Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.9282 of 1984. The petitioner in the writ petition is the appellant in this Appeal and the respondents in the writ petition are the respondents in this writ Appeal the sake of convenience, we are referring to the parties as per their nomenclature in the petition. The petitioner, who was in the employ of the third respondent as headmaster visited with an order of suspension on 9.11.1983. The order of suspension referred to conviction of the petitioner by a Criminal Court and the imposition of the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years, as the basis for suspending the petitioner. The admitted position is that no disciplinary action as such was prosecuted against the petitioner and the other hand the petitioner was restored to service on 29.9.1984. However, before reinstatement into service, the petitioner had already come to this court by way of the writ petition referred to above asking for a writ of mandamus to direct respondents 1 and 2 pass suitable orders compelling the third-respondent to restore the petitioner to service with effect from 9.11.1983 with continuity of service and back wages. Before the learned Single Judge, who dealt with the writ petition, the question which survived for consideration was only with reference to accord of relief for back wages. The learned single Judge entertained the impression that the controversy is only in the contractual sphere; and there is statutory provision enabling the petitioner to ask for payment of back wages, and in the said circumstances, a writ of mandamus could not be issued. In this view, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. This has obliged the petitioner to prefer this Writ Appeal. 2. Mr.Vijay Narayan, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the implications Sec.22(3)(b) and the Proviso thereto of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulations) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act, clearly make out that suspension pending an enquiry cannot be kept alive beyond a period of two months from date of suspension, and on the expiry of the period of two months, subject to an extension for another period of two months, the teacher must be deemed to have been restored service and the restoration to service must take in full emoluments. Learned counsel for petitioner points out that in the instant case admittedly there had been no extension of period of suspension as per the proviso to Sec.22(3)(b). Learned counsel for the petitioner also draws our attention to Rule 17(3)(i) of the rules framed under the Act to say that when the suspension is found to be not justified, as in the present case, the educational agency bound to pay the teacher the full pay and allowances, which he would have drawn but for suspension. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that a cogent and a combined reading these provisions will certainly form the statutory basis for the claims of the petitioner for emoluments during the period he was unjustifiedly kept under suspension. 3. It is better that we extract the relevant, statutory provisions in order to appreciate assess the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sec.22(3) of the act reads as follows: "3. (a) No teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of Code of Conduct prescribed under Sub-sec(1) of Sec.21, of such teacher or other person contemplated. (b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee:Provided that competent authority, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if in the opinion of competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher or other person." Rule 17(3)(i) runs as follows: "3. Whenever a teacher or other person employed in a private school is kept suspension., the grant payable to the private school shall be governed by the following provisions: i. where after due enquiry, including the appeal, a suspension is found to be not justified, the management shall remit the amount of subsistence allowance paid to the teacher other person employed in the private school to the Government in one lump sum under appropriate head of account. The educational agency shall, however, pay such teacher other person the full pay and allowances he would have drawn but for his suspension the amount of subsistence allowances already paid to the teacher or other person suspension period from the funds of the management without any claim from grant." 4. A plain reading of the provisions do speak to the effect as advanced by the counsel for the petitioner. When Sec.22(3)(b) speaks about the restoration into service the teacher after the period spoken to therein, of course, subject to the extension suspension for a period of two months as per the proviso thereto, the restoration must full sense and a restoration without emoluments will be a meaningless proposition cannot conceive of restoration into service as per that provision without emoluments. Furthermore, when the suspension is found to be not justified Rule 17(3)(j) casts obligation on the educational agency to pay the teacher the full pay and allowances for the period suspension. In the present case, the ‘ order of suspension was simply left in the air much the chagrin of the petitioner until it was revoked, on 29.9.1984, when the petitioner reinstated into service. There was also no extension of the period of suspension within meaning of the proviso to Sec.22(3)(b) of the Act. No disciplinary action was taken prosecuted against the petitioner. Nothing convincing is stated before us for the respondent in justification of the order of suspension. In the said circumstances, cannot be any other say than the one characterising the order of suspension as unjustifiable. It is true, Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, would say that the conviction of the petitioner by the Criminal Court prompted the third respondent to order the suspension of the petitioner. But, this submission learned senior counsel for the third-respondent, does not advance any justification could be acceptable for us for placing the petitioner under suspension, even when disciplinary action was contemplated and prosecuted. But, this submission learned senior counsel for the third-respondent, does not advance any justification could be acceptable for us for placing the petitioner under suspension, even when disciplinary action was contemplated and prosecuted. This is apart from the question whether any disciplinary action could be validly taken at all against the petitioner for misconduct within the meaning of code of conduct, in the stated facts and circumstances our view, the statutory provisions, referred to above, speaking about restoration into after the lapse of the permissible period of suspension, which has been found to justified, we cannot find any difficulty to spell out the statutory basis for the claims petitioner so as to issue the writ of mandamus, directing the third-respondent to disburse the emoluments for the period during which the petitioner was under suspension. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the third-respondent, would say that would be difficulty in working out the quantum. We do not think that any difficulty will experienced because the working out of the emoluments is a matter of arithmetics as service conditions and nothing more. We could not conceive of any ambiguity and attention has not been drawn to any feature of ambiguity with reference to the service conditions 6f the petitioner. 5. As a result, we allow this writ appeal; set aside the order of the learned single Judge W.P.No.9282 of 1984 and allow that writ petition, directing the third-respondent to disburse the emoluments legitimately due to the petitioner for the period of suspension 9.11.1983 to 29.9.1984, with expedition. We make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.