A. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was a conductor in the U. P. , State Road Transport Corporation and at the relevant time he was posted in Bareilly Region. While conducting Bus No. UPO 4715 between budaun-Moradabad route on 15. 5. 1984 at 10. 15 A. M. it is alleged that the petitioners bus was checked by the Traffic Superintendent Sri R. P. Singh, who found 43 passengers were being carried without tickets in the bus by the petitioner after collecting fare from them, on the basis whereof a report was submitted by the said Traffic Superintendent to the Assistant Regional manager who served the charge sheet on the petitioner by order dated 15. 6. 1984 in which four charges were levelled against petitioner. Other charges, apart from the charge of not issuing tickets to 43 passengers after collecting fare from them, were that the petitioner on being asked for stopping the bus did not stop the bus and directed the driver to speed up the bus. He also instigated the passengers for creating hurdle in the checking of the bus by the Traffic superintendent and also threw away the loose tickets so as to show that the tickets had been issued to the passengers. Petitioner submitted his explanation in which he denied the charges other than the charge of not issuing tickets to 43 passengers for which he gave a number of explanations. In his explanation, he also stated that he did not see the Jeep of the Traffic superintendent nor he could notice that the Traffic Superintendent wanted to check the bus and had signed for stopping the bus. He further denied that he had ever asked the driver to speed up the bus. He also denied having instigated the passengers to create hurdle in the checking of the bus by the Traffic Superintendent, he further stated that he had also not thrown away the bundle of tickets. It is noteworthy that in his explanation (Annexure 3 to the petition), the petitioner had specifically stated that the Traffic Superintendents report was based on the statement of drivers of the jeep, namely Mukhtar Ahmad and the Kalian Husain and the driver of the bus Tufail ahmad, and helper of the bus whose statements had been obtained by the Traffic Superintendent by threatening and forcing them. He, therefore, requested the Assistant Regional Manager to make the enquiry himself from them and to produce them for cross- examination by the petitioner. In the enquiry only Traffic Superintendent was produced and these four persons, namely Mukhtar Ahmad, Kalian Husain, Tufail Ahmad and helper of the bus were not produced in spite of specific request made in this respect by the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer found all the charges proved against the petitioner. Accordingly, he passed an order dated 12. 2. 1986 removing the petitioner from the service. The petitioner filed an appeal against that order before the Regional Manager, Bareilly and the said appeal was dismissed by the Regional Manager by the order dated 4. 8. 1986 (Annexure-8 to the petition ). A perusal of the appellate order (Annexure-8 to the petition) will show that the appellate authority namely, the Regional manager, did not at all apply his mind, specially to the request of the petitioner made in the explanation for cross-examination of the four persons which was also repeated in the memo of appeal (Annexure-7 to the petition ). In spite of petitioners request for production for cross-examination of the four persons namely; Mukhtar Ahmad, Kalian Husain, Tufail Ahmad and helper of the Bus, on whose statements the report of the Traffic Superintendent was based the Regional Manager dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. It is noteworthy that in the memo of appeal (Annexure 7 to the petition), the petitioner had stated in Paras 18 and 20 that the assistant Regional Manager did not summon the four persons for cross-examination by the petitioner to confirm that their statements taken by the Traffic Superintendent were not voluntary. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the orders passed by the appointing authority and the appellate authority are vitiated due to non-production of the four persons for cross-examinations in the enquiry. According to him, the order of removal as well as the appellate order are both vitiated in as much as the said orders are based on the assumption that all the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved whereas all other charges except the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets are not proved due to non-production of the four persons for cross examination by the petitioner. According to learned counsel, this infirmity is sufficient to render both the orders void ab initio as such the order of removal and the appellate order deserve to be quashed. On the other hand Sri S. K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has urged that since the order of removal is sustainable on the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets, as such mere non-production of four persons for cross-examination by the petitioner so as to prove other charges, then the Charge No. 1, does not at all vitiate the orders under challenge. ( 3 ) I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent specially in view of the fact that the other of removal as well as the appellate order have both proceeded on the assumption that all the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved. It is another thing that if there was only one charge of carrying passengers without tickets, this Court would not have interfered with the order of removal as it is for the authorities to decide as to whether the punishment already awarded to the petitioner is sufficient even on one charge which no doubt is a serious charge but as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order of removal as well as the appellate order since are based on the alleged proof of all the charges as such it cannot be said that the position would not have changed in respect of the punishment awarded to the petitioner if the appointing authority and appellant authorities were conscious of the fact that no other charge, except the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets, was made out against the petitioner. It is not at all necessary to repeat the legal position in this respect that if a charge is levelled on the basis of the statements of certain persons and cross-examination of those persons is claimed by the delinquent, it is the duty of the enquiry officer to produce those persons for cross-examination by the delinquent. Admittedly, this has not been done and the enquiry thus is vitiated in respect of the charges except the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets. Admittedly, this has not been done and the enquiry thus is vitiated in respect of the charges except the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets. The punishing authority and the appellate authority, therefore, wrongly proceeded on the assumption that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were made out, whereas only one charge was made out against the petitioner which was in respect of carrying 43 passengers without issuing tickets. ( 4 ) IT is an established principle of law that the High Court in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not substitute its own decision to replace the decision of the appointing and appellate authorities. It is in the discretion of the appointing and appellate authorities to come to a particular finding based on the facts on record and the statements recorded during the enquiry. However, it is also a welt established principle of law that this Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an order which is vitiated by violation of the principles of nature justice. It is an admitted case of the parties that the Traffic Superintendent took the statements of the above named four persons and on that basis he submitted his report which formed the basis for framing of the charges against the petitioner. From the very beginning (in his explanation submitted to the charge-sheet) the petitioner alleged that the statements of the said four persons which was the basis of the report of the Traffic superintendent, was not voluntary but it was a forced statement taken by the Traffic superintendent by extending threats to them. This allegation was also repeated in the memo of appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner repeatedly requested for production of the said four persons for cross-examination to prove his point but unfortunately none of them was produced and the petitioner was thus denied the fair opportunity so as to prove the charges other than the charges relating to carrying 43 passengers without tickets, as wrong. The denial of the opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the four persons obviously amounts to denial of opportunity to the petitioner in the enquiry held against him. Thus it was the duty of the appellate authority to have met this point raised by the petitioner in his memo of appeal. The denial of the opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the four persons obviously amounts to denial of opportunity to the petitioner in the enquiry held against him. Thus it was the duty of the appellate authority to have met this point raised by the petitioner in his memo of appeal. The appellate order, however, is also cryptic in all respects and the points raised by the petitioner have totally been ignored. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents cited an unreported Judgment of this Court in Writ petition No. 9102 of 1980, Sri Kishan Sharma v. Assistant Regional Manager and Ors. decided on 26. 2. 1988. This judgment does not help the learned counsel for the respondents as it is not on the point which arises in this case. In the said judgment, the Court held that non-realisation of money from the passengers who are said to have been carried without tickets in the bus, does not at all matter and the charge of carrying passengers without tickets is proved if the passengers are found sitting in the bus without tickets. Since I have already held that the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets levelled against the petitioner is found proved as such the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents is not of any help to him. ( 6 ) NO other case law has been cited by the learned counsel for either side. ( 7 ) IN my view, the order of removal as well as the order passed by the appellate authority suffer from error of law apparent on the face of the record and are therefore, liable to be quashed. However, since the appellate authority has not considered the appeal of the petitioner on merits and has simply endorsed the findings of the punishing authority as such I do not think it necessary to quash both the orders. It is sufficient to quash the order of the appellate authority dated 4. 8. 1986 (Annexure-8 to the petition) with the direction that the appellate authority shall consider the contentions of the petitioner made in the explanation submitted by him as well as in paras 18 and 20 of the memo of appeal where he had prayed for the cross-examination of the four persons on whose statements the Traffic Superintendent submitted his report which ultimately was made the basis of the charge-sheet. He shall also dwell upon quantum of punishment in case he finds that no further enquiry was possible for proving the charges other than the charge of carrying 43 passengers without tickets looking to the circumstances of the case that the petitioner has already been out of service for a pretty long time, i. e. since 12. 2. 1985, when the order of removal was passed removing the petitioner from service. ( 8 ) THE writ petition, therefore, succeeds in part and the order dated 4. 8. 1986 is quashed. The appellate authority is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioner within a period of three months from the date petitioner files a certified copy of this order before him after taking into consideration the directions given above. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. .