M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS'purpose to be a second appeal under section 100 of the C. P. C. by the plaintiff-appellant. In the course of the Judgment, I will refer to the parties by the rank assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 2 ) O. S. No. 24/1988 was presented in the Court of the Munsiff at Gowribidanur by appellant narasamma, the plaintiff. The suit was for declaration of her right, title and interest in the suit schedule properties as against the claims of the defendant, her husband T. Narasimhappa. During the pendency of the suit, a compromise petition was filed under Order 23, Rule 3 of the c. P. C. In terms of the compromise petition, the suit came to be decreed on 1-3-1988 in the presence of the parties in the Court. Soon thereafter, the defendant in the suit presented Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 inter alia alleging that he had married the plaintiff in the year 1953 and immediately after the marriage the relationship was strained and ultimately a registered document in the form of divorce was executed by the respondent and the same was duly registered on 10-4-1953. Thereafter, the respondent started living separately and she started living with one venkataramanappa who was a Police Constable and she gave birth to 2 sons and 3 daughters through the said Venkataramanappa and the petitioner was innocent and simpleton and taking undue advantage of the innocence of the petitioner, the plaintiff took him to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Gowribidanur and he was forced to put his signatures on various stamp papers and later the petitioner came to know that it was a sale deed in favour of the respondent in respect of the properties of which the petitioner was not at all tnc owner on that day. On 1-3-1988 the respondent and her supporters brought the petitioner before the Court and again taking advantage of the innocence of the petitioner, the defendant was made to believe that as he was aged and unable to carry on any agricultural operation the plaintiff will spend the money for the agricultural operation and as such the petitioner was further induced to believe that no harm would be caused to him and he was forced to put his signatures on certain papers and was forced to admit the contents of the documents before the Court and on 1-3-1988 he was completely under the will of the respondent and he blindly believed her and put his signatures on various papers and admitted its contents even though it was not read over to him and explained as to its consequences. Thus the plaintiff had played fraud on the defendant and obtained a compromise decree and when the respondent received the summons in OS, No. 26/1988 filed by one T. Narasimnanna be came to know the mala fide intention of the respondent and therefore he approached the Court and on verification he found ttiat the respondent had filed a suit against him in O. S. No. 24/1988 for the relief of injunction and declaration of title on various properties. The petitioner was forced to attend the Court on 1-3-1988 and he was forced to put his signature on the compromise petition and thus the compromise decree was the result of fraud and undue influence when the defendant was not in possession of disputed land but it was in possession of one Narasimhanna S/o Nyathanna and the compromise decree affected the right of third person and it was prayed to set aside the compromise decree passed in O. S. No. 24/1988. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff who was respondent in the Misc. Petition filed her objections and denied the allegations made against her. Plaintiff petitioner was examined as P. W. 1 and he got marked as many as two documents Exs. P-l. and P-2. Respondent examined one witness and herself as r. W.-2 and got marked Exs. D-l to D-10. After considering the evidence, both oral and documentary produced before him, the learned munsiff came to the conclusion that the entire exercise was pre-planned by the plaintiff- respondent to obtain a decree one way or the other. P-l. and P-2. Respondent examined one witness and herself as r. W.-2 and got marked Exs. D-l to D-10. After considering the evidence, both oral and documentary produced before him, the learned munsiff came to the conclusion that the entire exercise was pre-planned by the plaintiff- respondent to obtain a decree one way or the other. In that circumstance, discussing the case- law cited before him, he came to the conclusion that the petition was required to be allowed as the defendant had played fraud in the matter of obtaining a compromise decree in O. S. No. 24/1988. Aggrieved by that order made in the misc. Petition No. 4/1988, the plaintiff preferred a Regular First Appeal in the Court of the Civil judge at Chickballapur. The learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that no appeal under order 41, Rule 1 of C. P. C. was maintainable and as such he dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said order, the present second appeal is preferred under Section 100 of the C. P. C. ( 4 ) IN this Court, Mr. K. S. Savanur, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has contended the following:- That the order in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 on the file of the Munsiff setting aside the compromise decree was a decree as defined under the C. P. C. and therefore it was appealable. It is difficult to accept that contention having regard to the definition of the expression under Section 2 (2) of the C. P. C. Decree is defined to mean:-"the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 144, but shall not include any adjudication from which an appeal ties as an appeal from an order or order of dismissal for default". ( 5 ) MISC. Petition No. 4/1988 was not a suit cannot be disputed. Therefore, adjudication of whatever right in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 was not a matter in controversy in the suit. Therefore, having regard to the definition of the decree, adjudication in Misc. ( 5 ) MISC. Petition No. 4/1988 was not a suit cannot be disputed. Therefore, adjudication of whatever right in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 was not a matter in controversy in the suit. Therefore, having regard to the definition of the decree, adjudication in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 on the file of the Munsiff at Gowribidanur was not a decree under the C. P. C. However, Mr, Savanur drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Diwan Brothers v Central Bank of india, Bombay and Others, AIR 1976 Supreme court 1503. In the said case, Supreme Court had occasion to consider Article 2 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The use of the term 'decree' in Schedule II of Article 11 of the Court Fees Act, it was held, was referable to a decree as defined in Section 2 (2) of the C. P. C. and further the decision of the Tribunal constituted under Displaced persons Debts (Adjustment) Act as wrong a claim or rejecting a claim, it was held to be a decree under the Act, did not make it a decree within the meaning of the Court Fees Act and in that sense, the decision did not fulfil the requirements of a decree within the meaning of article 11 of II Schedule of the Court Fees Act. In other words, all that the Supreme Court decided in the case was that the settlement of a claim or rejection of a claim under the Displaced persons Debts (Adjustment) Act could not be termed a decree either under the Court Fees Act or under the C. P. C. by implication. I do not know how the decision assists the case put forward by the plaintiff-appellant, in this Court. It has no relevance or application to the facts of the case. I do not know how the decision assists the case put forward by the plaintiff-appellant, in this Court. It has no relevance or application to the facts of the case. ( 6 ) IT was next contended that even if a Regular First Appeal was not maintainable, the lower appellate Court ought to have converted the regular First Appeal in to a Miscellaneous First appeal having regard to Rule 1-A of Order 43 of c. P. C. Rule 1-A of Order 43 of C. P. C. reads as follows: -"1-A. (L) Where any order is made under this code against a party and thereupon any Judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contended that such order should not have been made and the Judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded". From the language employed, it is very clear that any order made under the Code against a party and thereupon any Judgment is pronounced against such party and decree is drawn up, such party may in an appeal against the decree contend that such an order should not have been made and the Judgment should not have been pronounced. Now on a careful reading of Rule 1-A, it is obvious that an order made under the Code against a party must be followed by a Judgment pronounced against such party and a decree drawn up consequently and the right conferred is to challenge in an appeal such a judgment and the decree and then contend that such an order could not have been made and the judgment could not have been pronounced. Subsection (2) makes it abundantly clear that in an appeal against a decree passed in the suit after recording a compromise or having refused to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should nor should not have been recorded. Therefore, none of the ingredients contained in sub-rule (1) and sub-rule 2 (l) (a) are attracted to the fact of the case. The order made in Misc. Therefore, none of the ingredients contained in sub-rule (1) and sub-rule 2 (l) (a) are attracted to the fact of the case. The order made in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 has not resulted in a Judgment and a decree against the plaintiff-appellant. Therefore, sub-rule (1) is not at all attracted. Even under Rule 2 until a decree is passed, the question of challenging the compromise does not arise. On the facts of this case, there is no compromise in existence which could be challenged. Therefore, I do not think a Miscellaneous first Appeal could have been maintained against the order of the trial Court under order 43, Rule 1-A. 15. However, learned Counsel Sri K. S. Savanur placed reliance on a decision of the bombay High Court in the case of Anant mahadeo Godbole v Achut Ganesh Godbole and others, AIR 1981 Bombay 357. In the said case the learned single Judge of that Court held that a suit was barred under Rule 3-A of Order 23 and as such a compromise decree could not be set aside by filing another suit. In other words, the decision relied upon assists the respondent- defendant and not the plaintiff. Explanation to rule 3 of Order 23 of C. P. C. reads as follows:- "explanation:- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule". That clearly points out that if a compromise decree is a result of an agreement or contract which is void under the Contract Act, it will not be lawful. That was exactly what was pleaded in the Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 in the Court of the munsiff at Gubbi by the defendant. If he proved that the compromise was unlawful under the contract Act as a void agreement then the Court was left with no choice but to set aside such a compromise decree in terms of the Explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 of C. P. C. Therefore, if any remedy was available to the appellant, it was elsewhere and not in the lower Appellate Court. ( 7 ) THIS appeal is therefore misconceived, as such it is rejected. ( 8 ) IT was submitted by Mr. ( 7 ) THIS appeal is therefore misconceived, as such it is rejected. ( 8 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Savanur that in the event this Court rejected the appeal, he should be permitted to convert this in to a Revision Petition under Section 115. So far as the Judgment of the Appellate Court is concerned, it cannot be set aside as a result of any error of jurisdiction. In fact, the Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction because it had none. Unless it is demonstrated that it had jurisdiction and it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction, the order will not be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. On the other hand, I have pointed out with reference to the law explained in the course of the Judgment that the order under appeal is correct, therefore, it is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction. Even if it were to be assumed that this Court had revisional jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 115 of C. P. C. as if it was revision preferred against the order of the learned Munsiff in Misc. Petition No. 4/1988 on his file, then there is no prayer to treat that order as an order without jurisdiction. ( 9 ) IN the result, the petitioner may pursue such remedy as may be available to him under the code against the order of the learned Munsiff, this Court cannot permit the petitioner to convert regular First Appeal in to Regular Second appeal against the order of the lower appellate court. Appeal is dismissed. --- *** --- .