Judgment :- 1. The defendant has preferred this Second Appeal. The defendant entered into a lease arrangement with the plaintiff under Ex. A1 dated 23.7.1981 with respect to the suit property for a period of three years. After the expiry of the period, the plaintiff filed the suit in March, 1986 for recovery of possession and damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff stated in the plaint that the defendant was liable for damages for use and occupation from 1.8.1984, that is, from the expiry of the lease transaction, But, in the prayer he restricted the claim for damages from 1.3.1986. The suit was contested by the defendant claiming that she was entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the suit was not maintainable. She also contended that there was no notice of termination of tenancy before the suit and, therefore, the suit was not sustainable. 2. The Courts below have concurrently held against the defendant and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant has come to this Court with the Second Appeal. 3. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that even in the agreement between the parties, there is a specific clause to the effect that the tenancy conferred under the document shall be governed by the provisions of the Act and that the claim of the plaintiff, to the contrary in the plaint, cannot be accepted. According to learned counsel the transaction between the parties is lease of a building within the meaning of the Act and a civil suit for dispossession of the appellant is not maintainable. It is next contended that even if it is not a lease of a building within the meaning of the Act and it is a composite lease of a business and immovable property and therefore, it is a lease of immovable property within the meaning of S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and without notice of termination of tenancy, the suit is unsustainable. It is also argued by learned counsel that after the period specified in the agreement came to an end on 31.7.1984, the appellant continued to be a tenant holding over as per the provisions of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and a notice terminating that tenancy is a sine qua non for the filing of the suit. It is pointed out by the Learned Counsel that a notice issued by Plaintiff under Ex. A2 was posted only on 13.2.1986 terminating the tenancy with the end of the month and that would not satisfy the requirements of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Besides that, the notice was not served on the appellant. 4. In order to appreciate the contentions of parties, it is necessary to refer 10 the test of Ex. A1 so that the real nature of the transaction could be ascertained. The document bears the title “Lease for three years”. The preamble reads as follows: “Whereas the lessor is the absolute owner of house and ground new No. 115 (Old Door No. 41/5), Mowbrays Road, Madras 600018, comprised of a zinc sheet roofed superstructure with vacant land attached thereto fully described in the Schedule below and the said zinc sheet roofed shed with seven zinc sheet has been equipped by the lessor with weighing scales, weights of 20 kgs, 10 kgs, S kgs etc., for the purpose of running a firewood business thereat and whereas the lessor has been leasing out the firewood depot with his equipment to various persons and Pechimuthu Nadar, the husband of the lessee herein has taken the same on lease in the year 1975 which lease has come to an end the said Pechimuthu Nadar has surrendered possession of the same to the lessor on the expiry of the lease dated 21.10.1973 registered as Document No. 1443 of 1975 of S.R.O. Mylapore, Madras. Whereas, the lessor has agreed to lease the firewood depot to the lessee herein since on account of ill-health he is unable to carry on business thereat by himself and he has consented to lease out the said firewood depot for a period of three years on the conditions that on the expiry of the said period of three years, the lessee should hand over the said property to the lessor so as to enable him to make his own arrangements and carry on his own business thereat.” 5. The operative portion of the document in so far as it is relevant reads thus:— “Now therefore, this deed witness the that the lessor doth hereby in consideration of the specific agreement of the terms and in consideration of the rent payable by the lessee, grant, transfer and assign in favour of the lessee all that firewood depot structure and land comprised in Municipal Door No. 115 (Old No. 61/5), Mowbrays Road, Alwarpet, Madras 18, as an equipped firewood depot with all weighing scales, weights kept thereat and fully set out in the schedule below for the lessor to have and to ho ld the same for a period of three years, commencing from 1.8.1981 to 31.7.1984 on the following terms and conditions. (1) The lessee shall pay a rent of Rs. 325/per month exclusive of electricity and other charges for the lease of the zinc sheet roofed structure together with weighing scale and weights and other equipments thereof and the monthly rent shall be paid on or before 5th of each English Calendar month without default whatsoever and the lessor shall pass a receipt for the same. (2) The lessee shall pay electricity charges regularly separately without default. (3) The tenancy conferred upon the lessee herein shall be governed by the provisions of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (4) The lessee shall carry on only the firewood business under the property leased out to her and shall not be entitled to carry on any other business. (5) The lessee shall not put up any other constructions under the demised premises without the consent of the lessor in writing and she shall not modify, alter or extend or present firewood depot structure as situate at the premises. (5) The lessee shall not put up any other constructions under the demised premises without the consent of the lessor in writing and she shall not modify, alter or extend or present firewood depot structure as situate at the premises. (6) The lessee shall not sublet or underlet the demised premises or part thereof and shall not part with possession or part of the demised business or assign her interest in the tenancy without the consent of the lessor in writing.” Clause 9 of the conditions of lease is as follows: “In case the lessee commits default in payment of rent or commits breach of any of the terms of this lease, the lessor shall be entitled to enter upon the premises and take possession of the same even before the expiry of three years stipulated herein, treating the lessee as having forfeited her right to the lease property by her default in payment of rent and compliance of the terms of the lease”. (6) A perusal of the above terms of the document proves beyond doubt that what was leased was not a building, simpliciter, as defined by the Act, but it is a transfer of business. Otherwise, there is no necessity whatever for the parties to refer, to the ill-health of the lessor and his being unable to carry on the business by himself. That part of the preamble clearly shows that the, lessor wanted to transfer the business as such to the lessee as he was not in a position to continue the same by himself on account of his indisposition. Further, in the operative portion also the subject-matter is described as an equipped firewood depot. Moreover, the lessee is expressly prevented from carrying on any other business in the premises as she is enjoined to carry on only firewood business. She is also prevented from putting up any other construction or subletting any part of the premises. There is a provision which enables the lessor to terminate the lease in the event of breach of any of the terms of the lease. I have no hesitation to hold that the lease is of a business and not of a building as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. There is a provision which enables the lessor to terminate the lease in the event of breach of any of the terms of the lease. I have no hesitation to hold that the lease is of a business and not of a building as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. (7) S. 30(iii) of the Act excludes the application of the Act to any lease of a building under which the object of the tenancy is to run the business or industry with the fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles belonging to the landlord and situated in such a building. The language of the section shows that even if there is a lease of a building, if it is with the object that the tenant should run the business or industry with the fixtures, machinery etc. belonging to the landlord and situated in the building, it will be excluded from the application of the Act. (8) The section has come up for consideration in several cases in this court. It is not necessary for me to refer to all of them. Suffice it to refer to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Pals Theatres v. Abdul Gaffoor Saheb 1 and that of Ratnam, J., in Narayana v. Natesa Achari 2, which appears to be the latest on the subject. In the former case, the Division Bench held that the fact that the lease deed does not expressly say that the lease is in respect of a going concern is of little significance, in as much as the terms of the contract should be read as a whole and the absence of such a specific recital would not take away the inference legitimately flowing from a reading of all the terms. It was also held by the Division Bench that where the terms of the lease are clear and unambiguous, it is needless to examine the intention of the parties. It was also held by the Division Bench that where the terms of the lease are clear and unambiguous, it is needless to examine the intention of the parties. In the latter case Ratnam, J., held that there is nothing in the language of S. 30(iii) of T.N. Act 18 of I960 or illustration (3) thereunder that only a demise by a landlord who is actually carrying on a hotel business to the tenant for the purpose of enabling him either to continue or carry on the same business is exempt from the provisions of the Act, and to accept the construction of S. 30(iii) of the Act or illustration (3) thereunder in the manner contended for by the tenant-appellant would be to read into them, words and expressions, which are not there. It is worthwhile to extract the relevant passage in the judgment of the Learned Judge. “In order to qualify for the exemption under S. 30(iii) of the Act, the following requirements have to be fulfilled; (1) There should be a lease of a building. (2) under that lease, the object of the tenant is to run the business or industry; (3) Such a business or industry should be run with the fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles, the ownership of which is in the landlord and which are situate in the building demised. It is not the requirement that the landlord should have been actually carrying on the business in the premises prior to the demise in favour of the tenant.” (9) Applying the principles and tests laid down in the above decision to the present case, there can be no doubt whatever that the lease in question would fall within the exemption provided by S. 30(iii) of the Act, even if it is held to be a lease of a building. The contentions put forward by the appellant to the contrary cannot be accepted as the terms of the document are very clear. At one stage the appellant raised a plea that the weighing scale weights and other equipments belonged to her and they did not belong to the respondents. Such a contention is wholly frivolous in view of the express terms of the document. At one stage the appellant raised a plea that the weighing scale weights and other equipments belonged to her and they did not belong to the respondents. Such a contention is wholly frivolous in view of the express terms of the document. (10) Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the specific provision in the document that the tenancy conferred upon the lessee shall be governed by the provisions of the Act will prevent the respondent from contending to the contrary. Learned counsel submits that the contention raised by the respondent in the plaint that the Act will not apply to the present case because of S. 30 of the Act is unsustainable. I do not agree. Just because the parties refer to a particular position, it would not alter the law. The question, whether a particular Act is applicable or not is to depend upon the terms of the transaction and the language of the legislation. When the legislature has expressly provided that a lease of a building under which the object of the tenancy is to run a business with the fixtures, machinery etc., belonging to the landlord, is exempted from the provisions of the Act it is not for the parties to decide that the Act will apply to such a transaction. For example, if there is a lease of machinery without any reference to any building whatever, the parties cannot bring it within the scope of the Act. Similarly the lease of a vacant land cannot be governed by the Act even if the parties agree to it. Thus, the provision in the document, Ex. A1 declaring that the tenancy will be governed by the Act will not in any way alter the situation and bring the transaction within the scope of the said Act. Hence, I reject the contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant. 11. The next argument advanced is that even if it is a composite lease, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act would apply and in the absence of a valid notice under S. 106 thereof, the suit is not maintainable. I do not agree with this contention for two reasons. First, it is not a lease of immovable property within the meaning of S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, as in my opinion, it is only a lease of a business. I do not agree with this contention for two reasons. First, it is not a lease of immovable property within the meaning of S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, as in my opinion, it is only a lease of a business. Secondly, on the facts of the case, it is not open to the appellant to raise the contention that there is a case of holding over and a notice is necessary under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. As regards the nature of the transaction, I have already referred to the terms of the lease and pointed out that what was transferred was the business and not merely an immoveable property. Leaned counsel for the appellant places reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Tarkeshwar Sio Tliakur Jiu v. B.D. Dey & Co. 1. In that case, the question was whether a mining lease was a lease of immoveable property within the terms of S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court referred to the definition of immoveable property along the Transfer of Property Act and held that it was a negative definition and not an exhaustive one. The Supreme Court also referred to the definition of immoveable property in S. 3(26) of the General Clauses Act and held that immoveable property comprehended all that would be real property according to English Law and possible more. Thus it was held that the right to carry on mining operations in land to extract specified mineral and remove and appropriate was a right to enjoy immoveable property within the meaning of S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and in that case it was coupled with a right to be in exclusive khas possession for specified period and, therefore, it was a lease covered by the Transfer of Property Act. 13. The ruling of the Supreme Court will not apply to the present case as this is only a transfer of business. As part of the right to carry on the business, the appellant is permitted to be in possession of the property only for the purpose of carrying on the firewood business. The clause which puts an embargo on the appellants carrying on any other business except firewood business clearly shows that the appellant will have no right to enjoy the property de hors the business. The clause which puts an embargo on the appellants carrying on any other business except firewood business clearly shows that the appellant will have no right to enjoy the property de hors the business. If the appellant stops the business, she is bound to surrender possession of the premises to the respondent is also specifically provided in condition No. 9 according to which if there is a breach of any of the terms of the lease, the lessor is entitled to enter the premises and take possession of the same even before the expiry of period stipulated in the document. Thus, a reading of the terms of the documents proves that what was leased was not immoveable property simpliciter, but the business which was an intangible property. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act makes a distinction between lease and sale. While under S. 54 of the said act, a sale is contemplated even with reference to intangible property and the section refers expressly to transfer of intangible property. But S. 105 refers to only an immoveable property. All the sections relating to lease refer only to immoveable properties and not intangible properties. Hence, if there is a lease of intangible property, it will not fall within the definition of S. 105. Hence the provisions in S. 106 will not apply to such a lease. Hence, there is no question of issuing a notice under S. 106 for terminating the lease of the business. 14. Even assuming that the lease is covered by S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, in this case there is no question of the appellant holding over as per the terms of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the first place, it should be pointed out that there is no plea in the written statement that the appellant as tenant is holding over: Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the plea that there is no valid notice of termination of notice is sufficient and that would tantamount to a plea of holding over. I do not agree. There must be an express plea by the tenant that he is a tenant holding over for the purpose of raising the contention that the terms of S. 116 shall apply. I do not agree. There must be an express plea by the tenant that he is a tenant holding over for the purpose of raising the contention that the terms of S. 116 shall apply. In Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (7th Edition) at page 771 the law is stated thus: “A plea under S. 116 which is really based on an implied agreement must be taken in the pleadings by the defendants. They cannot fall back upon such a plea on their failure to prove a defence of actual tenancy rights.” 15. In the present case, there is no express plea in the written statement. The specific case of the plaintiff in the plaint is that the defendant is liable to pay damages for use and occupation from 1.8.1984. In the evidence, he has followed it up deposing that after the expiry of the agreement he did not receive any rent. In chief-examination he stated that the defendant was liable to pay rent from 1.8.1984. In cross-examination, there was no specific suggestion that the defendant had paid the rent even after 1.8.1984 upto a particular period nor is there any positive evidence on the side of the defendant that he had been paying rent to the plaintiff after 1.8.1984. In the evidence adduced by the defendant through D.W. 1 he has stated in chief-examination that he did not pay the rent after January 1987. In cross-examination, he stated that he wanted a fresh document after 1.8.1984, but the lessor told him, that there was no need for a fresh lease deed as the rent could be the same. He denied the suggestion by the respondent that he did not pay the rent after 1.8.1984. In the absence of any positive evidence on the side of the appellant to prove that the appellant was paying rent after 1.8.1984, she cannot claim that she is tenant holding over. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant invites my attention to an affidavit filed by the respondent in an application for attachment before judgment under 0. 38, R. 5, C.P.C., There is an averment in the said affidavit as follows: “The defendant has not paid the rents from May 1985 onwards till date and the arrears of rent as on today for 27 months comes to Rs. 12,150/-”. 38, R. 5, C.P.C., There is an averment in the said affidavit as follows: “The defendant has not paid the rents from May 1985 onwards till date and the arrears of rent as on today for 27 months comes to Rs. 12,150/-”. Learned Counsel submits that there is a clear admission on the part of the respondent that he was receiving rent till April, 1985 and that would show that he had accepted the rent within the meaning of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 17. Learned Counsel for the respondent rightly points out that when the respondent was in the witness-box as P.W. 1, the affidavit was not put to him and he was not asked about the so-called admission. In the absence of confronting the plaintiff with the so-called admission, no reliance can be placed on the affidavit. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of relevancy of an admission in Sita Ram v. Ramachandra 1 and ruled that in order to attach weight to an admission, it has to be clear, unambiguous and if it has to be used against the party who has made it if the witness is under cross examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. The Supreme Court also held that a mere proof of admission after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him. Hence, the so-called admission in the affidavit filed in the application for attachment before judgment, cannot be relied upon by the appellant in this case when she has failed to confront P.W. 1 with the same when he was in the witness-box. 18. For the purpose of invoking S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is necessary that there should be a bilateral contract between the parties which may be proved by the continuous occupation by the lessee on the one hand and the assent of the lessor on the other by acceptance of rent or otherwise. The matter has been considered in detail by the Federal Court in Kaikush Rao Bezonjee v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy 2. The matter has been considered in detail by the Federal Court in Kaikush Rao Bezonjee v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy 2. In that case there was a lease in favour of the first defendant in the suit and he had created subleases in favour of respondents 1 and 2 in the appeal before the Federal Court. When the lessor terminated the lease and requested the lessee to quit and hand over possession, the lessee passed on the letter to the sub-lessees and requested them to vacate the premises. The lessee vacated the portion in his occupation, but the sublessees did not do so. On the other hand, they sent cheques for rents directly to the lessor. The lessor accepted the same and put them in his banking account. Sometime, later, the lessor sent letters to the sublessees to the effect that he had accepted the cheques as part deposits towards his claim for compensation for illegal use and occupation of the premises and without prejudice to his rights and contentions. On those facts, the majority of the Court held that there was a clear case of a new tenancy created by the acceptance of rent by the lessor from the sublessees directly. The majority held that it was not open to the lessor to accept rent in the first instance and thereafter turn round and claim that he had accepted the same only as compensation for illegal use. Though Patanjali Sastri, J. took a different view on the facts and held that there was no new tenancy and accepted the stand taken by the landlord, the principle underlying the provisions of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act as stated by the majority and minority judgment was the same. Mukherjea, J., in his judgment observed as follows:— “It is perfectly right that the tenancy which is created by the ‘holding over’ of a lessee or under-lessee is now tenancy in law even though many of the old lease might be continued in it, by implication; and it cannot be disputed that to bring new tenancy into existence, there must be a bilateral Act. What S. 116 Transfer of Property Act, contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of taking a renewed or fresh demise evidenced by the lessees or sublessees continuing in occupation of the property after his interest has ceased and on the other side there must be a definite assent to this continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by acceptance of rent or otherwise. It can scarcely be disputed that the assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it.” Patanjali Sastri, J., made the following observations:— “Turning now to the main point, it will be seen that the section postulates the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of the lease which is conduct indicative, in ordinary circumstances, of his desire to continue as a tenant under the lessor and implies a tacit offer to take a new tenancy from the expiration of the old on the same terms so far as they are applicable to the new situation, and, when the lessor assents to the lessee so continuing in possession, he tacitly accepts the latters offer and a fresh tenancy results by the implied agreement of the parties. When, further, the lessee in that situation tenders rent and the lessor, accepts it, their conduct raises more readily and clearly the implication of an agreement between the parties to create a fresh tenancy. As Woodfall remarks, “actual payment of rent is not always essential, although that is perhaps the clearest proof”. That is why, I conceive, acceptance of rent is specifically mentioned in the section but, apart from its probative value, it has no special legal efficacy or significance. What creates the new relationship of landlord and tenant after the determination of the previous lease is not the acceptance of rent by itself, but the “assent” of the lessor which may be proved by such acceptance or “otherwise”, the assent of the lessee to the fresh arrangement being already there, implicit in his continuing in possession or tendering of rent. In other words, the conduct of the parties, in such circumstances, implies an offer by the person holding over to take a new tenancy on the terms of the old and acceptance of that offer by the owner. In other words, the conduct of the parties, in such circumstances, implies an offer by the person holding over to take a new tenancy on the terms of the old and acceptance of that offer by the owner. That the section is based on an implied or presumed contractual, and not a statutory, relationship is also made clear by the reference to “an agreement to the contrary”, excluding the operation of the rule if it were the intention of the Legislature to bring into existence an agreement by force of the statute and independently of the consensus of the parties as under the recent rent control legislation, one would expect that it would not be made liable to be displaced by an agreement between the parties. In my opinion, the principle underlying S. 116 is implied contract, and the test of renewal is the consensus between the lessor and the lessee or under-lessee holding over and not an option exercisable by the lessor alone”. 19. In Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das 1, the principle laid down by the Federal Court was followed and applied by the Supreme Court. The following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court is very significant. “Apart from an express contract, conduct of the parties may undoubtedly justify an inference that after determination of the contractual tenancy, the landlord had entered into a fresh contract with the tenant, but whether the conduct justifies such an inference must always depend upon the facts of each case. Occupation of premises by a tenant whose tenancy is determined is by virtue of the protection granted by the statute and not because of any right arising from the contract which is determined. The statute protects his possession so long as the conditions which justify a lessor in obtaining an order of eviction against him do not exist, once the prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court is removed, the right to obtain possession by the lessor under the ordinary law springs into action and the exercise of the lessors right to evict the tenant will not, unless the statute provides otherwise, be conditioned.” 20. In Bhawanji v. Himatlal 2 the same principle was adopted. In Bhawanji v. Himatlal 2 the same principle was adopted. After referring to the judgment of Mukherjea, in the Federal Court case, the Supreme Court also made a reference to its earlier judgment in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das 1 and held:— “Learned counsel for the appellants argued that whenever rent is accepted by a landlord from a tenant whose tenancy has been determined, but who continues in possession, a tenancy by holding over is created. The argument was that the assent of the lessor alone and not that of the lessee was material for the purposes of S. 116. We are not inclined to accept this contention. We have already shown that the basis of the section is a bilateral contract between the erstwhile landlord and the erstwhile tenant, if the tenant has the statutory right to remain in possession, and if he pays the rent, that will not normally be referable to an offer for his continuing in possession which can be converted into a contract by acceptance thereof by the landlord.” 21. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the above passage and contends that the acceptance of rent is an unequivocal Act referable only to the assent of the lessor to the continuation of the tenant in the premises. Every case has to be decided on the facts thereof. In the present case, it is not made out that there was payment of rent by the lessee and acceptance thereof by the lessor. In the absence of the above, it is not open to the appellant to contend that he is a tenant holding over within the meaning of S. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, thus requiring notice of termination of the tenancy. Hence, I hold that after the expiry of the period specified in Ex. A1 the appellant has no right to continue in the premises and she is not a tenant holding over, Consequently, there is no necessity whatsoever for issuing a notice of termination of tenancy. 22. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Distributing v. Khaja Midhat Noor 2 . In that case, the lease deed was executed with permission to sub lease. The lease was not for agricultural purpose and it was for a term of ten years. The period expired on 16.1.1968. 22. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Distributing v. Khaja Midhat Noor 2 . In that case, the lease deed was executed with permission to sub lease. The lease was not for agricultural purpose and it was for a term of ten years. The period expired on 16.1.1968. After that, the sublessee continued to pay the rent which was being accepted continuously by the lessor. A notice was issued by the lessor to the lessee, terminating the lease and for giving vacant possession of the land by 15.1.1973. The notice was to the effect that the lessee should surrender the leasehold land on the expiry of 15.1.1973. No notice was given separately by the sublessee terminating the lease. Suit for ejectment was filed. The lessee did not contest, but the sublessee contested that there was no valid termination of the lease. It was held that there was valid termination of the lease and there was no dispute by the lessee as to the validity thereof. The contention put forward by the sublessee was negatived and the Court held that the law did not require that the sublessee need be made a party to the termination of the lease or the suit for ejectment. 23. Learned Counsel for appellant places reliance on the following statement of law found in the said Judgment: “In view of the paragraph I of S. 107 of the Act, since the lease was for a period exceeding one year, it could only have been extended by a registered instrument, executed by both the lessor and the lessee. In the absence of registered instruments, the lease shall be deemed to be “lease from month to month”. It is clear from the very language of S. 107 of the Act which postulates that a lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the absence of registered instrument, it must be a monthly lease. The lessee and the sublessee in the facts of this case continued to remain in possession of the property on payment of rent as a tenant from month to month. The High Court so found. In the absence of registered instrument, it must be a monthly lease. The lessee and the sublessee in the facts of this case continued to remain in possession of the property on payment of rent as a tenant from month to month. The High Court so found. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.” The passage does not help in any way the appellant in this case. The Supreme Court had only to consider whether there was a subsisting lease in favour of the lessee who was continuing in possession after the expiry of the period of the original lease. On the facts of the case, the Court held that there was continuation of the lease and, therefore, it required termination. On the facts of this case, I have already held that there was no holding over by the appellant and there was no necessity for the lessor to have issued a notice of termination of the tenancy. 24. Thus, all the contentions put forward by learned counsel for the appellant are unacceptable and they are, therefore, rejected. The only result that follows is, that the second appeal has to suffer a dismissal and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to Costs.