JUDGMENT 1. BY this revisional application under Section 397/401/482 cr. P.C. the accused petitioners pray for quashing the proceeding pending against them by setting aside the order dated 9. 8. 85 passed by-Judge, Special Court, (E. G. Act), Bankura, in a case under section 7 (i) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 2. THE case of the petitioners in brief is that following a raid in their ration shop, Gangajalghati, Bankura, they were arrested on 27.8.1983 and a case was started against them under Section 7 (i) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities act, for alleged violation of the West Bengal Rice and. Paddy (Licensing and Control) Order, 1967. After protracted investigation charge sheet was submitted against them on 29.1.1985 beyond the period of six months from the date of their arrest for which they filed a petition before the Judge, Special court, Bankura for discharging them from the pending proceeding under Section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. The learned Special Judge by his order dated 9.8.1985, rejected the same holding the provisions of section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. was not applicable to the pending case against the petitioners under Section 7 (i) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. Being aggrieved by the same, the accused petitioners have preferred this petition before this court. 3. THE question of law that arises for our determination in this revisional petition is whether the provisions of sub-section 5 of Section 67 Cr. P. C. are applicable to a case punishable under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Essential commodities Act. It may foe stated at the very outset that the amendment of the Essential Commodities Act, brought about by the Essential Commodities (Special Provision)Act, 1981, has introduced a sea of change in the procedural side of trial of all the offences under the Essential Commodities Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 12aa provides that not with standing anything contained in the code under Clause (a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted" for the area. Clause (c) of the said Sub-section provides that the Judge, Special Court may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) regarding bail, exercise all the powers under section 167 Cr. P. C. in relation to an accused person in such a case who has been forwarded to him under Clause (b) of the said Sub- section. Clause (c) of the said Sub-section provides that the Judge, Special Court may, subject to the provisions of clause (d) regarding bail, exercise all the powers under section 167 Cr. P. C. in relation to an accused person in such a case who has been forwarded to him under Clause (b) of the said Sub- section. Clause (e), authorises a special Court to take cognizance of an offence on perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. What is very' much important for the purpose of our present matter is the provisions of Clause (f) of the said Sub-section which is reproduced herein below s all offences under this Act shall be tried in a summary way. and the provisions of section 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial : provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. " 4. A plain reading of Clause (f) shows that all offences under this Act are to be tried in a summary way and that the provisions of Section 262 Cr. P. C. shall apply to the trial of such cases "the proviso lays down in clear terms that in course of such trial of all the offences under this act and punishment that may be inflicted by the Special judge shall not be for a period exceeding two years. The pertinent question is whether because of the provisions of Clause (f) and the limitation of the terms of imprisonment not exceeding two years, all such cases to be tried by the Special Court can be construed to be summons cases within the meaning of sub-section 5 of section 167 Cr. P. C. The key to answer the legal question that has been raised in the revisional proceeding lies in the determination of this question. Section 262 Cr. P. C. provides that the procedure for the trial of summons cases shall be followed in the case of summary trials. P. C. The key to answer the legal question that has been raised in the revisional proceeding lies in the determination of this question. Section 262 Cr. P. C. provides that the procedure for the trial of summons cases shall be followed in the case of summary trials. Prior to the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, sub-section (1) of old Section 262 provided that in summary trials, the procedure prescribed for summons cases' shall be followed in summons cases and the procedure prescribed for warrant cases shall be followed in warrant cases except as prescribed in Sections 263, 264 and 265 of the old code. After amendment, the new section lays down that in all summary trials the summons case procedure should be followed whether the case involved is a summons case or warrant case. The reason for doing away with such distinction and following two different procedures as considered by the Law commission was that no particular advantage would be gained by following the more complicated warrant case procedure in the case to be tried summarily. So, if all the offences under this Essential commodities Act are to be tried in a summary way following the summons procedure, together with the limitation of the period of sentense and imprisonment as laid down in the proviso to Clause (f), then, is there any bar to the application of Sub-section 5 in its entirity to the trial of all the offences coming under this Act? there is no dispute that the Judge, Special Court is competent to pass an order under Sub-section 5 of Section 167 Cr. P. C. in a case relating to an offence punishable under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii)of the said Act. Controversy arises only in the case of such application to an offence which is punishable under section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or Sub-section 2 and 2a of Section 7 of the said Act. 5. IT is not disputed that the case relating to an offence punishable under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or Sub-sections 2 and 2a are warrant cases within the meaning of Section 2 (x)of the Code. 5. IT is not disputed that the case relating to an offence punishable under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or Sub-sections 2 and 2a are warrant cases within the meaning of Section 2 (x)of the Code. As such, question has been raised even though for the purpose of trial under Clause (f) the procedure to be followed in the trial or such cases will be the summons procedure but whether' such cases which are inherently warrant cases, can be strictly speaking called summons cases within the meaning of Sub-section 5 of section 167 Cr. P. C. to attract such provisions for all purposes inn respect of such cases. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioners no other alternative or option is left for the judge, Special Court, but to follow the procedure of the summons cases, even in such cases coming under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or Sub-sections 2 and 2a, in view of the special Provisions of Clauses (1) (c)and (1) (f) of Section 12aa. 6. SECTION 167 (5) Cr. P. C. provides that in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation if not concluded within a period of 6 months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the office making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of 6 months is necessary. It has been argued that even the provisions of Clause (f) along with its proviso cannot render all the offences triable by tine. Special Court under this Act as summons cases and it is doubtful whether such inherently warrant cases, be said to be summons cases strictly for all purposes within the meaning of Sub-section 5 of Section 167 Cr. P. C. Such doubt is further strengthened when we consider the effect and impact of Clause (f) by amendment of 1981 in the Substantive previsions of penalty provided in a case under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii)or sub-sections 2 and 2a of the said act. Because of such doubt Shamsuddin ahmed, J. has held in his decision reported in 1986 Cr. Because of such doubt Shamsuddin ahmed, J. has held in his decision reported in 1986 Cr. LR (Cal)) page 158 (Lakshmi kanta Dey vs. State of West bengal} that inspite of such insertion of Clause (f) the classification of the warrant and summons cases remain unaffected and has not rendered the warrant case to a summons case. He has observed that inspite of application of the summary procedure by clause (f), it cannot have the effect Of amending the substantive provisions for penalty under Section 7 unless specifically- amended by the Special Provisions Act of 1981. As such the learned judge has observed that the provisions of Sub-section 5 of Section 167 cr. P. C. has no manner of application to a case under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or sub-sections 2 and 2a of Section 7. We have already seen that there is no escape from the situation as brought about by amending Special provisions Act of 1981 that all the offences under the Act shall be tried in a summary way following the summons procedure. Application of the summons procedure in such cases is not because of section 262 Cr. P. C. but Clause (f) of Section 12aa of the special Provisions Act which make such application of summary trial and thereby the summons procedure obligatory to such cases. Whatever doubt there may be whether all the offences under this Act have been rendered as summons cases, fact remains that by insertation of the proviso to Clause (f) the effect of the maximum sentence for any offence under this Act has been limited to two years i.e. the punishment provided for a summons case. The statement of objects and reasons of this amending Act, 1981 i. e,, the Special Provisions Act of 1981 shows in clear terms that the legislature considered it necessary to make Special Provisions by way of amendment to the principle Act for a temporary period of 5 years in order to expedite the process of prosecutions under the principal Act. Thereby Special Provisions were made for the trial, in a summary way, of all the offences under the Act. Enhancement of the term of imprisonment awardable in a case of conviction in a summary trial was raised to two years. Thereby Special Provisions were made for the trial, in a summary way, of all the offences under the Act. Enhancement of the term of imprisonment awardable in a case of conviction in a summary trial was raised to two years. Section 2 of the amending Act of 1981 lays down that the principal Act of 1955 is to have effect subject to Special Provisions for a temporary period during the continuance in force of amending Act, the essential Commodities act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in Section 3 to 11. By the amendment of Section 7 the penal provisions the proviso to Sub-Clause (II) of Clause (a) of Sub-section 1 has been omitted. Similar such provisions in the proviso to Sub-section 2 and 2 A and the entire sub-section 2 A have been omitted by such amendment. 7. FROM all these, it appears that the object of such amendment of 1981 was in a way even to neutralise the substantiative provisions of penalty as laid down in Section 7 of the Act. On a plain reading of the object of such amendment and particularly taking into consideration the notification in this connection that such amendment shall cease to have effect after the expiry of 5 years from the date of commencement (with effect from 1. 9. 82), it seems the object of such amendment of 1981, was in a way even to neutralise the substantive provisions of penalty as laid down in Section 7 of the Act. Such object also becomes clear because of the insertion of non- obstante Clause in such amendment by Section 12aa of the Special Provisions act. The requirement of putting the proviso to Clause (f)limiting the maximum period of sentence to two years for any offence triable under this Act became imperative as because all such cases by such amendment are to be tried in a summary way which limits maximum sentence that can be awarded by such summary procedure to 3 months as laid down in Chapter XXI of the Code. So, the net result of this Clause (f) read with Clause (c) of the Special provisions Act, 1931 is that though a case an elating to an offence punishable under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) or Sub-section 2 and 2a is a warrant case but when it is tried by the judge, Special Court, in a summary way and the procedure followed is that of a summons case, them the Judge, Special court can exercise all the powers under Sub-section 5 of section 67 Criminal Procedure Code and it becomes a summons case within the meaning of that Sub-section. The earlier decisions of this Court reported in 1981 Vol. II calcutta High Court Notes , page 173 (Ram Brijesh Jadav vs. The State) and 81 Cr. L. J. page 1288 (Ram Kumar keshori vs. State) and also a decision of Sunil Kumar Guin, j. as reported in 19% Cr. L. R. (Cal) page. 225 (Phalguni dutta vs. State of West Bengal) also lend support to such a view, although the earlier two decisions came before the actual operation of the amending Act of 1981. In the case of Ram Kumar keshori (supra) it was held that statutory period of investigation can be extended beyond 6 months on a prayer being made under sub-section 5 only on assumption that it was a summons case and that provisions of sub-section 5 was applicable to such a case. In coming to this decision in Phalguni Dutta vs. State of west Bengal (supra), Sunil Kumar Guin, J. followed a division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 1986 Cr. L. J. page 1456. 8. IN view of what has been stated I am inclined to take a view that the amending effect of Special Provisions Act of 1981 has enabled and empowered the learned Special judge to pass orders under Section 167 (5) Criminal procedure Code in cases punishable under section 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the E. C. Act. The procedure that has to be followed in the trial of such cases will also be governed by the provisions of Section 167 (5) Criminal procedure Code. The procedure that has to be followed in the trial of such cases will also be governed by the provisions of Section 167 (5) Criminal procedure Code. In the instant case investigation having not been concluded within the statutory period and there being nothing on record to show that such period was extended' by the learned Judge, cognizance taken on the basis of police report submitted beyond the statutory period of 6 months is bad in law. The case was started on 30.8.83 and the accused persons were arrested on 27.8.83, but the charge sheet was submitted long beyond the period of 6 months i.e. 180 days on 29.1.85 and as already stated the investigating officer did not make any application for extension of such period. So, there being nothing to show that the investigation was completed within a period of 6 months from the date of which the accused was arrested, the Special Judge had no option but to make an order stopping further investigation. The learned special Judge therefore committed an error in finding otherwise and holding that in such a case the provisions of Section 167 Criminal [procedure Code was not applicable. The result is the petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned Special Judge dated 9/8/1985 rejecting the prayer of the accused petitioners cannot therefore be sustained and the same is set aside. The pending proceeding is accordingly quashed and the rule is made absolute. Revision allowed.