JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. 1. The petition is directed against acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the construction of a residential colony by the Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'ADA'). There is two- strong attack on the notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The first ground of challenge is that the proceedings are barred under section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The second ground, urged more vehemently than the first, is that the petitioners had, at the relevant point of time, become the owners of the disputed plot, viz., plot no. 67 measuring 10 Biswas and yet no notice was issued to them under section 9 (3) of the said Act. The acquisition proceedings are thus invalid. 2. Before we proceed to deal with these points, we may briefly set out a few relevant facts. The total area of land sought to be acquired was 127 Bighas 2 Biswas. Acquisition was for planned development, more precisely, a housing colony. The notification dated 17-2-1987 issued for this purpose under section 4 was published on 17-2-87. The notice also contained a direction under section 17 (4) of the Act that in view of the urgency of the matter, the provisions of section 5-A are being dispensed with. The notification under section 4 was followed by the notification dated 13-3-87 under section 6 published in the gazette of the same date containing the declaration that the land was required for a public purpose and the same was published in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality on the 3rd and 4th April, 1987. The public notice of the substance of the declaration under section 6 was caused to be made at convenient places in the locality in question on 13-4-87. In due course notices were issued under section 9 (1) to (3). The petitioners, however, allege that notice under sub-section (3) of section 9 was not served on them We are, however, not dilating on this dispute as we shall presently demonstrate that the same shall have no bearing on the validity of the acquisition proceedings. Finally, possession over the entire area sought to be acquired was delivered to the ADA on 25-11-87 and a full fledged housing colony has come up over the land acquired. Finally, possession over the entire area sought to be acquired was delivered to the ADA on 25-11-87 and a full fledged housing colony has come up over the land acquired. In course of time, an award was made on 31-3-89 determining the compensation on the basis of the claims of various occupiers, persons entitled or interested in the land. The present petition was thereafter presented on 12-5-89. 4. We cannot agree. The argument ignores that the outer limit of two years under section 11-A has to be calculated from 'the date of the publication of the declaration.' The term 'date of the publication of the declaration' has been defined in sub-section (2) of section 6 as the last of the dates of the three modes of publication mentioned in that sub-section. These are, (1) publication of the notification in the gazette, (2) publication in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality, and (3) public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given by the Collector at convenient places in the said locality. Now in the present case the position is that though the declaration under section 6 was published in the gazette on 13-3-87, the same was published in two daily newspapers on 3-4-87 and 4-4-87 while public notice of the substance of the declaration was caused to be made by the Collector in the locality only on 13-4-87. That being so, the award could be made upto 13-4-89. The award made on 31-3-89 was hence well within the outer limit of the prescribed time The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the award had not in fact been made on 31-3-89 but it has been deliberately ante-dated by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to save the acquisition proceedings from lapsing. Reliance was placed on the various assertions made in the petition to the effect that when the first petitioner approached the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 29-4-89 and enquired about the award the latter asked him to move a formal application setting out the query. The petitioner complied with that observation and submitted a written application which was received in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer. A similar application was again filed but no reply was given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Instead he declined to accept the same. The petitioner complied with that observation and submitted a written application which was received in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer. A similar application was again filed but no reply was given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Instead he declined to accept the same. It was thus apparent that no award had been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer till 29-4-89. 5. These allegations have been denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents. The counter affidavit has been verified by the Land Acquisition Officer posted in ADA. In paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit it has been averred that the ADA had elicited specific information from the Special Land Acquisition Officer vide its letter dated 7-4-89 whether the award had been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. In response to this query, the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer stated that the award had already been made on 31-3-89. As regards the applications and query made by the petitioner the assertion in the said counter affidavit is that the petitioners were simply interested in creating grounds for the writ petition inasmuch as without waiting for the reply to the query made on 29-4-89, the petitioners rushed to this Court and presented the petition alleging that the award had not been made within time. Besides this the respondents had also produced the entire record containing the award for the perusal of the court on 16-5-89. After perushing the award dated 31-3-89 the record was returned and the respondents were directed to file a supplementary affidavit along with a copy of the award. That was done. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perushed the voluminous affidavits exchanged between the parties we find it difficult to accept the petitioners' case that the award had been ante-dated. Indubitably, the plea raised by the petitioners implies a serious charge, no less than a charge of forgery or fabrication of the record. Such a serious plea cannot be sustained unless there is reliable and convincing evidence which is completely lacking in the present case. A finding on such a crucial issue cannot be returned In favour of the petitioners on mere suspicion, conjectures and surmises. Such a serious plea cannot be sustained unless there is reliable and convincing evidence which is completely lacking in the present case. A finding on such a crucial issue cannot be returned In favour of the petitioners on mere suspicion, conjectures and surmises. The mere circumstance, even if it is assumed to have been established, that the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not reply to the petitioners' query before the writ petition was filed cannot justify the inference that the award had been forged and ante-dated. In this connection, it may also be borne in mind that 127 Bighas of land was acquired affecting hundreds of people. An equally large number of people also submitted claims for compensation in response to the notices issued under section 9 of the Act. On their claims compensation has been determined by the impugned award. Even Ram Autar from whom the petitioners claim to have purchased the disputed land filed a claim for compensation and the same was determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. None of the hundreds of affected person questioned the genuineness of the award apart from a challenge based on merits. 7. Not only this, a representative petition was filed in this court, being writ petition no. 5831 of 1989 (which was dismissed on 27-2-1990) by a society called Rajrooppur Jan Hitkari Samiti on behalf of the residents of village Kasari Masari wherein lies the acquired land. In the counter affidavit filed in that petition, it was clearly stated that the award was made on 31-3-1989. Significantly, this was not disputed by the petitioners. 8. In view of the facts noticed above, we are unable to accept the plea that the award has been ante-dated. That brings us to the second contention based on the alleged non- service of notice under section 9 (3) of the Act. The submission of the learned counsel was that petitioners had purchased the land from Ram Autar aforesaid and their names had been mutated and incorporated in the khatauni of 1387-F to 1392-F on 8-9-86. In spite of this no notice was served on the petitioners under section 9 (3) of the Act. Considerable debate took place at the Bar on the question whether the petitioners' name had been mutated in the year in which the impugned acquisition proceedings were initiated. In spite of this no notice was served on the petitioners under section 9 (3) of the Act. Considerable debate took place at the Bar on the question whether the petitioners' name had been mutated in the year in which the impugned acquisition proceedings were initiated. The stand taken by the petitioners was that their names had already been mutated in the khatauni of that year. The ADA, on the other hand, produced a khatauni before us of the same period in which the name of the petitioners' predecessor, namely, Ram Autar, continued to be recorded. The learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the entire acquisition proceedings stood vitiated by reason of the failure of the ADA to serve individual notices on the petitioners under section 9 (3). 9. As we shall presently demonstrate, it is unnecessary to enter into this controversy, purely factual as it is. There is considerable judicial authority in the shape of decisions of almost all the High Courts as to the effect of non-service or irregularity in the service of notice under section 9 (3). The view unanimously expressed by the High Courts is that unless the non- service of the notice is deliberate or malafide on the part of the officers charged with the duty of service of notice under section 9 (3), the omission to serve notice under section 9 (3) does not have the effect of invalidating the acquisition proceedings. 10. We start with the decision of our own Court rendered in writ petition no. 5831 of 1989 (supra) which was directed against this very acquisition. Incidentally the petitioners' vendor Ram Autar was also a member of the society through which the inhabitants of the concerned locality had challenged the acquisition proceedings. Repelling the contention that the acquisition proceedings were liable to be quashed on the ground that the occupiers had not been served with the notice under section 9 (3), the Bench stated the law thus : "Secondly issuance of notice under sub-section (3) of section 9 has no effect on the validity of the acquisition proceedings, where, as here, provisions of sub-section (4) of section 17 have been invoked. Sub-section (1) of section 17 provides that in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1) take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. As mentioned above in the present case this provision was applicable in view of the fact that the State Government had directed under sub-section (4) of section 17 that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply. In our opinion, notice under sub-section (3) of section 9 is intended only for the purpose of determination of compensation. That being so, the impugned acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed even if the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted.' (emphasis added Much the same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Madras High Court in the case of Kasturi Pillai v the Municipal Council, Erode, reported in ILR XLIII Madras 280 at 281. Their Lordships observed : "Assuming that such service has not been sufficiently proved in the present case, section 12 provides that the award shall be final and conclusive, whether the persons interested have appeared or not, as to the question which can be dealt with by the Collector under section 11, subject to the right of the party to require a reference to the Court under section 18. The declaration made by the Government under section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land is needed for the purposes sanctioned by the Act. All that the parties interested can urge before the Collector is that the area of the land is not properly stated, the compensation proposed is insufficient and the amount has been wrongly divided amongst them. The declaration made by the Government under section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land is needed for the purposes sanctioned by the Act. All that the parties interested can urge before the Collector is that the area of the land is not properly stated, the compensation proposed is insufficient and the amount has been wrongly divided amongst them. The defendant had noticed of the award under section 12 and his remedy was, therefore, to apply for a reference under section 18, and no other remedy is provided by the Act." In Laxmanrao Kristrao v. The Provincial Government of Bombay, AIR 1950 Bombay 334, a Division Bench comprising two celebrated Judges Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice of India then was) and Chief Justice Chagla had occasion to consider the effect of the failure to serve notice under section 9 (3) on a person claiming to be the owner of the land in question. Their Lordships ruled that the acquisition cannot be challenged on that ground unless it was proved that omission was wilful or fraudulent. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act must have its full operation and that it is only when the omission of the Collector to serve the notice is perverse or deliberate that the acquisition proceedings can be held to be vitiated. Section 12 of the Act provides that upon the filing of the award in the Collector's office the same shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectfully appeared before the Collector or not, of a true area and value of the land. Section 16 of the Act lays down that when the Collector has made an award under section 11 he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government. Relying on these provisions and the scheme of the Act, the Bench observed at page 335, second column : "Therefore, it is only colourable and mala fide proceedings which prevent the land under acquisition vesting in Government. Relying on these provisions and the scheme of the Act, the Bench observed at page 335, second column : "Therefore, it is only colourable and mala fide proceedings which prevent the land under acquisition vesting in Government. But where the proceedings are bona fide and not colourable, section 16 must have its full effect, and it is only when the action of the Collector is perverse or he wilfully refused to give notice as required by section 9 (3) that it could be said that the acquisition proceedings are vitiated and the property does not vest in Government under section 16." 11. The view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in the case of She bait of Sri Sri Brindaban Jiu Thakurbroja Bhusan Saran Dev Guru v. Raja Nripendra Narayan Chandradhvaree, 76 CLJ 430 at 434 and 435 is completely in line with these decisions. The law was summed up by the Hon'ble Judges thus at 434 and 435 : "Considering the scheme of the Act, that the main question that can be agitated by a person to whom notice might be given was merely the amount of compensation, and that any such person still has reserved to him under Section 31 a right to claim from the person actually receiving compensation any amount to which he may consider himself entitled; considering further the difficulties likely to arise if every failure to comply with the details of the proceedings of acquisition is to render them null and void we can see no reason to think that the failure to give this notice must be given such importance that the provisions must be held to be of a highly mandatory character such as that the failure to follow it will render the whole proceedings null and void and inoperative. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point." 12. Finally we may refer to another decision that of our own Court, Jagarnath Prasad Shah v. The Municipal Board, Benares, AIR 1948 Alld 446, in which it was held that there is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act which requires that the Collector has to give notice under Section 9 (3) to the real owner and that if a mistake which is not deliberate or perverse is made in serving the notice on the real owner, the whole proceedings are vitiated. It further held that when publication under Section 9 (1) has been made near the land in question it is the duty of the real owner to come forward and file any objection under Section 9 (2). Speaking for the Court, the learned Judges observed at 447 : "The object behind sub-section (3) of Section 9 is that as far as possible the Collector may inform the person who is known or believed to be interested; but it does not reguire that if the Collector cannot find out the name of the persons who is interested or makes a bona fide mistake the proceedings are vitiated. It would appear from sub-section (1) that the object of issuing notice is to enable the persons interested in the land to claim compensation. The persons interested have to state the nature of their respective interests and the amount and particulars of their claims to compensations for such interest and they can also object to the measurements made under Section 9 to object to the acquisition of the land being made on the ground that the proceedings were either irregular or were, for some other reason, bad. We, therefore, see no force in the contention of learned counsel that because the Collector did not serve notice on Hari Das Rastogi and Narshingh Das the whole proceedings were vitiated." It will thus be seen that there is a complete unanimity amongst the various High Courts as to the effect of omission to serve a notice under Section 9 (3) on the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The present case stands on a higher footing in that here the vesting of the property in the Government was no dependent on the making of the award inasmuch as the provisions of Section 17 (1) were applicable. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 provides that in cases of urgency whenever the Government so directs the Collector, though no such award has been made, he may on the expiration of fifteen days from the notice mentioned in Section 9 (1) take possession of the land and thereupon the land shall vest absolutely in the Government. The omission or irregularity in the service of notice under Section 9 (3) will, therefore, hardly have any effect on the validity of acquistion proceedings. The ratio of the decisions cited above shall, therefore, apply with greater force and validity to the instant case. 13. The omission or irregularity in the service of notice under Section 9 (3) will, therefore, hardly have any effect on the validity of acquistion proceedings. The ratio of the decisions cited above shall, therefore, apply with greater force and validity to the instant case. 13. The petitioners do not allege in the present case that the omission to serve notice on them was deliberate, colourable or malafide. At any rate, the petitioners have totally failed to establish that the omission was deliberate or land and consequently, it was urged, notice should have been served upon them under Section 9 (3). Extracts of revenue records were pointed out in this connection. The material furnished by the petitioners do not, however, establish that the Collector acted otherwise than in good faith. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the petitioners do not even allege that the Collector had not issued public notice under Section 9 (1) and 9 (2). The allegation of non-service was confined only to Section 9 (3). 14. As already observed it is unnecessary to enter into the question whether the petitioners were the real owners of the property or that their names were duly entered in the revenue records in the relevant year so as to entitle to be served with a notice under Section 9 (3) in view of the fact that the omission, if at all, does not have the effect of invalidating the acquisition proceedings. According to the settled view expressed by the Courts the only right which the petitioners now possess is to claim compensation in appropriate proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, such as Section 18 or Section 31 thereof. It is sufficient for our purpose that the petitioners' case is not that the omission of the Collector, if at all, to serve notice on the petitioners under Section 9 (3) was deliberate or colourable or malafide. So much for the challenge to the validity of the acquisition proceedings. We next turn to the contention that in the impurnged notifications there is no delineation of the disputed plot i.e., the areas purchased by the petitioners have not been shown separately. There is no merit in this argument. Though the petitioners' claim to have purchased portions of the plot with reference to areas it was not their case that the plots had been sub-divided on the spot or in the revenue records or map. There is no merit in this argument. Though the petitioners' claim to have purchased portions of the plot with reference to areas it was not their case that the plots had been sub-divided on the spot or in the revenue records or map. There was thus no lack of particularity in the description of the plot. 15. Before concluding, we may observe that the two things must be kept apart the validity of the award and the petitioners' right to claim compensation upon proof that they are the real owners of the property in appropriate proceedings. Our decision, therefore, that the acquisition is valid does not effect the right of the petitioners to claim compensation either by' way of a reference under Section 18 or also under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, whichever may be appropriate, as ruled by the Calcutta High Court in the case cited above, subject of course to the petitioners establishing their claim thereto. If, therefore, they make the appropriate application within a month of the date of the delivery of this judgment for compensation, the objection as to the bar of limitation may be treated as waived in view of the fact that the petition has been pending here for quite some time. 16. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to claim compensation is appropriate proceedings. The interim orders stand discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs.