JUDGMENT 1. NOT that this court in Revision cannot examine the correctness of the finding of fact; for in that case the words "correctness" or "propriety" in the expression "correctness, legality, or propriety any finding" in Section 397 of the Code of criminal Procedure and the provision in Section 401 of the Code empowering this Court "to exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of Appeal" would stand divested of their ordinary and legitimate meaning. It should be noted that while in the Civil Jurisdiction, the powers of the Court of Revision were all along circumscribed by express words, and the 1976-Amendments of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure have clearly demonstrated the anxiety of the legislature for further circumscription, the Legislature has nevertheless, by and large, retained the expressions and provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 in respect of Criminal Revision with all their amplitude and plentitude even hit proceeded to repeal the Old code and enacted the new one in 1973. 2. BUT as a matter of judicial propriety, finality of the finding of facts arrived at by the first appellate Court was found to be very much desirable and it has now become almost rule of law, settled by our pre-Constitution and post-Constitution apex Courts, that a Court of criminal Revision shall not interfere with the current grant Of the courts below, unless it cannot but for grave and compelling reasons to prevent palpable miscarriage of justice. We find the present case to be such a one. The accused-petitioner has been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of S. lion 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act, 1954 for selling and storing for sale adulterated Ghee. The case consistently made out by the: accused in his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, in his statements under Section 313 of the code of Criminal Procedure and, through the -evidence of Defence witness was that he did not sell, store 5r-otherwise deal in Ghee but was a dealer in Cloths only, that one of his customers used to keep ghee in his shop on occasions and used to sell the same outside in front of his shop and he also gave out the name and the residential address of that customer. A peculiar feature of this case was that the sole witness examined by the accused was also cited by the prosecution it self and was referred to by the Food Inspector in his deposition as the sole independent public witness and was also admitted to be the "adjacent shop-keeper". 3. IT cannot be disputed that the evidence of this witness is in perfect consonance with the defence-case as suggested in cross examination of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of the accused under Section 313. It cannot also be disputed that if, he testimony of this defence witness, admitted by the prosecution to be the "adjacent Shop-Keeper" and summoned by the prosecution to witness the occurrence, is believed, then the prosecution cannot be regarded to have been able to the case beyond reasonable doubt. Granting, as we must, that the two Courts below had the right, as well as the duty, to assess and appreciate the evidence and the right to accept or not to accept any testimony, such act, being obviously judicial, must be supported or supportable by reasons and the courts cannot obviously throw away the sworn testimony of witnesses on hypothetical conjecture or by more ipse, dixit. 4. THE law on the point is fairly well-settled since long, but sometimes we, like the Judges of the Courts below, do require a refresher course. Since the case at hand centres round the testimony of the Defence witness, thrown away by the Appellate Judge on the supposition that he might been tutored, we may profitably refer to the observations of Chandrachud, C. J. , speaking for the Bench in Dudh nath Pandey (IR1981 SC 911, para 19) to the effect that since defence witnesses are also entitled to equal treatment, no adverse presumption should be made "merely because hey were examined by the defence" and it is time that "the Courts. . . . . . overcome their traditional, instictive disbeliefin defence witnesses". A defence witnesses, like a prosecution witness, may not always tell the truth; but there cannot be any presumption that a witness, because he is summoned by the defence, is likely to pejure to help the defence. . . . . . overcome their traditional, instictive disbeliefin defence witnesses". A defence witnesses, like a prosecution witness, may not always tell the truth; but there cannot be any presumption that a witness, because he is summoned by the defence, is likely to pejure to help the defence. As pointed out by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in tashildar Singh v. State (AIR 1958 Allahabad 214 at 223), "when a person gives evidence on oath the presumption should be that he has sopken the truth - that is the oath he takes - and burden must lie on him who challenges the varacity of that statement to show that it is not true and if that burden is not discharged by any of the recognised legal methods, then a Court can have no legal justification for not relying on the evidence given on oath. Throwing over-board the sworn testimony of witnesses marely by using phrases like the statement does not ring true' or 'the statement does not carry conviction' is never legally sufficient. A Court has to give reasons for coming to the conclusion as to why 'the statement does not ring true' or 'the statement does not carry conviction' or why it does so". Relying on these observations in Tashilder Singh (supra). Beg, J. , (as his lordship then was in the Allahabad High Court), has ruled in chandrabhan Singh v. State (1971 Criminal Law Journal 94 to 99) that "the emption is that witness deposing on oaths solemnly taken are ises of truth" and 1 that presumption is displaced by some sufficiently good counter, balancing reason, their evidence cannot be discarded Reference may also be made to a three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, j. , in Iswari Prosad vs. Mohammad Is a ( AIR 1963 SC 1728 at 1734-1735), where it has been observed that in considering as to whether the evidence of the witness is to be accepted, the Court is no doubt to examine as to whether the witness is an interested witness and whether what has been deposed by him is probable and whether it has been shaken in cross-examination. And if these tests are satisfied, it would be unsafe to discard the evidence, otherwise not appearing to be improbable,, merely because some suggestions were made to witness without those suggestions being proved to be true. And if these tests are satisfied, it would be unsafe to discard the evidence, otherwise not appearing to be improbable,, merely because some suggestions were made to witness without those suggestions being proved to be true. If that is the approach which the law requires the Court to make before accepting or rejecting any evidence, then we have no doubt that the approach of the Courts below to the evidence of the defence witness, admittedly an adjacent shop-owner and referred to by the food Inspector himself as an "independent" witness, was legally wrong and vitiated the finding. As we have already indicated, if the evidence of the Defence witness is to be accepted, the prosecution would fail. A Courts erred in applying the well-established principles of Law and made a legally wrong approach in brushing aside the evidence, then we have no doubt that it would be our plainest duty to intervene, even while sitting in revision. Seeing, as we do, that the defence witness was prosecution's own witness, but has not been examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to them and not known to us, and finding further that he was admitted by the Food inspector himself to be the "adjacent shop-keeper" and "independent public witness" and not finding anything in his testimony to make it improon reasonable, we are inclined to hold that the Court acted illegally in ignoring the same on the hypothetical congecture that "d. W. 1 is local witness and it is just possible hat he has been prevailed upon by the accused". 5. IT is true that the accused, even if he was not the owner of or dealer in the Ghee, nevertheless handed over the samples and received the price and it is true that even sale of sample for analysis only is also a sale defined in Section 2 (xiii) of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act, 1954. But in order to amount to such a sale, the sample must be taken under Section 10, "a Food Inspector shall have power to take samples from any person selling the same". But in order to amount to such a sale, the sample must be taken under Section 10, "a Food Inspector shall have power to take samples from any person selling the same". True, storing or possessing or exposing for sale is also sale within the meaning of Suction 2 (xiii) But once we accept the testimony of the defence witness, we would have to hold that he accused was neither selling nor storing for sale the Ghee in question and therefore no sample could be taken from him under the law and accordingly such unauthorised taking of sample by the Food Inspector could not make the accused liable for selling or storing for sale the adulterated commodity. 6. WE accordingly allow be revision, set aside the order of conviction and sentence made and imposed by the trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate court, and acquit the accused and discharge him from the bail-bond. Let the records along with copy of our judgment go down at once. Revisional allowed.