H.K-Sema, J — Ojie Jar and Kechu Jar in Mongsen dialect of Ao tribe of Mopongchuket village means Sparrow eater and Frog eater respectively. Precisely, the question arose in the present dispute is, whether one of the founder members of the clan of Mopongchuket village is called Ojie Jar or Kechu Jar. 2. A dispute, whether one of the founder member's clan of Mopongchuket village is called Ojie Jar or Kechu Jar was referred to the DB's Court in 1982. 3. About 32 Putu (one Putu is equivalent to about 30 years) ago, the Mopongchuket village in the district of Mokokchung was founded by members of the 6 clan namely; Lemto, Jamir, Ozukum Longkumer, Aier, and Ojie Jar. Prior to 1982 the sixth founder member clan was called Ojie Jar, however, in 1982 a dispute had arisen that the sixth founder member clan is not called Ojie Jar but Kechu Jar. The district DB's Court after adducing evidence from the clan members and elders of Mopongchuket village as well as the surr­ounding villages from Molung Yimsen, Khari, Longjang, Sungratsu, Mangme-tong, Aliba, Chungtia, Khensa and Mokokchung villages and after hearing the parties it came to the conclusion that one of the sixth founder member clan of Mopongchuket village is called not Ojie Jar but Kechu Jar clan. This order was rendered as far back as on 24.5.82. This order was not appealed against by any of the parties to the dispute till today. In our opinion there­fore, the order passed in 1962 has now attained its finality. 3. As the order aforesaid was not given effect to, by the Village Council of the Mopongchuka village, the Head Dubashi of Mokokchung district, DB's Court had petitioned to Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung, on 17th June 1989 complaining that the Village Council of Mopongchuket village are not implementing the order passed by the DB's Court, namely, the due share of meat is not given to the Kechu clan. It is further stated in the petition that the judgment and order dated 24.5.82 of the DB's Court was accepted by both the parties. On receipt of the said petition, it would appear from the records that the learned Deputy Commissioner issued summons to the Village Council of Mopongchuket village and several dates were fixed for hearing of the case. Finally, the judgment and order was passed on 21.12.1989 by the Deputy Commissioner. On receipt of the said petition, it would appear from the records that the learned Deputy Commissioner issued summons to the Village Council of Mopongchuket village and several dates were fixed for hearing of the case. Finally, the judgment and order was passed on 21.12.1989 by the Deputy Commissioner. There was yet another order on 31.1.90 directing the Mopongchuket village to implement the order passed on 21.12.89 on or before 14.2.90, failing which the penalty imposed shall be made operative. These two orders has been assailed in this revision petition under Rule 34 of the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Naga Hills District. 4. We have heard Mr. Tali learned counsel for the revisionist as well as Mr. I Jamir, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The submission of Mr. Tali, learned counsel for the revisionist are two folds; Firstly, he submits that the DB's Court had no jurisdiction to take up the said dispute and therefore, judgment and order rendered by the DB's Court is nullity and cannot be given effect to, in the eyes of law. Secondly, he submits that the learned Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to assume the power of the execution of decree passed by the DB's Court. He further submits that from the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner, it does not appear clearly as to whether the learned Deputy Commissioner was acting as executing Court or treated the complaint under the provision of Rule 31 of the Rules as purportedly held by the learned Deputy Commissioner inasmuch as the learned Deputy Commissioner had framed two issues. 6. With regard to the first submission of the learned counsel for the revisionist, we have gone through the revision petition and we find that the order of the DB's Court rendered as far back as on 24th May 1982 has not been assailed before us. Not even a whisper against the judgment and order rendered by the DB's Court in 1982. On the contrary, it is categorically averred in paragraph 8 of this revision petition to the effect that, both the parties accepted the judgment and order dated 24.5.82 and none of the parties disputed till today the issues decided by the DB's Court Mokokchung on 24.5.82. On the contrary, it is categorically averred in paragraph 8 of this revision petition to the effect that, both the parties accepted the judgment and order dated 24.5.82 and none of the parties disputed till today the issues decided by the DB's Court Mokokchung on 24.5.82. We would therefore, think that the order passed by the DB's Court as far back as 1982 has attained its finality as the said order was accepted by both the parties and has not appealed against by any of the parties to the dispute, no useful purpose will be served by exhuming the order. 7. With regard to the second submission of the learned counsel for the revisionist, we are of the firm view that under the system of the admini­stration of justice as in vogue in Nagaland, we would think the learned Deputy Commissioner of the district definitely has jurisdiction to pass an order directing the parties to carry out the order passed by any Court subordinate to him in the event where no appeal was preferred by either of the parties to the dispute against the order passed by any subordinate Court and that the pro­vision for appeal prescribed under the Rules has already been lapsed. Because if the order passed by any Court subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner are not executed and if it is allowed to die a natural death it may have counter productive and instead of solving problems may create problems, settled issues may become unsettle which may generate ill feeling and hatred amongst the disputants parties and thereby bring disrespect to the judiciary and create chaos in the administration of justice. More so, in the case of present nature where the disputing parties are from the same village and asserting their respe­ctive rights under the prevailing customs and its practices, non implementation of the order passed by the Court is more likely to generate ill feeling amongst the disputing parties which may some times even led to breach of peace in the village. 8. It is, true, the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Naga Hills District 1937 as amended, is silent about the power of Deputy Commi­ssioner of the district with regard to implementation/execution of the order passed by the Court subordinate to it. It is also true, that the technicalities of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applied in Nagaland. It is also true, that the technicalities of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applied in Nagaland. Only the spirit of the Code is made applicable. In such a situation, when the Rule ;s silent, the discretionary power of the Deputy Commissioner has greater role to play according to the exigency of the situation so demand. Of course, at what situation the Deputy Commissioner decides to apply discretionary power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, we would expect the Deputy Commissioner to apply the discretionary power with restrained and to the extent so warranted by the exigency of circumstances. In the instant case we would think that the learned Deputy Commissioner would be entirely within his jurisdiction to order for the implementation/execution of the order passed by the DB's Court. Justice is not allowed to be defeated, just because there is no machinery to implement it. 9. However, in the instant case, the learned Deputy Commissioner thought it fit to invoke the provision of Rule 31 of the Rules for Administra­tion of Justice and Police in Naga Hills. The provision of Rule 31 is now not in existence. Rule 31 of the principal Rules has been deleted by the (3rd Amend­ment) Act, 1984 (Nagaland Act No.10 of 1987). Therefore, the learned Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung passed an order on 21.12.89 invoking the provision of Rule 31 by the time the rule was not in existence. Secondly, even assuming that the Rule was still alive and the learned Deputy Commissioner sought to invoke the said provision, the learned Deputy Commissioner had either to affirm the judgment as one of its own or try the case denovo or refer it to panchayat. In the instant case it appears from the order of learned Deputy Commissioner, the learned Deputy Commissioner thought it fit to try the case denovo as two issues were framed by the learned Deputy Commissioner. He however, fails to give any opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the basis of two issues framed. We a re, therefore, of the view that the order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner is not sustainable in law. 10. He however, fails to give any opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence on the basis of two issues framed. We a re, therefore, of the view that the order passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner is not sustainable in law. 10. It is only because of this reason, the order dated 21.12.89 and 30.1.90 passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung are set aside, However, considering the nature, background and the subject of the dispute involves in the case, we thought it fit to remit this case to the learned Deputy Commissioner to pass any order as he deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case. The learned Deputy Commissioner shall now take up the petition dated 17.6.89 to its file and dispose of the same in the light of observation made by us. If the learned Deputy Commissioner thought it fit to order the execution of the order rendered by the Dubashi's Court in 1982, we would, think that he is definitely within his jurisdiction to do so, in view of our observation made above. With this observation and direction, the petition is disposed of. No order as to costs. Send down the records along with copy of the judgment forthwith.