Judgment :- Thomas, J. In view of the conflicting views on interpretation of S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 (for short 'the Act'), Thulasidas, J. has referred this case to a Division Bench. Balakrishnan, J. ha s held in Mahadevan Sunal Kumar v. Bhadran (1991 (1) KLT 651 = 1991 (1) K.L.J. 335) that "it is clear that cause of action for filing the complaint may arise on several occasions and the payee or holder in due course is entitled to present the cheque at any time within a period of six months from the date on which it was drawn and for filing the complaint he should have served notice of such dishonour to the drawer; the payee or holder in due course can make a second presentation of the cheque and if other conditions are fulfilled, he can launch a complaint en the basis of the second dish on the cheque as the cheque world remain valid for a period of six months". Padmanabhan, J. without noticing the decision in Mahadevan Sunil Kumar's case took contrary view in his order dated 18-2-1991 (Crl. R.P. No. 480/90). 2. Facts of this case are the following: Respondent herein filed a complaint before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class alleging that the petitioner has committed the offence under S.138 of the Act (respondent will be referred to as the complainant hereinafter). He stated in the complaint that a cheque drawn on Vijaya Bank for Rs.10,000/- was issued by the petitioner on 4-11-1989 in favour of the complainant; and on 6-11-1989 the cheque was returned dishonoured by the drawee bank for the ground "refer to the drawer". Notice issued by the complainant was received by the petitioner on 23-11-89. But no payment was made pursuant to the said notice. Complainant again presented the said cheque on 15-1-90 before the drawee bank and was again dishonoured. A fresh notice was issued to the petitioner which he received on 13-2-90. As no payment was made by the petitioner thereafter too, the complaint was filed on 12-3-90. Learned Magistrate took the complaint on file and issued process to the petitioner. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed by the petitioner to quash the complaint. 3. A fresh notice was issued to the petitioner which he received on 13-2-90. As no payment was made by the petitioner thereafter too, the complaint was filed on 12-3-90. Learned Magistrate took the complaint on file and issued process to the petitioner. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed by the petitioner to quash the complaint. 3. The only ground urged by the petitioner is that respondent cannot have a second cause of action on the same cheque when once he had failed to institute a complaint on the strength ofthe first cause of action. 4. S.138 of the Act creates a new offence based on a cheque returned unpaid and subject to certain conditions. The said section and its ancillary provisions have been included in Chapter XVII of the Act. The said Chapter was introduced in the Act on 1-4-89. The offender as per S.138 is the drawer of the cheque. One of the conditions to constitute the offence is that the cheque should have been presented to the bank within six months of its issue. Another condition is that the payee should have made a demand for payment by registered notice after the cheque is returned unpaid. Third condition is that the drawer should have failed to pay the amount within 15 days of receipt of notice. Unless the cheque is returned unpaid due to insufficiency of amount of money standing to the credit of the drawer or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank, S.138 of the Act is not attracted. S.139 of the Act casts a presumption that holder of a cheque has received the same towards discharge of a liability. S.140 of the Act precludes the drawer from pleading that he had no reason to believe that the cheque would be dishonoured. A complaint can be filed only by a payee or holder in due course of the cheque. S.142 imposes a further restriction that no complaint can be filed after one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. 5. From the scheme of the provisions in Chapter XVII of the Act two features loom large. First is that more than one cause of action on the same cheque is not contemplated or envisaged. S.142 imposes a further restriction that no complaint can be filed after one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. 5. From the scheme of the provisions in Chapter XVII of the Act two features loom large. First is that more than one cause of action on the same cheque is not contemplated or envisaged. Second is, institution of prosecution cannot be made after one month of the cause of action. If more than one cause of action on the same cheque can be created, its consequence would be that the same drawer of the cheque can be prosecuted and even convicted again and again on the strength of the same cheque. Legislature cannot be imputed with the intention to subject a drawer of cheque to repeated prosecutions and convictions on the strength of one cheque. 6. Drawing a cheque is sine qua non for an offence under S.138 of the act. This Division Bench has held in Prithviraj v. Mathew Koshy (1991 (1) KLT 595) that when main body of S.138 is read along with its proviso, it is clear that the offence is committed when the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of notice. The question considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case was whether any offence can be committed with respect to cheque issued before the introduction of S.138 of the Act. The Division Bench observed in that context thus: "Dishonour of cheque by itself does not give rise to a cause of action, because payment can be made on receipt of notice of demand contemplated in clause (b) of S.138 and in that event, there is no offence, nor any attempt to commit the offence, nor even a preparation to commit the offence. Failure to pay the amount within fifteen days of receipt of notice alone is the cause of action and nothing else." Though the date of drawing the cheque is not the criterion to decide the date of cause of action as held in Paramjith Singh v. Job (1989 (2) KLT 740) and affirmed by the Division Bench in Prithviraj's case (Cited supra), drawing of cheque is the genesis of the facts without which there can be no offence. 7. 7. It is contended that since the view adopted by learned single judge in Mahadevan Sunil Kumar's case is also possible, the complainant cannot toe denied the right to proceed against the petitioner for the offence under S.138 of the Act. Even if such a view is possible, it is one of the settled principles of interpretation of statutes that when two interpretations are possible about a penal provision, only that which Is Tests onerous to the accused should be preferred (vide Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes -12th edition at page 239) :"The principle applied in construing a penal Act is that if, in construing the relevant provisions, there appears any reasonable doubt or ambiguity it will be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty". The learned author quoted Lord Esher M.R., from the decision in Tuck & Sons v. Priester ((1887) 19 Q.B.D. 629) thus: "If there are two reasonable constructions, we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections". Supreme Court has adopted the same principle for interpretation of penal statutes (vide M.V. Jos/7/ v. M.U. Shimpi - AIR 1961 S.C.1494). Departure from this principle is permitted if the object and scheme of the statute would be defeated otherwise (vide Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C. Thapar - AIR 1961 S.C. 838 and Maharaja Book Depot v. State of Gujarat -1979 S.C.C. (Crl.) 275). 8. That apart, according to us, the words in the relevant provisions of the Act are not so ambiguous as to afford scope for an interpretation which leads to disastrous consequences cited above. We have already indicated the possibility of ensuing such consequences if more causes of action than one are permitted to arise in respect of the same cheque. Hence the principle adopted in Mahadevan Sunil Kumar's case cannot be regarded as correct. We are in agreement with the view expressed by Padmanabhan, J. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the proceedings by which learned Magistrate issued process against the petitioner on the complaint. Crl.M.C. is disposed of accordingly.