JUDGEMENT A. M. Bhattacharjee, J.: - After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the State and examining the records ourselves, we have not been able to discover any infirmity in the Order of conviction, passed by the trial Judge and affirmed in appeal, to warrant our interference in revision. But for the reasons stated hereunder we propose to alter the sentence. 2. The accused, convicted u /S. 307 of the Penal Code, has been sentenced to imprisonment for five years. The victim of the offence is now dead and before us in this Court, the heirs of the victim of the offence have filed an application praying that the parties may be granted permission to compound the offence and the accused-petitioner may be acquitted. As provided in S. 320(4)(b) of the Criminal P. C. when the person who would otherwise be competent to compound the offence is dead, his legal representatives may, with the consent of the Court, compound such offence. But the offence u/S. 307 of the Penal Code, not being compoundable u/S. 320 or any other provision of the Criminal P. C., the victim himself, if alive, could not be permitted to compound the offence and, therefore, could transmit no right to his heirs to pray for such permission. 3. Though the position ought to have been the same even without the aid of the provisions of S. 320(6), the sub-section has nevertheless expressly provided that "a High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision u/S. 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this Section". We are, however, afraid that the expression "powers of revision u/S. 401" is rather inappropriate in respect of Court of Session, which exercises powers of revision, not u/S. 401, but under S. 399, which, and which alone, defines and determines the revisional powers of a Court of Session and has made the powers exercisable by the High Court u/S. 401, also available to the Court of Session. We must also note the rovisions of S. 320(9), which, without leaving the matter to the ambivalent and ambulatory rules of interpretation of statutes, has categorically provided that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided under this S. 320." 4. Mr. We must also note the rovisions of S. 320(9), which, without leaving the matter to the ambivalent and ambulatory rules of interpretation of statutes, has categorically provided that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided under this S. 320." 4. Mr. Dutt, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has, however, drawn our attention to a two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1988 SC 2111 ) and has urged that since the Supreme Court in that case permitted an offence to be compounded, even though the same was not compoundable u/S. 320 we would not be acting illegally in permitting the parties to compound the offence u/S. 307 of Penal Code, notwithstanding the legislative mandate to the contrary in S. 320(9) of the Criminal P.C. If it could be shown that the Supreme Court went on doing so in cases after cases, we might have thought that we would not be going wrong in following the course so often resorted to by the apex Court of the Land and we might have derived some assurance, from the pronouncement of Manu, our most respected ancient Law-Giver (Manu Samhita, chapter IV, verse 178) to the effect that in case of doubts arising out of contrary mandates, one should follow the course adopted by the forefathers and would commit no wrong by doing so "Yenasya Pitaro Yata, Yena Yata Pitamahah, Tena Yayat Satang Margang, Tena Gachchan Na Dusyate". But we have not been referred to any other decision in which the Supreme Court adopted such a course to enable us to hold that our Superior Court has sanctioned the course by repeated recourse. 5. Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on us as absolute authority, not only under the mandate under Art. 141, but even de hors that Article, because of the precedent-bound system of Judicial administration, borrowed by us from the Britishers and followed by us with almost devotional rigidity. And, therefore, if the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) made a declaration of law to the effect that an offence, though not, listed in S. 320, could still be compounded, we might have followed the law so declared. And, therefore, if the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) made a declaration of law to the effect that an offence, though not, listed in S. 320, could still be compounded, we might have followed the law so declared. We are afraid that we cannot enter into the embarrassing question as to whether, as pointed out by Salmond (Jurisprudence-10th Edition, p. 182), a precedent, which would have otherwise had absolute authority, would, lose the same because of being arrived at palpably per incuriam, because the decision in Mahesh Chand (supra) accepted the position that the offence u/S. 307, Penal Code "is not compoundable", even though the provisions of S. 320(9) of the Code were not expressly referred to. We are, therefore, not required to perform any such delicate task to ascertain as to whether the Courts, subordinated to the law declared by the Supreme Court, is in such a state of subordination as to be bound by the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court manifestly at per incuriam of clear and contrary legislative laws, to which also the Court cannot but owe allegiance under the Constitution, unless declared to be ultra vires by a complement (competent) Court. Because the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) has declared or announced no law to vest the decision with the authority of a binding, precedent. What the Supreme Court does in a particular case may bind the parties and the Court concerned for the purpose of that particular case. But what does and can bind the other Courts as a precedent is not what the Supreme Court does in fact in a given case but what it declares to be the law. We have not been able to glean any such declaration of law in Mahesh Chand (supra) as to the compoundability of non-compoundable offence. We have rather found indication to the effect that the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) decided to treat the matter "as a special case, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case". The decision not having determined or declared any question of law cannot amount to a precedent to bind us in other cases. 6. We have rather found indication to the effect that the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand (supra) decided to treat the matter "as a special case, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case". The decision not having determined or declared any question of law cannot amount to a precedent to bind us in other cases. 6. But as indicated at the out-set, we have decided to reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone, as a, convict including the period of detention during investigation and trial and it is not disputed that the accused has suffered post-conviction rigorous imprisonment for more than a month and about a fortnight as under-trial prisoner. Here are the reasons. 7. The occurrence took place about 14 years back in 1977 and the trial Judge convicted and sentenced the accused in l982 and the appeal to the Court of Session was dismissed in 1983. The accused, therefore, has had to face a serious criminal charge and to defend a protracted criminal prosecution for all these 14 years and to bear the awful tension of a criminal conviction and sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment for about 10 years and to suffer detention in prison for about 15 days and also post-conviction rigorous imprisonment for about a month. 8. The widow of the victim, who died in the meantime, and his other heirs, have in their sworn affidavit and also before us, categorically asserted that the occurrence took place as a result of "sudden quarrel" and "altercation" during the course of which the accused hit the victim. They have asserted further that after the victim was so injured, it is the accused who immediately proceeded to do all that was necessary for proper treatment of the victim, bore all the expenses and was absolutely repentant. It has also been asserted that the accused and the relations of the victim have been living all these years as good, and loving neighbours and have decently buried the past. There is nothing before us to disbelieve these assertions nor any counter-assertions from any corner. 9. Penology has now undergone revolutionary changes with such greater accent on the reformation than on the corporal punishment of the offender. Law no longer runs after the blood of the offender with red teeth and claws. There is nothing before us to disbelieve these assertions nor any counter-assertions from any corner. 9. Penology has now undergone revolutionary changes with such greater accent on the reformation than on the corporal punishment of the offender. Law no longer runs after the blood of the offender with red teeth and claws. The accused, as already indicated, has suffered rigorous imprisonment for more than a month and if he has behaved in the manner and has materially demonstrated his sincere repentance and remorse, as asserted by the heirs of the victims themselves, then the real object of penal punishment has already been achieved and any further incarceration of the accused may only spoil the present harmonious position and would look like gladiatorial Justice. 10. We accordingly maintain the order of conviction but reduce the period of sentence to the period already undergone. The sentence of fine, however, shall stand affirmed. 11. The revision is accordingly disposed of and the accused need not surrender to the bail bond at all on payment of the amount of fine, if not already paid. 12. The Records with copy of our Order to go down at once to the trial Court. 13. AMULYA KUMAR NANDI, J : - . I agree. Order accordingly.