B. C. VARMA, ACTG. C. J. ( 1 ) THROUGH this petition is questioned the acquisition proceedings relating to certain premises near Bharat Talkies in Bhopal, which is part of a building known as Naseer Building. It appears from the pleadings that Naseer Building was actually divided into two portions, one of which was sold to Madanlal and the remaining part continued to be owned by the petitioners. While implementing the widely declared encroachment removing drive', a threat was publicly made to demolish this Naseer Building. A portion of it had already been demolished. The right of the respondents to so demolish the building under the said drive has been questioned separately by the petitioners in Misc. Petition No. 2501 of 1990 (That petition is also being disposed of today by a separate order ). According to the petitioners, when the respondents' attempt to demolish this part of the building was foiled by the petitioners, the respondents have thought of a device of compulsorily acquiring this part of the building in which a number of shops are located. A notification was issued on 31-1-91/1-2-91 under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also notified that there was urgency to take over possession and, therefore, the enquiry under S. 5-A (2) of the Act was dispensed with, Realising that the joint notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act was not permissible, a fresh notification only under Section 6 of the Act was subsequently issued on 14-2-1991. The petitioners immediately rushed to this Court on issuance of the first notification and alleged that the proceedings for acquisition of the property are a colourable exercise of jurisdiction. The action is entirely mala fide. Specific allegations of mala fide have been made against Shri Babulal Gour, Minister, Local Self, the Commissioner and the Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Bhopal. It is further urged that the said acquisition is not to serve any public purpose and that by dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A (2) of the Act, the petitioners' valuable right toobject to the proceedings has been wrongfully taken away as, according to them, there is hardly any emergency for immediate possession. It is also urged that the land is needed for the Municipal Corporation and the acquisition is also for the Corporation and therefore, the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act should have been made applicable. It is also urged that the land is needed for the Municipal Corporation and the acquisition is also for the Corporation and therefore, the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act should have been made applicable. The notification was said to be bad as there was a combined notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The further attack is that S. 17-A (incorporating local amendment) has been violated. Since there has now been a separate notification under Section 6, the attack based upon issuance of a joint notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, therefore, does not survive. Counsel for the petitioners also later realised that S. 17-A, introduced by the local amendment, has been held ultra vires and, therefore, gave up the attack based upon the terms of that section. ( 2 ) ELABORATING the attack to the acquisition proceedings based upon mala fides and colourable exercise of jurisdiction, Shri Pakhruddin, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that even earlier to the notification in question, an attempt was made to acquire the land and the building in question. That notification was, however, withdrawn and the proceedings were dropped. There has been no change in the circumstances thereafter and until the date of the notification under Section 6 of the Act. Learned counsel, therefore, stressed that this device of acquisition has been adopted only after the respondents failed in their nefarious device of forcibly demolishing the building. It has been stated that the area falls in the assembly constituency from where Arif Muil, an independent candidate, was returned to the assembly after defeating a Bhartiya Janata Party candidate. Hence, the ruling party in the State, namely, Bhartiya Janta Party, has thought of teaching the petitioners a lesson through such a device, as the petitioners did not support the Bhartiya Janta Party candidate in that election. Shri Babulal Gour is said to have a personal grudge against the petitioner. The date, 25/01/1991, for this purpose had been deliberately chosen to cause humiliation to the petitioners on the eve of the Republic Day celebrations on the 26th January. ( 3 ) BAD faith, as expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1980 SC 319 , the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purpose of power by simulation or pretention of gaining a legitimate goal. ( 3 ) BAD faith, as expressed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1980 SC 319 , the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purpose of power by simulation or pretention of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power in vested, the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. ( 4 ) IT is well established that the burden of establishing mala fides is heavy on the person who alleges it. While it is too easy to make allegations of mala fides, it is not that easy to prove the same. The Supreme Court in R. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , observed that the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in Ghanshyam Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1991 Delhi 59, relying upon this decision of the Supreme Court, held that sufficient particular and evidence, supporting the allegations of mala fides, must be furnished. This is particularly so when such allegations are made against a minister and/ or against any Government official. It is in this light that the charges of mala fides levelled against the respondents should be examined. The suggestion that because an earlier attempt to acquire this property has been abandoned to us does not furnish any support to the contention that the present acquisition is the result of mala fides. What one has to see is the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by the proposed acquisition. The earlier acquisition proceedings might have been dropped, but not necessarily because the acquisition was held either undesirable or unnecessary. There is no evidence to indicate that the earlier proceedings were abandoned because the acquisition was held otherwise than bona fide. Nothing, therefore, turns on this suggestion. ( 5 ) IT is true that there has been a declaration by the respondents that encroachment shall be removed. There is no evidence to indicate that the earlier proceedings were abandoned because the acquisition was held otherwise than bona fide. Nothing, therefore, turns on this suggestion. ( 5 ) IT is true that there has been a declaration by the respondents that encroachment shall be removed. In the capital city, those who encroach upon public premises and Government land without any authority cannot be heard to say that a declaration to prevent such unauthorised occupation and to dissuade its continuance is an undesirable action. At least such encroachers cannot be heard to say that such a declaration is actuated by any mala fides. What we find from the allegations made in the return is that attempts had been made to persuade the occupants of the various shops to remove their possession. An offer has been made to establish them else where. In some cases, this attempt has succeeded also. Finding that some of the occupants of those shops and the petitioners are not inclined to voluntarily withdraw their possession, acquisition proceedings have been initiated. The need shown is widening of the road to some heavy traffic and to avoid accidents. The return is supported by an affidavit. Such being the object, it is difficult to see how the acquisition proceedings can be said to be obliquely motivated. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the proceedings in the past were dropped and even if there has been a declaration to remove encroachments, the present acquisition proceedings cannot be said to be actuated by any mala fides in view of the object sought to be achieved. ( 6 ) TO us, there also appears to be no force in the contention that since the petitioners did not agree to support the Bhartiya Janta Party candidates during the last State Assembly elections, this action has been initiated. Since we are satisfied that this particular acquisition is to regulate the traffic by widening the road, we are of the opinion that the acquisition cannot be said to be backed by any ill motive or mala fides. We are also satisfied that the petitioners have not been able to discharge the necessary burden by proving the charge of mala fides against any of the respondents. For the same reason, we are of the opinion that the acquisition cannot be said to be a colourable device to achieve some oblique motive. We are also satisfied that the petitioners have not been able to discharge the necessary burden by proving the charge of mala fides against any of the respondents. For the same reason, we are of the opinion that the acquisition cannot be said to be a colourable device to achieve some oblique motive. We are satisfied that sufficient material has been disclosed by the respondents in the return to support the acquisition. We are also of the opinion that the public purpose behind the acquisition, as disclosed by the respondents, is real and is not a device just to throw the petitioners out of the premises. ( 7 ) SHRI Pakshruddin, learned counsel for the petitioners, also urged that the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is unjustified and, in doing so, the authorities exhibited no application of mind. In Gurdial Singh's case, (supra), the Supreme Court observed that hearing a person before depriving him of his property is both reasonable and preemptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing the land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Article 14, burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. In that case, the Government wanted to acquire land for establishing a grain market, but later gave it up and selected another piece of land. That acquisition was declared mala fide and several years thereafter the Government sought to acquire the same land and invoked emergency power under Section 17. It was hell that invoking of such powers was not justified. This decision was applied and followed by this Court in Ahmed Khan v. Collector, East Nimar, Khandwa, M. P. 114 of 1982, decided on 6-7-1982. It was observed that when a notification under Section 6 was issued, nearly a month after the notification under Section 4 and the petition was filed nearly two months after the notification under Section 6 and the holder of the land continued in possession, the case was not one of such urgency that the authorities could have dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It was also observed that Section17 (1) applies in case of urgency and when the land to be acquired in waste or arable land, the enquiry under Section 5-A can be dispensed with only in such cases. Similar view has been taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Mohammed Shafi v. State of M. P. , 1989 Jab LJ 501. ( 8 ) IN the present case, the factual position is stated in paras 4 and 14 of the return exhibited by respondents Nos. 1 to 9. The necessity to widen the road to avoid traffic hazards has been emphasised. The traffic on the road abutting the premises in question is said to have enormously increased. According to them, the traffic hazard needs immediate redressal. Negotiations were held with the owners and occupiers of those premises and they were offered alternative accommodation. Some of the occupiers agreed. Lease deed has been executed and registered. Petitioner No. 2, who, according to the respondents, is the head of the family, represented the family during that negotiation. Petitioner No. 1 observes Pardan. Petition No. 2 agreed to vacate the premises and to accept alternative accommodation in one of the prestigious localities of the town. Some how, he turned round and, therefore, proceedings under the land acquisition Act had to be taken. Pressing need to widen the road is the cause stated for dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that a case has been made out by the respondent-State for invoking the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17, for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5a of the Act. It may also be noticed that after the amendments introduced in Section 17, by Act No. 68 of 1984 and in view of the local amendments to that section, the respondent-State is entitled to take immediate possession for managing the traffic over he public road in case of urgency. We have found above that the respondents have established that urgency and, therefore, are entitled to take possession as notified. The petitioners, therefore, are not right in contending that dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A, by invoking the provisions of Section 17, suffers from any illegality. This contention is rejected. We have found above that the respondents have established that urgency and, therefore, are entitled to take possession as notified. The petitioners, therefore, are not right in contending that dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A, by invoking the provisions of Section 17, suffers from any illegality. This contention is rejected. ( 9 ) THIS takes us to the last contention, namely, that the acquisition is in fact by or for the Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, which should be deemed to be a company for the purpose of Part VII of the Act. The contention is that since the procedure laid down in Part VII of the Act has not been followed, the acquisition is bad. The only averments in this regard are to be found in paragraph 13 of the petition. All that the petitioners state is; "there is no compliance of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. The acquisition is at the behest of Corporation and unless the provisions of Part VII are complied with, the land cannot be acquired. Provisions of Part VII are to be complied with before issue of notifications. " There is no allegation that not the Government but the Municipal Corporation was to supply funds for the acquisition. It, therefore, cannot be said that the acquisition is for a company with funds exclusively provided by the company. The notifications in questions (Annexures A and B) indicate that the acquisition is for public purpose (widening of road) and it is the State which is acquiring the land to carry out a public purpose with the instrumentality of the Municipal Corporation, Bhopal. Thus, it cannot be said that the acquisition is for a company with funds exclusively provided by the company, (Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, in this case), which would attract Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. Reference in this behalf be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Manu Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 120 . In that case, land was acquired for the benefit of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. It was held that such a corporation is a company. However, the Court ruled that even where land is acquired for a company, the State Government has power to acquire land for public purpose from the revenue of the State. The acquisition is for public purpose with contribution from the State revenue. It was held that such a corporation is a company. However, the Court ruled that even where land is acquired for a company, the State Government has power to acquire land for public purpose from the revenue of the State. The acquisition is for public purpose with contribution from the State revenue. The State has acquired land to carry out public purpose with the instrumentality of the Gujarat StateRoad Transport Corporation. The acquisition was not for a company with funds exclusively provided by the company and, therefore, would not attract Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. Following this decision and in view of the averments made in the petition, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of Part VII of the Act are attracted in the present case. No other point was urged in support of the petition. ( 10 ) THE petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .