Honble JASRAJ CHOPRA, J.—This appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dt. 5.4.1990 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 951 of 1989, whereby the learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-respondent, directed the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to allot the petitioner a plot of equal importance of the same measurement in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. It was further directed that the petitioner will have to pay the difference between the plot allotted to him and the rates which were prevalent in the year 1984, if there is any, and the non-petitioner U.I.T. will also be entitled to charge the amount in accordance with law and if any amount due to the petitioner towards the earlier allotment. It was also directed that the allotment shall be made within a period of three months from today and the petitioner is entitled to costs, which is quantified to the extent of Rs. 2,000/-. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this appeal brie-fly stated are : that the petitioner was allotted plot No. 47-C measuring 317 50 sq. yds. in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur for a sum of Rs. 27,384.37 p. vide order Annexure-1 dated 11.5.1984. At the initial stage, the peti-tioner deposited a sum of Rs. 5,000/ on 30.11.1983 vide receipt Annexure-2. Rs. 20,000/ were further deposited by him vide receipt Annexure-3 dated 6.8.1984. It is alleged that the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37 p. was offered several times but the appellant U.I.T. on one or the other pretext did not accept the same as the plot was not ready for allotment because the licence of the same was given to some other person. It is further alleged that the appellant U .I.T. came to know that on account of non-maintenance of disposal register, it has become a case of double allotment. The petitioner respondent then informed the appellant U.I.T. to allot him some other alternate plot and further requested that he should not be allowed to suffer on account of the mistake and negligence on the part of the employees of the appellant U.I.T. The petitioner-respondent Laxmichand also informed the appellant U.I.T. that number of plots in Sector A and other Sectors of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur are lying vacant and, therefore, he should be allotted a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar itself. 3. However, it appears that on 8.8.1988 (which appears to be a wrong date, it must be 8.8.89), a direction was issued that the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand be allotted another plot No. 260-B in Sarswati Nagar, Jodhpur. This order was passed by the appellant U.I.T. after obtaining a detailed report from the Office [but even therefore, nothing has been done. It was submitted that the petitioner has already suffered irreparable loss and injury inasmuch as on account of this delay, he could not raise the construction and the cost of the construction is going high day by day. He has therefore, prayed that the non-petitioner-appeflant U.I.T. be directed to allot him an alternate plot of the same importance in the same Scheme i.e. 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. He has further prayed that the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. may be rest-rained from auctioning any plot in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur in Sector A till the plot is allotted to the petitioner. 4. Initially, notice was issued to the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to show cause as to why this writ petition be not admitted and in pursuance of that notice, Mr! M.R. Singhvi, Advocate put in appearance on its behalf and filed a reply to the show cause notice. In reply to the show cause notice, it was admitted that the petitioner was allotted plot No. C-47, in 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar. Jodhpur and that plot had already been allotted to one Shri Lakhpat Raj Bagrecha in the year 1978 and, therefore, due to over sight, this mistake had crept in. It was submitted that there were few more cases in which such kind of mistake was committed. 5. St was further submitted that the appellant U.I.T. in its meetings dated 9.6.89 and 25.7.1989 disposed of certain cases in which it was decided that such persons should be allotted alternate plots in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur. The petitioner was also allotted plot No. 270-B in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur measuring about 200 sq. yds vide Resolution Annexure R-2 dated 25.7.1989. It was claimed that it is a case of private contract and therefore, no writ petition can be filed. 6. Later on, the case was admitted and a detailed reply to the writ peti-tion has been filed on behalf of the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. in which the contentions which were raised in reply to the show cause notice was reiterated. It was claimed that it is a case of private contract and therefore, no writ petition can be filed. 6. Later on, the case was admitted and a detailed reply to the writ peti-tion has been filed on behalf of the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. in which the contentions which were raised in reply to the show cause notice was reiterated. It was further contended that the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37 p. was never offered and, therefore, the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand is guilty of non-payment of full price of the plot in dispute and hence, his allotment came to an end automatically. However, as a benevolent gesture, the non-petitioner-appell-ant decided on 09.6.1989 vide its Resolution Annexure- R-1 that an alternate plot be allotted to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand alongwith other similarly situated applicants. It has been claimed that no duty lay on the appellant U.I.T to allot a plot to the petitioner Laxmichand in the same scheme. It was submitted that it is a case of private contract and, therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable. It was further submitted that this writ petition is highly belated and therefore, on that account, it be dismissed. According to the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. as per the provisions of r. 17 (5) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust (Disposal of Urban Lands) Rules, 1974 (for short the Rules) this allotment came to an end automatically. It was submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to him under r. 30 of the aforesaid Rules for redressal of his grievances by fling an appeal before the State Govt. and since that remedy has not been availed by him, this writ petition be dismissed. 7. A rejoinder to the reply to the writ petition has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand, in which, the contentions raised in the writ petition were reiterated and it was submitted that certain plots are available with the non-petitioner-appellant in Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and, therefore, he be allotted a plot in the same scheme. This request of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand has been accepted by the learned single Judge vide his Order dated April 5, 1990. 8. Aggrieved against this judgment of the learned single Judge dated April 5, 1990, the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. has filed this special appeal under s.18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. 9. We have heard Mr. MR. This request of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand has been accepted by the learned single Judge vide his Order dated April 5, 1990. 8. Aggrieved against this judgment of the learned single Judge dated April 5, 1990, the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. has filed this special appeal under s.18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. 9. We have heard Mr. MR. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. and Mr. K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent Laxmichand and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 10. It was contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that this writ petition is highly belated and therefore, it should be dismissed on that ground. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Madbya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai (1), wherein it has been laid down that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art. 226. However, the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. 11. A similar view has been expressed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Amrit Lal V. Collector, C EC. Revenue (2) and a Division Bench of this Court in Suraj Mal V. State (3), wherein it has been held that save in exceptional cases, if a litigant comes to Court of law after the period of limitation prescribed for a particular relief, the Court would ordinarily decline to grant it on the ground of delay and it does not make any difference whether the relief is claimed in regard to the violation of fundamental rights or otherwise. We have considered these authorities and we are afraid that they are not applicable to the facts of this case. We have considered these authorities and we are afraid that they are not applicable to the facts of this case. It is true that in this case, the allotment was made in favour of the respondent Laxmichand way back in the year 1984 and in pursuance of that allotment, the respondent has already deposited a sum of Rs. 25,000/- but the possession of the plot allotted to him could not be handed over because it turned out to be a case of double allotment. Hence, that plot was not available for allotment and this mistake was realised by the appellant U.I.T. It is unfortunate that a Public Institution like the Urban Improvement Trust, which is the creation of a Statute, acts in such a callous and i irresponsible manner. So much so, that in that very Scheme, according to the learned single Judge, 100 persons have been allotted plots which have already been allotted to other persons. Be that as it may, while realising this mistake, the appellant U.I.T. itself has decided as late, as in the year 1989 that the persons who have suffered on account of its mistake and who have deposited their money with it should be offered alternate plots for allotment and that was done in the months of June a.07.1989 and, therefore, when the appellant U.I.T. itself has decided to rectify its mistake, this writ petition cannot be said to be belated and it cannot be thrown out on that count. 12. It was next contended by Mr. M. R. Singhvi, the learned counsel for the appellant that the allotment made in favour of the respondent has automatically come to an end because of the application of r. 17(5) of the Rules, which provides that an allottee has to deposit the remaining amount within 30 days of the allotment and if it is not done then he can do so within the next 30 days by depositing the amount with an interest @ 15% p.a. from the date of allotment, failing which, the allotment of land shall automati-cally stand cancelled. However, it has been provided that the Chairman may regularise such allotment of land withdrawing the automatic cancellation within a period of ten months from the date of said automatic cancellation, if the allottee is prepared to pay the full amount of cost plus interest @ 15% p.a. upto the date of regularisation of allotment of land in addition also an amount of penalty at the rates provided by r. 17(5) of the Rules. It has further been provided that after the expiry of the period of ten months from the date of the said automatic cancellation, the Chairman shall have no power to regularise such allotment of land in any case, and if the Chairman considers necessary in the interest of the Trust, he may refer the case to the State Govt, even after the expiry of the period mentioned in clause (ii) of sub-r. (5) of r. 17 of the Rules, and the State Govt. after considering the recommendations made by the Chairman may permit such regularisation on payment by the allottee, the amount of cost of land plus interest and penalty as provided in clause (i) of sub-r. (5) of r. 17 of the Rules upto the month in which the case was referred to the State Govt. by the Chairman. 13. Much stress was laid on the provisions of r. 17(5) of the Rules and it was submitted that the respondent has only deposited a sum of Rs. 5,000/-in time. The remaining amount of Rs. 20,000/- have been deposited by him on 6.8.1984 i.e. after the period of sixty days from the date of allotment and even the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37 P. has not been deposited so far. This contention could have assumed great importance, had it not been a case of double allotment. When the plot itself was not available for allotment, the application of r. 17(5) of the Rules is out of question. The provisions of r. 17(5) of the Rules can only be attracted when the plot is available for allotment and the applicant is guilty of latches. In this view of the matter, the argument of Mr. Singhvi that the allotment made in favour of the respondent had automatically come to an end as per the provisions of r. 17(5) of the Rules has no force and it is rejected. 14. It was argued by Mr. In this view of the matter, the argument of Mr. Singhvi that the allotment made in favour of the respondent had automatically come to an end as per the provisions of r. 17(5) of the Rules has no force and it is rejected. 14. It was argued by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that it is a case of private contract and for enforcement of a private contract, a writ petition does not lie under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Kulchhinder Singh vs. Hardayal Singh (4) and Radhakrishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar (5), wherein it has been held that if the contract does not contain any statutory terms of obligations then no statutory power/ obligation can be attracted and, therefore, in such matter of breach of contract, extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be attracted. Such a contention was raised even before the learned single Judge and it has been repelled by saying that it is not a case of private contract but it is a case of statutory contract, which has been entered into between the parties. 15. In this case, the respondent has been allotted the plot in dispute under the provisions of the Rules and according to the Rules, the scheme has to be framed by the U.I.T. and that has to be got approved from the Chief Town Planner and thereafter, the land has to be divided into commercial and residential purposes. Thereafter, plots are to be carved out and they can only be leased out for 99 years. They cannot be sold to any party. Certain reser-vations can also be made according to Rules. Thus,the land is being leased out by the U.I.T. in pursuance of the Rules. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can allot the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auction. Thus the contract of sale of land by the U.I.T. is governed by the Rules and, therefore, it has statutory overtonnes and so, it cannot be said to be a case of private cotract as such. 16. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can allot the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auction. Thus the contract of sale of land by the U.I.T. is governed by the Rules and, therefore, it has statutory overtonnes and so, it cannot be said to be a case of private cotract as such. 16. Even if for the sake of argument, it is held to be a case of contract between two contracting parties then too the Institution like U.I.T. which can be described as other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution cannot act as arbitrarily. It has to act fairly and reasonably as has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in a cantena of decisions. 17. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in K.C Rout vs. State (6) observed that the Govt. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigations and drive law-abiding citizens to raise dispute for enforcing their admitted rights. By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto. 18. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Prasad Misra vs. O.N.G.C (7) has held that fair play and justice ought to be the basic criterion on which a governmental agency should act. The concept of justice and rule of law is not however a static one, but it ought to keep pace with the socio economic changes in the country. Doctrine of promissory estop-pel ought to be applied against the government or the governmental agency where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate such a course. It is, however, also true that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and it must yield when the equity so requires. Thus, we are firmly of the view that it is not a case of private contract as the contract is governed by certain statutory Rules. It is, however, also true that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and it must yield when the equity so requires. Thus, we are firmly of the view that it is not a case of private contract as the contract is governed by certain statutory Rules. The plots cannot be sold by the U.I.T. through private bergain. They can only be leased out either through open auctions or through inviting applications and then allotting them by heasing lots as per the Rules. Thus, it has a statutory overtonnes. Even if, it is assumed that strictly speaking it is not a statutory contract then too, the appellant U.I.T. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigants and drive law-abiding citizens to raise dispute for enfor-cing their admitted rights By its conduct and performance, the statutory body like U.I.T. must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the U.I.T. must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. Thus, this argument of Mr. Singhvi also cannot be sustained. 19. Mr. K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel for the respondent has however, approached this aspect of the matter with a slightly different angle. He has submitted that even if, stricly speaking, it is treated as a statutory contract then too, U.I.T. being a statutory body, it is obliged to perform its statutory obligation under the Rules. According to Mr. Joshi, scheme for the development of the City has to be framed by the U.I.T. and that has to be approved from the Chief Town Planner and, thereafter, the land has to be divided into commercial and residential purposes and the plots are to be earbed out by it. Plots can only be leased out for 99 years but they cannot be sold to any one. Certain reservations can also be made. He has submitted that the land being leased out by the U.I.T. in accordance with the Rules. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can leased out the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auctions. Thus, it has all statutory overtonnes. Mr. Certain reservations can also be made. He has submitted that the land being leased out by the U.I.T. in accordance with the Rules. It invites applications for allotment and thereafter, it can leased out the land either by way of allotment through lots or by open auctions. Thus, it has all statutory overtonnes. Mr. Joshi has submitted that once the U.I.T. invites applications for allotment of plots and allots certain plots in favour of certain applicants but later on it is revealed that on account of its own mistake those plots have already been allotted to some other applicants then in such circumstances, taking recourse to s. 20 of the Contract Act, it cannot back out the promise made by it. He has further submitted that U.I.T. being the other authority has to act fairly and reasonably so that the people may not loose faith in such public institutions. In this respect, he has drawn our attention to the decision in Surendra Prasad Misras case (supra) wherein, it has been observed : "that where Govt. or Governmental agency makes a promise knowing or intending that it could be acted upon by the promisee and if the promisee acting in accordance therewith and thereby alters his position, the Govt. or the Governmental agency would be held to be bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. or the Governmental agency at the instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise or that the promise has not been reduced to writing in the form of a contract as required under Art. 299 of the Constitution. It was in this context that the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has observed that fair play and justice ought to be the basic criterion on which a Governmental agency should act." It was further observed that if a promise can form part of a cause of action connected with statutory obligation, it is too late in the day to contend that it ought (to be restricted to the extent above and no further extension ought to be allowed. In this case, the major part of the consideration has already passed i.e. the petitioner respondent has altered his situation by depositing a sum of Rs. In this case, the major part of the consideration has already passed i.e. the petitioner respondent has altered his situation by depositing a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with the appellant U.I.T. way back in the year 1984, which arc still lying with it and, therefore, the appellant U.I.T. cannot back out of its promise, which was he d out by it that it will allot a plot to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in 1st Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. No particular plots were advertised to be allotted to the applicants. The petitioner-respondent Laxmi Chand had applied for allotment of a plot in 1st Extension Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and he was allotted Plot No. 47-C in First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. That was the act of the appellant U.I.T. and not of the respondent Laxmichand. This allotment was permissible under the Rules. However, it turned out that plot was not available for allotment because it had already been allotted to someone else. That is no fault of the respondent Laxmichand. he cannot suffer for negligence, callousness and non-maintenance of the essential record by the appellant U.I.T. and, therefore, in such circumstances, in Surendra Prasad Misras case (supra), it was further observed that the writ court would be within its jurisdiction to enforce the equity as found to be existing and can compel the government or the governmental agency to perform its part of the bargain. If an act of the Government or the Governmental agency is apparently not in accordance with the rule of law, equity and fair play, it would be a plain exercise of judicial power for the writ court to intervene. 20. There is no doubt about this fact that equity stands in favour of the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand, who deserves allotment of a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur because he had applied for allotment of a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur in pursuance of an advertisement of the appellant U.I.T. and has parted with the huge amount in favour of the U.I..T. The appellant U.I.T. did not return that amount to the respondent Laxmi-chand and has utilised it for its own purpose. Thus, the equity, fair play and justice demands that respondent Laxmichand should be allotted an alternate plot and probably that weighed with the appellant U.I.T. and therefore, it decided to offer a plot in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur to him. Thus, the equity, fair play and justice demands that respondent Laxmichand should be allotted an alternate plot and probably that weighed with the appellant U.I.T. and therefore, it decided to offer a plot in Saraswati Nagar, Jodhpur to him. The learned single Judge in Surendra Prasad Misras case (supra) has further observed that when there is manifest injustice and after coming to a finding that an equity exists in favour of the petitioner, the writ court can mould the relief in order to do justice between the parties. The concept of justice cannot be restricted to a strait jacket formula, but is very wide and the law courts exist to do justice and come in aid of a person who seeks justice against an administrative caprice and......dixit. 21. Our attention was also drawn to a Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in K. C. Rout V. State (supra), wherein a particular lease was granted by the statutory authorities in favour of the petitioner under the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that the lessee has statutory right to force the lessor to put him in possession of the leasehold property. S. 108, cl. (b) of the T. P. Act casts that obligation on the lessor. When there is a valid and duly registered lease in favour of a lessee, right to property is created in his favour and he is entitled to have possession and enjoy the lease held in accordance with law. If the lessor omits to perform its part of the obligation of putting the lessee in possession, the lessee of the property has a statutory right to enforce performance of the obligation. The lessee is entitled to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction for enforcement of his statutory right. It was also observed that where on the basis of the representation made by the State Govt. that the lessee will be provided with alternate site and will enjoy the property for 90 years, the lessee surrendered the legal right created in his favour under the first lease deed and a valid lease-deed in respect of the alternate site was also executed and registered in his favour and thus, the lessee changed his position to his prejudice relying on representation, the lessee is entitled on the basis of promissory estoppel to claim possession of the alternate site from the State Govt. It was in this context that it was held that the Govt. is bound to act in a manner which would hold out ideal conduct for citizens to imbibe and it cannot undertake performance of its functions in a manner which would lead to litigations and drive law-abiding citizens to raise dispute for enforcing their admitted rights. By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the minds of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto. In this case too, in pursuance of the allotment order, initially the petitioner has d posited a sum of Rs. 5.000/- and later on he has deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with the appellant U.I.T. on 6.8.1984 and the appellant U.I.T. vide its resolution dated 9. 6. 1989 offered an alternate plot to the respondent in Saraswati Nagar. Jodhpur and, therefore, when the petitioner has changed his position to his prejudice, the appellant U.I.T. is now estopped to wriggle out from this promise by taking recourse to S. 20 of the Contract Act. 22. In Union of India V. Hoarwall Cycle Co. Ltd. (8) a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has observed: "that the decision to transfer a property forming part of the compensa- tion pool made in exercise of the power under s. 28 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act read with r. 87 of the Displaced Persons (Compesation and Rehabilitation) Rules framed thereunder could only be by the statutory authorities under the Act and non-making thereof in the name of the President could not be stated as in breach of Art 299 of the Constitution. The transfer instrument need alone be executed in the name of the President." It was further observed as follows; "that once the Govt. The transfer instrument need alone be executed in the name of the President." It was further observed as follows; "that once the Govt. has decided to transfer a property forming part of the compensation pool to a particular displaced person who was in occupation of such property resiling from such decision without any valid reason was arbitrary and in breach of Art. 14 of the Constitution so that the aggrieved person was entitled to invoke Art. 226 to compel the authorities to perform its duty in accordance with law. It was not a mere breach of contract and the party could not be asked to seek his remedy in a civil suit." Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in G.S.F.C. vs. M/s Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd.(9) wherein certain promise was held out by the Gujarat State Finance Corpn. to advance certain amount of loan to the respondent and thereafter, it wriggle out from that promise and it was in that context that their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that it is too late in the day to contend that the instrumentality of the State which would be other authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution can commit breach of a solemn under taking on which other side has acted and then contended that the party suffering by the breach of contract may sue for damages but cannot compel specific performence of the contract. It was submitted by Mr Singhvi that if plot No. 47-C First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur was not made available to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand then he should have filed a suit for damages and no specific performance of the contract can be granted. 23. It may again be stated at the cost of repetition, that the respondent applied for a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme and in that scheme, Plot No 47-C was allotted to him by the appellant U.I.T. by drawing the lots. 23. It may again be stated at the cost of repetition, that the respondent applied for a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme and in that scheme, Plot No 47-C was allotted to him by the appellant U.I.T. by drawing the lots. Thus contract between the parties was to allot a plot to the respondent in 1st Exten-sion of the Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur, for which, in our humble opinion, specific performance of the contract can be claimed because when Plot No. 47-C, which came to be allotted to respondent by drawing lots, was found not available for allotment, it does not mean that other plots will not be made available to him in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur. At this stage it will be useful to advert to an argument of Mr. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. that the Court cannot carve out a new contract between the parties, if the old contract is not enforceable. Actually, the contract between the parties was for allotment of a plot in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur and the petitioner did not apply for a particular plot in this very scheme and, therefore, that contract can certainly be enforceable and when this contract has statutory overtonnes and if the statutory authorities are not acting fairly and reasonably then certainly the respondent is entitled to get redressal of his griev-ance by invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution". 24. It was contended by Mr. MR. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant U.I.T. that the learned single Judge while relying on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Haryana Urban Development Autho-rity Vs. Sunita (10) has observed that a plot be allotted to the respondent Laxmi Chand in the same scheme for which he has applied for. He has submitted that decision does not lay down any law and therefore, it has no binding force on this Court as a precedent under Art. 141 of the Constitution. In this respect, he has placed reliance on an authority of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Neta Ram V. Jiwanlal (11) wherein it has been observed that a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact and each case will have to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. In this respect, he has placed reliance on an authority of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Neta Ram V. Jiwanlal (11) wherein it has been observed that a case cannot be an authority on a point of fact and each case will have to be examined in the light of the circumstances existing in it. He further referred to the following three decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court: 1. Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab (12) 2. Prakash Chandra v. State of U.P. (13) 3. Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (14). There is no quarrel about this principle that a case decided on facts cannot be an authority, which has a binding force as a precedent under Art. 141 of the Constitution but that does not mean that if in given facts of a case, a particular decision has been rendered by their lordships of the Supreme Court then in similar circumstances, such a decision should not be given any weight and importance. In this respect, the learned single Judge has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Hyderabad, Deccan v. M/s Vaziar Sultan and sons(15) Mr. Singhvi has contended that it was never his intention that the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court should not be given due weight but what he wanted to canvass was that such decisions cannot be taken a binding precedent. So far as this particular proposition is concerned, we have no quarrel about it. Even in the case of Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Sunita (supra), certain plots were allotted to certain persons in a particular scheme but the land on which those plots were situated was not available for allotment on account of certain factors which were beyond the control of the HUDA and, therefore alternate plots were offered and out of 306 drawees, 278 persons accepted that alternate offer but the rest of the persons claimed that certain plots are still available in those very scheme and, therefore, they should be allotted plots in those very schemes for which they applied for and, therefore, their lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that when plots are available in those schemes and they are being advertised for sale by auction, the petitioners are entitled to claim allotment of those plots. The facts of that case are almost similar to the facts of the present case. In the present case also, the appellant U.I.T. has issued advertisements Annexures 4 to 7 for sale of certain residential plots in Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur and these plots are situated in First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. When those plots are available for sale and their sale has been advertised, the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand is entitled to be allotted a plot in the First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. 25. It was contended by Mr. Singhvi that issue of a direction to allot a plot to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in First Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur will disturb the entire scheme. We are unable to under-stand how the allotment of a plot will disturb the entire scheme of the U.I.T. because plots can be sold or leased out either by allotment in lots or by auction. It hardly matters whether a plot is leased out either by allotment in lots or by open auction and such a disposal of plots cannot disturb the entire scheme as such and, therefore, to this extent, we cannot sustion the objection of Mr. Singhvi. 26. The decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Haryana Urban Development Authoritys case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case and the ratio of that decision can safely be applied to the facts and circum-stances of this case: In this respect, Mr. Joshi has gone a step further and has submitted that while sitting in appeal, the appellate Court is only required to find out whether the learned Judge has rendered a just decision and if the decision in the facts and circumstances of that case is just then even if that decision is unauthorised, that should be sustained. In this respect, reliance has been placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohd. 27. Mr, Joshi has submitted that in this case, the learned single Judge after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that plots are available for allotment in Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and, therefore, a plot of equal importance should be allotted to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand at the rates which prevailed in the year 1984. Mr. Mr. Singhvi has submitted that the phrase equal importance is causing great anxiety because the Officers of the U.I.T. are unable to define this phrase. While issuing direction to the non-petitioner-appellant U.I.T. to allot a plot of equal importance to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in the First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur, the intention of the learned single Judge by using this phrase equal importance was that the petitioner should be allotted a plot in the First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur keeping in view the situation and surroundings which plot No. 47-C in First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur enjoyed as regards approach to the road and other civil facilities, which were available there and hence that should not cause much concern to the Appellant U.I.T. 28. It was next contended by Mr. Singhvi that the plot of the same size in First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur is not available with the appellant U.I.T. Mr. Joshi has, however, submitted that the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand may be allotted any plot preferably in Sector-A First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur and if that plot carries an excess area to the size of plot No. 47-C in the First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur then the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand is ready to pay for the excess area of the plot at the market price. This proposal appears to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case. According to Annexures-4 to 7, the appellant U.I.T. proposes to auction plots measuring about 100 to 600 sq. yds; 200 to 600 sq. yds; and 375 to 525 sq. yds in size in this very scheme of Kamla Nehru Nagar, First Extension Scheme, Jodhpur and the appellant U.I.T. may allot any of these plots to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand in the First Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur. 29. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and the appellant U.I.T. is directed to allot a plot in the 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur to the petitioner-respondent Laxmichand and if the plot allotted to the respondent is in excess of the area comprised of plot No. 47-C, 1st Extension, Kamla Nehru Nagar, Jodhpur then the respondent will be obliged to pay the prevalent market price for the excess area of that plot. So far as the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37p. So far as the remaining amount of Rs. 2384.37p. is concerned, that will be payable by the respondent with interest @ 15% p.a. from the date of allotment i.e. ll.5.1984 within a period of fifteen days from today. The appellant is granted two months time to make a regular allotment of plot in favour of the respondent from today in the light of this appellate judgment. The respondent will also deposit the excess amount at the prevalent market rate on the date of allotment for the additional area of plot allotted to him over and above the area of plot No. 47-C in 1st Extension of Kamla Nehru Nagar Scheme of Jodhpur as and when demanded by the appellant U.I.T. in the light of this judgment within in one month of the notice of demand served on him. 30. As this case was purely based on legal pleas, the costs of this appeal as also of the writ petition will be easy.