JUDGMENT P.N.S. Chouhan, J. 1. Appellant Kashibai is the legally married wife of Bhagwansingh. There are two issues born of this wedlock. Kashibai filed a complaint Under Section 494read with Section 114 IPC against the respondents and two others in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Udaipura District Raisen on the ground that during her absence her husband Bhagwansingh has contrac- ted second marriage with Binibai daughter of respondent Himmatsingh on 1-2-1980. One of the accused namely Parmenand who has officiated as priest at the second marriage though pleaded not guilty admitted the fact that Bhagwansingh had contracted marriage with Binnibai at her parents village Timravan. Vide judgment dated 5.12.1984, the learned trial Magistrate held on facts that neither the first nor second marriage was proved and acquitted the accused persons. The complainant then filed this appeal against the said order of acquittal and leave to appeal was granted only against the respondents. 2. Appellant's learned Counsel has argued that the learned trial magistrate construed the laid down in Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1153 and misinterpreted the evidence to record the perverse finding that neither of the two marriages could be proved. In fact appellant's marriage having beena admitted by respondent Bhagwansingh proceeding Under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code resulting in a final order against him and having again admitted the same in his statement Under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code appellant's valid marriage with respondent Bhagwansingh ought to have been held duly proved. Similarly, in view of the evidence of Shri Khillu (PW 2), Gokul (PW 3) Prakashbai (PW 4) Jasman (PW 6) of the second marriage, the same should also have been held duly proved. In reply it was contended that the evidence has been rightly evaluate and the law has been correctly applied to arrive at the impugned finding. Moreover, even if this Court is inclined to take a different view of the evidence that would not justify interference with the impugned finding of acquittal which under no circumstances is liable to be characterised perverse. 3. Moreover, even if this Court is inclined to take a different view of the evidence that would not justify interference with the impugned finding of acquittal which under no circumstances is liable to be characterised perverse. 3. In the case of Priya Bala Ghosh (supra) in view of the admitted position that homa' and 'Sapta Padi' were essential ceremonies to constitute valid marriage and there was no specific evidence to prove that these ceremonies were gone through the question arose whether it was necessary to establish by specific evidence performance of the above ceremonies and rites in relation to second marriage before the respondent could be convicted Under Section 494 IPC. 4. Relying on Gopal Anand Miganonkar v. State of M.P. 1976 MPLJ, Bunda v. Chaitram 1976 JIJ 621 and Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Surender Chander Ghosh AIR 1971 SC 1153 , the learned trial Court held that the appellant was required to prove her marriage with Bhagwansingh by hard evidence and the admissions of the other spouse were of no avail in this behalf. Since she only stated that she was married to Bhagwansingh and did not specify that 'Homa' and 'Sapta Padi' was performed at such marriage the fact of her marriage with Bhagwansingh could not be held as proved. The learned trial Magistrate had earlier in proceeding Under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code held the appellant to be the legally married wife of Bhagwansingh & awarded her maintenance allowance vide Ex. P. 1 and this document was also pressed into service to prove solemnisation of first marriage but to no avail. The citations referred to by the learned trial Magistrate only relate' to admissions of the other spouse and not to a judicial finding. Since Ex. P. 1 shows that the issue of valid marriage between the appellant and Bhagwansingh was held proved, the principle of issue estoppel was attracted and the learned trial Judge was in error in holding that the appellant's evidence on the point of her marriage with respondent No. 2 was not sufficient and heard no evidence was needed to prove the same. 5. 5. The trial Court after referring to the above cited decisions rightly held that the prosecution has to prove, that the alleged second marriage was duly performed in accordance with the essential religious rites applicable to the form of marriage gone through by the parties and admission of marriage by an accused is no evidence of marriage for the purpose of proving an offence of bigamy. On this basis, the learned trial magistrate felt that hard evidence was required to prove these second marriage which was lacking in the case. What he meant be hard evieence is not clear. In all probability he meant cliniching evidence but none of the cases relied on by him insist on the requirement of clinching evidence in this behalf. This appears to be the point where the impugned judgment went away. 6. In Kalimunnisa v. Shah Salimkhan Rehmankhan 1976 JLJ 621 , cited in the impugned judgment it was held that in this country marriages are performed with elaborate ceremonies and fan-fare and so it is not difficult for a party required to prove such marriage to produce specific evidence in this behalf. The observation will apply in case of first marriages. Bigemous marriages are generally performed in a clandestine manner for obtious reasons and it may be extremely difficult if not impossible for the other spouse to adduce clinching evidence to prove it. True it is that fight since 1980 Law Courts have consistently held that specific evidence to prove the second marriage in the form applicable to the parties is essential to bring home the charge of bigamy but it is no where made clear as to why an admission of second marriage by the erring partner should not be considered good evidence on this point whereas as held in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 405, admissions made by the parties are substantive evidence by themselves in view of the Section 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act and if such admissions are duly proved they can be relied on even if the party making it does not enter the witness box and is not confronted with such admissions. In Priya Bala's case (supra) this argument wasrepelled senseassigning any reason. The charge of bigamy is brought in an over-whelming majority of cases against the male spouse. In Priya Bala's case (supra) this argument wasrepelled senseassigning any reason. The charge of bigamy is brought in an over-whelming majority of cases against the male spouse. In our male dominated society this exception to the general principle of evidence seems to favour the erring spouse and therefore deserves a second look by the appex Court when the occasion arises. 7. In the present case besides Ex. 1 referred to above there is the evidence of Khillu (PW 2) who is a labourer of village Timravan where the second marriage is alleged to have taken place to the effect that in. the marriage of Binnibai and Bhagwansingh which took place near about 77-78. 'Khan was fixed and 'Bhanwar' that is Sapta padi' was performed. He claims to have participated in the ceremony of 'Sapta Padi' along with members of his family. He has been corroborated by Gokul Barber (PW 3) Prakashbai (PW 4) who is Bhagwansingh's Bhabhi and Jasman (PW 6). All this evidence has been disbelieved on the ground of incignificant contradictions. These witnesses come from village. Their memory on details time, presence of people is bound to differ from each other and therefore rejection of their evidence for inconsistency in such matters was patently erroneous. One of the co-accused Permanand had stated Under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code that the second marriage did take place in his presence. 8. The evidence shows there are two villages of same name Timravan one within the jurisdiction of Sainkhera police-station and the other in police station Deori. Respondent Himmat Singh is shown to be resident of Timravan police-station Deori, in the complaint. The summons was served on him through P.S. Deori as is evident from the endorsement of Station House Officer. Deori at para 66 of B-File Sessions Trial No. 78/78. Both Vishanath (DW 1) and Radhelal barber (PW 2) have falsely stated that Himmat Singh respondent No. 1 is resident of Timravan, Police Station Sainkhera. The summons was served on him through P.S. Deori as is evident from the endorsement of Station House Officer. Deori at para 66 of B-File Sessions Trial No. 78/78. Both Vishanath (DW 1) and Radhelal barber (PW 2) have falsely stated that Himmat Singh respondent No. 1 is resident of Timravan, Police Station Sainkhera. This fallacy was first sought to be created probably as a smoke screen by respondent Bhagwansingh in his affidavit dated 4.4.1978 at page 17 of the same B-file wherein he has admitted his first marriage with the appellant and has charged the appellant for deserting him and falsely initiating case against him and Himmat Singh of Timaravan Police Station Sainkhera Under Section 294 I.P.C. The learned trial Magistrate too seems to have fallen prey to this fallacy by failing to give the address of Himmat Singh in the title of the impugned judgment as that given in the complaint and showing him as resident of Timaravan police station Sainkhera which error for obvious reason has survived in the memorandum of appeal. Had the defence witnesses not been purchased by the respondents they would not have attempted to perpetuate the fallacy created by respondent Bhagwansingh in his above referred to affidavit even before he was served with process in the case. As such the evidence of these defence witnesses must be held to be unreliable and the trial Magistrate was in error to hold it credit worthy. The prosecution evidency is specific on the point of solemnisation of the second marriage with 'Saptapadi' and other ceremonies. Therefore, respondents' acquittal is found to be manifestly erroneous and has to be set aside. 9. It was submitted that respondent Bhagwan Singh is a Teacher in Government School and in case of conviction, may loose his job which will result in immense suffering to the members of his family who are dependants on him. This may be true but the law is equally concerned with the appellants' growing sense of injustice caused by the untimely breakdown of her marriage by the respondents' deliberate acts and the bleak prospects of her survival with two innocent children in this cruel world which has goaded her to knock the door of justice all these years. This may be true but the law is equally concerned with the appellants' growing sense of injustice caused by the untimely breakdown of her marriage by the respondents' deliberate acts and the bleak prospects of her survival with two innocent children in this cruel world which has goaded her to knock the door of justice all these years. Therefore, for obvious reason the prospect of respondent Bhagwan Singh loosing his job cannot be deemed relevant for reversal of respondents' acquittal when the material on record clearly warrants it. 10. In result the appeal is allowed seeting aside the acquitted respondent Himmat Singh is convicted Under Section 494 R/w Section 114 I.P.C. and respondent Bhagwansingh is a convicted Under Section 494 I.P.C. In determining the quantum of sentence it has to be remembered that more than 12 years have elapsed after the second marriage and appellant's marital ties for all practical purposes must be held to have irretrievably broken. In such circumstances substantive jail terms are not warranted. Taking a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case both the respondents are sentenced to imprisonment till rising of the Court (to be executed by C.J.M. Raisen) and ordered to pay fine of Rs. Twenty thousand each failing which R.I. for one year each. The amount of fine on realisation be paid to the applicant as compensation.