that case, on account of notification issued on 26/11/1987 superseding the earlier notification dated 1/03/1987 the basis for grant of exemption was changed in respect of certain man-made fabrics. The net effect of the change was an increase in the additional duty of excise on the specified goods. The question arose : whether the goods manufactured before Notification No. 254 of 1987 dated November 26, 1987 came into effect, but not removed from the factory premises, would be covered by the said Notification or the earlier Notification No. 60 of 1987 which was in operation till then ? The question arose : whether the goods manufactured before Notification No. 254 of 1987 dated November 26, 1987 came into effect, but not removed from the factory premises, would be covered by the said Notification or the earlier Notification No. 60 of 1987 which was in operation till then ? Applying the provisions of Rule 9a of the Central excise Rules, 1944 the Division Bench held that the rate of duty and tariff valuation if any applicable to any classified goods shall be the rate and valuation in force, in case of goods removed from the factory or warehouse, on the date on which the duty is assessed. ( 35 ) THE same logic and principle would apply in the instant case also, both for the reasons of language of Rule 9a of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and for the reason of the language of Sec. 3 (1) of the Act of 1978. Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1978 clearly provides that the additional duty shall be levied and collected when the goods of the description mentioned in the Schedule are assessed to duty. In the instant case the goods are assessed to duty at the stage of removal only, at which stage the provisions of Rule 9a of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 are also applied. ( 36 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. State of Mysore, reported in 1977 ELT (J) 26. In that case the question arose as to whether certain agricultural implements like shovels and spades which were in possession of the State Government but not produced or manufactured in the State governments implements factory would attract duty liability, on account of insertion of Tariff Item No. 25aa. In that context the Supreme Court has made observation that Sec. 3 of the Act could not be invoked to levy excise duty merely on the ground that pre-excise stock of rods and bars were utilised for the purpose of manufacturing agricultural implements. These observations are required to be read in proper context. If so read, the decision is of no help for interpreting the phrase excisable goods. These observations are required to be read in proper context. If so read, the decision is of no help for interpreting the phrase excisable goods. ( 37 ) IN the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Andhra fertiliser Ltd. , reported in 1987 (32) ELT 343 (AP), the department sought to levy duty of excise on fertiliser which was not marketed. In that context the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court has made certain observations on the basis of the provisions of art. 265 of the Constitution and the Power of the State to levy and collect tax. This decision also. in our opinion, does not throw any light on the question of interpretation of the Act of 1978 and the Act of 1944 as well as the rules framed thereunder. ( 38 ) LEARNED Counsel for the intervenor drew over attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Modi Rubber Limited and Ors. , reported in 1986 (25) ELT 849 (SC ). In that case the question of construction of the expression duty of excise occurring in two notifications issued under Rule 8 (1) of the Central Excise rules, 1944 occurred. In that context the Supreme Court held that the expression duty of excise is required to be construed in the context in which it occurred. Therein the Supreme Court held that the phrase duty of excise referred to in the notification will be confined to the basic duty of excise and would not cover special excise duty also. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the course of the judgment while deciding the aforesaid question are of no help to the petitioner, for it is well settled law that a decision is an authority for the question which it actually decides. In the case of Modi (supra) the Supreme Court has decided the meaning of the phrase duty of excise occurring in two notifications and that too for the purpose of deciding the extent of exemption granted. It has not laid down any principle which would be helpful for interpreting the provisions of the Act of 1978. ( 39 ) THE case of D. R. Kohli and Ors. It has not laid down any principle which would be helpful for interpreting the provisions of the Act of 1978. ( 39 ) THE case of D. R. Kohli and Ors. v. Atul Products Ltd. , reported in 1985 (20) ELT 212 (SC), provides an example as to how the department can be enticed (or inveigled as stated by Supreme Court) to receive the amount of excise duty and thereafter how one may attempt to escape the payment of excise duty at a higher rate. By Finance Act 1961, Item 14d was added in the First Schedule to the Act of 1944 and synthetic organic dye stuffs (including pigment dye stuff) and synthetic organic derivatives used in any dyeing process were made chargeable to excise duty at the rate of 30% ad valorem. On 23/11/1961, Central government exempted the dyes specified in the Schedule to the notification from the payment of whole of the excise duty if and only if such dyes had been manufactured from any other dyes on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid. The assessee purchased dyes (Fast Colour Bases) from the market which were manufactured before the same was liable to excise duty. However, the assessee offered to pay the excise duty on the dyes purchased from the market at the rate of 30% ad valorem. The department accepted the same. Thereafter assessee claimed exemption from payment of excise duty on its product on the ground that in the manufacture thereof duty paid dyes were used. It may be noted that the products manufactured by the Company were costlier than the basic dyes. In this context the question arose, whether the assesswould be entitled to claim the benefit of exemption notification when it had paid the excise duty on the basic dyes used in manufacturing of its product ? ( 40 ) THE Supreme Court answered the question in negative and observed :"the language of the notification left no room for doubt at all. It stated that if and only if sush dyes were manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid, they would be exempted from duty Payment of excise duty on dyes was possible only if they had been manufactured after the introduction of Item 14d into the First Schedule to the Act. It stated that if and only if sush dyes were manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid, they would be exempted from duty Payment of excise duty on dyes was possible only if they had been manufactured after the introduction of Item 14d into the First Schedule to the Act. Admittedly in this case the dyes which were used by the respondent had been manufactured prior to that date. "the Supreme Court further observed :"the crucial question in all such cases is whether the case falls within the scope of the law granting exemption or not and there can be no dispute about that principle. The difficulty arises only when the said principle is to be applied to the facts of a given case. As mentioned earlier, in this case, the case of the respondent did not fall under the notification granting exemption since the basic dyes used by it in producing other processed dyes were not subject to levy of excise duty when they were manufactured and cleared. "thus the question which arose for determination in this case was altogether different. Therefore the observations made while deciding this question have to be read in the proper context. Observations made as regards non-excisability of the goods manufactured prior to the introduction of Item 14d in the first Schedule to the Act of 1944 have no relevance to the question raised in this petition. Therefore this decision is also of no help to the petitioner. . ( 41 ) LEARNED Counsel for the intervenor has referred to a decision of the CEGAT in the case of Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, reported in 1985 (21) ELT 757 (Tribunal ). Therein the majority members of the Tribunal (CEGAT) have interpreted the provisions of the Finance Act, 1978 by which special excise duty was imposed. It is true that the majority of the members of the Tribunal have taken the view which supports the petitioner. However, with respect, in our opinion the learned members of the Tribunal have been influenced by the observations made by the Supreme Court in certain decisions which did not decide the question at issue. In our opinion for the reasons which we have already spelt out herein above, the minority view taken by one of the members is correct. However, with respect, in our opinion the learned members of the Tribunal have been influenced by the observations made by the Supreme Court in certain decisions which did not decide the question at issue. In our opinion for the reasons which we have already spelt out herein above, the minority view taken by one of the members is correct. However, we do not propose to discuss the judgment of the Tribunal in further details, since it would involve repetition and reiteration of all that has been staled by us in foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. ( 42 ) IN the result the petition is rejected. Rule discharged with costs. .