N. D. V. BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE question as to whether the Court-fee payable in the plaint in O. S. No. 32/1981 on the file of the I Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum is under Section 35 (1) or 35 (2) of the Karnataka court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and as to whether a direction to pay additional Court-fee is revisable have arisen for consideration in this revision petition. The brief facts, leading to this revision petition, are as under: ( 2 ) SY. Nos. 10, 50/1, 50/2 and other Survey numbers referred to in the plaint para 2 situate in Belgaum Taluk in Belgaum District were the properties belonging to the joint family of shrinivas Nadagouda. The said properties came under the management of the State of Karnataka for the period from 6-5-1930 to 15-7-1953. The present defendant-1 Krishnaji Chintamanrao nadagouda along with some other members of nadagouda family filed O. S. No. 231/1956 against the State of Karnataka for the accounts relating to the properties in question. A preliminary decree was passed on 28-2-1962. Thereafter the present defendant-1, Krishnaji Chintamanrao nadagouda prayed for Rs. 3,28,359-00 together with interest at 6% p. a. from 31-10-1962 and a final decree came to be passed on 23-3-1978. The present defendant-1 represented the branch of plaintiff in the said suit. According to plaintiff she has got l/4th share in the same, therefore, she filed a suit for partition of her l/4th share in the said amount which is said to be in deposit in Court. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by defendant-1 in the written statement on various grounds. One of the grounds urged in the written statement is that the Court-fee paid on the plaint is not sufficient. On the basis of the pleadings, the lower court raised seven issues for decision. Out of them, Issue No. 6 was an issue relating to the question as to whether the Court-fee paid is proper and sufficient and the same was heard as a preliminary issue. The learned Civil Judge, for the reasons recorded in his impugned order, took the view that the fixed Court-fee of Rs. 200/- paid on the plaint is not sufficient, since in his view the Court-fee is required to be paid under section 35 (1) of the Act. The learned Civil Judge, for the reasons recorded in his impugned order, took the view that the fixed Court-fee of Rs. 200/- paid on the plaint is not sufficient, since in his view the Court-fee is required to be paid under section 35 (1) of the Act. He, therefore, by the said order directed the plaintiff to pay the deficit court-fee on Rs. 1,79,952-90 ps. Hence, the instant revision petition by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) 1 have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties to this revision including the high Court Government Advocate. ( 5 ) A preliminary point is raised in this revision by Sri S. K. Joshi, learned counsel for some of the respondents in this revision petition, he raised a contention that the instant revision is not revisable. He has relied on the decision of this Court is S. Mohammed Omer v Saran Bi and Others, 1974 (1) Kar. L. J. 27. In the said case, on the objection raised by defendant-7 on the question of Court-fee the Court on a preliminary issue, upheld the objection raised by defendant- 7, by ordering the plaintiff to pay additional court-fee. When the matter came up in revision by the plaintiff, this Court has observed as under:"2. Several contentions were raised by Sri bhagawan, learned counsel for the petitioner. I do not think it is necessary to go into the merits of those contentions because the plaintiff has got an adequate remedy provided under sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act, to challenge the order of the lower Court in an appeal against the final disposal of the suit. When such question is raised, the appellate Court would be competent to consider the correctness of any order passed by the lower Court affecting the court-fee payable on the plaint. This is not one of those cases where on payment of additional Court-fee, the trial court wouldlose its jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 3. I therefore decline to interfere at this stage. Revision petition is dismissed. " ( 6 ) PRESSING into service the afore said decision the learned Advocate, Sri S. K. Joshi, contended that the revision petition is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on this count alone. The learned Government Advocate supported the submission made by Sri S. K. Joshi, learned Advocate for some of the respondents. Revision petition is dismissed. " ( 6 ) PRESSING into service the afore said decision the learned Advocate, Sri S. K. Joshi, contended that the revision petition is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on this count alone. The learned Government Advocate supported the submission made by Sri S. K. Joshi, learned Advocate for some of the respondents. ( 7 ) SRI S. Vijayashankar, learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, contended that the observation made by this Court in the said case, cannot be construed as laying down the proposition that a revision petition is not at all maintainable against an order relating to the question of payment of Court-fees. He has relied on a host of judicial decisions to contend that a revision petition in a situation like the one in hand is maintainable. ( 8 ) AT this juncture, it is indeed necessary to notice that the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in S. Mohammad Omer's case, was a decision rendered by this Court before the provisions of Section 115, CPC were amended by the Amendment Act, 1976. It is significant to note here that an explanation is added apart from the proviso to Section 115, CPC by the said amendment. It would be indeed in fitness of things to cull out the provisions of Section 115, CPC as it stands after the Amendment Act, 1976. Section 115, CPC reads as under:"section 115. It is significant to note here that an explanation is added apart from the proviso to Section 115, CPC by the said amendment. It would be indeed in fitness of things to cull out the provisions of Section 115, CPC as it stands after the Amendment Act, 1976. Section 115, CPC reads as under:"section 115. Revision - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, very or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where- (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or revers'e any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the high Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Explanation - In this section the expression 'any case which has been decided' includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. " ( 9 ) IT is necessary to notice here that a lot of controversy was prevailing on the question as to the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided," employed in Section 115 (1), cpc. This controversy has been set at rest by adding an explanation to the effect that the said expression includes any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings. This controversy has been set at rest by adding an explanation to the effect that the said expression includes any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings. In fact, the interpretation of this explanation came up for consideration before a division Bench of this Court in Vijaya Bank employees Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. v c. Srinivasa Raju, ILR 1990 Kar. 2451. ( 10 ) IN the said case, this Court among other things, has observed as under: "13. The conditions or the restrictions imposed on the power of revision exercissable under Section 115 of the C. P. Code by a High Court can be stated thus:1) No revision lies to High Court against a decree or order passed by a subordinate court whether it decides the whole or part of the case, if an appeal lies against such decree or order either to High Court or to any Court subordinate to High Court. 2) A revisional power can be exercised against any decree or order passed by a court subordinate to High Court if such a decree or order is not appealable and such decree or order is passed by a Court subordinate to High Court; and in passing such order or decree, a) it has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law; or c) has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 3) Any order made by a Court subordinate to High Court including an order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding, cannot be revised unless such an order or decision satisfies any one of the following further two conditions: (i) If such an order had been made in favour of the revision petitioner the suit or other proceeding would have been finally disposed of; or (ii) if such an order is allowed to stand, it would likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made. Thus the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised against an order or decree passed by a Court subordinate to High Court, whether it be of interlocutory nature or has finally decided the suit or proceeding whether in part or in its entirety, provided further that it satisfies the conditions referred to above, as the case may be. We shall not be understood as laying down the proposition that every interlocutory order passed in a suit or proceeding is revisable or a Revision Petition can be maintained. This aspect will be considered a little later. Whether an order passed by a subordinate court amounts to a 'case decided' or not had been the subject matter of discussion by the various High Courts and it led to several conflicting decisions also. It also added to prolongation of proceeding before the Court below. Therefore, the Law commission of India in its 54th Report went to the extent of recommending for deletion of section 115, C. P. C. itself. The Law commission was of the view that adequate remedy is provided for in Article 227 of the constitution to correct cases of excess of jurisdiction or non-exercise of jurisdiction or illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction; so, Section 115 is no longer necessary to be retained. However, the Joint Committee of the Parliament did not agree with the Law Commission. The Joint Committee of the Parliament observed thus:"the Committee, however, feel that the remedy provided by Article 227 of the constitution is likely to cause more delay and involve more expenditure. The remedy provided in Section 115 is on the other hand, cheap and easy. The Committee, therefore, feel that Section 115 altogether omitteed particularly on the ground that an alternative remedy is available under Article 227 of the Constitution. "the Joint Committee therefore recommended for additions to the restrictions contained in Section 115. Consequently, the original Section 115 came to be numbered as sub-section (1) and a new proviso to sub-section (1) and a new sub-section (2) and an Explanation thereto came to be added by Central Act 104 of 1976. The explanation was specifically added to define the expression 'case decided' in order to avoid controversy and lengthy arguments being advanced as to what is meant by 'case decided'. The explanation was specifically added to define the expression 'case decided' in order to avoid controversy and lengthy arguments being advanced as to what is meant by 'case decided'. The expression 'any case which has been decided' was explained to remove the doubt and to set at rest the controversy as to whether Section 115 applies to an interlocutory order. Thus by reason of addition of the Explanation to Section 115 of the C. P. Code, it cannot now be doubted nor any arguments can be entertained whether an interlocutory order or any order passed during the course of a suit or proceeding would amount to a base decided', as long as the order affects some right or obligation of the parties in controversy in a suit or proceeding. In this connection, it may also be relevant to notice a decision of the Supreme Court in baldevdas Shivalal and Another v Filmistan distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, AIR 1970 SC 406 . Though this decision was rendered prior to the amendment of Section 115 by Central Act 104 of 1976, it still governs the question as to whether it is every interlocutory order passed in a suit or proceeding is revisable or it is only such interlocutory order passed in a suit or proceeding affecting some right or obligation of the parties to a suit, in controversy. In the above decision, the Supreme Court also took note of its earlier decision in major S. S. Khanna v Brig. FJ. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 and held that the expression 'case' was not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in action. The relevant portion of the Judgment is as follows:"10. It may also be observed that by ordering that a question may properly be put to a witness who was being examined, no case was decided by trial Court. The expression 'case' is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action. This Court observed in Major S. S. Khanna v Brig. FJ. Dillon, (1964)4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497 that the expression 'case' is a word of comprehensive import; it includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 of the code to the entirety of the proceeding in a Civil Court. This Court observed in Major S. S. Khanna v Brig. FJ. Dillon, (1964)4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497 that the expression 'case' is a word of comprehensive import; it includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 of the code to the entirety of the proceeding in a Civil Court. To interpret the expression 'case' as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. But it was not decided in Major S. S. Khanna's case, (1964)4 SCR 449: AIR 1964 sc 497 (supra) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. "in the context of the observation made by this court in the aforesaid case, with reference to the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided" it is clear that the observation made by this Court in S. Mohammed Omer's case, would not apply to the facts of the instant case at all. In the context of the explanation to Section 115, CPC as interpreted by the Division Bench of this Court, it is clear that a revision petition would be maintainable if the order under revision would amount to a 'case decided', provided, of course, the petitioner further satisfies anyone of the conditions referred to in the proviso to section 115, CPC. The conditions required to be proved [clauses (a) and (b) in the proviso] are already culled out hereinabove. It is seen that if the petitioner is in a position to establish that the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury, the revision petition would be sustainable. The conditions required to be proved [clauses (a) and (b) in the proviso] are already culled out hereinabove. It is seen that if the petitioner is in a position to establish that the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury, the revision petition would be sustainable. At this juncture, it is necessary to remember that an order demanding improper Court-fee, if unfavourable to the plaintiff, is equivalent to telling the plaintiff that the Court will not proceed with the trial although the plaintiff has in fact, paid the proper Court-fee. In that context, it would therefore be a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, the same of course cannot be said if such an order is favourable to the plaintiff though it may cause detriment to the revenue, but does not prejudice the defendant. It is exactly for this reason that the Supreme Court in the decision in rathnavarmaraja v Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 has held that if a question of Court-fee on a plaint is decided against the defendant, he cannot have any grievance and that therefore he has no right of revision. It is also not possible to say in such a situation that there is any failure of justice or irreparable injury to the defendant. It is also necessary to note here that in the decision in visvarama Hotels Ltd. v Anjuman-E-Imamia and others, 1984 (2) Kar. LJ. 185, this Court has held that the defendant cannot challenge the determination of Court-fee made by the trial Court. From what is stated hereinabove, it is crystal clear that when a question relating to the Court-fee is decided against a plaintiff, the same would in a way amount to refusal to exercise jurisdiction, since as stated earlier, the same would amount to telling the plaintiff that the Court will not proceed with the trial unless the plaintiff pays the additional fee. Further the decision on the question would also amount to "a case which has been decided". Further if the Court-fee demanded by the plaintiff is not paid by him the suit will be dismissed and as such he will be put to irreparable injury and it will also occasion failure of justice. Under these circumstances, it is clear that a revision petition would be maintainable in such a situation. Further if the Court-fee demanded by the plaintiff is not paid by him the suit will be dismissed and as such he will be put to irreparable injury and it will also occasion failure of justice. Under these circumstances, it is clear that a revision petition would be maintainable in such a situation. The decision of this court in S. Mohammed Omer's case and rendered next before the amendment to Section 115, CPC is brought into being would not apply to such a situation at all. The said decision is therefore not of any assistance to the respondents to contend that the revision petition is not maintainable. Sri Vijayashankar, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in Ganesh Lal v Narain Lal and Others, AIR 1958 patna 486; the decision in V. S. Thiruvengadas wami Mudaliar v State of Madras and Others, AIR 1959 Madras 155; the decision in Mohd. Ajmal v Firm Indian Chemical Co. and Others, AIR 1978 all. 21 ; and the decision in Krishan Kumar Grover vsmt. Parmeshri Devi and Others, AIR 1967 punjab 389 to contend that a revision petition is maintainable. Having regard to the decision of the supreme Court alluded to earlier and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in vijaya Bank Employees Housing Co-operative society Ltd. 's case, in the context of the amended provisions to Section 115, CPC, it is not necessary to go into the details of these decisions pressed into service by Sri Vijayashankar. This Court has no hesitation whatsoever in holding that the revision petition is maintainable. ( 11 ) IF that be so, it will have to be next seen as to whether the order under revision is legal and proper. It is seen that the trial Court has taken the view that the provisions of Section 35 (1) of the Act would apply and that therefore, plaintiff is required to pay the Court-fee on Rs. 1,79,952-90 ps. At this juncture, it would be useful to cull out the provisions of Section 35 of the act. It reads as under: "35. It is seen that the trial Court has taken the view that the provisions of Section 35 (1) of the Act would apply and that therefore, plaintiff is required to pay the Court-fee on Rs. 1,79,952-90 ps. At this juncture, it would be useful to cull out the provisions of Section 35 of the act. It reads as under: "35. Partition suits - (1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff whose title to such property is denied, or who has been excluded from possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiff's share. (2) In a suit for partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property, fee shall be paid, at the following rates:- rupees fifteen if the value of plaintiffs share is Rs. 3,000 or less; rupees thirty if the value is above rs. 3,000 but not more than Rs. 5,000. Rupees one hundred if the value is above rs. 5,000 but below Rs. 10,000 and rupees two hundred if the value is rs. 10,000 and above. (3) Where, in a suit falling under sub-section (2), a defendant claims partition and separate possession of his share of the property, fee shall be payable on his written statement computed on half the market value of his share or at half the rates specified in sub-section (2), according as such defendant has been excluded from possession or is in joint possession. (4) Where, in a suit falling under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the plaintiff or the defendant seeks cancellation of decree or other document of the nature specified in section 38 separate fee shall be payable on the relief of cancellation in the manner specified in that section. " ( 12 ) BEFORE Section 35 (1) of the Act is attracted to a case it should be a suit for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or it should be a property owned jointly or in common by the plaintiff. Further the title to such property should be denied or he should be excluded from possession of such property. Further the title to such property should be denied or he should be excluded from possession of such property. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 would operate in a case where the suit is for partition and separate possession of joint family property or property owned, jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who is in joint possession of such property. The question as to which of the two sub-sections in a given case would apply would depend upon the ingredients flowing from the allegations made in the plaint. It is well settled that the criterion for assessment of Court-fee is the allegation made in the plaint. In this connection, the decision in m. Nagendriah vm. Ramachandriah andanother, air 1953 Mysore 108 and the decision in karibasappa v Jademallappa and Others, AIR 1955 Mys. 140 would be relevant for consideration. In Nagendriah's case, the Mysore High court, among other things, has pointed out that where a co-owner, co-sharer or co-tenant alleges that he is in joint possession of the property in suit and wants his share to be separated and put into his possession a fixed Court-fee under article 17 (iii) (Court-fees Act, 1870) is sufficient. It is further pointed out that even if he is in possession constructively, if not actually, a fixed court-fee would be sufficient. Similarly, in karibasappa's case, it is pointed that the question whether the plaintiff is in possession of the joint family properties constructively or otherwise for the purpose of levying Court-fee should be determined on the allegations made in the plaint. It is further pointed out therein that merely because the defendants deny that the plaintiff was in joint possession of the suit schedule properties, the nature of the suit is not altered. Further in the decision in T. K. Srinivasamurthy and Others v T. Seetharamaiah and Others, AIR 1990 Karnataka 149 it is held that to apply Section 35 (1) there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that plaintiff has been excluded from joint possession and an averment that plaintiff could not remain in joint possession would not amount to exclusion from joint possession. In order to come under the provision requiring fixed fee, the plaint must generally contain an allegation that the plaintiff is in joint possession of the properties actual or constructive. In order to come under the provision requiring fixed fee, the plaint must generally contain an allegation that the plaintiff is in joint possession of the properties actual or constructive. It is also necessary to remember that this should not be a formal allegation made merely for the sake of Court-fee. The allegations should be read as a whole without being guided only by the allegations in the valuation paragraph of the plaint made solely for the purpose of Court-fee. In sum, the criterion for assessment of Court-fee is the sum total f the allegations made in the plaint. The question as to whether the Court-fee in the instant case is payable by the plaintiff under Section 35 (1) of the Act or under Section 35 (2) of the Act will have to be determined from the aforesaid perspective. ( 13 ) FROM the certified copy of the plaint which is made available to this Court at the time of argument, it is seen that in para-2 of the plaint the plaintiff has alleged that the propositus of the family of the plaintiff and defendants was one sri Shivaji. In para-3 of the plaint, the joint family properties which were under the management of the State of Karnataka are referred to. In para-4 of the plaint, among other things, it is stated that the present defendant-1 represented the branch of plaintiff and defendants-1 to 3 and 10 to 17 in D. F. O. S. No. 231/56 and as such he has received and is holding the income and interest on behalf of the said branch. In para-6 of the plaint an agreement dated 1-8-1975 between the father of defendants-4 to 9 and defendant-1 is referred to and is stated that the same is not binding on the plaintiff as he was not a party to the said agreement. In para-7 of the plaint, among other things, it is stated that plaintiff has already received Rs. 65,000/- on 17-3-1979 from defendant-1. In para-8 of the plaint it is stated that the cause of action arose in the last week (presumably next before the suit was filed) since defendant-1 has declined to give the share of the plaintiff. In para-7 of the plaint, among other things, it is stated that plaintiff has already received Rs. 65,000/- on 17-3-1979 from defendant-1. In para-8 of the plaint it is stated that the cause of action arose in the last week (presumably next before the suit was filed) since defendant-1 has declined to give the share of the plaintiff. It is also stated that O. S. No. 4/1979 which has been filed by the father of defendants-4 to 9 and defendant-10 has come up for hearing and that the said suit is one for declaration. It is also stated that this suit (suit filed by the plaintiff) is for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff to the income and interest accrued therefrom to the suit land. On these allegations, plaintiff has made the following prayer:"it is therefore prayed that setting aside all the contentions of the defendants, a decree may be passed for- " (a) Awarding l/4th share of the income of the suit lands awarded in D. F. O. S. No. 231/56 to the Branch of plaintiff and interest accrued thereon with future interest at 6% p. a. ; (b) Awarding full costs of this suit to the plaintiff; (c) Permission to amend the plaint may kindly be granted to the plaintiff as and when necessary; (d) Awarding any other reliefs for which the plaintiff is found entitled to," ( 14 ) SRI S. K. Joshi, learned counsel for some of the respondents contended that in a similar, case this Court has held that the Court-fee ad valorem is to be paid and directed the plaintiff in the said suit to pay Court-fee on rs. 1,79,95290 ps. In this connection, he has relied upon the decision of this Court in CRP No. 261/1986. The said revision arose out of O. S. No. 4/1979. In the said case this Court has observed as under in para-4 therein:"4. Perusal of the plaint averments will disclose that the plaintiffs were not claiming any share in the amount lying in deposit, but they based their claim on an agreement entered into by them with defendant No. 1 as stated in para-7 of the plaint. Further, the relief sought for made it clear that the declaration that they are entitled to receive the amount of Rs. 1,79,952-90 out of the amount lying in deposit. Further, the relief sought for made it clear that the declaration that they are entitled to receive the amount of Rs. 1,79,952-90 out of the amount lying in deposit. Therefore, the proper way to value the suit is by paying court-fee ad valorem on the amount sought to be recovered. In that view of the matter i find no infirmity in the conclusions reached by the learned Civil Judge. " ( 15 ) RELYING on the aforesaid observation, itis contended by Sri S. K. Joshi that the same logic would apply here also and that a similar decision will have to follow. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the said observation has no application to the facts of the instant case since in the said case, the plaintiffs have filed the suit on the basis of an agreement and that they have also prayed for a declaration of their title with reference to their suit property. It is further contended that the said suit also cannot be construed as a suit for partition. ( 16 ) THE observation made by this Court in CRP No. 261/1986 and culled out hereinabove would go to show that the learned single Judge of this Court has specifically held that in the said suit the plaintiffs have not claimed any share in the amount lying in deposit and on the other hand they have put in claim on the basis of an agreement entered into by them with defendant-1 as stated in para-7 of the plaint in the said suit. It is therefor, clear that the nature of the relief claimed there in the said suit and the nature of the relief claimed in the suit out of which the present revision petition has arisen are quite different. In that view of the matter, the submission made by Sri S. K. Joshi that the logic of the decision of the learned single Judge in CRP No. 261/1986 would automatically hold good to this case also, is not correct. This Court is required to take a correct decision on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint in this case. As pointed out earlier, the suit in question is a suit for partition of plaintiffs 1/4th share. There should not be any difficulty or doubt in so far as this aspect is concerned. This Court is required to take a correct decision on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint in this case. As pointed out earlier, the suit in question is a suit for partition of plaintiffs 1/4th share. There should not be any difficulty or doubt in so far as this aspect is concerned. In fact, that is also the finding of the trial Court. The trial Court after having taken the view that this is a suit for partition has proceeded to hold further that the suit would lie within the compass 6f Section 35 (1) of the Act and that therefore, the Court-fee is required to be paid on the entire sum referred to in the operative portion of the order of the trial court. Sri S. K. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent's contended that this suit is not a suit for general partition. In my opinion, the precise question for consideration of the Court is as to whether the suit is for a partition of the joint family property for that the materials required to be perused are the materials alleged in the plaint. The materials alleged in the plaint would indeed indicate an assertion of the part of the plaintiff that the property (which has crystalised into money) was a joint family property and the final decree was obtained by the instant defendant-1 who was the plaintiff in the said suit and the said money is held by the 1st defendant not only for himself but also on behalf of the plaintiff's branch. In para-4 of the plaint, among other things, it is asserted as under:"defendant-1 represented the branch of plaintiff and defendants-1 to 3 and 10 to 17 in D. F. O. S. No. 231/56 and as such he has received and is holding the income and interest on behalf of the said branch. "it is therefore clear that the assertion is to the effect that the allegations in substance would mean that the said amount represents the joint family fund and defendant-1 hold the same on behalf of the plaintiffs branch also. I hasten to add here even at the risk of repetition that the contentions raised in the written statement of defendant-1 denying the same are not relevant. The denial of title referred to in Section 35 (1) of the Act should be the denial of title as disclosed the plaint. I hasten to add here even at the risk of repetition that the contentions raised in the written statement of defendant-1 denying the same are not relevant. The denial of title referred to in Section 35 (1) of the Act should be the denial of title as disclosed the plaint. However, there is nothing to indicate in the plaint that defendant-1 has denied the title of the plaintiff with reference to the money in question; on the other hand, there is a clear averment that amount of Rs. 65,000/- has already been paid. It is therefore clear that once when the plaintiff has asserted that defendant-1 is holding the money on behalf of the plaintiffs branch also, it would amount to a clear assertion that plaintiff and defendant-1 arc in joint possession which may be either actual or constructive. The fact that the amount is in deposit in court also would not make any difference to this aspect since the Court is only a custodian of the amount. Thus it is seen that the suit in question is a suit for partition and plaintiffs possession of the share in the amount, it is also a suit for joint family 'property', it is also a suit on the allegation that it is jointly owned. It is further clear that the totality of the allegations made in the plaint would indicate an allegation that they i. e. , both plaintiff and defendant-1 are in joint possession of the same, might be that the same is constructive. If these aspects are taken into consideration, it is clear that the suit of the plaintiff would squarely fall within the purview of Section 35 (2) of the Act for the purpose of payment of court-fee. For the reasons stated hereinabove, it would follow that the order under revision is liable to be set aside. ( 17 ) IN the result, the revision petition is allowed, the order dated 10-7-1986 in O. S. No. 32/1981 passed by the I Additional Civil Judge, belgaum on Issue No. 6 is hereby set aside. It is ordered that the Court-fee already paid by the plaintiff - revision petitioner is sufficient. ( 18 ) IN the facts and circumstances of thecase, I direct both the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .