Judgment :- The writ petition is for a writ of Quo Warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction preventing the respondent from exercising his authority as the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calicut. The petitioner is a citizen of India and he challenges the appointment of the respondent as Vice Chancellor. There is no dispute relating to the qualification of the person appointed and also the legality of the appointment made under the relevant statute. S.10 of the Calicut University Act, 1975 provides for appointment of the Vice Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the unanimous recommendation of a committee appointed by him consisting of three members, one elected by the Senate, one nominated by the Chairman of the University Grants Commission and the third nominated by the Chancellor. The Chancellor shall appoint one of the members of the committee to be its convener. The Committee shall make its recommendation within a period of three months of its appointment. No person who is more than 60 years of age shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. The Vice Chancellor shall hold office for a term of four years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for reappointment. There is a provision that a Vice-Chancellor shall not be appointed as such for more than two terms. The duties of the Vice-Chancellor are also mentioned in S.10. S.9 of the Calicut University Act enumerates the Officers of the University and S.7 says that the Governor of Kerala shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University. The Chancellor shall be the Head of the University and sub-section (9) of S.7 gives him the power to remove the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro-Vice Chancellor from office by an order in writing on charges of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds or misbehaviour. There is provision for conducting enquiry before the Vice-Chancellor is removed. The Chancellor exercises the visitorial jurisdiction in the University and this jurisdiction is conferred on him because of the high eminence of the University and if any mis-behaviour or mis-conduct or irregularity is found in the academic or in other fields in the University, the same has to be brought to the notice of the Chancellor. He exercises the visitorial jurisdiction. He exercises the visitorial jurisdiction. The law of visitorial jurisdiction has recently been clarified by the House of Lords in the case of dismissed University Lecturer, holding that it extends to all questions arising out of institution internal rules, notwithstanding that they involve contractual relation and notwithstanding that the complainant is not a member of the institution. The extent of visitorial jurisdiction has greatly expanded in recent years. (See Wade HWR oth Edn. p. 568). 2. In this case there is no dispute relating to the qualification to be appointed as Vice Chancellor or any complaint regarding any violation of the relevant statutory provisions in the case of appointment. The case pleaded in the petition is that the Vice Chancellor failed to exercise the power or abused the power. The powers are classified as Administrative and financial. Under the Administrative Head several omissions and commissions have been detailed from A to Q in the petition. Similarly under the Head financial powers the omissions and commissions have been detailed under A to F in the petition. These facts constitute misbehaviour or misconduct, according to the petitioner and therefore the respondent is liable to be restrained from exercising the power. 3. I feel that the prayer in the writ petition viz. issuance of a writ of Quo Warranto is not prima facie maintainable. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner has taken a point departing from usual grounds on which Quo Warranto can be issued. Normally, writ of Quo Warranto can be issued only when the qualification of the appointee is disputed or when there is violation of any statutory provision in making the appointment in question, to show under the what authority the incumbent is holding its office. According to the petitioner a departure has to be made and it is submitted that the writ can be issued even incases where the appointment has been made according to law, but the appointee is not discharging his duties properly, or mal-administering, or committing misconduct while in office. It is submitted that in such case, Quo Warranto can be issued. He referred to the decision in Rex v. Spever 1916 (1) KB 595 (LJ (1916) 85 KBD NS 630). He also referred to the decision in Peter v. Kendal & another, 30 R.R.504 also reported in All. E.R. reprint 1824-1834 page 24. It is submitted that in such case, Quo Warranto can be issued. He referred to the decision in Rex v. Spever 1916 (1) KB 595 (LJ (1916) 85 KBD NS 630). He also referred to the decision in Peter v. Kendal & another, 30 R.R.504 also reported in All. E.R. reprint 1824-1834 page 24. The decision reported in Rex v. Spever 1916 (1)KB 595 is related to the appointment of two Privy Council members. The question was posed as to under what Authority they were holding as members of the Privy Council. In that context the scope of writ of prohibition Quo Warranto etc. had to be examined. In the historical background a preliminary question was posed as to whether the writ is maintainable at the instance of a private person. While answering the question relating to locus standi, it was held that as in the case of writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition Quo warranto also can be availed of at the instance of the petitioner. The observation of Lush, J. is as follows:- "I will briefly state my reasons for thinking that the preliminary objection fails. There was no doubt a time at which the old writ of quo warranto was used exclusively in order to prevent encroachments on the King's prerogative. But as times changed, the nature and scope of the writ became enlarged, and even before the case of DARLEY v. REG. (12 C1. & F 520). The proceeding by way of information in the nature of quo warranto, which had taken the place of the older writ, had come to have afar wider application. It is the process by which persons who claim to exercise public functions of an important and substantive character, by whom so ever appointed, can be called to account, if they are not legally authorised to exercise them. It seems to me to be clear that there is now no such limitation upon this process as that for which the Attorney General as contended. It has been constantly used or purposes other than that of preventive, encroachments upon the King's prerogative, as I think the case of BARLEY v. REG. (12 Cl. & f 520) itself shows. It seems to me to be clear that there is now no such limitation upon this process as that for which the Attorney General as contended. It has been constantly used or purposes other than that of preventive, encroachments upon the King's prerogative, as I think the case of BARLEY v. REG. (12 Cl. & f 520) itself shows. By means of this information and the writ of mandamus and prohibition this Court can, and does, exercise control or all persons who hold public offices-and the appointment of a person to be a member of the Privy Council is, I think, clearly an appointment to an office-and discharge public duties, either judicial or otherwise. They are the processes by which this Court compels them to discharge those duties, according to law, if they failed to do so, or prohibits them from acting, if they have no lawful authority to do so. The process is enforced for the benefit of the community, and is the only available remedy if an office is either abused or usurped. That any subject can call the attention of the court to any excess of authority on the part of an Inferior court and apply for prohibition is clear, and in my opinion the same principle applies in the case of an information in the nature of a Quo Warranto". By observing Lush J. dismissed the preliminary objection that the quo warranto will not lie at the instance of a private person. In the decision reported in Peter v. Kendal & Another, 30 R.R.504 the question involved related to private ferry service. The ferry service was originally given to a person who sublet to another person. It is on that context the question was examined. There is an observation to the effect that neglect also can be subject matter of Quo Warranto or Scire facias case. There the court was examining the question whether in what circumstances the two writs can be issued. The court explained that in a case where there is no authority to run the service, then Quo Warranto can be issued and in other case, where the appointment is according to law but negligence is there calling for removal of the authority is Scire facias case can be issued. This is clear from Vol. 11 Halsbury' s Laws of England at page 153 para. This is clear from Vol. 11 Halsbury' s Laws of England at page 153 para. 292 Third Edition where the term Scire facias is explained as under: "Scire facias.--Scire facias on the crown side of the Queen's Bench Division is a proceeding for the purpose of rescinding or repealing Crown grants, charters and franchises (1). It must be distinguished from the obsolete writ of scire facias used in aid of executions(m), and from scire facias on the Revenue side of the Queen's Bench Division which was abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (n). Scire facias on the Crown side is still available(o). The grant, in order to be rescinded by this process, must be of record (p). The proceedings are conducted through the agency of the Crown Office, as successor of the Petty Bag Office. If they are initiated by a subject, the fiat of the Attorney-General must be obtained. Declarations and other pleadings are to be delivered to the opposite party and not filed. The judgment, if in favour of the applicant orders that the Crown grant is to be restored to Chancery, there to be cancelled, in which case the parties attend in Chancery, and the seal is cut off and the enrolment vacated." Counsel for the petitioner also referred to the decision in Rex v. Hertford Corpn. (1699) Salk 374. This decision will not advance the contention of the petitioner that quo warranto will be issued to remove a person from office when he is found guilty of mismanagement or misbehaviour. There is alternate remedies available to the petitioner in this case. If the petitioner's contention is that the respondent is mis¬behaving, or mismanaging, or even not acting properly, he has remedy under the Act., viz. under S.7(9) of the Calicut University Act. He can approach the Chancellor with a petition to remove the Vice Chancellor. Alternatively, he has other remedies as well in civil law. 4. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that in India the question of issuance of a writ of quo warranto is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491. Alternatively, he has other remedies as well in civil law. 4. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that in India the question of issuance of a writ of quo warranto is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said decision reads as under: "The Judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by the respondent in the present proceedings, and the conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue in such proceedings. As Halsbury has observed: "An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be, determined". Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo' warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not". He also referred to 11 Halsbury's Laws of England page 145 which reads as follows: "An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. It also lay in cases of non-user, abuse, or long neglect of a franchise. Certain limitations were imposed on the scope of the information by statutory provisions to the effect that elections to certain offices should not be questioned on the ground that the person elected was at the time of election disqualified, save by election petition. In 1933 an alternative form of proceedings was substituted for informations in respect of the qualifications of persons acting as members of a local authority or as mayors of boroughs, and it was provided that except in the form so substituted no proceedings, whether by way of information in the nature of quo warranto or otherwise, should be taken against a person on the ground that he had, while disqualified for acting as a member of a local authority or mayor of a borough, so acted or claimed to be entitled so to act. In 1938 all informations in the nature of quo warranto were abolished, and it was provided that, in any case where a person acted in an office in which he was not entitled to act and an information in the nature of quo warranto would have lain against him, the High Court might, at the instance of any person who would have been entitled to apply for such an information, grant an injunction restraining the former from so acting and might (if the case so required) declare the office to be vacant". This matter has been considered by my learned brother Varghese Kalliath, J. in KJ. Josephv. Hon'ble Mr. This matter has been considered by my learned brother Varghese Kalliath, J. in KJ. Josephv. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Sukumaran, 1987 (1) KLT 37 = AIR 1987 Ker.140 where this Court observed: "I need not emphasise that since writ of quo warranto is a somewhat drastic remedy the courts in administering it should proceed with anxious deliberation and with utmost caution. In England, by S.9 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, proceedings by way of prerogative writ of quo warranto to challenge the right of any person to hold a public office has been abolished. But there is a provision by which the Queens Bench Division may now be requested to issue an injunction restraining an individual from acting in a public office in circumstances in which quo warranto could formerly have been brought. The above views and principles broadly indicate and throw sufficient light on the path, the courts have to ambulate before issuing a writ of quo warranto. These principles have been largely followed by our courts and the Supreme Court. AIR 1965 SC 491 (University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao ) practically affirms these principles. What I have quoted from the Halsbury's Laws of England has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the above decision, the Supreme Court said:- "Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the enquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office". 5. Petitioner argued the case mainly for the writ of quo warranto. But if it is found that the writ petition is maintainable on the facts pleaded and other writs can be issued. The fact that quo warranto alone was prayed for will not be a ground for refusing the jurisdiction. In other words this Court has adequate power to fashion appropriate relief based on the facts of the case. But if it is found that the writ petition is maintainable on the facts pleaded and other writs can be issued. The fact that quo warranto alone was prayed for will not be a ground for refusing the jurisdiction. In other words this Court has adequate power to fashion appropriate relief based on the facts of the case. In appropriate case the Court also is not powerless to issue a writ in the nature of a quasi quo warranto when the authority though lawfully appointed forfeits the right to continue or usurps the powers or acts in excess or abuse of power. But going through the pleadings in this case, as I already stated, there are adequate alternative remedies available to the petitioner. The question whether a writ of mandamus or prohibition or other writ, order or injunction is maintainable need not be considered because the petitioner has other alternative remedies available under the relevant statutory provisions as well as ordinary law of the land. The Chancellor of the University is given power to exercise visitorial jurisdiction and he has power to remove the Vice-chancellor if so required. I find no ground to entertain this original petition. The Original Petition is dismissed.