JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.:---This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution takes exception to the verdict of respondent No. 1 in an appeal preferred by respondent No. 2 under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977---hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The first petitioner of which the Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer are also before us, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is also the Bombay Public Trusts Act, the beneficiaries being the Bengali speaking people. The school and a Junior College run by it are a minority school within the meaning of the Act. These schools had for its Head Master, one D.C. Mukherjee. The said D.C. Mukherjee attained the age of 60 years and was to be retired. At that time the seniority list of teachers working in the school showed respondent No. 3, Makhijani, to be the first in order of seniority and the second respondent Miss Banerjee the second seniormost person. D.C. Mukherjee was given two extensions but this was on an onerous condition stipulated by the Education Department viz. that his salary would be paid from the funds of the society and not from the grant-in-aid payable to the school. This could not continue for long and a choice had to be made for manning the post of principal. The Governing Body of the Society met on 24-6-1979. The Resolution passed at that meeting, to the extent relevant, reads as follows: "As the Council of the Management has finally decided not to pursue the re-employment case of Shri Mukherjee, the appointment of a substitute in his place cannot be delayed any longer, particularly because the institution is re-opening on 25-6-1979. Ku. Ila Banerjee, M.A., B.Ed. second in the seniority list has already proved her worth as in charge Principal from 7-5-1979 to 16-6-1979. She is the unanimous choice of the Council of Management as Principal, Dinanath Junior College and Higher Secondary School. This appointment is also in pursuance of provision of Article 30 of the Constitution of India read with Clause 13 of the L.A. Act regarding regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of employees in certain private schools and Government of Maharashtra Instructions in the matter." On the same day i.e. on 24-6-1979, the society addressed two communications, one to Ila Banerjee and the second to the Deputy Director of Education. That addressed to IIa Banerjee was designated an order and read as follows: "Ku. Ila Banerjee, Lecturer, is appointed as Principal (Offg.) Dinanath Junior College and Higher Secondary School with effect from 25th June, 1979 until further orders." The letter addressed to the Deputy Director of Education was worded as below: "It has since been decided to appoint Ku. Ila Banerjee as Principal of Dinanath Junior College and Higher Secondary School from 25th June, 1979. In this connection the self-explanatory resolution of the Council of Management of the society dated 24-6-1979 is enclosed. The appointment of Ila Banerjee as Principal may kindly be approved expeditiously." The Deputy Director of Education gave a reply and the relevant extract therefrom needs reproduction and it is as below: "Ku. Ila Banerjee second in seniority is allowed to sign the pay bills only with a view to avoid inconvenience to the teachers. However, her appointment as Head Mistress cannot be approved till the case of Shri F.D. Makhijani is finally decided, which may please the noted. Moreover you are also informed that since Shri Makhijani has been suspended without the prior permission of the Department, the payment of salary and allowance will have to be paid by the management to him regularly." 3. Going back a little, Makhijani had so acted as to give the Management of the society the impression that he was behaving in an indecent manner. This was when he was functioning as the in-charge Principal. This also was done at the instance of the Education Officer who pointed out that till a regular principal was appointed, only the seniormost teacher could sign the pay bills and function as an in-charge principal. On 5-9-1979 the school Committee considered the problems arising from Makhijani's behaviour. The minutes of the meeting are at Annexure R-IV and these minutes recite as follows: "The Council of Management of the society met on 24-6-1979 and after a detailed discussion of all the pros and cons of the situation decided to employ Ila Banerjee as officiating Principal from 25-6-1979 until further orders. The Council of Management decided in favour of Ila Banerjee on the following grounds: (1) She held the post of in-charge principal from 7-5-1979 to 16-6-1979 with great distinction. The Council of Management decided in favour of Ila Banerjee on the following grounds: (1) She held the post of in-charge principal from 7-5-1979 to 16-6-1979 with great distinction. She was also the unanimous choice of the Council of Management consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India read with the allied Act and Government Instructions in the matter. The copies of this unanimous resolution passed on 24-6-1979 have been communicated to the Education Officer, Deputy Director of Education...... etc. ......Shri Makhijani has represented against the decision of the Council of Management. The Secretary replied to the letter of Shri Makhijani....In the background of the facts stated above and in the interest of discipline, it became an imminent necessary to halt unwarranted activities of Makhijani. He should be charge-sheeted. Shri Makhijani be allowed 3 days for reply from the date of the receipt of the charge-sheet. Further action in the matter should be taken on receipt of his reply." In pursuance of the appointment, Ila Banerjee was receiving no more than the pay and allowances which she was entitled to as a lecturer plus the allowance of Rs. 50/- per month for the additional duty she was said to be discharging. Whether this was as an officiating principal or an in-charge Principal or a probationary Principal, will have to be considered at a later stage. 4. Ku. Ila Banerjee resented her continuation as an in-charge or officiating principal and addressed Annexure Rule 1 dated 3-5-1982 to the Secretary of the society. This letter was delivered to the said Secretary on 6-5-1982. It referred to the serious illness necessitating hospitalisation which Ila Banerjee had to undergo in May 1981. Her shattered health and suffering from weakness disabled from discharging the duties of an officiating principal. The letter also complained of Ila Banerjee not having any incentive to work inasmuch as her appointment as a regular Principal was being delayed. The letter ended with a reference to either give Ila Banerjee an assurance of making her a regular Principal or reverting her to her permanent post as a lecturer. On 6-5-1982, she developed cold feet and instantly delivered to the Society's Secretary Annexure Rule II which informed the society of her withdrawing the letter dated 3-5-1982 which was to be treated as cancelled. The Society addressed two communications on 6-5-1982 to Makhijani and Ila Banerjee respectively. On 6-5-1982, she developed cold feet and instantly delivered to the Society's Secretary Annexure Rule II which informed the society of her withdrawing the letter dated 3-5-1982 which was to be treated as cancelled. The Society addressed two communications on 6-5-1982 to Makhijani and Ila Banerjee respectively. Makhijani was informed of the Society's appointing him to the post of a Principal, the appointment being on a long term basis. The communication addressed to Ila Banerjee referred to her letter dated 3-5-1982 and informed her of the society's having accepted her resignation from the post she had been holding and in he resultant vacancy appointing Makhijani as Principal with effect from 8-5-1982. Ila Banerjee was further informed of her reversion to her substantive post of lecturer. Ila Banerjee went back to her post and for about 23 months maintained her peace. Thereafter, she launched an appeal under section 9 with the first respondent who shall hereinafter be referred to as the Tribunal. The Memorandum of Appeal is an Annexure E and four reliefs sought in that appeal were, 1) a declaration that the reduction in rank in post of Ila Banerjee from Officiating Principal to Senior Teacher was illegal, 2) declaration that the order appointing Makhijani as a Principal was illegal, 3) direction that the society to remove Makhijani from the post of Principal and 4) a direction to the society to reinstate Ila Banerjee in the post of a confirmed Principal. 5. The stand taken by the society was that Ila Banerjee had resigned from the post of officiating Principal voluntarily and it was because of that resignation that they had appointed Makhijani to the said post. The Tribunal in a somewhat confused judgment came to the conclusion that in the year 1982 Ila Banerjee was a permanent principal who was entitled to get an order of confirmation after the expiry of 2 years as reckoned from the date of her taking charge of the post. The Society's acceptance of Annexure C as a resignation was violative of Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules of 1981---hereinafter referred to as the Rules---and section 7 of the Act. The appeal was allowed and the operative part of the judgment recites as follows: "The appellant continues to be a Principal officiating from 7-5-1982 onwards and is entitled to receive all benefits of that post. The appeal was allowed and the operative part of the judgment recites as follows: "The appellant continues to be a Principal officiating from 7-5-1982 onwards and is entitled to receive all benefits of that post. The Management is free to decide her case for regular Principalship. The appointment of the respondent No. 2 in place of the appellant is hereby set aside." The expressions 'appellant' and 'respondent No. 2' used in the aforesaid passage, referred to Ila Banerjee and Makhijani respectively. Impugning the Tribunal's verdict, the society and office-bearers have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The subsequent developments which have taken place need to be mentioned here. They are that Makhijani officiated as a Principal and in due course retired. That appointment of a successor (Joshi) was challenged by a Ila Banerjee in an appeal under section 9 to the Tribunal. By way of interim relief Ila Banerjee sought an injunction to stay the taking over of the post of Principal by Shri Joshi. That relief was not granted and Ila Banerjee impugned the rejection by means of Writ Petition No. 2492 of 1988. On 26-10-1988 the said petition was rejected with a direction that the hearing of Appeal No. 188/88 be expedited. We are told that the appeal is still pending. In the meantime, Ila Banerjee also filed a civil suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 2512 of 1988 now pending in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division at Nagpur. 6. The stand taken by the society in the present petition is that the school being run by it is a Minority School. Consequently it has unfettered discretion in the matter of recruitment to the post of the Head of the said school. Ila Banerjee had not been appointed as Head of the school and she was a mere in charge Principal. The freedom given to the society vide section 3(2) of the Act was exercised while making the appointment of Makhijani. Ila Banerjee in approaching the Tribunal was trying to take an advantage to which she was not entitled. She could not complain of the acceptance of her resignation from the post of in charge Principal. The freedom given to the society vide section 3(2) of the Act was exercised while making the appointment of Makhijani. Ila Banerjee in approaching the Tribunal was trying to take an advantage to which she was not entitled. She could not complain of the acceptance of her resignation from the post of in charge Principal. In fact, it was she who made that offer and the society accepted the same having regard to her physical incapacity to perform the duty annexed to the office of the Principal Rule 14 to which recourse had been had by the Tribunal was inapplicable. The verdict of the Tribunal was indefensible. The verdict of the Tribunal was erroneous and deserved to be quashed. This stand is supported by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 who are the Education Officer and the Director of Education respectively. Ila Banerjee who is represented by an Advocate supports the verdict of the Tribunal. 7. Before we go to the consideration of the points for determination it is necessary to enumerate the statutory provisions applicable. From the Act, the relevant provisions are sections 2(13), 3, 496), 5(2) and 9(1). From the rules the relevant provision is Rule 40. Section 2(13) defines a Minority School, as meaning a school established and administered by a minority having a right to do so under Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Section 3 of the Act is in 2 parts. Sub-section (1) of section 3 lays down that the provisions of the Act shall apply to all private schools in the State of Maharashtra whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the State Government or not. Sub-section (2) of section 3 begins with the non obstante clause worded thus--- "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the recruitment of the Head of a Minority school and any other persons (not exceeding three) who are employed in such school and whose names are notified by the Management to the Deputy Director for this purpose." Section 4(6) prohibits the management of a Private School from suspending, dismissing removing or otherwise terminating the services of an employee or reducing him in rank, except in accordance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made in that behalf. Section 5 enjoins upon the Management to fill in, in the manner prescribed, every permanent vacancy arising in a private school by the appointment of a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy sub-section (2) of section 5 reads as follows: "Every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy shall be on a probation for a period of two years. Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5), he shall, on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed." Sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 5 need not be referred as they do not have relevancy to the questions arising for the determination to this petition. Section 9 sets out the right of appeal to the Tribunal and sub-section (1) thereof is worded thus--- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee in a private school--- a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by order passed by the Management; or b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion; and who is aggrieved. shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8." Rule 40 is titled 'resignation' and to the extent relevant reads thus: "A permanent employee may leave service after giving three calendar months notice and a non-permanent employee may leave service after giving one calendar month's notice. The management may, however, allow an employee to leave service earlier on payment of pay (excluding allowances) for three months, or as the case may be, one month in lieu of notice by the employee. The amount in lieu of notice shall be restricted to the pay for the period by which the notice period falls short." 8. Learned Counsel representing the society contends that Rule 40 had no application to the facts of this case. Apart from anything else, Ila Banerjee was not leaving the service but was being reverted to her substantive post voluntarily. Rule 40(1) speaking of resignation from service and giving up an in-charge assignment and reversion to the substantive post can never be considered as resignation in any sense of that expression, much less resignation as contemplated by Rule 40(1). There is substance in this contention. Rule 40(1) speaking of resignation from service and giving up an in-charge assignment and reversion to the substantive post can never be considered as resignation in any sense of that expression, much less resignation as contemplated by Rule 40(1). There is substance in this contention. The Tribunal has overlooked the crucial words "leave service" appearing in Rule 40(1). But this will not have much of a consequence upon the case. Therefore, we proceed to the next submission of the learned Counsel which is to the effect that the society running a minority school is freed from all fetters which private schools are required to abide by in the matter of recruitment of personnel such as the Head of the teaching establishment. This contention is made by way of a reply to the plea that the power given to make recruitment to the post of head etc. can be exercised only when there is a vacancy in the said post. In so far as the case of Principalship of this school was concerned, Ila Banerjee had not been appointed as an in-charge Principal. Her appointment was to fill up a permanent vacancy. In this connection reliance is placed upon the resolution passed by the society Council Management on 24-6-1979 and the communication addressed by the society to the Deputy Director of Education to grant approval to the appointment of Ila Banerjee as the Principal. The contention is that the society wanted to fill up a permanent vacancy and had selected Ila Banerjee to fill up that vacancy. On behalf of the society our attention has been invited to Annexure Rule VIII which is the letter of the Deputy Director of Education dated 15-9-1979. It is submitted that whatever be the background of the Society's decision to appoint Ila Banerjee as a Principal, the Deputy Director had made it clear that she was to be a mere in-charge and this also was the purpose of ensuring signatures to pay bills. The letter dated 15-9-1979 made it specifically clear that Ila Banerjee could not be appointed as Head Mistress until a final decision had been taken upon the representation made by Makhijani. The society implemented the directions given by the Deputy Director of Education in his letter dated 15-9-1979 for though Ila Banerjee was described as Principal (officiating), she was not paid the salary payable to one holding the Office of Principal. The society implemented the directions given by the Deputy Director of Education in his letter dated 15-9-1979 for though Ila Banerjee was described as Principal (officiating), she was not paid the salary payable to one holding the Office of Principal. All that she got was the allowance admissible to a person holding additional charge. The argument is that Ila Banerjee understood her position to be in conformity with the directions given by the Deputy Director, for as later as on 3-5-1982 she was complaining of not been made a regular Principal. How parties understand the situation is one way to determine a dispute. But the other way is required to be viewed by the law. Ila Banerjee had not been appointed as an in-charge Principal. She was, in fact, appointed a Principal (officiating). According to the minutes of the meeting and the resolution, she was chosen to man the post of a Principal and not as an acting or in-charge Principal. She was designated an officiating Principal because the Principalship in the proper sense of that term was to take effect only after the Deputy Director of Education had conveyed his approval---so at least thought the society. But what is clear is that Ila Banerjee was appointed to fill a permanent vacancy and not any in charge or acting vacancy. There was no impediment to her being appointed to fill the permanent vacancy. Being a minority school, the Head could be anyone selected by the society. The society had made a choice and the validity of that choice did not depend upon the approval or otherwise of the Deputy Director of Education. That approval may have been necessary to ensure a grant, but no more. The receipt of a grant or reimbursement for the expenditure incurred on payment of salary to a teacher or any employee, has no relation to the character of the employment. The Deputy Director of Education could not interdict the appointment of Ila Banerjee. Firstly, this was because the appointment was in a minority school and the appointment of a Head of such school is excluded from the provisions of the Act vide section 3(2) of the Act. Secondly, the pendency of the representation made by Makhijani against his supersession was no reason for withholding approval to the appointment of Ila Banerjee. The society had superseded Makhijani and Makhijani had his remedies. Secondly, the pendency of the representation made by Makhijani against his supersession was no reason for withholding approval to the appointment of Ila Banerjee. The society had superseded Makhijani and Makhijani had his remedies. Until the supersession was set aside the Deputy Director of Education could not ignore what had taken place viz. his replacement in the post as an in-charge Principal and the installation of Ila Banerjee in the vacant slot. Once we reach this conclusion, section 5(2) of the Act is automatically attracted. Ila Banerjee had completed the period of two years as on 24-6-1981. Therefore, she would be deemed to have been confirmed in accordance with the second part of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act. That, Ila Banerjee believed the contrary, viz., that she was a mere officiating Principal when she addressed the letter of 3-5-1982 to the society is of no consequence. A mistaken belief does not alter the legal position. That the society believed differently is again of no consequence. Ila Banerjee had no reason to seek appointment as a regular Principal for the deeming provision had taken effect and she stood confirmed as from 25-6-1981. 9. It was argued that even if Ila Banerjee stood confirmed as a Principal with effect from 25-6-1981, the society could take recourse to section 3(2) of the Act by exercising afresh the power of recruitment Makhijani as the Principal. It is not possible to agree with this submission. The argument that a head of the Minority School is totally stripped of the protection given by the Act, is not acceptable. The different provisions of the Act have to be so read as to reconcile one with the other. If section 3 is to be read in isolation it would amount to this that the Head of Minority School and three named persons would be totally deprived of protection, and, for no better reason that the Management had singled them out for notification. A better way to read sections 3 and 5 would be to hold that section 3(2) can be taken recourse to, only when there is a vacancy in the post of a Head of a Minority School and three other posts. Once the vacancy is filled up, the incumbent after completion of two years becomes an automatically confirmed employee. A better way to read sections 3 and 5 would be to hold that section 3(2) can be taken recourse to, only when there is a vacancy in the post of a Head of a Minority School and three other posts. Once the vacancy is filled up, the incumbent after completion of two years becomes an automatically confirmed employee. Once the confirmation takes effect, he gets the protection of section 4(6) in that he cannot be suspended, dismissed, removed otherwise terminated or reduced in rank, except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made in that behalf. Unless an attempt is made to so reconcile, the exemption contemplated by the provisions of section 3(2), would become a charter of oppression. Giving a minority the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice is recognised by Article 30(1) of the Constitution But as observed in (Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India)1, reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 1, the right guaranteed permits regulatory measures designed towards the achievement of the goal viz. making minority educational institutions effective instruments for imparting of education. Uncertainty of tenure for the person manning the post of a Head would endanger this goal. To sum up, the position emerging may be stated thus: 1) Ila Banerjee was appointed in to fill a permanent vacancy, 2) Her appointment was on merit i.e. after consideration of her qualities to man the post of a Principal of the School, 3) The appointment was within the powers of the society vide section 3(2) of the Act, 4) The Deputy Director of Education could not reject the appointment or whittle its effectiveness by directing that she be treated as an in charge Principal, 5) That Ila Banerjee believed that she was not the full regular holder of the post was of no consequence and did not affect the legal position, 6) That Ila Banerjee did not receive the full pay and allowances annexed to the post of the Principal did not affect her status, 7) On the expiry of the two years' period she stood confirmed and thus became the regular holder of the post of Principal. Consequently, the society could not, whether because of her letter or otherwise revert her to the post of a senior teacher. In terms, the letter dated 3-5-1982 was not a letter of resignation. Consequently, the society could not, whether because of her letter or otherwise revert her to the post of a senior teacher. In terms, the letter dated 3-5-1982 was not a letter of resignation. It was in substance a plea coupled with an alternative threat and the threat was withdrawn on the very day on which the letter dated 3-5-1982 was tendered. If the resignation stood withdrawn, the society could not continue to believe that a resignation existed and could be acted upon. It is well-settled that a resignation cannot be given effect to, if it is withdrawn. The society before it took up the question of appointing Makhijani, had before it the letter dated 6-5-1982 by Ila Banerjee withdrawing the letter written by her on 3-5-1982. It may be argued that the society was free to act upon the letter dated 3-5-1982 inasmuch as Ila Banerjee had pleaded ill-health as a ground for being allowed to revert to her substantive post of a senior teacher. But the letter dated 3-5-1982 had to be read as a whole and thus read the offer of reversion was nothing more than emotional blackmail. For all these reasons, we hold that the reversion of Ila Banerjee to the post of a senior teacher was not warranted. Once this position is reached, it follows that Ila Banerjee could take recourse to section 9 of the Act. She did take recourse to section 9 and has succeeded in obtaining a declaration. Learned Counsel for the petitioners takes exception to the phrasing of the operative part of the Tribunal. Petitioners have no right to complain against the said phraseology. If any one has a right to complain it is Ila Banerjee and as she seems to have no grievance on that score we will leave the matter at that. In the result, the petition fails and hence the order. Rule is discharged with the parties being left to bear their own costs. Petition failed. -----