D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS case brings forth the general impression that in this country difficulty of a litigant starts after getting a favourable decree / order. Civil Revision petition filed by the judgment-debtor is directed against the order passed by First Munsif, Cuttack on 19-3-81 in Execution Case No. 254 of 1988 rejecting the plea that the decree-holder is not entitled to execute the decree. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts leading to the present proceeding may be stated thus : the original decree holder, Akhaya Kumar Behera, obtained an order from the House Rent Controller, Cuttack for eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question, 183 decimals of land under two plots, 72 decimals in plot No. 1251, 111 decimals in plot No. 1252 and a pucca house standing on a portion of it, under Khata No. 360 in Mouza Unit No. 16, Bisinabar which is a part of Cuttack town. He filed Execution Case No. 254 of 1988 in the Court of the Munsif, First Court, Cuttack to execute the said eviction order. During pendency of the said case, the opposite party purchased a portion of the property, 82 decimals, with the house standing thereon. On getting information about the sale, the petitioner filed an application purportedly under Section 47, C. P. C. contending that since the decree-holder had sold the property in question he was not entitled to execute the decree. The opp. party-purchaser filed an application before the Executing Court seeking permission to intervene in the case. The Executing Court rejected the contention by order dated 12-9-81 of the petitioner that the decree had been rendered inexecutable on account of sale of the property by the decree holder and directed that the purchaser be substituted in place of the decree-holder and permitted her to continue the execution case. The petitioner filed two Civil Revisions in this Court, Civil Revision No. 954 of 1990 against the order dated 12-11-90 rejecting his objection regarding executability of the decree and directing delivery of possession to be given to the substituted decree-holder and Civil Revision No. 955 of 1990 against the order dated 31-10-90 by which the executing Court impleaded the purchaser in the Execution Case. Both the revision petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter when the opp. Both the revision petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. Thereafter when the opp. party took steps to execute the decree for eviction of the petitioner, he filed another application alleging, inter alia, that from the sale deed executed by the original decree-holder in favour of the opp. party it appears that she has purchased only a portion of the property in question therefore she is not entitled to recover possession of the entire property and the execution case should be dismissed as not maintainable. The Executing Court rejected this application by the impugned order. ( 3 ) ON perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the main reason which persuaded the learned Munsif to reject the petitioner' objection to execution of the decree was that by order dated 12-11-90 he had held, inter alia, that the purchaser (opp. party) was entitled to execute the decree and recover possession of the premises in question that order having attained finality the judgment-debtor (petitioner) is precluded from raising the self-same plea again. ( 4 ) THE submission of Shri R. Ch. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner was that the eviction order is not executable by the opp. party since she has admittedly purchased only a portion of the property in question and therefore who is not entitled to recover possession of the entire property. It is the further contention of Shri Mohanty that the decree cannot be split up and executed in parts and therefore the resultant position is that the entire decree has become inexecutable. Shri Susanta Kumar Das appearing for the opp. party while supporting the impugned order contended that the present plea taken by the petitioner is nothing but an attempt to protract the proceeding and delay the delivery of possession of the property to the decree-holder. It was his further submission that since the previous order impleading the opp. party in place of the original decree-holder was passed on the application filed by the petitioner objecting to the decree-holder' right to continue the execution case after having sold the property to the opp. party and that order having become final the petitioner should not be permitted to take a contrary stand that at the instance of the purchaser-opposite party the decree is not executable. party and that order having become final the petitioner should not be permitted to take a contrary stand that at the instance of the purchaser-opposite party the decree is not executable. Shri Das however accepted the factual position that his client has purchased only a portion of the property delivery of possession of which is sought in the execution case. ( 5 ) DURING hearing of the case, to my query Shri Mohanty fairly conceded that even after sale of a portion of the property to the opp. party, the original decree-holder had the right to continue the execution case and that executability of the eviction order was not affected by the sale. However I will have occasion to discuss this point a little later. Order 21, Rule 15, Civil Procedure Code (C. P. C.) provides that where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, any one or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or, where any of them had died, for the benefit of the survivors and the legal representatives of the deceased. The Rule further provides that where the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed on an application made under the Rule, it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. Rule 16 of Order 21 deals with application for execution by the transferee of the decree. The Rule lays down that where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons, the interest of any decree-holder in the decree is transferred by the assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application was made by such decree-holder. Under the first proviso to Rule 16 it is provided that in case of transfer by assignment, a notice of the application is required to be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections, if any, to its execution. Under the first proviso to Rule 16 it is provided that in case of transfer by assignment, a notice of the application is required to be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections, if any, to its execution. On the Explanation it is laid down that nothing in the Rule shall affect the provisions of Section 146 and a transferee of rights in the property, which is the subject-matter of the suit, may apply for execution of the decree without a separate assignment of the decree as required by the Rule. Section 146, C. P. C. provides that save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. Rule 15 of Order 21 in terms does not apply to the present case since the decree under execution is not a joint decree. Rule 15 of Order 21 enables the transferee of the decree or transferee of the property which is the subject-matter of the execution case to execute the decree. There is, therefore, little scope for doubt that the opposite party-purchaser is entitled to execute the decree. As such, no fault can be found with the executing Court for having impleaded the opposite party in the execution case. ( 6 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the opp. party who has admittedly purchased only a part of the property in question is entitled to execute the decree. In this connection it is relevant to consider the question whether the decree in this case can be split up and executed in parts. As noted earlier, it is the contention of Shri Mohanty that spliting up of the decree is not permissible. He has relied on certain decisions which I shall presently discuss. In this connection it is relevant to consider the question whether the decree in this case can be split up and executed in parts. As noted earlier, it is the contention of Shri Mohanty that spliting up of the decree is not permissible. He has relied on certain decisions which I shall presently discuss. In the case of Narayandas Sunderlal Rathi v. Tejmal Mohanlal, reported in AIR 1934 Bom 59 interpreting the provisions of Rules 15 and 16 of Order 21, the Court held that a decree for purposes of execution must be regarded as a whole and indivisible; when it is sought to execute it must be executed as a whole and not split up into parts. Hence an assignee of a part decree is not entitled to execute his part of the decree nor even the whole decree as he cannot be regarded as a joint decree-holder. In the case of Gauri Shankar v. Kunwar Jang Bahadur, reported in AIR 1926 Oudh 605 considering the provisions of Order 21, Rule 15, the Court held that it is not open to apply for a partial execution and therefore where a decree is passed in favour of two decree-holders, application for execution for only a half of the decretal amount by one of them cannot be proceeded with. In a later decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Motilal Shivnarayan v. Santaram Bala, reported in AIR 1954 Bom 273 a Division Bench of the Court on consideration of several decisions including that reported in AIR 1934 Bom 59 held as follows :"looking at the scheme of Rule 16 of Order XXI, it does appear that this rule does not expressly prohibit the partial transfer of a decree in favour of an assignee. If a decree can be executed piecemeal, there is no reason why an assignee in whose favour part of the decretal rights has been transferred should not be entitled to execute the decree so far as it relates to the part assigned to him. It may be that if the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be executed piecemeal different considerations may arise. It may be that if the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be executed piecemeal different considerations may arise. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether partial assignment of any given decree is effective or not, it would always be necessary to consider the nature of the decree, the rights under which are partially transferred to the assignee. It would not be correct to lay down a general proposition either one way or the other. The rule which prohibits piecemeal execution of the decree is subject to one important exception and that is where the decree in question awards two or more different and distinct reliefs. In regard to a decree which grants to the decree-holder two or more distinct and different reliefs it would not be correct to say that if one of the reliefs so granted by the decree is assigned by an act inter vivos, the assignee could not be permitted to execute that decree. If the decree-holder can execute the decree in part, an assignee of a distinct and separate part would also be entitled to execute the decree in regard to that part. ". (Quoted from placitum ). On consideration, I respectfully agree with the principles laid down in the above mentioned decision of the Bombay High Court. It cannot be laid down as a general principle that in no case it is permissible to split up the decree or to execute the decree in piecemeal. The contention of Shri Mohanty in this regard is therefore not acceptable. ( 7 ) THIS matter may also be considered from another angle. As noted earlier, the landlord filed the execution case to execute the order of the House Rent Controller directing eviction of the tenant-petitioner. The term 'landlord' is defined under the Orissa House Rent Control Act to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a house, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others. Therefore, it is not necessary for the landlord to have the right, title and interest in the house in question. Similarly a landlord who filed the application and obtained the order of eviction does not cease to be a landlord by transferring the property to another person. Therefore, it is not necessary for the landlord to have the right, title and interest in the house in question. Similarly a landlord who filed the application and obtained the order of eviction does not cease to be a landlord by transferring the property to another person. It follows that despite the transfer he is entitled to continue the execution case for eviction of the tenant from the house in question. The transferee also can prosecute the execution case if he/she is able to show that under any arrangement with the vendor the right to prosecute the execution case and seck eviction of the tenant has been assigned to him/her. Thus considered from any angle, neither the executability of the decree nor the locus standi of the original decree-holder or the transferee can be said to have been adversely affected in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Executing Court was therefore not right in deleting the name of the decree-holder from the proceeding. While allowing the application of the transferee to intervene in the proceeding, he should have allowed the decree-holder to continue the proceeding. In that case the present objection raised by the judgment-debtor would not have been available and delay in execution of the order could have been avoided. ( 8 ) BEFORE parting with the judgment, I would like to discuss the reasons stated in the impugned order that the petitioner having taken the plea that the original decree-holder has lost his right to continue the execution case after the transfer of the property and on the said submission the transferee having been substituted in place of the decree-holder, he cannot be permitted to take a different plea at a subsequent stage of the proceeding. The Supreme Court in the case of Y. B. Patil v. Y. L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 892 rules that the principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings but they also get attracted at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. The present objection taken by the petitioner that the transferee is not entitled to execute the decree in my view is hit by the principle of res judicata. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. The present objection taken by the petitioner that the transferee is not entitled to execute the decree in my view is hit by the principle of res judicata. ( 9 ) ON the analysis and the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no merit in the revision petition. Therefore while decling to set aside the impugned order, I would direct the Executing Court to pass appropriate orders to continue the original decree-holder in the case in addition to the transferee and proceed to dispose of the execution case in accordance with law. Subject to the above direction, the revision petition is dismissed. Both parties will bear their respective costs of this proceeding. Petition dismissed.