Judgment Sachchidanand Jha, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree of reversal dismissing the plaintiffs suit for eviction. 2. The plaintiffs case, shortly stated, is that he is the owner of a building comprising Holding No. 19 within Ward No. VIII or Doranda Municipality. The shop in question being portion of the aforesaid building was leased out to the defendant for a period of eleven months with effect from 1-10-1974 on payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 280 per month, In pursuance of the agreement, the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 2, 080 as advance. Although the period of lease had expired, the premises had not been vacated by the defendant. The defendant also did no pay the monthly rent since September, 1975. Besides, the shop was also required for own occupation by the plaintiff for the reason that he had been carrying on betel shop business on P.W. D. land from which he is liable to be evicted any day making the existence of the plaintiffs business precarious. According to the plaintiff further, his two sons were unemployed and so he required the premises also for the benefit of his two sons. A notice Under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was duly served on the defendant terminating the tenancy with effect from 31-12-1975 but still the defendant had not vacated the premises giving rise to the instant suit, 3. The defendant denied that the tenancy was for fixed period of eleven months only. According to him, he is a month to month tenant on payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 104 per month. He had paid a sum of Rs. 2, 080 as advance rent for a period of twenty months commencing from 1-10-1974. Accordingly, the rent had been pail upto May, 1976. Thereafter, rent was sent every month beginning from June, 1976 by postal money order which the plaintiff always refused. Thus, he was not a defaulter. According to the defendant farther, the plaintiff had been carrying on the betel shop business for last thirty years ever since the time of the plaintiffs father at Doranda Bazar. Thereafter, rent was sent every month beginning from June, 1976 by postal money order which the plaintiff always refused. Thus, he was not a defaulter. According to the defendant farther, the plaintiff had been carrying on the betel shop business for last thirty years ever since the time of the plaintiffs father at Doranda Bazar. The plaintiff along with his family had been living in the house in the Bazar area but after constructing a new house the family shifted there in or about 1975 letting out the entire old building to several tenants. It was also stated that shop room adjacent, the suit premises was already vacant which was available for the own occupation of the plaintiff and/or his sons. 4. The trial court held, inter alia, that the defendant was a month to month tenant and that the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises was not in good faith. So far as the ground of default is concerned, it held, agreeing with the defendant, that rental was Rs. 104 and not Rs. 280 but since the defendant did not remit the entire arrear of rent every month, there was no valid remittance of rent during the period commencing from June, 1976 and as such, the defendant was defaulter within the meaning of Clause (d) of Sec. 11(1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and was liable to eviction. The suit, accordingly, was decreed only on the ground of default. 5. On appeal, the lower appellate court agreed with the findings of the trial court in regard to f he nature of tenancy, and the ground of personal necessity. The appellate court, however, held that it was not necessary on the part of the defendant to remit the entire arrear of rent commencing from June, 1976 and since the monthly rent had been validly remitted every month during the entire period in question, the ground of default also was not established. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree of eviction on that ground also. The suit, accordingly, was dismissed by the lower appellate court giving rise to the instant appeal. 6. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree of eviction on that ground also. The suit, accordingly, was dismissed by the lower appellate court giving rise to the instant appeal. 6. At the stage of admission of this appeal on 16-4-1987, the following substantial questions of law were formulated: (1) In absence of any registered instrument whether the courts below could have held that the respondent was in occupation of the building in-question on monthly rent of a permanent basis ? (2) Whether the findings of the courts below on the question of personal necessity for the reasons stated therein can be sustained? 7. MR.N.K. Prasad appearing for the plaintiff-appellant submitted at the very outset that apart from the two questions formulated at the stage of admission, another question which arises for consideration is whether the courts below had acted erroneously in permitting adjustment of a sum of Rs. 2080 for the period commencing from October, 1974 upto May, 1976. A prayer was made that since the aforesaid question arises for consideration on the very face of the judgment, leave should be granted to the plaintiff to urge the aforesaid question also. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid questions of law formulated by this Court at the stage of admission have not been argued as elaborately as the question which has been suggested during the course of argument before me. In this connection. it may be stated that in terms of the provisions contained in Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at the stags of hearing, the court may, for the reasons to be recorded alow any other substantial questions or law not formulated by it earlier. Having regard to the implications of the question raised, I have heard the parties on the aforesaid question also without formally recording reasons for the same because haying; considered the merits of the submission, in my opinion, the aforesaid question also does not improve the plaintiffs case. 8. It would appear that both the courts below have held that the tenancy was not for any fixed term and the same was on month to month basis. This aspect is concluded by finding of fact and cannot be agitated in second appeal. 8. It would appear that both the courts below have held that the tenancy was not for any fixed term and the same was on month to month basis. This aspect is concluded by finding of fact and cannot be agitated in second appeal. It is true that while recording its findings, the lower appellate court has stated that the defendant was in occupation of the building on payment basis To me it appears that the aforesaid observation in regard to the permanent nature of tenancy was made while discussing the plaintiffs case of the tenancy being for fixed term. It was in that context that, while rejecting the aforesaid case, it was said that the defendant was in occupation on monthly rent on permanent basis. What the court really meant to say was that the defendant being a tenant on month to month basis could not be evicted except on one of the grounds as mentioned in Sec. 11(1) of the Act and that in absence of any such ground for eviction being established, the defendant-tenant could continue in occupation of the boil ling in question on payment of rent. In my opinion, therefore, the so-called finding about the tenancy being permanent was a surplus age. No material infirmity can be attributed in the aforesaid finding merely because the words permanent basis have been indicated in the judgment. There is nothing like tenancy being permanent. It can be either for a fixed period or on month to month basis. If the finding of the court below is interpreted to mean only that the tenancy was on monthly basis and not on permanent basis, the absence of any registered instrument does not materially change or affect the ultimate finding. I, accordingly, hold that the tenancy being only en month to month basis, there was no necessity of any registered instrument. 9. So far as question No. 2 relating to personal necessity is concerned, it would appear that the question is concluded by concurrent findings of both the courts below. I, accordingly, hold that the tenancy being only en month to month basis, there was no necessity of any registered instrument. 9. So far as question No. 2 relating to personal necessity is concerned, it would appear that the question is concluded by concurrent findings of both the courts below. In terms of language of Clause (c) of Sec. 11(1) of the Act, the plaintiff need has not only to be reasonable but also in good faith, in this connection, it may be mentioned that an application for taking additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed on behalf of the defendant-respondent stating that the portion of the same building adjacent east of the suit premises which was stated to be vacant in the written statement filed in the trial court, during pendency of the appeal in this Court, had been let out on rent by a registered deed on 23-6-1989 for a period of two years on monthly rent of Rs 1, 000. The original certified copy of the aforesaid deed has been annexed to the aforesaid application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code. As stated above, in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity the plaintiff has to establish not only that the requirement of the suit premises is reasonsable but also that it is in good faith. In other words, in the instant case, even if it is hell that the plaintiffs requirement of the premises either for the purpose of doing business himself or by his sons is reasonable, if, inspite of alternative space or shop, being available, the plaintiff does not occupy the same himself without a valid reason and lets out to others on payment of rent, can it be said that the need is bonafide also? It was not disputed during the course of arguments that this Court is competent to take into consideration subsequent events. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it has to be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish that his need of the premises is in good faith. Therefore, the findings of the two courts below on the question of personal necessity cannot be said to be erroneous id law. 10. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it has to be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish that his need of the premises is in good faith. Therefore, the findings of the two courts below on the question of personal necessity cannot be said to be erroneous id law. 10. Adverting to the aforesaid question of law which had been allowed to be raised at the stage of final hearing, it would be appropriate to refer the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Act on which learned Counsel for the appellant based his submissions: "It shall not be lawful for any person to claim or receive, in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy of any building, the payment of any premium, salami, fine or any other like sum in addition to the rent or payment of any sum exceeding one months rent of such building as rent in advance. It would appear from the perusal of the aforesaid Section the provision contained therein is in the nature of protection given to the tenant. It restrains the landlord from claiming or receiving the payment of any premium, salami etc. or the rent exceeding one months rent in advance. It gives a protection to the tenant from unscrupulous landlord who may, on account of his superior bargaining position vis-a-vis the tenant, compel or coerce him to any premises, salami or advance rent exceeding one month. In an appropriate case, the tenant taking help of the aforesaid provisions may claim adjustment for the future months. The question for consideration is whether the landlord also can take a vantage of the aforesaid provision Under Sec. 3 of the Act. If such a right is conceded to the landlord, it would mean that the landlord, is the first instance, would compel or coerce the tenant into payment of advance rent etc, retain money so realised and yet take the plea that the money is not adjustable. This proposition would be quite anamolous. It would only give a premium to the greedy and unscrupulous landlord to take advantage of his own wrong doing. In this connection the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. This proposition would be quite anamolous. It would only give a premium to the greedy and unscrupulous landlord to take advantage of his own wrong doing. In this connection the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Selimuddin V/s. Misri Lal -- , with reference to Sec. 3 of the Act, may usefully be noted: One cannot conceive of greater judicial sin of treating the oppressor and the oppressed on a part or that of rewarding the oppressor and punishing the oppressed whilst administering the law designed to protect the oppressed. We would be guilty of committing the sin if we upheld the view that the tenant who advances a loan to the landlord in order to secure the tenancy (in violation to the prohibition to do so embodied in the statute enacted for his benefit) is in pari delicto and that the Court will not assist the tenant in claiming adjustment of the loan amount against the landlords claim for rent. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to the decision in the case of Budhwanti and Anr. V/s. Gulab Chand Prasad . It was held in that decision that if the tenant pays rent in excess of the agreed rent, in absence of proof of such payment having been made under compulsion or exploitation, he would not be entitled to claim adjustment Where both the parties have by consensus contravened the, provision of law for their mutual advantage, in such a situation, the tenant may net be held entitled to adjustment of the amount so paid in excess against the. rent to be paid in future. Here the position is somewhat different. In this connection, it would be appropriate to refer to the, relevant pleading in Paragraph 6 of the written statement which runs as follows: "Rather in fact the plaintiff had approached one Sri, Gawri Shankar Pradhan, a reputed man of the locality, to arrange a tenant for him who can give about Rs. 2,500 as advance for repayment pf certain dues and to meet certain expenses for completing the construction. This defendant was told of this by said Sri Gawri Shankar Pradhan, who got the terms settled and money advanced plaintiff by this defendant. It would thus appear that the payment of advance rent was in consideration of the grant of tenancy. 2,500 as advance for repayment pf certain dues and to meet certain expenses for completing the construction. This defendant was told of this by said Sri Gawri Shankar Pradhan, who got the terms settled and money advanced plaintiff by this defendant. It would thus appear that the payment of advance rent was in consideration of the grant of tenancy. Had the payment of advance rent been on the basis of a mutual agreement, but not as a condition for the grant of lease, it could be said that the tenant being in part delicto could not claim adjustment. In the instant case, both the courts below have held that adjustment of advance rent towards rent payable in future was permissible. I do not find any error in the judgments of the courts below. 12 Admittedly, the rent for the period commencing from June, 1976 till institution of the suit had been remitted to the plaintiff every month. The trial court had, in view of the earlier decision of this Court reported in 1978 BBCJ 503 , held that since the accumulated rent for the period in question was not being remitted to the plaintiff, the defendant was a defaulter. The aforesaid decision having been overruled later in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narayan Mishra reported in -- in which it was held that the remittance or the amount of rent of one month only at a time was sufficient compliance of the law and it was not necessary to remit every month the entire accumulated rent, the court of appeal below has rightly held that the defendant was not defaulter. It is an admitted position that the defendant was held to be defaulter only on that ground. In view of the subsequent decision in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narayan Mishra (supra) it has to be held that the aforesaid ground of eviction also does not subsist now. The defendant not being a defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Act, no decree for eviction on that ground also can be passed. 13. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed but without any order as to costs.