ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. -- 1. By this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged an order dated 11.1.1990 (Annexure P.10), whereby the petitioner has been punished and a penalty of reduction of two stages in the time-scale of pay for two years has been imposed on him by the Disciplinary Authority under rule 10 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, the 'Rules'). 2. Material facts leading to this petition are: The petitioner was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk on 1.4.1962 in Government Regional Press, Rewa, where he was promoted on 11.4.1986 as Upper Division Clerk and was transferred to Government Regional Press, Gwalior. The petitioner vide Annexure P.1 dated 12th April 1988 was placed under suspension under R.9 of the Rules, as disciplinary proceedings against him were contemplated. A charge-sheet vide Annexure P.2 dated 20.5.1988 with articles of charges and particulars thereof, issued by the Controller, Printing and Stationery Department, was served on the petitioner, wherein three charges were levelled against the petitioner, which related to the period of 1975-76. Charge No. 1 states that while the petitioner was at Rewa, he did not file 154 applications of leave of employees in their personal files. Charge No. 2 related to 189 leave applications of which the petitioner made an entry in service books without obtaining sanction of the superior officer and the said applications were also not tagged in the respective service books. Charge No.3 related to 19 applications, of which entry was made in service books of the respective employees without sanction of the superior officer. Out of these 19, two applications were shown as sanctioned, and for 17, without showing sanction, the petitioner got the payment made to the employees. On receipt of the articles of charges the petitioner moved applications (Annexure P.4, P.5 and P.6) for supply of copies of documents, vide Annexure P.7 a reply was given. Admittedly, most of the copies of the documents demanded for filing explanation to the charges were not supplied as they were in abundance and were not available. Ultimately, the petitioner filed his explanation. During the course of the inquiry also, the petitioner demanded production of certain documents including registers, etc. In the inquiry inspection of certain documents was allowed. Admittedly, most of the copies of the documents demanded for filing explanation to the charges were not supplied as they were in abundance and were not available. Ultimately, the petitioner filed his explanation. During the course of the inquiry also, the petitioner demanded production of certain documents including registers, etc. In the inquiry inspection of certain documents was allowed. After conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer gave a report holding the charges as proved, but also observed that if the copies of the documents demanded would have been made available to the petitioner, the petitioner could have defended his case better, as the documents related to the charges levelled against him. The Disciplinary Authority ultimately passed the impugned order against which the petitioner preferred statutory departmental appeal, which is pending for disposal for the last one year. As the petitioner is to retire on 31.3.1991, he has preferred this petition. 3. In the return the respondents have raised an objection that the petition is premature as the petitioner's appeal is still pending for disposal. On n1erits, the averments made in the petition were denied. It was contended that the documents demanded during inquiry were in bulk, hence, it was not possible to supply copies of those documents, but vide order (Annexure R.2) dated 21.6.1988, the petitioner was allowed to inspect the said documents. 4. Shri R.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, besides raising other grounds, stressed mainly on three grounds: The petitioner was promoted in the year 1986 and the respondents were in know that the petitioner has committed lapses while performing his duties, but for a period of 13 years no action was taken, and the petitioner was promoted; hence, the lapses, if any, were deemed to have been condoned; the charge-sheet was not issued and action was not taken within a reasonable time, therefore, too, the inquiry held against the petitioner deserves to be quashed, and that for want of supply of relevant copies of documents, the inquiry was vitiated, as the defence of the petitioner was prejudiced for want of copies. The petitioner in support of his contentions placed reliance on 3 decisions of the Apex Court and 3 Division Bench decisions of this Court: S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P. 1990 JLJ 230 (SC)= AIR 1990 SC 10 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh 1990 JLJ 319 (SC)=AIR 1990 SC 1908 and Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 2118 ; M.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Om Prakash Joshi, 1989 MPLJ 575 ; Mukhtyar Singh v. State of M.P., 1989(1) MPWN 253, and Audhrajsingh v. State of M.P., 1967 JLJ 630. 5. After hearing Shri M.G. Khedkar, learned Additional Government Advocate, we are of the opinion that this petition deserves to be allowed for the reasons stated hereinbelow. 6. The preliminary objection of Shri Khedkar that the petition is premature in view of the pendency of the departmental appeal, in our opinion; has no force. It has been settled by the Apex Court in S.S. Rathore (supra) that in the case of a service dispute the cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority, where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation, is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed or, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. Admittedly, the petitioner's statutory departmental appeal (Annexure P.11) dated 12.2.1990 (filed on 28.2.1990) has not been disposed of so far, and, as the petitioner is retiring on 31.3.1991, it cannot be said that the petition is premature and the cause of action for preferring this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the absence of decision in the appeal did not accrue to him. 7. During the course of hearing, Shri Khedkar also raised another objection (though not in the return) that an alternative efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner to approach the Lahour Court under sections 31 and 61 or the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short, the 'Act'), as the respondent's establishment, the Press is a notified industry under section 1 of the Act. True, an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner, but considering the peculiar circumstances of the case and the facts that the petitioner is retiring on 31.3.1991 and the charge-sheet issued and the order of punishment passed being without jurisdiction, will affect the petitioner's retiral benefits. Instead of directing the petitioner to approach the forum under the Act, we overrule the objection. 8. Admittedly, the alleged lapses are of the period 1975-76. The petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 12.4.1988 and the imputations of the charges were levelled against him on 20.5.1988, i.e., after a period of about 13 years. But, in between on 11.4.1986 the petitioner was promoted from the post of Lower Division Clerk to that of Upper Division Clerk and was transferred to Government Regional Press, Gwalior. It is not the case of the respondents that the concerned authority of the petitioner was not aware of the lapses or misconduct committed by the petitioner. But, on the other hand, knowing fully well that the petitioner committed the said lapses or misconduct, the respondents promoted the petitioner without any reservation. 9. It is the settled view of this Court that a master cannot impose any punishment on an employee for a misconduct which he has condoned. If the lapse or misconduct is one which is known to the authority before the person is promoted and not one which comes to light subsequent to the promotion, and if the authority concerned knowing of this lapse or misconduct promotes the employee without any reservation, then it must be taken that the lapse or misconduct has been condoned, and thereafter the employee cannot be punished for his lapse or misconduct which would be deemed to have been condoned and the employer is estopped to take action subsequently on the same. [See Audhraj Singh; Mukhtyar Singh and Omprakash Joshi (supra)]. Therefore, the disciplinary authority was not competent to suspend and initiate departmental proceedings; as a consequence of that the order of punishment (Annexure P.10) deserves to be quashed. 10. [See Audhraj Singh; Mukhtyar Singh and Omprakash Joshi (supra)]. Therefore, the disciplinary authority was not competent to suspend and initiate departmental proceedings; as a consequence of that the order of punishment (Annexure P.10) deserves to be quashed. 10. Besides the proceedings were initiated after a period of about 13 years; the department was aware of the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged irregularities, but no action was taken nor the respondents have explained the delay, as the burden lay upon them to demonstrate how and why the action could not be taken for such an inordinately long period. Initiation of proceedings after a lapse of about 13 years, certainly, has prejudiced the petitioner/employee, as the petitioner could not defend his case properly for want of supply of copies of the documents which he was entitled under R. 14(3) of the Rules, and certain documents were not available even. Recently, the Apex Court in case of Balli Singh (supra) while considering a case of delay of 12 years in initiating departmental proceedings, has observed that it is unreasonable to think that the employer would take more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings about the involvement of the officer in respect of the irregularities. In that case it was also observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge-memo. Hence, in the opinion of the Apex Court it was unfair to permit the departmental inquiry to be proceeded with at that stage. 11. It is also settled that where no period is prescribed for initiation of the departmental proceedings, when it is known to the employer of the involvement of the employee in the lapses, irregularities or of the misconduct, ordinarily, proceedings should be initiated within a reasonable time, which depends on the facts of each case. The facts of the present case are not such which can compel us to take a view for holding the initiation of the proceedings as valid, as the respondents have not explained the delay of initiation of the proceedings after the lapse of about 13 years. Therefore, also the initiation of the proceedings, in our opinion, was without jurisdiction. 12. The facts of the present case are not such which can compel us to take a view for holding the initiation of the proceedings as valid, as the respondents have not explained the delay of initiation of the proceedings after the lapse of about 13 years. Therefore, also the initiation of the proceedings, in our opinion, was without jurisdiction. 12. The third contention of the petitioner about non-supply of copies of the documents, in our opinion, has also got a force, as the documents were more than 330 in number, besides registers, etc., of the period of 1975-76; the petitioner on the basis of memory could not have defended himself without going through those documents; it has certainly prejudiced the case of the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer himself has observed that if the copies of the documents would have been supplied, the petitioner could have proved his defence in a batter manner. Besides, Shri Khedkar, learned Additional Government Advocate, could not demonstrate and convince this Court that no prejudice was occasioned to the petitioner on account of non-supply of copies of the documents or that the documents, of which copies were demanded, were not relevant in the inquiry. In the circumstances, reliance by petitioner on Kashinath Dikshita's case (supra), in our opinion, is well merited, and we arc of the view that the petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself. 13. As we have held that the disciplinary authority was not competent in the facts of the case to initiate disciplinary proceedings on account of condonation of the lapses, misconduct or irregularities and delay in initiation of the proceedings, we do not feel it proper now to give liberty to the disciplinary authority to hold an inquiry afresh after supplying copies of the documents, as demanded by the petitioner. 14. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs; the order imposing penalty of reduction of two stages in the time-scale of pay of the petitioner for two years (Annexure P.10) is quashed; as consequence of that, the order of suspension (Annexure P.1) is also quashed, as a result of which, the petitioner shall be entitled to all benefits, including arrears of salary because of the suspension, increments and other ancillary benefits of the service. 15. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/- if already certified. K.K. Varma, J. -- 16. I agree with the final order of my learned brother. 15. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/- if already certified. K.K. Varma, J. -- 16. I agree with the final order of my learned brother. I, however, propose to give my own reasons in brief, for accepting the petitioner's plea that the respondent be deemed to have condoned the lapses of the petitioner. In the return, the respondents did not plead that they had not been aware of the lapses of the petitioner before they promoted him or that owing to circumstances for which the superior officers of the petitioner did not have any cognizance in the normal course of the supervision of the work of the petitioner, the superior officers had been unable to unearth the lapses in question before promoting him. Hence, the petitioner's aforementioned plea as posited above stood established on the pleading itself.