Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This First Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Smt. R. Kumari, IXth Additional Subordinate Judge, ranchi in Money Suit No.121/58 of 1980-83, whereby and whereunder the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of a sura of Rs.2, 71, 557.78 paise was decreed in part. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff is a partnership firm registered under the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act and had entered into a contract with M/s central Coal Fields Ltd. through the General Manager (B and K) Bokaro and Kargali, P. O. Bermo, whereby and whereunder it gave on hire bulldozers to remove the heaps of over burden and to level the coal dumps in new Elected Dhori Colliery on hire at the rate of Rs.140/- per hour. 4. It appears that the bull-dozers of the plaintiff worked during the period 23-4-1975 to 17-10-1976 for 1218-66 hours, wherefor the requisite entries were made in the Log book (Ext.1 ). 5. The plaintiff prepared a bill which was misplaced by the office of the appellant. A fresh bill dated 10-8-1977 (Ext.2) was, therefore, sent by the plaintiff to the Manager of New selected Dhori Colliery (Respondent no.4) alongwith a letter dated 6-9-1977. 6. According to the plaintiff, as despite receipt of the said bill its lawful dues were not paid, it sent a notice dated 7-9-1977 addressed to the defendant-appellant No.2. 7. According to the plaintiff, the defendants acknowledged their liabilities to pay a sum of Rs.1, 70, 512.40 paise by reason of a note-sheet dated 20/30-9-1977, a copy whereof was forwarded to the plaintiff and which was marked as Ext.3/1. 8. The appellants in their written statement inter alia, contended that the suit was barred by limitation. It was further contended that prior sanction of the competent authority was not taken before placing order for engagement of the D-7 Dozers of the plaintiff. 9. It was further alleged that the competent authority turned down the recommendations on the ground that the post facto approval can not be agreed to. 10. According to the defendants-appellants, the aforementioned note-sheet dated 29-7-1977 (Annexure-3/1) and the letter dated 20/30-8-1977 do not constitute an acknowledgment so as to save limitation. 11. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned c ourt below framed the following issues:- "1. 10. According to the defendants-appellants, the aforementioned note-sheet dated 29-7-1977 (Annexure-3/1) and the letter dated 20/30-8-1977 do not constitute an acknowledgment so as to save limitation. 11. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned c ourt below framed the following issues:- "1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit ? 2. Is the suit maintainable as framed ? 3. Is the suit barred by law of limitation ? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree with interest as claimed in the plaint ? 5. To what relief or reliefs, if any, plaintiff is entitled ? 12. The learned court below answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and held that it is entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs.1,70,612.40 paise by way of hire charges on the Bull-dozers, but it instead of granting interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, as claimed by the plaintiff allowed interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 30-9-1977 i. e. from the date when the defendants acknowledged the claim ot the plaintiff. 13. Mr. Debi Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant appellant submitted that suit was not maintainable as against the defendant Nos.2 to 4. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that the defendant-appellant No.2 had no authority to enter into the contract on behalf of the appellan No.1, no decree could have been passed in favour of the plaintiff. 15. The learned counsel counsel further submitted that in any event, as the Bull-dozers in question operated during the period 23.4.1975 to 17.10.1976, the suit was barred by limitation as the same was filed after expiry of a period of three years from the said date as it was filed on 27.9.1980. 16. The learned counsel contended that in any event, the purported note-sheet dated 29.7.1977 (EXT.3/a) does not constitute acknowledgment within the meaning of Sec.18 of Limitation Act, 1963 . 17. It was further submitted that even if the period of limitation is counted from 10.8.1977, when the plaintiff submitted a fresh bill (Ext.2), still then the suit will be barred by limitation. 18. Mr. 17. It was further submitted that even if the period of limitation is counted from 10.8.1977, when the plaintiff submitted a fresh bill (Ext.2), still then the suit will be barred by limitation. 18. Mr. N. K. Prasad, the learnrd counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the suit was maintainable, in view of the fact that therein not only the officers of the defendant-appellant No.1 but also the Company itself was impleaded as party and thus the suit cannot be held to be defective. 19. The learned counsel next contended that the plea raised on behalf of the appellant, to the effect that the defendant No.2 was not authorised to enter into a contract of hiring a Bull-dozer with the plaintiff has not been proved. In any event, the plaintiff would be entitled to reimburse itself as the defendants benefitted themselves by the work carried out by the plaintiff, which was not intended to be done gratutiously. 20. With regard to the question of limitation, the learned counsel contended that the cause of action for filing the suit must be held to have arisen after the defendants denied and/or disputed their liabilities to pay the amount to the plaintiff. 21. The learned counsel contended that admittedly, a fresh bill dated 10.8.1977 (Ext.2) had to be issued by the plaintiff as the earlier bill submitted was misplaced. It was submitted that as the suit is based on the principle of quasi-contract as envisaged under Sec.70 the Indian contract Act, Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be attracted and cause of action for the suit must be held to have arisen when the defendants refused to pay the lawful dues of the plaintiff. The learned counsel, in this connection has relied upon in the State of Bihar V/s. Thawardas Pherumal (AIR 1964 Patna, 225) and in State of Bihar V/s. Rama bhushan Basu (AIR 1964 Patna, 326 ). 22. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the suit instituted an 27.10.1980 must be held to be within the briscnbed period of limitation. 23. The submissions made by Mr. 22. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the suit instituted an 27.10.1980 must be held to be within the briscnbed period of limitation. 23. The submissions made by Mr. Debi Prasad is wholly devoid of any merit as the suit has been instituted not only against the appellant no.1 which is a Company incorporated under Inaian Companies Act, 1956 but also against its officers who had some role to play at one stage or the other in relation to the transaction in question. 24. The officers of the defendant-appellant No.1 had to be impleaded in the suit as they had some role to play right from the grant of contract to the plaintiff to payment of his bill. The defendant No.4 verified the quantum of work done by the plaintiff and also recommended that the bill submitted by the plaintiff towards the hire charge should be settled the defendant No.2 also not only acted on behalf of the appellant No.1 in awarding the contract of hiring of Bulldozers at the rate of Rs.140/-per hour but also verified the quantum of the work and recommended payment therefor. The suit, therefore, can not be said to be not maintainable. 25. It is undisputed that the Buldozers belonging to the plaintiff commenced work from 3-4-1975 for removal of the heaps of over burden and to level the coal dumps in new selected Dhori colliery and worked upto 17-10-1976. The relevant entires in the Log book maintained by the defendants-appellants themselves, a copy whereof has been marked as ext.1, prove the contentions of the plaintiffs. 26. Despite service of notice, the defendants-appellants have not produced the original of the aforementioned log book before the trial court. It has also not been disputed that the bulldozers of the plaintiff were engaged for 1918.66 hours and the hire charges therefore were settled at Rs.140/- per hour. The aforementioned fact, apart from the oral and evidences adducing by the plaintiff has been proved by Ext.1 (carbon copy of the Log book) and Ext.2 (carbon copy of the bill dated 10-8-1977 ). 27. These facts have not been disputed or denied by the defendants. From the letter dated 29-7-1977, which was marked as Ext.7, it appears that the same was issued by the appellant No.2 to the General manager, Central Coal Fields Ltd. Ranchi in respect of non-payment of the bill of the plain tiff firm. 27. These facts have not been disputed or denied by the defendants. From the letter dated 29-7-1977, which was marked as Ext.7, it appears that the same was issued by the appellant No.2 to the General manager, Central Coal Fields Ltd. Ranchi in respect of non-payment of the bill of the plain tiff firm. In the said letter, it has clearly been stated by the appellant No.2 that the sanction of payment of bill had not been received by the Headquarters and the same would be paid as soon as the sanction is received. 28. The plaintiff has further proved two letters dated 16-8-1977 (Exts.4 and 4/a) wherein, it complained about the non-payment of his bill towards hire charged. By reason of the said letters, the plaintiff demanded interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. The plaintiff has further proved a notice dated 7-5-1983 which was marked as Ext.6. 29. The learned court below has held that the defendants have not brought any evidence on record to show that the recommendation of the defendant-appellant No.2 was turned down as no prior sanction for grant of contract was obtained. The only witness who has been examined in this case on behalf of the defendant was one Amar Nath Bhattacharya. He was merely proved the delegation of power which was given to the general Manager, which has been marked as Ext. A. 30. The defendants have specifically raised a plea that the contract purported to have been entered into by the defendants-appellant No.2 with the plaintiff was void and of no effect. The defendants, as noticed hereinbefore, proved the delegation of power to the Area General Manager, which was marked as Ext. A. 31. Amar Nath Bhattacharya, DW 1 Categorically stated that the power of the defendant No.2 to hire machineries from any person other than the government or government agencies was limited to the extent of rs.5,000/- per annum which was subsequently raised to Rs.10,000/- per annum. 32. It further appears that even in respect of the acceptance of tender, the power of the General Manager to issue work order is only upto value of Rs.10,000/-32-A. Clause 14 of the said delegation of power read as follows :- "14 (a) Power to hire and sanction hire charges for mobile equipment, machinery from other Government department, Corporation etc. 32. It further appears that even in respect of the acceptance of tender, the power of the General Manager to issue work order is only upto value of Rs.10,000/-32-A. Clause 14 of the said delegation of power read as follows :- "14 (a) Power to hire and sanction hire charges for mobile equipment, machinery from other Government department, Corporation etc. (b) Power to hire and sanction hire charges for mobile equipments, machinery from private agencies upto Rs.5,000/- in a year under intimation to the Managing Director with a certificate that such equipment and machinery was not available from any government department, Corporation etc. this, however, does not include the hiring of taxi. If at any time hiring of taxi is required specific sanction should be obtained from the Head-qurters. " 33. The plaintiff has not been able to show by bringing any material on records that the contract was rectified at a later stage by the Company. 34. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the defendant-appellant No.2 had no jurisdiction to take the bulldozers on hire from the plaintiff on a hire charges at the rate of Rs.140/- per hour. 35. The said contract was, therefore, void. The question which, therefore, arises, as to whether despite the same, the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for recovery of the amount in suit from the defendants or not. 36. Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act read as follows :- Section 65.-"obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void. When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or To make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. " section 70.-"obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act. Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. " section 70.-"obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act. Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. " 37 From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions, therefore, it is evident that in a case where contract comes to be known as void or some goods are supplied without there being any contract which was not intended to be done gratuitously, the plaintiff may recover compensation to the extent that defendants derived benefit therefrom. 38. In Mulamchand V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 1218 , it was held:- "the provisions of Sec.70 can be invoked by the aggrieved party to the void contract. The first condition to be satisfied under the section is that a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him ; the second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must not intend to act gratuitously ; and the third condition is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is devivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. If these conditions are satisfied Sec.70 imposes upon the letter person the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore the thing, so done or delivered. " 39. The aforementioned decisions was followed by the Supreme court subsquently in Badri Prasad V/s. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1970 SC 706 ; The State of U. P. another V/s. Murari Lal and brothers Ltd. , AIR 1971 SC 2210 and in A. Damodaran and another v State of Kerala and others, AIR 1976 SC 1533 . 40. In terms of the principles as laid down in Sec.70 of the Indian contract Act, the defendants cannot be absolved from their liabilities to reimburse the plaintiff to the extent of the benefit derived by it. It is not the case of the defendants that the hiring charges were unreasonable high or the same was not the prevailing market-rate. 41. In this case, it is clear that by reason of the work done by the plaintiff, the defendants benefitted themselves. It is not the case of the defendants that the hiring charges were unreasonable high or the same was not the prevailing market-rate. 41. In this case, it is clear that by reason of the work done by the plaintiff, the defendants benefitted themselves. It is not further not the case of any party that the plaintiff intended to do the same gratuitously. 42. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff must be held to be entitled to the amount to the extent, the defendants benefitted themselves, in terms of the principles of quantum meruit. 43. In fact, the defendant nos.2 and 4 acknowledged that the plaintiffs bulldozers worked for 1218.66 hours and the hire charges in respect of the said Bulldozers at the rate of Rs.140/-per hour has not been stated to be unreasonable or no a higher side nor any evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defendants to show that what was the normal hiring charges. 44. For the reasons aforementioned the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants must be rejected. Re-Contention No.3 45. The learned court below, while deciding the issue of limitation being issue no.3 has relied upon Ext.3/a which is notesheet dated 29.9.1977/30.9.1977 and it was held that the same constitutes an acknowledgment within the meaning of Sec.18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . 46. The aforementioned Ext.3/a reads as follows:- "placed below is a bill from M/s Nawa Jiwan Trading Company kargali for hiring of D-7 Dozer at N. S. D. Colliery for 1218.40 hours @ Rs.140/-per hour during the period from 23.4.75 to 17.10.76 for Rs.1,70,612.40 p. The relevant file was sent to the Headquarter vide this Office letter no. GM (B and K)/hiring Dozer/4190 dated 4.12.1976 for approval of the Competent authority, but it has been informed that the same file is not traceable at Headquarters. Inspite of thorough search and queries from the officers concerned at headquarter, it has not been possible to trace out the file. Therefore, the attached bill for Rs.1,70,612.40 p. is submitted herewith for approval. I have got the entries of the bills checked from the Log book maintained at the Colliery. The Colliery Manager N. S. D. has also certified that the work has been done and payment for 1218.40 hours has to be made. " 47. Therefore, the attached bill for Rs.1,70,612.40 p. is submitted herewith for approval. I have got the entries of the bills checked from the Log book maintained at the Colliery. The Colliery Manager N. S. D. has also certified that the work has been done and payment for 1218.40 hours has to be made. " 47. There can not be any doubt that the defendant-appellant no.2 and the defendant no.4 admitted the quantum of the work done by the plaintiff as also the rate for doing the said work. 48. The question however arises for consideration is as to whether the same would amount to an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 18 of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows :- "effect of acknowledgmedt in writing (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit of application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledment was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed ; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation :- For the purpose of this Section- (a) An acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property, of right, or avers that the time of payment, delivery performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompained by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right, (b) the word "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right. " 49 From a perusal of the aforementioned provision, it is evident that not only the jural relationship of debtor and creditor should be admitted but the admission of liability of the debtor must clearly or by necessary implication be made. 50. In Shapoor Fredom Mazda V/s. Durga Prasad Chamaria and others, air 1961 SC, 1236, it was held that in construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgment rests, oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. 51. It was further held that generally, Courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statement though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastend on the maker of the statement by an involved or far fetched process of reasoning. (Italic is mine for emphasis) 52. From a perusal of the note-sheet (Ext.3/a) aforementioned, it appears that the same can not constitute an acknowledgement within the meaning of Sec.18 of the Act. 53. An acknowledgement has to be made in writing. Explanation (b)appended to Sec.18 signifies the word "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf. 54. Fxt.3/a is merely a note-sheet. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant-appellant No.2 was duly authorised by the appellant No.1 to make any acknowledgement on its behalf. 55. As indicated hereinbefore, from Ext. A i. e. the delegation of power by the appellant-Company in favour of Area General Manager from the evidence of DW 1 as also from Ext.1, it appears that Area General manager was authorised to enter into a contract of hiring machineries etc. for a total sum of Rs.5,000/- for a year, which according to the DW 1 has now been raised to Rs.10,000/-. 56. Nothing has been pointed out before me that in terms of Ext. A aforementioned, the defendant No.2 was authorised to make an acknowledgement on behalf of the debtor namely, the defendant No.1. 57. Ext.3/a is merely a notesheet, such a notesheet was issued for internal use of the office of the defendant-appellant No.1. Therein, merely a recommendation was made by the defendant Nos.3 and 4 that the amount claimed by the plaintiff should be paid to it. 57. Ext.3/a is merely a notesheet, such a notesheet was issued for internal use of the office of the defendant-appellant No.1. Therein, merely a recommendation was made by the defendant Nos.3 and 4 that the amount claimed by the plaintiff should be paid to it. 58. Further, from Ext.7, it is evident that the appellant No.2 himself stated that the sanction for the payment due to the plaintiff has not yet been received and payment should be made to it as soon as the sanction therefor is received. 59. These two exhibits namely, Exts.3, 4 and Ext.7 was not even issued by disbursing authority and for any payment which was required to be made by the plaintiff, he had to obtain necessary sanction therefor from the finance department of the appellant No.1. 60. In such a situation, in my opinion, the learned court below cannot be said to have rightly held that Ext 3/a and Ext.7 would constitute an acknowledgement within the meaning of Sec.18 of the Act. 61. In M/s. Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. V/s. Aluminium corporation of India Ltd. , AIR 1971 SC, 1482, the Supreme Court followed the decisions of Shapoor Preedom Mazda V/s. Durga Prasad Chamaria and others, AIR 1961 SC, 1236 as also Tilak Ram and others V/s. Nathu and others, air 1967 SC page 935 and held:- "it is clear that the statement on which the plea of acknowledgement is founded must relate to a subsisting liability as the section required that it must be made before the expiration of the period prescribed under the Act. It ned not, however, amount to a promise to pay, for an acknowledgement does not create a new right of action but merely extends the period of limitation. The statement need not indicate the exact nature or the specific character of the liability. The words used in the statement in question, however, must relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties, such as, for instance, that of a debtor and a creditor, and the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. Generally speaking a liberal construction of the statement in question should be given. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. Generally speaking a liberal construction of the statement in question should be given. That of course does not mean that where a statement is made without intending to amit the existence of jural relationship. such intention should be fastened on the person making the statement by an involved and far-fetched reasoning. " 62. In Baidyanath Mandal and others V/s. The Coal Purchase and inspection Agency (P.) Ltd. Liquidation, AIR 1971 Patna, 229, it was held that : "as per the statements in the letter relied on as acknowledgement of liability were vague and it could not be inferred that they amounted to acknowledgment of existing liability, the letter could not be construed as an acknowiedgement of liability even though the letter was sent in reply to a reminder for payment of outstanding liability. " In this situation, it must be held that the finding of the learned trial court to the effect that the suit is saved by reason of the purported acknowledgement cannot be upheld. 63 Articles 18 and 113 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation act read as follows:- "article 18 and 113" description of suit period of Limitation time from which period begins to run for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. Three years when the work is done any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule. Three years when the right to sue accrues. 64 The question, which now arises for consideration is whether the suit will be governed by Article 18 or Article 113 of Limitation Act. 65. It is true that normally for the purpose of computation of period of limitation, the applicability of one or the other Articles contained in the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 , would mainly depend on the allegetions made in the plaint. However, for that purpose the Court cannot shuit it eyes to the material of records. In such a case, in my opinion, the matter has to be judged on the basis of proved facts. 66. However, for that purpose the Court cannot shuit it eyes to the material of records. In such a case, in my opinion, the matter has to be judged on the basis of proved facts. 66. The plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit for recovery of a sum on the basis of a contract but it has been now held that the suit can only be decreed on the basis of quantum meruit. 67. In this case, prior to the institution of the suit, the plaintiff was not made aware of the fact that the defendant-appellant No.2 was not authorised to enter into a contract of hiring bull-dozers with him on behalf of the Company. 68. In this view of the matter, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be held have been aware of that the contract was void by reason of having been entered into by the defendant No.2, who was not authorised by the defendant-appellant No.1 therefore. The plaintiff, therefore, proceeded to file the suit for recovery of the amount on the basis of a valid contract. 69. However, it is well known that if a suit can be decreed as being one for payment of compensation, on the materials brought on record in terms of Sec.70 of the Contract Act, the same shall be governed by article 18 thereof. 70. Article 18 applies in a case where the plaintiff had sued for the price for the work done by him at the request of the defendants which implies existence of a valid contract. 71. When, however, a contract is discovered to be void, the limitation for a suit for recovery of the advantage under Sec.65 the Indian contract Act runs from the date of discovery from the contract becoming void. 72. In Kara Lukose V/s. Chacko Uthuppan, AIR 1957 Kerala, 19, a Full bench of the Kerala High Court considered this aspect of the matter and laid down the law in the following terms:- Para 11.-"such a conclusion no doubt leads to the anomally of suits on contract having a period of limitation of three years and of quasi-coneract coming under limitation of six years. The anomally, however, appears to be unavoidable in the present state of the law and will certainly disappear if the suggestion of the Law Commission in their 3rd Report is adopted. The anomally, however, appears to be unavoidable in the present state of the law and will certainly disappear if the suggestion of the Law Commission in their 3rd Report is adopted. The suggestion is that term contract be defined as follows : "contract" shall have the same meaning as in the Indian Contract act (IX of 1872) and includes an obligation imposed by law to restore or to make restitution of any benefit derived by a person, on the basis of unjust enrichment. It was further held : "according to Sec.108 (q) of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 a lessee of immovable property, in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property on the determination of the lease and in Mt. Sukh Devi V/s. Lakshinarayan, 1946 All LJ 305 (2) : air 1947 All 31 (E), it was held that the Article applicable for a claim compensation or damages for breach of the liability is Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court said: "the plaintiff is claiming compensation or damages for breach of the liability and although she has chosen to put the claim in the form of an arithmetical calculation basis on the period for which she was kept out of possession, she was perfectly entitled to claim the sum of indeed any large or smaller sum which she might fix as a suitable amount of compensation for breach of Statutory duty which lay upon the defendant" and that "the learned Munsif was perfectly right in holding that the case fell within the scope of Article 120 and he was, therefore, right in decreeing the plaintiffs case as made by her. " 73. In the State of Bihar V/s. Thawardas Pherumal, AIR 1964 Patna 225, a Division Bench of this Court also held that a claim based on section 70 of the Indian Contract Act will be governed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. The learned judges held : "section 70 of the Indian Contract Act provides that where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make a compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore the thing so done or delivered. Applying the provisions of section 70 to the present case, the plaintiff has to prove that (1) it did the work for the defendant (2) it did not intend to do if gratutitously, and (3) the defendant enjoyed the benefit of the work. There can be no dispute that the plaintiff has undertaken to complete the work in question and it completed it in usual course and this work was done for the defendant. The plaintiff while doing the work had an element of self interest inasmuch as the defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiff additional sums on account of the increase in the labour rates. The work was not done voluntarily. Benefit as well was the work done by the plaintiff. I am thus of the opinion that the condition for the applicability of Sec.70 have been fulfilled and the defendant is bound to compensate the plaintiff for the work done. " The learned Judges further held :- "the first letter relevant in this connection is exhibit 1 (b) dated 26-12-1952 sent by the plaintiff to the Construction Engineer reminding him that he and the Superintending Engineer had given an assurance that its claim for the increment in the rates would be favourably considered after making certain enquiries. The plaintiff by this letter requested for an early settlement of the claim. On 15-1-1955, the plaintiff sent another letter, exhibit 1 (c) to the Construction Engineer for an early decision of the claim inasmuch as another contractor Telu Ram Jain had been already allowed additional sums on account of the increase in labour rates. The Chief Engineer, Public Health engineering Department, then made an enquiry on 3-3-1955 by a letter Exhibit 1 (k), from the Chief Engineer Central Public works Department, as to whether Telu Ram Jain had been paid additional sums. On 1-7-1953 the plaintiff gave details of the claim to the tune of Rs.2032/4/14 vide Exhibit 1 (d) and on 15-7-1953 the Executive Engineer recommended that the plaintiff should be paid Rs.113824/- vide Exhibit 1 (1 ). " 74. In the case, it was held that as the plaintiffs right to get the additional sum was denied on 3-3-1954, and the suit having been filed on 30-8-1956 ; the same was not barred by limitation. 75. " 74. In the case, it was held that as the plaintiffs right to get the additional sum was denied on 3-3-1954, and the suit having been filed on 30-8-1956 ; the same was not barred by limitation. 75. The same Bench in the State of Bihar V/s. Rama Bhushan Basu, AIR 1964 Patna, 325 held that the answer of the question as to when the cause of action arose would depend upon the procedure and terms for payment of the bills submitted by the plaintiff. 76. In M/s Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. V/s. The Union of India, MR 1971 calcutta 219, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held as follows :- "it would appear from the evidence that no payment could be demanded and no payment was to be made until the bills presented by the plaintiff had been checked and verified by the defendant. Ext. E (f) is a letter from an officer of the Union of india to another officer dated 20th October, 1953. It shows quite clearly that the plaintiff was agreeable to accept the sum of Rs.10,901.80 and the bills were forwarded for verification and allocation and early return by one officer to another. Therefore, there was admittedly a liability on the 20th October, 1953. The bills had not even then been properly and finally checked and the suit having been instituted on the 19th of may, 1954 would be within time in any view of the matter. " 77. This aspect of the matter has again been considered by another division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jadavendra Narayan V/s. State of West Bengal and orders, AIR 1985 Calcutta, 215, wherein the said High court followed its earlier decision reported in AIR 1921 Calcutta, page-93, air 1971 Calcutta page 150 and AIR 1974 Calcutta, 231. 78. In this case, the basic facts are not denied. Although, the work commenced from 23-4-1975 to 17-10-1976, the bills submitted by the plaintiff was lost. The plaintiff as per advise of the Officers of the defendant no.1 had to submit a fresh bill on 10-8-1977 (Ext.2 ). 79. 78. In this case, the basic facts are not denied. Although, the work commenced from 23-4-1975 to 17-10-1976, the bills submitted by the plaintiff was lost. The plaintiff as per advise of the Officers of the defendant no.1 had to submit a fresh bill on 10-8-1977 (Ext.2 ). 79. The defendant No.2 admitted that the plaintiff had done the work and assured him of payment in terms of the note sheet dated 29-9-1977 (Ext.3/a) and his letter dated 29-7-1977 (Ext.7) wherein, the plaintiff was intimated : "we have not received the sanction of the Head-quarter and the payment will be made as soon as the sanction is received. " 80. In such a situation, the plaintiff was expected to wait only for a reasonable period for receiving the payment and in the facts and circumstances of this case, the suit filed by it on 27-9-1980 cannot be said to be barred under the law of limitation. 81. The principle for determining as to when the cause of action arises is that which makes the action possible. It is now well known that for determining the question as to when the cause of action arises, it must be left to the court to determine what constitutes the cause of action in each case applying the well established principles to prove facts. 82. In this case, the difference in phraseology used in Articles 18 and 113 respectively as to the time from which period begins to run may be noticed. Whereas in terms of Article 18, the period begins to run when the work is done but in terms of Article 113, the time from which the period begins to run is when the cause of action for suit accrued. 83. It is now clear from the decisions referred to hereinbefore that the starting point of limitation should be the date when the defendants expressly or by necessary implication repudiated claim of the compensation made by the plaintiff. 84. It is well settled principles of law of limitation that where two articles on such law may be wide enough to cover a given right of suit and it can be postulated of neither of them that the one applies more specifically than the other; then court should lean in favour of the application of the provision which would keep the right of suit alive in preference to that which would destroy it. (See Nathulal V/s. Sualal and others, AIR 1962 Rajasthan, 83 ). 85. In this view of the matter, the claim of the plaintiff must be held to be not barred under the law of limitation. 86. As the plaintiffs suit has been found to be maintainable on the basis of the quasi-contract in terms of Sec.70 of the Indian contract Act, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any interest as no interest was payable on compensation which was to be determined in the suit itself. 87. That portion of the judgment, therefore, whereby the learned court below has granted interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum with effect from 30th September, 1977 upto the date of realisation is set aside. 88. The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of decree passed by the learned court below till realisation. 89. In the premises, this appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed partly.