JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---The appellant in this case has appealed against the conviction by the learned Special Judge, Greater Bombay in Special Case No. 42, of 1990. It is unnecessary to refer to the several charges framed against the appellant by the trial Court except in passing to mention that the original charges came to be amended more than once, the last time being during the evidence of the complainant. The learned Special Judge at that stage added a 6th charge which virtually encompasses all the incidents that are the subject matter of the present prosecution. It appears that having regard to the peculiar nature of the facts and considering that the accused was not a public servant, that the learned Special Judge found it more appropriate to frame a composite charge under section 213 I.P.C. I am informed at the bar, as is evident from the record, that some of the witnesses were recalled pursuant to the amendment to the charge. 2. Mrs. Shenoy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has not made any serious grievance with regard to this amendment, which in any event, was permissible in law, because she has seriously attacked the very basis of the conviction itself, though on the basis of submissions which to my mind were quite puerile. 3. The facts of the present case are rather unusual and interesting. It is alleged that the present complainant Gulam Hussain was at the relevant time i.e., between the period January 1979 and March, 1980 when the incident took place, facing a charge of murder along with one other accused before the Court of Sessions, Greater Bombay. We are not immediately concerned with the other accused in that case. According to the prosecution, the wife of the present appellant is alleged to have informed the Inspector of Police, Kherwadi Police Station, through her advocate that she was an eye-witness to the incident of murder that was the subject matter of the Sessions trial and that she is also alleged to have filed an affidavit to this effect before the police authorities. Pursuant to this, the police recorded her statement and it is alleged that she was one of the main witnesses on whom the prosecution evidence heavily rested. Pursuant to this, the police recorded her statement and it is alleged that she was one of the main witnesses on whom the prosecution evidence heavily rested. It is the prosecution case that the complainant had been released on bail by the High Court and that the present accused is alleged to have been instrumental in making an application before the High Court for cancellation of his bail. It is further alleged that the accused had gone to the extent of filing and affidavit before the High Court for purposes of getting the bail of the complainant cancelled. According to the complainant, the accused had represented that he is a man of considerable influence as also political clout and that he could materially assist in getting the complainant acquitted in the Sessions trial be seeing to it that his wife who was the most material and important witness would either not give evidence or would change her version. It is alleged that on the basis of this ploy and the threats to get the bail of the complainant cancelled, that the accused was extorting money from the complainant and that he is alleged to have extorted an amount of Rs. 500/- initially, followed by an instalment of Rs. 200/-, thereafter a substantial amount of Rs. 2,000/- and finally an amount of Rs. 200/- on 26th March 1980. It is alleged by the complainant that the accused was stepping up the pressure on him because the commencement of the Sessions trial was imminent and that the accused had demanded an amount of Rs. 20,000/- in consideration of which, the accused was to ensure that his wife was instrumental in scuttling the prosecution against the complainant and furthermore, that the Police Inspector Mangalji would also be taken care of. It is alleged that the complainant who could no longer tolerate this extortion and who could ill-afford to pay that substantial amount, finally approached the Anti-Corruption Department on 27-3-1980 and lodged a complaint, pursuant to which, the police arranged for a trap on the same afternoon. In the sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the accused at Oomez Hotel, Bandra and that an immediate panchanama was drawn up when the said amount was handed over. It is further alleged that the anthracene powder was seen on the hands of the accused as also on certain parts of his clothing immediately after the trap. In the sum of Rs. 1,000/- to the accused at Oomez Hotel, Bandra and that an immediate panchanama was drawn up when the said amount was handed over. It is further alleged that the anthracene powder was seen on the hands of the accused as also on certain parts of his clothing immediately after the trap. The accused has denied the charges and has pointed out that the complainant is distantly known to him and that he has been wrongly implicated because of hostility in so far as even though the complainant had originally managed to get the police to exclude the evidence of the wife of the accused, that the accused had insisted on her statement being recorded and that he had also been instrumental in the matter of pointing out to the High Court that the complainant's bail should be cancelled. 4. Mrs. Shenoy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has read the prosecution evidence in detail. Mrs. Shenoy was severely critical with regard to the quality of the complainant's evidence and she has pointed out that in the course of the long narration and considerable verbosity of this evidence that the essential ingredients that could make out the present charge are either deficient or that they are extremely sketchy. She has concentrated her attack basically on pointing out that several omission and contradictions have been brought on record which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cast serious doubt on the veracity of this evidence. Essentially, Mrs. Shenoy has tried to argue that the entire evidence is fabricated, which to my mind, would not be at all justified because the evidence regarding the trap is quite unassailable. In support of the complainant's evidence, we have the evidence of panch Abdul Razak and two other witnesses Moosa and Chand. The panch deposes about the manner in which the trap was laid and the actual handing over of the marked notes of Rs. 1,000/- to the accused and of his acceptance of the same and the other two witnesses Moosa and Chand also speak about the exchange of certain amounts of money. Mrs. The panch deposes about the manner in which the trap was laid and the actual handing over of the marked notes of Rs. 1,000/- to the accused and of his acceptance of the same and the other two witnesses Moosa and Chand also speak about the exchange of certain amounts of money. Mrs. Shenoy has submitted that as far as the panch is concerned, that he was taken by the police along with them and that he is bound to repeat whatever the Investigating Officer asked him to say or, in other words, to reproduce the contents of the panchnama. This criticism is not justified in so far as nothing has been brought out in cross-examination of the panch to doubt his credibility. Admittedly, he was called by the police to act as a pancha and he has frankly narrated to the Court whatever transpired in his presence. The Investigating Officer again, has deposed about the manner in which the complaint came to be lodged with him and the entire incident starting with the preparation, the trap and the recovery of the marked currency from the trouser-pocket of the present accused. Mrs. Shenoy has gone to the extent of alleging that the Police Officer has fabricated the entire case with regard to the trap. This criticism is both unwarranted and far-fetched in so far as it would be quite incredible to assume that an officer of the Anti-corruption Department should fabricate evidence merely because somebody has lodged a complaint with him. To this extent, if the submission of Mrs. Shenoy were to be accepted, one would have to discard not only the evidence of the panchas for which there is no valid reason but the panchanama it self which are contemporaneous documents and which show that the accused received the currency notes at the relevant time and that anthracene powder was found on his clothes. As indicated earlier, the evidence of this witness cannot be discarded nor can one doubt the prosecution case with regard to the complaint and the actual trap itself. 5. As regards the evidence of Moosa and Chand, Mrs. Shenoy has strenuously argued that these two persons admittedly are friends of the complainant. On this ground, she submits that they would go all out to support him in his attack against the accused and that the Court should, therefore, straightaway discard their evidence. 5. As regards the evidence of Moosa and Chand, Mrs. Shenoy has strenuously argued that these two persons admittedly are friends of the complainant. On this ground, she submits that they would go all out to support him in his attack against the accused and that the Court should, therefore, straightaway discard their evidence. It is necessary to point out that Mr. Chopda, learned A.P.P. has strenuously argued that just as, according to him, the evidence of the pancha and the Investigating Officer and the supportive documents must be accepted, that the evidence of these two witnesses also cannot be discarded merely because they were friends of the complainant. I am inclined to accept the submission advanced by Mr. Chopda to the effect that these two witnesses are persons who would naturally and normally be part of the transaction as one cannot except outsiders to be parties and eye-witnesses to transactions of the present type. Their evidence, by and large, has remained unshaken even in the course of cross-examination. The evidence of these two witnesses, however, is extremely restricted in so far to amounts of money which were required to be paid by the complainant to the accused, the timing and the quantum etc. There is no direct evidence forthcoming from these witnesses with regard to the main ingredient of the charge viz., the purposes for which the money in question was to be paid. 6 As regards the evidence of the complainant, Mr. Chopda, learned A.P.P. has very vehemently and strenuously submitted that his evidence must be accepted in toto. He submits, that the complainant is a man of very ordinary means, that he is supposed to be a hawker and that the few omission and contradictions that are attributed to him are very normal and natural, having regard to the long time lag. He, therefore, submits that the evidence of the complainant with regard to the circumstances that forced him to give the amounts in question and to lodge the complaint must be accepted in entirety. It is necessary for me to record as regards the most important ingredient of the charge, under section 213 viz., that the payment was in relation to the interference with the course of a judicial proceeding and the tampering with the evidence, that we have the statement of the complainant and nobody else. It is necessary for me to record as regards the most important ingredient of the charge, under section 213 viz., that the payment was in relation to the interference with the course of a judicial proceeding and the tampering with the evidence, that we have the statement of the complainant and nobody else. There is virtually not a shred of other evidence on record to support his say with regard to this vital aspect of the prosecution case. 7. Dealing with the legal aspects of the case, Mrs. Shenoy has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn)1, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1408, wherein the proposition has been laid down that where there are two inconsistent statements made by the witnesses, the mere recovery of the amount would not be enough and that, evidence of this quality cannot be used as a corroborating factor. Mrs. Shenoy has also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court reported in (Baikrishna Goyal v. State of Punjab)2, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. page 689 wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with the burden of proof in a case of this type has observed that the onus shifts to the accused to explain the circumstances under which the currency was found with him. It was surprising that this decision was cited by the Counsel for the appellant. Often times, in the anxiety to rely on case law, decisions are mechanically collected and relied upon even if they are in favour of the other side, Mercifully, however, the case in question is distinguishable because the accused in the present case was not a public servant and consequently, there is no presumption which normally arises under the Prevention of Corruption Act against him and which he is required to discharge before a Court of law. Mrs. Mrs. Shenoy has also placed reliance on the decision reported in (Abdut Kehan v. Ishwareppa and others)3, 1988 Criminal Law Journal, page 756, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that it is necessary for the courts to take special note of the fact particularly after the introduction of section 165-A to the Criminal Procedure Code, that the complainant in a corruption case is an accomplice in so far as he is as much a participant in the deal for having negotiated and finalised a corrupt arrangement and that to this extent, the Court, as a matter of necessity, must look for corroboration to the evidence of a complainant in such a case. Another decision of some consequence is the one reported in (Harideo Sharma v. State (Delhi)4, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. page 1489, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as a general rule of appreciation of evidence that the prosecution case is required to be taken as one inter-related story which ought not to be severed and bi-sected. The Supreme Court has observed, in that case, that where the Court rejected a material part of the prosecution case and the greater part of it, that it was an error in having based the conviction solely on the remaining part of the prosecution case. Lastly, reliance was placed by Mrs. Shenoy on a decision reported in (Ambalal Motibai Patel v. State)6, A.I.R. 1961, Gujarat, page 1, wherein the Court has observed that it is a salutory principle, in the case of evidence of parties and witnesses to look for independent corroboration. Undoubtedly, this is a rule of prudence and a principle of deep significance in all criminal cases where the consequences of a conviction to an accused are grave. 8. Regardless of the quality of arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, it is still the function of this Court to ensure that no injustice results to the accused. One very significant aspect of this case has been unfortunately overlooked completely by Counsel for the appellant. 9. In the course of the evidence, reference was made to the fact that the accused, at the time of the trap, is alleged to have had in his possession a certain sheet of paper which has come on record as an Exhibit and which sheet of paper is alleged to have been handed over to the complainant shortly before the trap. It is alleged that the accused had informed the complainant that the sheet of paper contains certain points of importance which would be of assistance to him in his defence in the forthcoming trial. I have perused the document in question which has been exhibited in the course of the trial and it is of some interest to point out that admittedly, though rather shabbily and crudely, certain points have been typed out on that piece of paper which could perhaps be of assistance to the defence in the course of the trial. It is this document, to my mind, that provides the real key to the nature of the transaction. Shifting the prosecution evidence, it is quite certain that there was some contact or considerable contact between the accused and the complainant at different points of time between January 1979 and 27-3-1980 when the trap was arranged. Apart from the bare word of the complainant, there is nothing on record to support his version that he had given various sums of money to the accused in the course of the preceding one year ostensibly for securing help in connection with the pending sessions case. It is quite probable that the accused kept asking for money in return for his so-called "services". The complainant found it difficult to comply and the accused must have tried to pressurise him. It appears that matters came to a head because the accused was rather persistent about his efforts to get the bail of the complainant cancelled and this obviously was the reason that pushed the complainant to go to Anti-Corruption Department. It was also obvious from the document (Exhibit 33) that the accused was to meet the complainant on that day and it is quite plausible that the complainant had been asked to pay to the accused a certain amount of money as consideration for the assistance which the accused was giving to him. For a semi-literate person, it is not at all surprising that he agreed to this arrangement but it is equally noteworthy to record that having regard to the background, the complainant was obviously not too happy with the manner in which the transactions were proceeding and he, therefore, decided once and for all to hit back at the accused with the assistance of a complaint to the Anti-corruption authorities. The receipt by the accused of the amount that was agreed upon on that date, therefore, happened in the normal course of events in keeping with the earlier arrangement and the mere fact that the currency notes were smeared with anthracene powder will not change the complexion of the transaction at all. Even if the accused, in keeping with the earlier arrangement, came to the hotel and accepted the amount, which fact is established from the prosecution evidence, to my mind, before he can be convicted under section 213, the prosecution ought to have proved and that too, conclusively and beyond doubt, that this amount was paid specifically for the purpose that would make it an offence within the meaning of section 213 I.P.C. 10. Mr. Chopda has placed strong reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 51 Bombay Law Reporter 565 : A.I.R. 1949, Bombay page 405. Chagla, C.J. (as he then was) has interpreted section 213 and has pointed out that even those of the cases where a promise is made to interfere with a prosecution witness, or where a promise is made that the complainant, as in that case, would not make himself available at the time of the trial, on such a promise in consideration of which money is accepted could bring the facts within the ambit of section 213 I.P.C. There is no quarrel with regard to this proposition but to my mind, the only area where the prosecution has failed and completely, if in establishing that the purpose of the payment made was in order to keep back the wife of the accused or in order to interfere with the course of the Sessions case. Significantly enough, the statement of the wife of the accused has not been recorded nor is she examined as a witness. There is one more tell-tale circumstance viz., that the accused in this case had nothing to do with the Sessions trial. The conduct of that proceeding was undoubtedly in the hands of the Public Prosecutor assisted by the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer has totally disclaimed any knowledge, even of a remote nature or association with the accused. There is one more tell-tale circumstance viz., that the accused in this case had nothing to do with the Sessions trial. The conduct of that proceeding was undoubtedly in the hands of the Public Prosecutor assisted by the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer has totally disclaimed any knowledge, even of a remote nature or association with the accused. It is, therefore, extremely far-fetched and totally implausable to accept the position that the complainant would agree to pay large sums of money to the accused in relation to that trial without first having ascertained from the Investigating Officer and first having ensured that if he paid the money, the desired consequence would ensue. In the absence of this, it is quite incredible to accept that part of the prosecution case which alleges that the purpose of the payment was in order to tamper with the due course of the trial which the complainant was facing. 11. It is rather unfortunate as indicated by me earlier, that the quality of submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant have not been up to the mark but it is after all the basic function of this Court to dispense justice, and to achieve this end, it is often times the duty of the Presiding Judge to independently appraise the matter in spite of the quality of arguments advanced. Unfortunately, the conduct of an appeal does not end with reading out the evidence and producing a couple of authorities regardless of whether or not they are genuinely relevant. Our High Court, in a rather old decision reported in XV Bombay Law Reported, page 694 in the case of (Emperor v. Sanalal Lalubhai and Emperor v. Gordhandas Keshavlal)7, has occasion to deal with the ambit and scope of section 213 I.P.C. The Division Bench of Bachelor and Shah, JJ., in very analytical judgement had occasion to examine the case law under section 213 I.P.C. and to hold that it was very necessary to establish that the interference with the course of a judicial proceeding which is punishable under this section related to the doing of an act whereby a person is prevented from the exposure to the consequences of a crime. On the basis of the ratio of this judgement, It is necessary to take a very clear view of what section 213 I.P.C. clearly prescribes. On the basis of the ratio of this judgement, It is necessary to take a very clear view of what section 213 I.P.C. clearly prescribes. What has been made punishable under this section is the doing of an act in the face of an offence, which would virtually frustrate the normal operation of law or, in other words, which would screen and accused from the consequences of his offence. The term "offence" has been judicially intepreted to mean an actual offence and not an imaginary one. In the case reported (supra) where in respect of the original charge in which the interference was alleged, it was held that no offence had been committed and as a necessary consequence, the Court held that there could be no conviction under section 213 if there was no offence originally. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is very necessary to note that apart from what has been earlier pointed out to me, the additional factor was that the complainant was ultimately cleared of the original charge and we are, therefore, left with the position that there was no offence and consequently, there could be no screening of the offender or preventing him from being exposed to the consequences of the offence. 12. In this view of the matter, it will have to be held that as regards the most consequential and cardinal ingredient of section 213 that the prosecution has failed in establishing the charge. It is quite immaterial whether the rest of the evidence is trustworthy and acceptable because in a case of the present nature, unless every ingredient of the charge is established, the conviction becomes unsustainable. 13. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the accused is set aside. The bail bond to stand cancelled. It is further directed that the amount of Rs. 1,000/- be returned to the original complainant. Appeal allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed. *****